Mick15

Re Gore Force According to the Official History Gore Force was constituted from Vicforce at Thala on 19/20 February. Vicforce was an ad hoc unit collected under Brigadier Dunphie and despatched from Sbiba to protect Thala and comprised : 17/21 Lancers 2 Lothian and Border Horse collectively fielding 25 Valentines and 30 Crusaders (half a dozen of the latter being close support versions with 3in howitzer) 10 Rifle Brigade minus its AT platoon and with only 40 carriers (remember that '10 Rifle Brigade' denotes a single battalion) 2/5bn Leicesters 22 x 25 pdrs at least six of which were 12 RHA 12 x 6pdr AT guns - parent unit not mentioned 12 x Bofors AA - parent unit not mentioned (parent units are most likely to be 6 Armoured Divisions divisional troops) 2 trps armoured cars from Derbyshire Yeomanry 1 trp of 8 Field Sdqdn RE Distance from Kasserine to Thala was approximately 25 miles, Dunphie was ordered to protect Thala but also conserve his forces to allow movement back to Sbiba if required. Gore Force was detached and advanced from Thala towards Kasserine after Dunphie personally inspected American positions at Kasserine on 19 Feb and concluded an axis breakthrough was "imminent". He first asked permission to reinforce the Americans - this was refused by 1st army HQ but he was allowed to advance a small force to delay any axis move from Kasserine to Thala while the majority of Vicforce was held there (Thala) and prepared defensive positions. The small force was Gore Force. Gore Force was Lt Col Gore 1 x Coy 10 Rifle Brigade 10 x Valentines of 2 Lothians 6 x 25 pdrs of 12 RHA 6 x 6 pdr AT guns Also coming under command were 3 x Grants, 5 x M10s and a "scattering" of infantry from unidentified american units scattered in the Kasserine Pass fighting. Gore Force took up position on a low undulating ridge just beyond the north end of Kasserine pass at 0400 on 20 February. By 1000 most effective resistance from American forces in the pass had ended. Axis troops 'bumped' Gore Force about midday and at 1600 a major attack was developed. Between 0900 and 1600 the American Grants, M10s 6pdrs and infantry mentioned above had joined Gore Force. I'll keep the what happened next out (as a potential spoiler) so over to your scenario - I look forward to it.

QUOTE] Actually they did have that ability at the time we are considering. French tanks had HE in 1940. As did Soviet tanks. The Germans still used the 88, and even more vulnerable guns, such as the divisional artillery guns sFH 18, lFH18 and K18, in an AT role. Needs must, or sumfink. DAK just got lucky because of the fecklessness of the recently unhorsed upper-class twits from the Cavalry who would not be able to recognise combined arms if it came and bit them in the a*se, and the utter cluelessness of the Whitehall bureaucrats, who did not send HE to the desert

Originally posted by JasonC Technically correct but a tad curt on both your parts I think and likely to strangle any other discussion at birth. Yes the 88 was used in an A/T role in Spain and Krupps were manufacturing AP ammunition for the 88 from 1937 or 38. So the Matilda was not 'the' reason that the 88 was used in the AT role but it would be wrong to give the impression there was no relationship between Matilda and 88. As with most technological and doctrinal changes many factors apply. Received wisdom is that Rommel averted potential disaster for his 7Pz div at Arras with an A/T screen including 88s. In the desert under the same commander Matilda MkIIs are stopped using 88s when an existing combined arms doctrine is further developed and evolved. This at a time when stopping Matildas is a pressing issue. There is plenty of evidence of a clear (German) awareness of the vulnerability of the 88 to HE. However at the time we are considering their opponents had no HE capability in their main tank armament (the 2pdr) and were showing a comprehensive inability to successfully marry artillery support to tank operations unless in set piece operations. DAK however possessed these few guns able to hit and damage enemy armour at prodigious ranges. Were the 88s successful against Matildas? - obviously. Did this success contribute to their continued use in this role? - of course, success is a major driving force in any developmental endeavours. Particularly when achieved against a notorious (from the axis viewpoint) adversary. Was this success (of the 88) against the vaunted Matilda the only factor involved? - Absolutely not and as Andreas and JasonC pointed out not the initial impetus either. What is interesting is debate of the reasons why the actual and 'psychological' ascendancy of the 88 remained potent so long after it usurped the Matilda as 'Queen of the Desert'. I suppose the assessment of the Middle East Command's Technical Intelligence Section (Expanded to two officers and a truck in 1941) that 88s could not penetrate the armour of a Matilda at ranges above 440 yards did not help. It must have impressed the crews of the RAC. Uses for this bit of paperwork 'Up the Blue'?

