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Private Bluebottle

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Everything posted by Private Bluebottle

  1. In several games I've played lately, my tracked and semi-tracked vehicles keep getting bogged! The funny thing is, that my wheeled vehicles apparently never do. I was under the impression that the later Panzers (Panther/Tiger II, in particular) and the various Russian tanks, such as the T-34 and KV-1s had very wide tracks with superior flotation across mud and soft ground. Yet these vehicles, no matter how fast I move them, often end up bogged. Is the chance to get bogged too high?
  2. One would assume that such penetrations would only be likely if the vehicle was not an MBT. Thin skinned AFVs have always been vulnerable to artillery rounds, although, it should be noted even then, most vehicles are supposedly "proof against artillery fragments" in their description. Its interesting that David Fletcher quotes a test conducted in 1944 with Churchills, driving around inside an artillery bombardment with no ill effect beyond the loss of aerials and a few vision blocks.
  3. I'm sorry, but effectively you are the section level commander in the game - you must managed the route taken, the method, virtually everything for each and every section in the game (or squad if you desire to use American terms). If I was the platoon or company commander, I'd merely instruct my subordinates that X is the objective, our line of advance is Y, H-Hour is Z and the unit formation is whatever I desire. Off they'd go, knowing how to do what they needed to do within their roles in that structure. Yes, more detail would normally be supplied in an Ops order but thats it at its most basic level. I wouldn't have to tell each section to use that dip in the ground or that line of trees or whatever, to improve its chances of survival, they'd do it (or wouldn't, depending upon experience) themselves. I think we're quibbling about terminology. A "command level game" to me means that I'm the commander, I direct the operation, I don't micro-manage every subunit. To a certain extent. Tell me, have you ever had your tanks end up, because the TacAI couldn't handle its movement around a piece of difficult terrain, advancing arse first towards the enemy? Have you had your infantry take the most direct route, in the face of enemy fire, rather than the more safe indirect one to an objective? Have you had tanks follow a road? Perhaps. I'd love to see little red lines going from battalion commanders to company commanders and thence to platoon commanders, so that indeed, staying in command becomes of some value. Depends upon other factors, such as experience and personal initiative and training. A raw conscript unit is going to do a great deal worse than a crack veteran one. SOPs would also ensure that you can take into account training and "directives". Agreed. [ September 05, 2003, 12:11 AM: Message edited by: Private Bluebottle ]
  4. Well, thats exactly what I've proposed in other threads. Personally, I dislike being both an NCO and an Officer. I'd much rather be an officer, ordering my NCOs to carry out certain tasks and then leaving it to them, as it is in real life, to undertake them. Utilising such a model, it would be really possible to simulate unit experience levels - a veteran NCO would be far better at commanding his section than a green one would be, therefore it would make better use of ground, move in better formations and carryout manoeauvres. All I'd have to do would be to designate the objective and a rough route towards it, the tacAI would handle the rest. As in other threads, the use of SOPs would ensure, to some degree, that you didn't completely lose control over your units and would enable you to make sure they acted in a manner that you wanted them to. At the present moment, the game expects you to act both as officer (ie giving orders) and NCO (actually organising and instructing the men on how to carry out the objective sought in those orders. The result is that you have to pay attention to every section or vehicle's movement. You have to constantly set their waypoints, targets, positions, etc. Remember, an officer doesn't tell an NCO how to erect a flagpole. He orders him to erect it and then leaves it to his discretion about how its done. I accept that you may well not like that sort of model to be used but surely the game could be made flexible enough so both models could be utilised?
  5. I believe it was Jary who made the point that often, because of external operational constraints, a company or battalion commander could rarely actually wage his battle the way he wanted to. Artillery time-tables and so on, often meant that manoeavure was often limited as attacking infantry had to keep close to an advancing, creeping barrage, while their use meant that flanking was nearly impossible. It appears to me that many who claim that battles should have unlimited time limits, ignore that the battle their fighting could well be only a small part of a much larger operation and their role in its pretty minor as far as higher command is concerned. Resource allocation could well mean that if they want to have that artillery or armour support, they'll have to carry out their attack NOW, not at their leisure and in the manner they necessarily would like to.
