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The following quote is from Major Bryan E. Denny's "The evolution and demise of U.S. Tank Destroyer Doctrine in WWII". He in turn is quoting from S.L.A. Marshall, Armies on Wheels. "The observer of things in the present has becomse so fascinated by Blitzkrieg's thundering chariots that he ignores, or discounts the extent to which the excellence of the co-operating services made possible victories seemingly won by the tank." And quoting from William B. Ziff's The coming Battle of Germnay, Denny tells us: "It is not a single weapon and its not even a new kind of warfare. It is simply a more ingenious development and use of every kind of modern weapon that has hitherto been seen." Denny explains: "German success... rested on a continuation of storm trooper tactics developed during... WWI. The backbone of this team lay in the fast-moving German armor... "German storm trooper tactics... combined with the mobility of armored... forces proved an almost unstappable combination in 1939 and 1940. "...the unit that committed the biggest infractions with their tank destroyers was the 1st Armored Division. From the Kasserine Pass through to the closing fight at El Guettar, the 1st Armored Division routinely piece mealed the [tank destroyer battalions] into combat." That was 1942. In 1943 we have the first instance where a US unit succesfully stops a major Panzer attack. On 23 March 1943, the 1st Infantry Division succesfully stopped the 10th panzer division through much better use of their tank destroyer battalion. Denny's work regards the development and demise of Tank Destroyers. Although that area is not of much interest to us in SC, it does show how faulty was Allied combat doctrine at the beginning of the war.

Me Too.

...well defense should be 0. I cannot imagine a transport group caussing much damage to a squadron of Battleships...

Yes, I have read about this too. Perhaps SC2 could model this by having some sort of supply uboat unit ...similar to a uBoat HQ that moves out ot sea. But this uBoat HQ only provides supply, it does not have a leadership modifier (or the leadership modifier is set to 0).

I don't think players should be able to invest in each and every cathegory. A player should carefully devise a strategy and figure out which research areas better fit his strategy. Having said that, I would reduce the initial (starting) cost of reseach to 100 MPP's but then require an additional 1 MPP per week (52 per year) to continue research. If I want to invest a second research chit in a given research area, I would require an additional 50 MPP on the week you want to increment research levels, and, then increase the weekly allowance by another MPP for a total of two weekly MPPs (104 per year). If you work out the math running a basic research program for three years would cost 256 MPP's. Two research chits for three years woulc cost 456. (I am assuming a year has 52 weeks). Now, if you run a research program for five years it will cost you more. ...but probably you will get more out of it. If you discontinue a program for only a few weeks due to lack of funds, you should be able to re-start the program at a reduced "starting" cost, say 10 MPPs.

I checked out the bumped thread. I like the idea of including an infrastructure tech. It makes perfect sense for Germany to buy more locomotives to transport troops to the front. ...or the US may build more liberty ships to transport equipment to England. This sort of investment, in turn would result in lower "operational costs". Perfect. But my C3 is something different. During WWII there were huge different in performance between different armies that resulted, not from equipment, but from: Better Command Better Communications Better Organizations Better Doctrine Better Procedures Better Coordination Betwen Different Arms All the technologies that we have proposed cover either the equipment, or the economy that makes that equipment. I propose just one technology that will represent all the intangibles that result in better tactical performance. You may call it C3, Combined Arms Doctrine, Modern Warfare Tactics, I don't care. But there were enormous difference in performance between the Germans (at one extreme) and the Russians (at the other end) with everyone else in the middle. These performance abyss was not just the result of superior equipment. It was there even when the equipment was lacking.