I have only just read this thread and felt like chipping in. Originally posted by arax3 Probably no different - As already pointed out in this thread Rommel could not assemble the supplies he required for the forces actually at his disposal. We should not forget that the most significant problem for the axis forces in the Western Desert was logistical. All Rommel's supplies had to come across the med avoiding the surface and submarine elements of a strong Royal Navy. Only the extreme western route to Tripoli had relatively secure sea lanes. Assume the 10 divisions (Italian + German) in Libya in 1942 require 10000 tons per month that is a total of 100000 tons supplies per month. These are the values based upon Von Thoma's report of 1940 quoting a requirement of 350 tons per day for a mobile infantry division. Pz divisions would require more - leg infantry less. Tripoli had capacity of 80000 tons per month but actually achieved 45-60000 tons/month. Benghazi had a capacity of 60000 tons per month but only ever managed a maximum of 30000 mostly due to the 'Benghazi mail' delivered regularly by the Wellington bombers based on the Nile delta. If Rommel held Tobruk he might, theoretically, add another 40000 tons capacity but this would be even more susceptible to interdiction from bombers based in Egypt. In fact on 8th August 1942 RAF bombing of Tobruk caused what the Italians called 'irreparable damage'. Looking at this the axis were coping with 60-70% of their supply requirement and when Rommel was at El Alamein Tobruk was over 300 miles away Benghazi over 600 and Tripoli over 1200. To put that in perspective the drive from El Alamein to Tripoli is London to Gibraltar or for our American cousins Boston to New Orleans. Drive being the operative word here. Two more Panzer divisions with very limited mobility = very limited use. Swop them for Italian divisions and the political dimension (Mussolini's ego?) becomes a difficulty. Michael Emrys posted in this thread asking why Rommel stayed at the Alamein line - look at the supply perspective as well and ask that question again. Hard to understand even with hindsight. As for the original question was Rommel a good General. Well you pay your money and you take your choice. I am, however, surprised that no 'grog' has yet pointed out that from March 1941 to Autumn 1942 there were no other prolonged land campaigns involving Italo/German and Western Allied forces. The propagandists and pressmen of London and Berlin (until Barbarossa in June '41)had little else to fill the column inches and newsreels. My Gran, renowned for her baking and not her knowledge of military history, knew the name of only one German general - guess who! I strongly suspect that as a result of this high profile she held him personally responsible for the knocking down of her sisters house in Liverpool in May '41. One other pertinent comment; Rommel was certainly outfaced and/or out planned by the Auk twice. The first time when Auchinlek relieved Cunningham on 24/25 November 1941 and then had the nerve not to be intimidated by the 'dash to the wire'. As a result Operation Crusader saw Tobruk relieved, Rommel's forces shifted from Bardia back to El Agheila and reported axis losses of 20000 Italian, 13000 German and 340 tanks compared to VIII army losses of 18000 men and 440 tanks. Local tactical successes, and debate over the relevance of equipment quality and doctrinal differences don't change this final result. The second was when the Auk relieved Ritchie in June 1942 (15th I think). Rommel's first attempt to break the Alamein line on 1 July was defeated comprehensively by VIII army elements under Auchinlek's personal command. Starting on 4 July Auchinlek then put Rommel on the defensive with tightly controlled and limited attacks against the Italians forcing Rommel to use DAK as a fire brigade. The important attack was 10 July - Rommel is quoted in the Rommel Papers as writing at this time "there could be no question of launching a large-scale attack .... I was compelled to order every last German soldier out of his tent or rest camp....the situation was beginning to take on crisis proportions". The attack of 10 July was the one which overran Seebohm's radio-intercept unit (mentioned in another thread) destroying the unit and capturing a mortally wounded Seebohm. There have been suggestions that the Auk gave the destruction of this unit to elements of the 9 Australian division as a specific objective. For the little it is worth my choice; I agree with Michael Emrys that Rommel's personal doctrine was psychological domination through the bold stroke. Unfortunately Rommel was too much of an impetuous risk taker to be classed even as one of the great tactical captains. Auchinlek now - there is a general I like to hear opinions on.