  6. I believe it was Jary who made the point that often, because of external operational constraints, a company or battalion commander could rarely actually wage his battle the way he wanted to. Artillery time-tables and so on, often meant that manoeavure was often limited as attacking infantry had to keep close to an advancing, creeping barrage, while their use meant that flanking was nearly impossible. It appears to me that many who claim that battles should have unlimited time limits, ignore that the battle their fighting could well be only a small part of a much larger operation and their role in its pretty minor as far as higher command is concerned. Resource allocation could well mean that if they want to have that artillery or armour support, they'll have to carry out their attack NOW, not at their leisure and in the manner they necessarily would like to.
  7. The Stuka was capable of a CEP of about 30 feet under ideal conditions. Despite the claims of many Typhoon pilots, very few tanks were hit with rockets. One suspects that their rockets' CEP was a great deal larger, which is why they tended to saturate an area.
  8. That is a means of designating the target, usually used in conjuction with radio to direct the incoming strike aircraft (usally the sequence is: FB: "Please fire smoke to designate target!" AC: "Smoke fired!" FB: "I see red smoke!" AC: "Confirmed, red smoke!" And the fighterbomber would then attack. At the same time, FEOT (Forward Edge Own Troops) would also have to be designated. In WWII, this was often done with colour cloth or in the case of the Germans, a national swastika flag. However, you still had to call up the FB on radio, to get it to come to your area and you could direct it to the vicinity of the target, utilising landmarks and/or air recognition panels. The Germans developed this to a very exact science, well before the Allies in the Spanish Civil War when von Richtofen worked out his system. Interesting, it was done without radio links between the air and the ground. Those refinements only came later. The book It Doesn't Snow in September whose author escapes me at the moment has some accounts of the German air controllers around Arnhem in 1944 and their use of ideosyncratic German to direct the attacking fighterbombers.
  9. One would hope though, that with all the preliminary work done that with the release of CM2x that it would be one game, to cover the whole war (perhaps with supplements) rather than three or four, each incompatable with one another. I'd personally like to be able to utilise the same maps for different periods/locations. I've been recently reading Delaforce's Marching to the Sound of the Guns and several accounts make the point of units fightng through the same area in 1944 that they had fought through in 1940. Being also able to mix and match forces would make it possible to fight unusual campaigns, such as in the Balkans in 1945 where Germans, Russians and British encountered one another. It'd also enable post and pre-war campaigns to be fought, such as the Spanish Civil War or Korea or the counterfactual mainstay of so many wargames - Patton versus Zurkhov.
  10. In the case of the smaller tanks, such as the T26 and the US Combat Cars, the turrets were independently targetted, there being no person responsible for directing fire onto targets, which is usually the role of the commander in a single turret. In the case of the Lee/Grant, there was a single individual responsible for directing fire who had an added responsibility to fire his own weapon as well (ditto for the Char B1bis as well). I'd suspect in CMAK, this would be taken into account by allowing a vehicle with multiple turrets/sponsons to independently engage different targets. However, I'd be interested to see how they handle a commander with multiple responsibilities - commanding, spotting, loading, firing, etc. I suspect it would mean he'd have less chance of spotting something. Its a shame they didn't include this in CMBB where it would be more useful. The T28 is a real loss to the game IMO.
  11. Of much greater importance than fog for CMAK will be heat haze. How will the effects of that be handled? Usually for the mid-hours of the day, visibility is markedly reduced in hot/arid regions. Often down to less than 500 metres, usually from about 1000hrs to about 1600hrs, particularly during summer months.
