dan/california

Yeah, people forget that the advent of cheap, powerful and energy efficient computing is upon us. This is what enables quadcopters to fly, cell phones to do all sorts of fancy image processing, etc.
Whenever someone questions cheap precision, I gotta wonder if they’ve ever touched a smartphone in the last decade.

This is a hack to survive the current cycle. For the specific conditions the Russians face- numerically inferior enemy with lots of FPVs with small warheads, and lots of Russian meat and ****ty old armor- this works fine.

I question stats like this.  The paper uses Jack Walting out of RUSSI, who are a pretty good bunch, but the ref in the paper is not a citation, it basically says "Jack said so".  So when was this in the war?  Excalibur rounds come with inertial guidance for just this reason - GPS jamming.  We know there have been continual upgrades and revisions to deal with the EW environment.  Are these rounds at 7% now?  Where did Jack get this number?
We know EW will remain a thing, but autonomy is the offset and it is accelerating.  The Excalibur round started development in the 90s and has been on the battlefield for nearly 20 years:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/M982_Excalibur
We need to really remember that a lot of the miltech we are seeing is actually one or two generations old. So this makes predictions even harder.  We do not know what is out there with respect to PGM and counters, nor what is on drawing boards.  My sense within the business is that cheap precise is accelerating, while the very expensive counters are behind the curve, but time will tell.

First off, we know that the UA has more than "just FPVs".  Even though supplies and ammunition of some natures, some critical were low, the entire UA did not run out of ATGMs, AT systems, landmines, direct fires and indirect fires.  Ukraine clearly does have weaponry to destroy "sheds-on-tracks" because we just saw video of exactly that.
What I did not see was a successful infantry assault, nor can a tank or IFV boxed in by a metal shed effectively provide fires support to infantry...because the entire freakin turret is in a giant box!  Russians have been stupid in the past, this entire bloody war is a monument to stupidity, but even if they are being clever now, this is desperate clever.  They are eroding expensive military capability on their own...Ukraine doesn't even need to do it for them.  They are doing so in the hope they can somehow take 100m at a time.  Which, btw is fine, so long as each 100m costs them 3-4 AFVs and platoon of infantry.  By the map it is 21km to Pokrovsk and 32 kms to Kostyantynivka, which are the closest things to actual operational objectives (immediate objectives mind you).  At this burn rate Russia will lose 6300 troops and 630 AFVs to get to Pokrovsk alone.  That is an entire Bde+.  And here is the the thing...they are not even advancing that quickly.  Their burn rate is actually much higher.
And here is another thing...if they can take Pokrovsk...they still have 236 kms to Poltava.  Which as a minimum is what they are going to need to do to cut the UA line in half and truly threaten it and Kharkiv - assuming they can somehow make a drive/link up with Sumy.
The problem we are having on this forum right now is the exact opposite of what all the experts had at the beginning of the war.  They were all looking macro and ignoring micro, we were not and saw things they missed.  Now we are all looking micro and extrapolating it up wildly to macro.  A few sheds on Russian tanks is not a sign that Russia has somehow solved for FPVs and now can make a Costco-garage-drive to freakin Kyiv.  It is a sign that they are running out of ideas, not cracking the code with some sort of mystic Russian military prowess. 

Ok, let’s think about this for a minute.  Anyone who has played CM knows that a tank needs to do three things to be effective - move, target and shoot.  These giant sheds basically erode all three of those.  They can still move but I am pretty sure with some serious impacts as drivers situational awareness is worse and the fact they have a giant metal box on their tank is going to impact mobility.  Targeting must be a joke.  They cannot swing the gun sights and can only see a narrow window out the front. Situation awareness in that garden shed must be the worst. They are likely blasting nearly blind.  And finally shooting.  What sort of gunnery are they accomplishing with a giant box over top them?  They cannot move the turret more than a few degrees to the front, so they have basically become a mobile field gun….in a big metal box.
What these sorts of developments tell us is that the RA is more afraid of drones than they are of anything else, to the point that they are willing to drastically reduce the effectiveness of armor.  The fact they have to put garden sheds on their tanks is already a tactical victory.  It demonstrates just how far things have gone. They do not “work” beyond keeping whatever these vehicles have become alive for a few more minutes and raising the number of FPVs it takes to kill them. 