IM(unqualified)HO Counterattack to Galatas - Kiwis vs FJ Crete 25/5/41 Played 3 times 1 x Minor Victory for the Kiwis' 2 x FJ victories but all very close. No outright success - very like the horses but less costly

And a couple more very informative sites for CMAK. One young man's journey from the banks of the Mersey to and through three years of active service with the North Irish Horse (NIH}here. First hand accounts of operating in Churchills in the defence of Kzar Mezour against Kampgruppe Lang (including the Tigers of 1 Coy 501 Hvy tank bn)and in the taking of Longstop. On to action in Italy and occupation duty in Austria. Have a look at it in conjunction with the NIH war diaries available here.

Excellent - very informative. Thanks

Answering your question Artillery with 6 Armoured Div. in Tunisia in February '43 were apparently :- 12th Royal Horse Artillery 152d Field Regiment Royal Artillery 72d Antitank Regiment Royal Artillery 51st Light Antiaircraft Regiment Royal Artillery All were Divisional Troops and excepting 51st LAA Regt were with 6th Armoured Div from shortly before ordering overseas (June 1942- sailed November 1942)to occupation duties in Austria August 1945. 51 LAA Regt were replaced by 6 Heavy Support Company in November or December of 1944. Commander in Feb '43 was Major-General Keightley and the divisional flash was a white mailed fist on a black background. The Infantry brigade under the divisional HQ at this time was the 38th but they left 6th Armoured Div in mid February and were replaced by 1st (Guards) Infantry Bde in March. Hope this helps.

Originally posted by Aces-and-8s Indeed - and in the same vein : Originally posted by Michael Emrys Obviously. It's supposed to be "It's supposed to be spelt 'too'". As we have spelled 'too' before and probably will have to spell 'too' again. While kicking everything off was a little bit of tautology. Originally posted by GJK: A femur is, of course, a bone. Shooting, fish and barrels spring to mind.

Les Goumier (the 'Goums') were specifically French Morrocan irregulars although the term was sometimes used incorrectly for other North African troops. In the fourth and final battle at Cassino the Free French Expeditionary Corps (US Fifth Army) was 2d Moroccan Infantry Div 4 RTM (Regiment de Tirailleurs Marocains) 5 RTM 8 RTM 3d Algerian Infantry Division 3 RTA (Regiment de Tirailleurs Algeriens) 7 RTA 4 RTT (Regiment de Tirailleurs Tunisiens) 1e Division de Marche (The original 1 Division Francais Libre - see the East African Thread) 1 bgd 2 bgd 3 bgd 4th Moroccan Mountain Division 1 rgt 2 rgt 6 rgt Goumiers 1 Tabor Group 3 Tabor Group 4 Tabor Group Only the last, irregular, formation were truely the Goums. Find the Goums insignia here Goums Insignia and the TOE here Order of Battle - Goumier Tabor Marocains This includes the Duexieme GTM (2d Tabor Group) who were not at Cassino but on Napoleons former temporary home of Elba at the time. Finally here is an image of a 'Goum' A 'Goum' Hope this answers your question re the little known Tabors Marocains - Les Goumiers.

Michael Emrys posted Michael well spotted not a nomme de guerre but a merseyside typo! Sorry this is Legentilhomme. Has anyone found any lost 'eg' s? He was commander of French garrison at Djibouti and defected from Vichy autumn 1940. He did not manage to persuade his erstwhile command to defect. A failure that irked de Gaulle enough to get a mention in his memoirs and caused allies difficulties over the subsequent period of 'hostilities' with the Vichy regime - Djibouti sitting right on the neck of the Red Sea had to be effectively blockaded. Re-reading my own essay a couple of points that I didn't make clear. The 13e demi brigade at Trentham Gardens - de Gaulles first cadre - were not Dunkirk evacuees but returnees from Narvik mostly - Foreign Legion. These did form the nucleus of the force in Central Africa as sent to, but not landed at, Dakar they did not return to England but were debarked in Cameroon. Their eccentric commander was Col. Magrin-Verneret he did use a nomme de guerre and is 'Monclar' in my account. These troops eventually ended up at Keren (see the other links in this thread) and included an American Lieutenant John F. Halsey, a Legionnaire. This is a man I would dearly love to know more about - did he see action at Keren? What became of him? Was he in Syria and/or the western desert - because as two understrength battalions (2d and 3e battalions Foreign Legion) many of these men were with Koenig at Bir Hacheim. At the risk of setting another Hollywood hare running was there an American at Keren and Bir Hacheim with the French Foreign Legion? Anybody know? A couple of good Free French links Foreign Legion This gives good info on the 13th Demi Brigade and its involvement in central Africa and Eritrea Ordre de la Liberation History and timelines for the Free French movement including the text of de Gaulle's speech of 18th June 1940 all well translated into English.

