Private Bluebottle

Just proves that no matter which army you're in, there are only two sizes for uniforms - too bloody big or too bloody small! "Hey, you can't have that! Someone else might want it!"

Just proves that no matter which army you're in, there are only two sizes for uniforms - too bloody big or too bloody small! "Hey, you can't have that! Someone else might want it!"

This also used to be the claim behind the superiority of Australian soldiers. However, once analysis was done of the enlistment rolls, the reality was that it was found that the overwhelming majority of Australian soldiers were reflective of the society they came from - primarily urbanised and not from "off the farm". It might surprise many people but Australia is one of the most urbanised nations on earth with, at the turn of the 20th century, it was as high as over 75% of the population living in urban settings. Its become progressively better/worse (depending I suppose upon one's perspective) with today nearly 90% of the population living in urban settings. IMO, its not where the soldier is drawn from, as much as what the training incalculates in the soldier, as to their ability to think for themselves and to act independently when needed. If the emphasis is upon following direction from officers or NCOs and little room for independent thought is allowed, then you'll have a mob of sheep. If, on the otherhand, the reverse is true, with soldiers being allowed to contribute and to provide solutions and their role within the unit being recognised as being as essential as that of the officer/NCO, then you'll have a group of soldiers who can overcome most obstacles. Attitudes to authority are also important in that respect. A rigid class system (UK) versus an egalitarian system (Dominions) or even a mobile class system (US) tends to be part of the national differences between army. Afterall, armies are created by their societies and hence reflective of them. However, that is, as I've suggested before, a generalisation and one which lies at a level much higher than portrayed in the CM game universe. [ October 09, 2003, 03:26 AM: Message edited by: Private Bluebottle ]

Michael, you do understand the difference between personnel and troops, don't you? I'll stand by my statement, no British troops in the PTO, therefore, no British troops with half-tracks.

I suspect 50 yards is a bit of an exaggeration. From my experience in the desert a figure of 250 to 500 yards is more likely. And no, it doesn't happen at night - you need heat to create a heat haze. Night in the desert has its own visibility problems. :cool:

I think the problem is that when Americans think of the Pacific war, they call it the PTO, which in reality was only a subset of the entire war against Japan. That war was made up of (from the Commonwealth perspective) SEAC - South East Asia Command - from India to Singapore; South West Pacific Theatre of Operations - from Philippines through Indonesia to the Soloman Islands (which were included after about 1943, before then, the boundary was as far as New Guinea IIRC) and the Pacific Theatre itself, which covered the south and central pacific from the Solomans (originally) up to Japan. And to answer the original question, there were no British troops involved in the PTO. There weren't any Commonwealth troops either. Australians and the Kiwis were in the Solomans, I believe after they became part of SW Pacific Theatre. Therefore, there was no possibility of them operating half-tracks. Even in the SW Pacific Theatre half-tracks were very rare beasts, primarily confined to Australia and used by the US Army and Marines. The Australian Army had small numbers of them but preferred their own local pattern Universal Carrier (primary difference between it and UK and Kiwi versions was the lack of track-warping for steering, reliance being on track braking instead. Externally the major difference was the presence of improved cooling which consisted of a large cooling vent just behind the driver's position and stretching across the width of the body and provision for mounting a Vickers MMG in the front cockpit, rather than a Bren, as standard).