  12. I think its more a matter of how many followup their purchase of the game with the next version or supplement to the game, rather than their initial purchasing decision. If they feel the methodology is unrealistic or they feel that their concerns aren't being listened to, you don't think there may be a danger that followon market might be put off? I believe I suggested that its addressing might well be placed on a lower priority compared to other factors. I'm not demanding that it should be done, "NOW!" Rather I and I suspect others are suggesting it might be a worthwhile something to include in a later release/new version of the game, perhaps CMX2, I believe its called? [ August 25, 2003, 10:05 PM: Message edited by: Private Bluebottle ]
  13. Sorry, I'm not into big bums. However, that aside, the marketplace for CM is us, all potential and real purchasers. You're talking about the total gaming marketplace, a much bigger superset who's taste unfortunately tends to run to big boobs and bummed female action heros which they can fantasise about unhealthily (as against those who have healthy fantasies about tanks and guns, with all those Freudian phallic symbols...sorry, got a bit carried away there! ) Surely responding to what your market desires can never be perilous for a company which is providing a game like CM? If it was, then surely capitalism must have been a failure? Initially but once a market has been created for a product then woebetide a producer, say of icecream who doesn't respond to the request to add extra flavours to their icecream. [ August 25, 2003, 07:59 PM: Message edited by: Private Bluebottle ]
  14. Yes. What else do they have to do? Its not as if they are doing this out of the goodness of their hearts, either. They are being paid for it, afterall. That they enjoy what they are doing is just an added bonus that most code-cutters don't get. If the marketplace demands, shouldn't they fulfill that demand? If they fail to fulfill the demand, isn't there a danger they'll lose their market share? I agree. However, resupply is merely another issue. That doesn't mean it shouldn't be addressed but rather that it might just be placed on a lower priority over other matters. Ignoring or suggesting that its pointless, will not fix it nor will it satisfy customers who percieve it is lacking.
  15. What exactly is wrong with the Radeon drivers? I'm using a 7500 without any trouble to play CM.
  16. I came across mention of this on the Tanknet webboard. I thought it might be of interest to people here as another primary source: --------------------------------------- Divisional MG regiments in Commonwealth service used Universal Carriers simply to transport the guns, basic load of ammunition and crews; while the gun COULD be fired from its traveling pintle mount atop the carrier's engine deck, it was meant to be dismounted and emplaced where it was less visible to the enemy and less vulnerable to incoming fire. They usually worked in sections of three guns plus a command/support carrier to transport ammunition, and could be used in support of any divisional regiment as required. In this role they were really quite effective, being able to lay down an effective beaten zone which could be maintained almost continuously. BTW, the logistics of carrying any gun larger than the Vickers would have seriously undermined the carrier's capabilities. There's really very little space inside once you clutter them up with gun, ammunition, personal weapons and kit, rations, spare parts and four crew. If you're seriously interested in learning more of these unique regiments, I would recommend the following highly. I published this review here and elsewhere in February 2002 (scroll down to the bold bits as required): Entitled A CANLOAN OFFICER, this large-format, soft-cover book (8 1/2 x 11, 321 pages, loaded with photographs and maps reproduced from the originals the author carried), was written, compiled and self-published by Reginald F. (Rex) Fendick, CDN 453, a Canadian lieutenant who served as "Sometime OC No.1 Platoon, A Company, 2nd Battalion, The Middlesex Regiment (DCO), 1944-1945" as part of the CANLOAN scheme. The CANLOAN scheme, as you may remember, was the arrangement by which Canadian junior officers were permitted to volunteer for service in British Army infantry regiments, in order to make up for Britain's shortfall in qualified junior leaders due to casualties. Some 673 Canadian officers volunteered and served accordingly (some even taking a reduction in rank to do so), and of that number, 128 were killed in action