So this post and the one above it are what we like to call “losing the bubble”.  You have let your passion for Ukraine cloud objective strategic thinking to the point that you are proposing a denial of reality to insert one of your own that matches that passion.  In blunt terms, if you were on my staff I would be thinking you need a vacation and maybe a posting away for awhile.
1.  We cannot simply discount/avoid/wave away the risks of a full on Russian political and social collapse.  First off it is not “impossible” or even improbable given we have a rigid autocratic political mechanism that has been under significant strain for some time now.  Russia has collapsed in the past (twice in the past century and a bit) and can do so again.  
2.  The consequences of a Russian collapse cannot simply be waived away either.  At best we get a stable regime quickly grabbing power so that the centralized control apparatus stays in place.  That regime will need to 1) have clean enough hands to do an honest deal with, and 2) be supportive in stopping this war.  That is a tall order. Follow on scenarios of a Russian collapse and its impacts get worse from there and we have gone into them many times.  You are essentially so gripped with the Ukrainian cause that you have simply stated “ignore them” with neither proof or logic on why to do so beyond “well it hasn’t happened yet, so it will never happen”.
3.  By your metrics Ukrainian security is not guaranteed outside of a full Russian collapse and regime change.  Nothing would stop Russia from lobbing missiles even if it was forced back to 2014 lines.  So we are back to “we need a full Russian collapse to ‘win’ but ignore the consequences of that collapse because = ‘love Ukraine’.” That makes no sense nor does it address the scenarios where a collapsed Russia poses as greater risk to Ukraine than what they are dealing with now. 
4.  There are plenty examples of frozen conflict where an enduring peace and security were guaranteed: Korea, Cyprus and Former Yugoslavia, to name a few.  Like Israel right now, there is always risk of reemergence of warfare but we can manage that.  So immediately writing off any and all other peace scenarios is not only extremist narrative, it is dangerously reductive thinking.  This is not how high levels of diplomacy, defence and security or economics think about the world, it is how college students on a campus do.
5.  Your position and thesis essentially start with a conclusion and then build a logic model theory of success that only supports that conclusion.  Ukraine must have total victory, all other outcomes are defeats.  Further the West must support Ukraine in this venture to the point that it will risk the total political and social collapse of a nuclear power.  We are to sidestep all that risk for Ukraine.  What happens if we get to 2014 lines and Russia does not quit?  Do we need to go into Russia proper?  This nearly happened in Korea/China in 1950, this was how MacArther talked himself into nuclear weapons and a massive Chinese reaction.
6. We all support Ukraine and want a victory here.  But..and you really need to sit down and think about this…Ukraine is damned important, but it is not that important.  We are not going to start WW3 over Ukraine - even as we skirt around it.  We would be talking hundreds of millions of deaths, even if the thing stayed conventional.  We have 8 billion people on this planet and keeping them all alive takes a lot of energy and resources.  We built a highly complex and integrated system to keep the whole dance going.  One war breaks out between Ukraine and Russia and we already have people starving to death in Africa. Imagine a full on conflagration that drags in NATO. Iran and possibly China.  I am sorry but we could easily go with plan A, which was likely the plan on 24 Feb 22: continue to support Ukrainian resistance, fall back to NATO lines, drop a new Iron Curtain, and fund the hell out of NATO - in fact there are likely big winners in this scenario who know it.  We won the First Cold War, we can take our chances on a Second.
So, no, total 2014 lines are not the only victory in this war by a long shot.  In fact those territorial lines might not even mean victory if they were attainable.  We are very likely looking at a stop line, like in 2014, somewhere in the middle.  Then we will get some sort of shaky ceasefire that we will need to exploit, quickly.  We need to set the conditions to strategically deny Ukraine from Russia.  We know Russia can be deterred, this is why we do not have deep strikes into Poland happening.  We will need to move that deterrence line.  We will likely have to pound Russia until it drops its ridiculous negotiating position and we can land on something more reasonable.  Whether that will take a full on collapse is unknown, we can only hope if it does that we are looking at a soft collapse of political position and not social controls within Russia.
Finally, framing the war the way you have supports Russia.  You are making this war nearly unwinnable via these maximalist rhetoric.  As such, a reader of this thread could easily walk away agreeing with you but arriving at a very different conclusion - unwinnable war = GTFO, because we have already seen this movie twice in the last 20 years.  Which is exactly what Russia wants.
You have narrowed down the acceptable narrative only to those ardent extremist viewpoints that agree with you.  By leaving no middle ground you violate a core component of war: negotiation.  There is no negotiation in your position and that immediately sets off warning bells.  We hear this everyday now coming from all sorts of corners over so many issues.  I vehemently disagree with your analysis, narrative and conclusions based on this fact alone.