Let's see... not really. Two hours before the British drop, the MG Btn of 1. FD jumped in and set up to the south of the Bridge. The British jump has to be the most spectacularly screwed up jump in history... First they get shot up by allied ships. Then they get shot up by allied and axis flak. Then they get dumped out all over the place (scattered all over eastern Sicily. Of the almost 2000 paras, less than 300 made it to the bridge... where the MG Btn was. Meanwhile the ground forces were only making about 5km a day against various strongpoints. By the time the ground forces make it to the bridge, the Paras have already broken up into small groups and scampered back to friendly lines. Interesting that Frost was there as well as Arnhem </font>

Let's see... not really. Two hours before the British drop, the MG Btn of 1. FD jumped in and set up to the south of the Bridge. The British jump has to be the most spectacularly screwed up jump in history... First they get shot up by allied ships. Then they get shot up by allied and axis flak. Then they get dumped out all over the place (scattered all over eastern Sicily. Of the almost 2000 paras, less than 300 made it to the bridge... where the MG Btn was. Meanwhile the ground forces were only making about 5km a day against various strongpoints. By the time the ground forces make it to the bridge, the Paras have already broken up into small groups and scampered back to friendly lines. Interesting that Frost was there as well as Arnhem </font>

Differences in national character do exist between national armies. However, they have a much greater influence on strategic and operational matters, than tactical ones and its the tactical level that CM is conducted. From the British and Commonwealth perspective, British line infantry weren't known for their personal initiative - something remarked upon by Australian observers from the 2nd Boer War onwards in the debates over the differences between "Tommy Atkins" versus "Tommy Cornstalks". Yet, more specialised units where the "misfits" and the independent thinkers could flourish were invariably established during wartime and they could and did match Johnny Boer or whomever was being fought for willyness. More elite British units were either completely unimaginative in their thinking but were well known for their doggeded pursuit or defence of an objective, while the well led and trained could and did match the Dominion and Colonial troops as fighters in both world wars. Within the Axis, there were of course a very mixed bunch. Even the German soldier wasn't always what he was cracked up to be yet, even what could often be considered the worst troops did conduct brilliant defensive actions with little in the way of materiale' if inspired by their leaders. The Italians generally were brittle, yet in East Africa they gave a good account of themselves, often only supported by native Askaris and against considerable odds. However, invariably, as I stated at the top, this was more of a factor at the upper levels of strategy, not down on the battlefield. Invariably there was always some bugger who hadn't read the pamphlet you'd been given on "Know the enemy" which pointed out that they were a bunch of craven cowards who'd surrender at the first shot, shoot back at you and aimed to kill as well. [ October 06, 2003, 10:32 AM: Message edited by: Private Bluebottle ]

They sound very nice but a bit pricey at $A350 for the two volume set. Do you have a copy? Would you be willing to scan some maps for me?

I'm looking for maps (preferrably online) of Operation MARKET-GARDEN. Basically I need topographical maps of the area the operation was fought over, particularly Nijmegan-Arnhem. Does anybody know of a source of maps which show topography, road network, etc? I've got some good general ones, like those in Kershaw's It Never Snows in September but they focus exclusively on "hell's highway" and don't show the surround terrain/roads.

OK, I can agree with that. Yes, 800 yards is a within, as someone else suggested "danger close". Orientation of the attack is also important for aircraft, attacking along the FEOT is actually more dangerous than bombing away from it.

Becket - bombing from 7-8000 feet, those would be mediums - baltimores, Marylands, and the like, not FBs (Hurricanes, Kittyhawks). Hopefully (?) no-one is suggesting that Mediums have a place in CM? Regards JonS </font>

No. Depends I think upon how you define "an attack" but 800 yards is actually not that much of an advance before contact. It depends most upon terrain - in Europe, 800 yards might be a bit long, in the desert, its very close. Either way, its only a very quick stroll. I've recently been doing some maps and I have to keep reminding myself that most of the distances I've seen in CM maps are pretty tiny compared to real life. Most designers cram or attempt to cram rather, much too much into too small an area IMO.

Please show me the diplomacy I was shown and I will freely admit I am wrong. </font>

Cabron, spitting the dummy isn't going to make things easier. Try a little more diplomacy, it often works wonders.