A lot of vagueness about the Free French forces and their equipment. If you are prepared for an essay this might help :- De Gaulle and 'Dunkirk Evacuees' The moving force was of course de Gaulle who publicly broke with Weygand and his successor Petain's move to armistice with the Third Reich in a BBC broadcast at 6pm on 18th June 1940. A military court, in France, sentenced de Gaulle - in absentia - to a months imprisonment later changed to one of death. Illustrating just what view the Vichy regime took. De Gaulle was driven in the summer of 1940. He contacted all the French colonies governors -'proconsuls' - arguing rejection of the armistice. Only General Catroux of French Indo-China rallied to the cause. De Gaulle also tried to visit all French units evacuated from Dunkirk. British authorities prevented visits to the large camps at Aintree and Haydock (Merseyside) but he did visit the Light Mountain Division at Trentham (Staffs) on 29th June. The majority of the troops refused to listen but he did get most of the 13th Legion half brigade (approx 2 battalions) several Chaussers Alpins and handfuls of other specialists (armour and artillery) all sans equipment. Apparently these were mostly from Alsace with a particular reason to be unhappy with another German occupation. They included the Alsatian Captain Marie-Pierre Koenig the, later, hero of Bir Hachiem. With odds and sods (including all the able bodied men from the island of Sein and their fishing boats who arrived in Cornwall) by end of July de Gaulle, now de facto leader, had about 7000 under (a wide variety of small) arms. On 3d July our (British) attack on the Vichy fleet at Mers-el-Kebir killed 1000 French sailors and put a dent in de Gaulle's recruitment drive. Although on 23d June Westminster had declared that it did not consider Petain's regime independent and followed this with official recognition of de Gaulle on 28th June. By August agreement was finalised that saw General de Gaulle recognised as Supreme Commander of Free French Forces who would be financially supported by Britain (to be repaid at wars end) and operate under British High Command. Free France vs. Vichy part 1 and vs. Italy De Gaulle's primary strategic goal was a territorial base - 26 August 1940 in Chad Governor Felix Eboue and local military commander Col Marchand collaborated in declaring the colony for Free France. On the 27th Colonel Leclerc (also at Bir Hacheim) engineered a coup in Douala Cameroon and troops from Chad captured Brazaville, French Equatorial Africa. By October 1940 all of the French Central African colonies were firmly Free French and several Free French against Vichy actions had taken place albeit on small scale in Gabon. Attempts to move Free French control North by land were not practical (the Sahara) and an attempt by sea - the Anglo French Dakar expedition of 23d September was a fiasco. No Free French troops were landed. In late 1940 a Free French battalion had participated well in O'Connor's offensive. In December more Free French forces were moved east from Chad to participate in the Eritrean and Abyssinian campaigns against the Italians. The force was a Foreign Legion half brigade, a Senegalese battalion, a company of Marines and a squadron of tanks (sorry type not known but almost certainly French built). The commander was Colonel Monclar and he led an epic journey from Chad through the wastes of the Sudan to Khartoum and east to Abyssinia first going into action at Kub Kub on 20th February 1941. The force was joined by Spahis (colonial cavalry)who had followed their young commander Major Jourdier out of Syria the previous June. This Free French force fought with distinction at Keren (This was the major battle in Eritrea) and captured 15000 Italian troops during the campaign. It became the basis of a Free French division under the command of General Lentilhomme. Meanwhile Leclerc with legionnaires and colonial troops had invaded Southern Libya from Chad and defeated an Italian force at Kufra Oasis - later such an asset to the LRDG - on 1st March. All of the above was accomplished by forces equipped with French uniforms and weapons and would provide a few good CMAK scenarios. It did not involve Dunkirk evacuees but did include a disproportionate number of Colonial and Foreign Legionnaires including many German political refugees - a fact perhaps not sufficiently well recognised in many French accounts. Free France vs. Vichy part 2 As General Lentilhomme's Free French Division formed in the aftermath of the Eritrean campaign the arrival of Rommel March '41 and the losses in Greece and Crete changed the campaign in Libya and the Mediterranean. Luftwaffe aircraft could now reach Vichy Syria and use airbases their to interdict the strategically vital Suez canal. De Gaulle pressed for the invasion of Vichy Syria using the FF division and British/Dominion support. Initially British High Command wanted a commercial treaty and set up food and fuel supply to Syria and Lebanon. However in mid May German aircraft arrived in Vichy Syria and, with German aid, Rashid Ali instigated a rebellion against British forces in Iraq (plus ca change). On 8th June British Dominion (Australian and Indian)and the Free French division invaded Syria. The operational command was Australian General Laverack. The Free French Division had 6000 infantry, eight guns, ten tanks and was supported by 24 aircraft. Organisation and vast majority of equipment was French establishment. The Vichy forces under General Dentz (a committed vichyite)were 30000 well equipped also of course, French establishment and well supported by aircraft though mostly obsolete. An armistice was concluded on 12 July at Gen Dentz' behest. He went to the British and the terms agreed infuriated de Gaulle and strained British/Free French relations. Casualties on both sides were heavy 6000 Vichy and 4000 (mostly FF) allied. Gen Lentilhomme's opponent outside Damascus was Vichy Gen. de Verdilhac a close friends since their days as classmates at St-Cyr (the French Sandhurst/West Point). This and the fact that of the 30+ thousand French troops in Syria and Lebanon only 127 officers and under 6000 other ranks converted to Free France after the armistice shows how deeply divided loyalties were. Again CMAK Free France vs. Vichy would be a possibility here if any modders are willing to provide the necessary troops. There is more and I would be happy to continue - feel free to ask. Particularly re the First Free French Brigade at Bir Hacheim. Best sources - Bir Hakeim Felix de Grand'combef (Tresses Universitaires de France) Mediterranean & Middle East Volumes 1 & 2 ISO Playfair (HMSO) and for a good first hand account of Syria including being bombed by Vichy Martin bombers The Road Past Mandalay John Masters new reprint - Cassell Military Paperbacks