Lifting of these restrictions, while in themselves eggregious examples of political stupidity and well deserving to be scrapped ASAP, is not going to help much. The Ukraine is now waging a very conventional war (possibly paradigm-shattering drones excepted, but we are not there yet) with a very big country capable of sustaining a big army. It will not create a strategic bombing campaign via drones and ATACMS able to destroy Russian warmaking capability. This is an expensive way to wage war, and UKR will not get the funding for this. 
What they need is very simple, but they need a lot of it with guaranteed delivery without limitation in time. Artillery munitions (they cannot manufacture locally); SAM munitions;  funding for drone production, better still outsourcing the production itself to  the sanctuary countries (PL, Romania; in the future maybe Slovakia again); SPGs; HIMARS or equivalents; long- and mid-range SAM's; ECM/ECCM land-based equipment; ATACMS; some tanks, in numbers to replace losses; IFVs, in higher numbers than tanks; APCs more than tanks and IFVs; some ATGMs; small arms munitions; trucks and logistic vehicles; finally (and I have been convinced of this by the recent Russian successes with glide bombs) some fighter aircraft, with the understanding that they will all be shot down at some point. Also, the UKR need to have their stuff in order and find a way of mobilising soldiers for war, Zelenski's chances for reelection be damned.
The only theory of victory in this war that I can see is exactly the same as could be formulated in every conventional war  with a very big country capable of sustaining a big army, provided that the war has not been resolved via a France 1940 type offensive or a Nomonhan 1939 type counteroffensive in the first months: invest all resources you can and try to hang on in the war longer than the other guy, while always keeping an eye out for a potential technical paradigm shattering solution (Project Manhattan) or a potential opportunity to asymmetrically hamstring his economy (ref. bombing of ball bearing and synthetic fuel factories 1944).
Or, as the Duke of Wellington put it: "Hard pounding this, gentlemen. Let's see who pounds the longest"

As for why espouse the rhetoric of "total victory" by the West, well for one thing, aside from that brief stalling period, Russian peace demands and signalling has been maximal. No reason for the West to concede ground. As far as I'm aware of, we have terms from Russia being: the removal of the current Ukrainian government, the annexation of 4 regions into Russia, the blocking of Ukraine into NATO or EU, the demobilization of the Ukrainian military, the formalization of Russian sovereignty over Crimea. At least. There's that drunken idiot thinking of Odesa. Idiot or not, Russian rhetoric remains maximal.
There is no reason to speak rhetorically of anything less than the restoration of full Ukrainian territorial sovereignty over its 1991 borders and the intent of Western aid to support such goals. There is no reason to speak cautiously regarding Western weapons being used inside Russia as they end UN arms embargoes on North Korea and Iran and fire from Russia into all of Ukraine.
No reason to be cautious in rhetoric as Russian jamming affects the Eastern flank of NATO.

A frozen front line without a ceasefire is not a win for Ukraine or the West. A situation that presumably allows Russia to missile strike and drone attack into Ukraine's cities is one that will result in Ukraine's slow bleed out thru civilian morale collapse. I assume that a situation without ceasefire being agreed means ukraine is unable to threaten Russia with enough retaliation to bring Russia away from contently lobbing missiles. Mind you pre-2022 ceasefire and negotiations were in much different contexts than today. We have no idea what Russia's breaking point to begin negotiations to formalize a freeze is and not a form of surrender or Western loss.
It is therefore essential to define win in terms of a maximal, seeking quick as possible goal, in order to best pressure Russia towards peace, to best prep western governments to aspire and support Ukraine with maximum aid and long term awareness of potential Russian renewal. (Things like arguing over ammo procurement should have never become a issue to the result now where the West looks weak as hell as Russia makes gains and can argue it can make strategic gains eventually, if our goal is to stop the war, anything that allows Russia to convince itself it can win is a failure)(lack of urgency is a failure)
The slow drip of aid, the reactive position of the West to Russia, is a failure. At every step, Russia has escalated, has increased its capabilities, has continued to bet that it can exhaust the West. Instead of providing offramps, Russia sees it as Western weakness to take advantage of.
The fear of Russian collapse, which characterized many foreign policy doves including Jake Sullivan in the Biden administration has resulted in the measures Russia has taken advantage of. It's necessary to no longer concern with Russian collapse (which I don't think has ever been a possibility in hindsight, if you forgot, at every step of escalation Russia has sought to warn of Russian collapse (I include nuclear weapons use as a collapse scenario, as only a hard pressed Russia would want to open Pandora's box) and right now it looks like Russia was stalling (obviously). If anything we need, the West needs to concern itself with Ukrainian collapse and to operate accordingly to prevent it. Accordingly, we must signal to Russia that it's maximal goal is impossible. Certainly the present situation indicates Russia still looks for its maximal goal. Holding up aid for months is certainly not helping the mindset of a dictator who started the full scale invasion in the delusion it would succeed quickly and painlessly.
What does disregarding Russia's potential collapse mean in reality? Well for one thing, the restrictions on Western weapons use in Russia, Germany acting oh so scared of hurting Russian land with a missile as cluster munitions land in Odesa and France being exceedingly selfish procuring ammo are just some behaviors that Putin may be able to take solace in.