or died of wounds, 310 were wounded in action and another 27 taken as POWs. As CANLOAN officers they earned 42 MCs, 1 U.S. DSC, 1 MBE, 1 U.S. Silver Star, 4 Croix de Guerre and numerous other citations. In short, a magnificent group of individuals, whose accomplishments and sacrifices have not, until now, been suitably extolled. This book is a memoir of one of those officers, and is so well-written and presented that I cannot understated why it hasn't been picked up by a commercial publisher. It should be. This personal memoir, while not in the same category as a regimental history (for example), still strikes me as comparable to Donald Graves' superb book on the South Albertas in its readability and presentation, and its personal perspective simply adds to the book's attraction. Lieutenant (later Capt and ultimately LCol) Fendick's book begins with an account of his early service in his father's regiment, the St. John Fusiliers (MG). He was a part of the regimental shooting team back as far as 1938, even as a high school cadet, due to his shooting skills, the latter of which ultimately drove him to become a successful, Active Service volunteer in 1942. After more than a year's service with the Regiment in British Columbia, Fendick and several of his friends learned of the CANLOAN scheme and subsequently volunteered, embarking on what became the adventure of a lifetime. For the most part, Fendick's memories are clear, and his prose flows equally clearly and smoothly as he presents to us a cornucopia of detail on all aspects of service life as a young officer. As we progress from his earliest days with the St. John Fusiliers, through enlistment and training in the CANLOAN program to arrival in England and posting as a platoon commander in The Middlesex Regiment (MG), Fendick weaves a colourful tapestry of the experiences of a fresh, somewhat naive 20 year-old subaltern about to embark on a frightening journey through the already-bloodsoaked battlefields of Normandy, in command of what turns out to be mostly long-service, experienced British troops. As his narrative proceeds, we find out, by reading through the lines - Fendick is refreshingly modest and honest about his misgivings - that he is in fact a natural leader of men and an exceptional officer in a time and place which has been otherwise noted by some historians as distinctly lacking in these vital requirements. As the story continues through Normandy and into Holland, we find for the first time that Fendick's memories desert him from time-to-time, which serves only to remind us that this is a very real account, written by an aging veteran of a very difficult campaign. However, throughout this section of the story, the author ery skillfully blends in enough tactical and administrative detail for us to understand his experiences against the backdrop of the campaign itself. Further to that, as he is an officer in charge of a Vickers Machine Gun Platoon, we are blessed with one of the finest accounts of the deployment and use of this unique and little-discussed weapon. Not only is his account of the war itself filled with priceless information on the subject, he also includes a 48-page appendix at the end of the book, containing a synopsis of the Vickers, its systems and the employment of an MG Platoon in Northwest Europe. For anyone with an interest in the Medium Machine Gun, this book remains a priceless source of first-hand information. At the conclusion of hostilities in May 1945, Fendick went on to spend almost a year with the British Army of the Rhine (BAOR), before being repatriated to Canada in the spring of 1946, by then a T/Capt. He subsequently applied for, and was accepted into, the Regular Army in Canada, serving in a variety of duties (most within RCEME, including a year in Korea) until his retirement in 1975 as a Lieutenant Colonel. The book, however, ends with his arrival in back in Canada, as it is a story about CANLOAN, not about the man himself. Thanks to Fendick's free-flowing clarity of expression, what we are left with is an outstanding historical document of an era long past and of the forgotten men who contributed so well to Victory in Europe. Sir, MAPLE LEAF UP salutes you. A CANLOAN OFFICER, by Reginald F. (Rex) Fendick Illustrated Edition Copyright 2000 Many maps, illustrations and photographs throughout. Available from: R.F. Fendick 25 Vaughan Drive, Nauwigewauk, N.B. Canada E5N 6T9 rfendick@nbnet.nb.ca Price: $35 CAD or $27.50 USD, Postage Paid in North America.
  17. "Critical Dehydration Level" = "I need an Ice-Cold one in Alex immediately"?