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh Such eloquence in so many, many posts! But of course in the world of anagrams Michael Dorosh = O! hear him scold Thanks anyway from a watcher and very infrequent poster.

ANZAC Biscuits in Finland? Is this the alternative given the price of 'tinnies' in Scandinavia? ANZAC Biscuits 2 cups rolled oats ½ cup sugar 1 cup flour 125gm butter, melted 1 tablespoon golden syrup (Tate & Lyle) 1 teaspoon baking soda 2 tablespoons boiling water Combine the oats, sugar, flour and melt together. Then add the golden syrup, and finally the baking soda dissolved in the boiling water. Put spoonfuls of the mixture on a greased tray and bake at 180°C (350°F) for 15-20 minutes or until cooked a golden-brown colour and crispy.

---------------------------------------------------------------- Though it goes against the grain to take an Aussie's part after too many years watching cricket - the Aussies did play the most significant part in handing German arms their first tactical and strategic reverse in WWII. The prelude was 11 April '41 - 2/13 and 2/17 bns of the Aussie 20th brigade (9th Div) with support from 1st RTR and 1st RHA stopped Rommel's first attack on Tobruk. On 13/14 April Rommel launched an 'all out assault' with Ponath's 8Mg, Engineer Bn 200 and 1st and 2d bns 5Pz covered by large concentrations of Italian artillery. The Australians (2/13 and 2/17 again) manning the perimeter posts pinned down the German infantry separating them from the Panzers. Though the Aussie positions were not reduced and continued to hold up German infantry and A/T the Panzers rolled past and through the Tobruk perimeter (Red Line)at 0500 to be engaged by 5 portees of 3RHA, A/T guns of 3AA-T and A/E battery 1RHA (over open sights). By 0730 the Panzers were in full flight - 17 left behind destroyed or damaged - and being harried by elements of 1st RTR (The diary of eyewitness Leutnant Joachim Schorm of 5Pz describes a rout). By the evening the last German presence in the perimeter 8MG had been eliminated and its commander, Ponath, killed (8MG had ration strength of 1400 prior to these Easter battles and just under 300 after). Rommel of course launched more attacks later than this but never captured Tobruk in '41 and never had the opportunity to push hard at Alexandria and Egypt while in eastern Libya in '41. These Easter battles saw German Panzers and Infantry/AT support separated and defeated in detail for the first time - tactical defeat. Unlike Arras it was also strategically significant denying the Axis the port and closer (to Egypt) supply point - Tobruk - very different to Arras which denied nothing except a greater haul of BEF POWs. The infantry involved was Australian (first Australian VC of WWII was won on 13/14 April by LCpl J.H. Edmondson), supporting arms British. The command and control in Tobruk Australian - General Morshead known to his troops as 'Ming the Merciless'. Seems ozi-digger has at least one right. If you want a good dispassionate account from a bona fida 'Rat of Tobruk' - "Tobruk - The Great Siege Reassessed" F. Harrison, Brockhampton Press 1996.