I have no earthy idea what that was supposed to show.  I saw 5-6 gun trucks (at least one tank) make a gangsta style gun run into a town, entirely unsupported mind you.  And 2 came out, likely damaged.  They look like they ran around and shot things up at a vehicle loss of 3-4 and then drove back out.  Not sure what the point of that entire rodeo was but if it was to prove that the garden sheds that the Russian's are bolting on armor are working...well, not sold.

And we are back to "define win."  Can Ukraine retake every inch of terrain back to pre-2014 lines...woohee that is a tall order.  I think they could but we could be talking years of grinding and western support - think Vietnam.
Can they turn back recent Russian tactical gains and re-take some ground - yes.  Can they pull off another RA operational collapse...now that is the big question.  Theoretically, yes.  But since we are not even sure what it takes to do this right now it really is a crap shoot.
Ukraine can definitely freeze this thing and keep bleeding Russia white.  The West has bought itself some runway to get its act together on organizing support.  NATO and the EU really need to step up because at least until this Nov (and possibly beyond) the US may prove to be an unreliable ally.  Worst case is Trump gets in and cuts off US support and guts NATO, because...reasons.  But that is six more  months of RA bleeding.  Ukraine needs to sort out its force generation as well.  Lot moving parts.  It is really a race to see who runs out of what first - a straight up war of Exhaustion.  Unless we get a Hail Mary and the UA can pull off something really dramatic.
So solid, maybe, hopefully...we will see.  

It is such an elegant and nuanced language really….

Russian locomotives destroyed by partisans. Haven't seen that before.
Death by a thousand needles is a thing. 

Reportedly Ukrianian forces became to use almost noiseless night FPV drones. Here is UKR drone slowly follows for two Russians and despite the range is no more 15-20 m and this is a night, Russians don't hear it.
 

A credible report that Ukraine is pulling its one ~battalion of Abrams out of active combat because current combat conditions are making them ineffective and to vulnerable, especially drones. I am filing this one firmly in the tank is dead file.

Two Ukrainian servicemen 23 and 36 years old died in stabbing attack in Germany. Both have been underwenting rehabilitation course there after wounding. The murderer - 57 years old Russian was detained.
Germany still a country with most large pro-Russian community, consisting of migrants of several waves - from late Soviet Union to modern Russia. There are many conflicts between them and Ukrainain refugees. Russian community regularly conducts actions in support of Russian agression, demonstratively celebrating Russian  holidays. It's weird, when citizens lives in the country, enjoy all benefits, but hate it and wish to see Russian tanks here.   

Good news about the ATACMS already hitting S-300 and S-400 complexes....WHY THE HELL DID IT TAKE MONTHS AND MONTHS FOR THIS TO HAPPEN. This country ffs.....
Anyhow i was curious for the sourcing on the NYT reporting green light for destroying the Crimean bridge, and im not seeing specific wording mentioned for the bridge in either recent NYT articles on the delivery of ATACMS, https://www.nytimes.com/2024/04/24/us/us-ukraine-russia-missiles.html
https://www.nytimes.com/2024/04/25/us/politics/ukraine-aid-atacms.html
Only general referencing to Crimea as a whole under target, nothing specific about the bridge, the word "bridge" not even mentioned. 

I haven't seen this posted. The U.S. has purchased 81 Soviet-era aircraft (including Mig-31, Mig-29, Mig-27, SU-24) from Kazakhstan. It is likely that these aircraft will find their way to Ukraine after enhancements or as spare parts.

https://news.yahoo.com/us-buys-81-soviet-era-145127753.html

Wouldn't  Super Tucanos be perfect in the drone hunting role? I realize the IFF is a problem, but otherwise it seems like these thing would be perfect for hunting both Orlan/Zala drones, and Shaheeds.

How to make a guiding for a drone-interceptor? These drones fly too high to be spotted from the ground by unarmed eye of FPV-operator. Even the pilot of this Yak-52 was guided on the target by radio from aviation guiding and targeting post, receiving information from radar. Pilot in cabine has better orientation in the space, than FPV-operator in glasses.