  18. Nope. Credit the Brits with both names. After Dunkirk and before Lend Lease came into being the British wished to purchase tanks from America. Initially they wished to have existing British designs built and supplied but fortunately the Americans said no. Take the designs we're tooling up for or forget it. The British therefore purchased the M3 with a re-designed turret containing a radio (in line with British practices at the time)which they called Grant. When Lend Lease kicked off the Americans supplied tanks above and beyond the original orders and built to the American standard (with the radio in the hull) which they called Lee. Hence the names and the two different turrets. As far as I know the Brits also named the Sherman and the Stuart althought I stand ready to be corrected on that assertion. All the American tank names that followed in a similar vein are carrying on the British names like the Pershing and so on. Good job we didn't call them something really silly </font>
  19. I seem to remember reading somewhere about Blacker Bombards being issued in North Africa. Some even apparently reached Tobruk during the siege. It wasn't popular, not because of the lack of penetration but because the weapon was unreliable. Apparently the charge either wasn't large enough apparently to project the round or it had a tendancy to fail to fire, with the result that the round often skidded for some distance along the ground before exploding when it hit a rock or some other form of impediment, usually well before the intended target. Didn't someone win a decoration for firing one during a battle in North Africa? Might have been the one at Tobruk.
  20. Isn't the middle vehicle that version? It has the round opennings in the front of the sponsons which were IIRC, for the MGs. I hope that alternative turret versions will be available for the M3 Lee/Grant?
  21. Ah! That could well explain it. It is possible to lay wire from a vehicle in real life though.
  22. I've just started a massive 5000+ point quick battle (purely as an experiment to see how well my PC could handle such a large game). The problem I have is that I've got some Russian 122mm FOs which I want to embark in an M5 halftrack. The game won't let me do it. Yet, it will allow me to embark 120mm Mortar FOs on the same vehicles! It also won't let me put an 82mm FO in them either. This is a little bit screwy. I'm not overloading the vehicles, the game simply won't let me place them on the vehicle and display the word "embark" when I do so. Does anybody have any ideas why this won't work?
  23. Having read the arguments, I've come to the conclusion that indeed, instead of adding new unit/vehicle types to the game it would be better to fix the games other obvious errors that have been mentioned. In particularly, I'd like to see some sort of method where I can stop being an NCO and become an Officer. I've mentioned it before, the game turns players into NCOs. It makes them plan and carry out every little movement to ensure success of an overall plan whereas if we were Officers, we'd merely designate an objective and the manner in which it was to be attacked and off would go the troops and do it. Perhaps I'm unusual in that respect but I'd prefer to give orders to my troops rather than play the NCO and tell them how to carry those orders out. I'd also like to see some sort of effort to make the game integrated with sort of campaign manager. Make it easier to play campaigns with perhaps a game finish report which can in turn form the basis for the preliminary planning for the next battle? Finally, perhaps just for cosmetic sake, the "skins" I mentioned earlier, to allow individual vehicles to be seen, rather than having one type only of each vehicle.
  24. While not absolutely necessary, they do add to the flavour of the game somewhat. Personally, I'd like some means to individualise vehicles. Not every vehicle was identical and its something I miss from my days as a miniatures gamer. Perhaps the addition of a number of "skins" (say 10?) which overlay the existing surfaces of each type of model's surfaces, which can have different slogans/items of equipment added, to give the "lived in" flavour so apparent in most pictures? The uniform nature of vehicles might be nice on the parade ground but once you get into the field, creature comforts become rather important. I'd also like to see some consideration to, as someone mentioned, pioneer tasks. Bulldozers did exist and they were utilised but they were mainly a western allies' piece of equipment. As to the matter of motorcycles/dispatch riders, they'll more than likely need to be modelled once we get rid of, whats it called again? Borg sighting rules. There will need to be some means of moving information about the battlefield and I can't think of an easier way to do so than via what was really used - dispatch riders. It will also lead to the interesting situation where tactical HQs will have to be established and maintained. As far as buildings go, I think we need some means of showing where doors are, inside the buildings and have them as the primary means of entry/exit. No door, no getting out, except via a window and that slows your movement appropriately.
  25. You might want to contact Roman Alymov at tank_driver@mail.ru. He posts semi-regularly to the tanknet site. Apparently he is a volunteer who works at Kabinka restoring AFVs. He might be able to help you.
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