One should also remember that the 8th Army always tended to affect a style of its own, as far as military uniform went. Slacks, suede desert boots, open-necked shirt with perhaps a silk cravat, were de'rigeur for an officer, in from "the blue" for a night on the town in Alex or Cairo. Whilst out in "the blue", one couldn't wash either oneself or one's uniforms (except in petrol), because of water rationing so being scruffy became rather more acceptable than it would have been on Horse Guards. Go for a couple of weeks like that and try and tell me you'll still want to wear that collar and tie. Funny thing is, when winter hit in NW Europe, it was the Guards units which tended to affect their own style of scruffiness. Rather as the Germans did in the winter of 1941-42 when anything was worn, as long as it held the promise of keeping you warm. [ September 16, 2003, 11:52 PM: Message edited by: Private Bluebottle ]

I think this image would be an excellent one for use as the splash screen:

Walking in soft sand can certainly be tiring, especially if you're in a hurry. But I wouldn't expect that to be a common factor in CMAK. Whereas a lot of the fighting on the East Front was done in snow, it was extremely rare to be fighting in deep or soft sand in Africa. The deep sand was mostly found in areas called sand seas, and the armies stayed away from those. The only troops that went into them with any regularity were the special forces like the LRDG or SAS, and since they were there by themselves, they weren't fighting, they were transiting. Michael </font>

One wonders, will it be that in CMAK, moving in soft-sand is considered as difficult? Will other environmental factors, such as heat be taken into account? Trying conduct a battle in extreme temperatures is very debilitating after even an extremely short amount of time.

This recently landed in my email box from a list I subscribe to. I thought it might be of interest to readers here:

Speaking of blue-on-blue incidents, I've never read of a German ones, occasionally of a British one (invariably though of the type in Normandy where Bomber command bombed short) but a very great deal of American ones. Why might this be? Bias? Lack of accounts? Were some airforces better at identifying ground units than others?

As in the game or real life? My understanding it has a great deal to do with the type and quality of the gearbox. Say, a Merritt-Brown will allow much greater variability than a crash-box in a Russian light tank.

As Jon hasn't bothered to answer your request, I called this up on the library catalogue: Main Author: Bidwell, Shelford, 1913- Other Author(s): Graham, Dominick Title: Fire-power : British army weapons and theories of war, 1904-1945 / by Shelford Bidwell and Dominick Graham Primary Material: Book Subject(s): Great Britain. Army Artillery--Great Britain--History--20th century Artillery drill and tactics--History Publisher: London : Allan & Unwin, 1982 Description: xvi, 327 p. Notes: Army operations by Great Britain.. Army, 1904-1945. Artillery. Tactics (BNB/PRECIS) Includes index Bibliography: p. 309-320

Thanks for all the replies. My own observations were that: Vehicle speed does seem to affect the likelihood of bogging - fast moves are more likely than hunt orders; Crew experience appears to make no difference - I would have assumed that the more experienced the crew, the less likely the chance of bogging but I've seen green crews go across a patch of ground easily, only to see a crack vehicle get bogged there, when it followed; Location is seemingly unimportant - I've had vehicles bog on the sides of hills, while vehicles in valleys have simply sailed along; Vehicle type appears inconsistent - as I mentioned in my original post tracked vehicles appear to get bogged more easily than wheeled ones. Again, I've had wheeled vehicles cross a patch of ground without getting bogged followed by a tracked vehicle and the first was free while the second was bogged as well as vice-a-versa. My own military expeirence was such that I regularly had to recover or help recover wheeled vehicles which had become bogged while tracked ones rarely got bogged from my observations (and bear in mind, this was in Australia were when it rained, everything turned to deep mud. From my understanding, tracked vehicles, as long as they can prevent themselves from "bottoming" - getting their bottom hull plates firmly in contact with mud will keep going reasonably well. Once that happens though, suction will prevent them moving. I still believe that the chance of bogging is too high for tracked vehicles and not sufficiently high for wheeled vehicles. My remedy for bogging has been to immediately reverse the vehicle, if possible. This generally seems to get the unstuck but not always.