And to bad news. As was posted above, Syrskyi several hours ago made a statement, UKR troops withdrew west from Berdychi. This was logical step after Russians managed to expand own Ocheretyne salient and capture neighbour Novobakhmutivka village and part of Solovyove. So, elements of 47th brigade had a risk to be outflanked and even semi-encircled. 
Video of Russian progress by DeepState map
Concerning to Ocheretyne breakthrow, in Ukrainian media is starting a scandal about inconpetence of brigade commanders and HQ high-officers. Approaches to Ocheretyne were well fortified - personnel of 52nd separate rifle battlion for about six months did own work well with support of engineers. But higher command decided to rotate this unit and moved it to more cal Lyman direction (yes, in conditions of personnel lack there is usual "rest" - to be moved not to rear, but to the sector with less intensive warfare). On their place 115th mech.brigade had to be moved. This is the same brigade, which personnel in May-June 2022 in mass was abandoning positions near Severodonetsk, cuasing collapse of defense. Despite since that time two commanders were substituted, by words of brigade servicemen, there are no any changes - it still one of worst brigades in ZSU. 
No proper combat training. Brigade HQ and battalion HQs were indiffernt to own duties. Officers mostly absolutely indiffernt to soldiers. One guy told, he have seen own battalion commander only two times and their company commander treated them like sh...t and did nothing what he had to do according field manuals. Actually in his company only deputy commander of morale&psychological support tried to tow all duties, including duties of commander and at least a little to prepare own personnel to fight. 
It's no clear infirmation  what happened - one say brigade command didn't control situation and didn't know battlefield, so lost control. Other - that because of disrupted control and timing, brigade elements hadn't time to seize all positions at once, so forward units, which seized them were just smashed by Russian attack, remaining without support. By the rumors 4th company was almost completely eliminated with KIA and MIA. Other personnel (which has low training and motivation levels with such attitude in own brigade) jsut didn't seize positions or just fled from it. During next three days brigade command tried to stop Russians already inside Ocheretyne, but their incompetence and throwing people to thoughless actions led to new casualties and complete dismoral of personnel. 
47th brigade sent some fire teams on Bradleys, but they couldn't save situation. Higher command decided in the midst of battle to move 115th brigade to the rear and substitute them on 100th mech. brigade (was formed from 100th TD brigade, so it almost hasn't armored vehicles and in real is infantry brigade). Until this substitution took place, Russians, having 3-times advantage in manpower here, expanded own salient and captured most of Ocheretyne. Though 100th brigade fihgts tough and could for some time slow down Russian advance, which threatened so far to grow in operative breakthrow.
But story with 115th brigade command didn't finished. There is a rumor that by old post-Soviet tradition (because in Soiviet army for such fails comamnder can turned out under tribunal) higher command decided "to punish" brigade commander... with promotion in the duty. If this true, this bastard will sit in OTUV HQ and maybe develop plans of operations, without understanding of situation and just drawing arrows on the map, shouting on lower commanders "Take this fu...g treeplant immediately! I don't care your artillery hasn't shells! This is an order!"
And other obvious reason of steady Russian successful advance - WE HAVE A LACK OF THEESE FU...G SHELLS! Mass US and EU shell supplies probably will feed the whole front only through two weeks or a month. Reportedly our artillery still be limited in fire capabilities. So, during this weeks you can expect news about next UKR withdrawals. 
PS. Just for notice. 115th was enough well-equipped brigade - it has BMP-1 (or some Eastern Europe produced analogs) and some M113.

The squad of 115th in M113. Right machine-gunner has Czechoslovakian UV vz.59 LMG

Perun discussing the new US aid package
 

Two days before, Russia conducted missile strike on Ukrainain power and gas-sharing system in western Ukraine. As result four thermal power plants got direct hits
Targets of Russian strikes:

And the scheme of attack:

 
Strike statistic:
9 Kh-101 - 6 shot down
8 Kalibr - 6 shot down
2 Iskander-K - 1 shot down
2 S-300 - no interceptions
4 Kh-47 Kinzhal - no interceptions
9 Kh-59/69 - 8 shot down
Total: 34 launced, 21 intercepted. Excluding ballistic ones - 28 launched, 21 intercepted. 
 

The Russians already knew that ATACMS could attack the bridge and since the bridge is officially still on Ukraine's territory they didn't need a green light from anyone. Ukraine could always attack its own territory with western weapons.
So explicitly stating the fact only does, as the_capt would say, enlarge the uncertainty space for Russia.
Btw, are those arches only decorative or are they a structural necessity for the bridge? I would imagine they are easier to hit than a pillar and easier to damage. Even something like napalm may weaken the strength of the steel enough.