...not sure there will be an infrastructure tech, but I think these would be two very different specimens. By C3 I mean Command, Control and Communications. This regards the development of communication equipment, as well as communication procedures, command structures, doctrine, etc. Effective use of combined arms required better C3. Many US and British historian equate Guderian to Fuller and other military thinkers of Great Britain and the U.S. My humble opinion is that these historians are missing the most important contribution made by Guderian. Guderian picked up the ideas of Fuller and others about mechanization. He understood the importance of machines, whether in tanks, planes, or in transport. But he added two more things: Guderian was the champion of combined arms tactics. Guderian did not advocate for the development of Tand Units. He advocated the development of Armored (Panzer) Formations in which all services would be mechanized (Tanks, Infantry, Artillery, Engineers, etc.). And, furthermore, all the services would fight support each other in battle, including tactical air bombers! The Germnas entered WWII with a state of the art combined arms doctrine because of Guderian. But Guderians contribution did not stop there. Guderian realized that combined arms tactics could only work if adecuate command, control, and communication procedures were establihed. Guderian himself was a communication officers, and serve as such during WW I. Guderian was directly responsible for the development of C3 necessary to quickly coordinate the different elements of the Panzer Formation as well as the tactical air support. Ironically, the Russians could have been the first to copy the German combined arms doctrine, and the supporting C3. The Germans and Russians held joint maneuvers in the late 30's - part of Hitler's effort to appease the Russians prior to the Polish invassion. The Russians learned much during those maneuvers. The T 34 was a direct result it. And, it is clear that officers within the Russian Armored Corps were calling for reform. Unfortunately for them, and for Russia, most of those officers were massacred during the Stalin Purges. If C3 tech was made part of this game, one insteresting variation would be to assume Stalin Purges never occured and allow better C3 for the Russians... C3 levels would be defined as follows: C3 Level 0 no combined arms tactics. C3 Level 1 combined arms for infantry and artillery. C3 Level 2 combined arms for infantry artillery and tanks. C3 Level 3 combined arms for infantry artillery tanks and air. C3 Level 4 faster paced maneuver combining with mechanized infantry. C3 Level 5 faster paced maneuver combining with armored recon. Am I confusing C3 with mechanization? I hope not. Better equipment is worth very little without the procedural and organizational capabilities to take full advantage of it. You can have great halftracks. If you use them as trucks you have improved some strategic deployment speed (action points in SC), but you have done very little to imprve the tactical performance of your fighting men. But the Germans did not use their halftracks as trucks. Due to superior C3, they used their halftracks as an effective fighting plataform for their infantry. My default C3 startup levels would be. Germans start with C3 Level 3. They also start with one research chit invested. HQ's and Panzer Units have fully implemented C3 Level 3, but Infatry is kept at C3 level 2. French, British and Americans start with C3 Level 1. Russians start with C3 Level 0 if the Stalin Purges occured, but C3 Level 1 plus without the purges. Why do I give the Germas a C3 Level plus one research chit invested? First, the Germans Panzer Formations clealy applied combined arms tactics in Poland 1939. However, during Poland, and France 1940 recon was made by motorcyles. During Poland and France the Germans realized infantry travelling with tanks needed cross contry armored transports to.effectively keep up with the tanks. We find substantial numbers of infantry bearing, halftracks with machine guns mounted on top in 1941.

Thank you Kuniworth. I really think this would add a new dimmension to the game. There is a good paper Mark J. Calhoun, Maj. US Army on the Defeat at Kasserine: American Armor Doctrine, Training, and Battle Command in Nortwest Africa, WWII. I encourage you all to read it. You may down load it for free at: http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/ Some excerpts of this paper: One of the most remarkable charactristicss of the Tunisian campaign is the abysmally poor leadership displayed by many of the American and British commanders.... p62 The author goes on for several pages listing glaring mistakes made by commanders from corps down to regimental level. Some of the most glaring examples: The corps commander had a battalion of engineers build a bunker for his headquarters 100 miles behind the frontline... those engineers should have been building cover for the front line troops, and the corps commander should have been visiting the frontline. The Corps Commander sidestep the Division Commander and split the 1st Armored into 4 combat groups and spread them out so each combat group could not support the other. The commander of the 1st Armored gave conflicting orders: order Combat Command A to make attack on a German possition without weakening the defenses of the possition they were currently holding. He was indecisive and slow to react. Many of the 1st Armored Division officers "displayed poor leaderhip at Kasserine." The commander of Combat Command A "moved at an extremely slow pace, finally deciding to bivuoac for the night only seven miles short of his objective - providing the Germans ample time to prepare for a strong devense... When McQuilin finally attack, he ignored 26th Infantry Div intellingence reports of dug in Germnan 88's..." In other areas of this paper, the author empasizes how americans consistently failed to use combined arms tactics at Kasserine. The author explains that American units had never trained in combine arms tactics and their doctrine did not call for it... The most glaring example of this was the fact that there was no way for armor commanders at the from to obtain air support. All of this mistakes were the more costly because the Germans were fully exploiting the benefits of combined arms tactics. The Germans did not have their Tigger tanks at Kasserine. The Germans defeated the Americans at Kasserine because of combat doctrine, trainning, and C3. The officers responsible for the Kasserine fiasco were immediately sacked. ...as they should. But, the US army also had to review doctrine, trainning, and communication procedures to allow combined arms tactics and tactical air support. The battle of Kasserine took place in 1942. The Normany invasion was two years later. By 1944, the US had gone a long way at correcting the mistakes that resulted in the Kasserine fiasco.

Exel, I am afraid you missunderstood my remarks. First, I propose 2:1 odds for a 50% chance of success. I am not requiring 3:1 odds. If you read the table I prepared above you will notice I am proposing defense will be double the attack strength. But double the attack strength should not give you absolut certainty of success. In order to have absolute certainty of success you should require 3:1 odds. A 2:1 advantage should give the attacker a 50-50 chance of success. This I understand is what WWII studies say ...or at least is what I remember from my readings of WWII. With a little bit of math, if the attacker needs 2:1 odds to match the defender then defense strength is twice attack strength, as per my tables above. But 2:1 is the match ratio. 2:1 is an equal match between attacker and defender (in infantry). A match ration is not a superiority ratio. A match ratio is a 50% success ratio. A superiority ratiio is a 90% chance of success. 3:1 is a superiority ratio. If you read carefully my comments above I mention that a 2:1 is a toss up (50% probability) and 3:1 assures a successfull attack (90% probability). I am not requiring 3:1 odds. On the contrary, I am saying that you may attack at 2:1 odds but you take a good chance you won't be successfull. On the other hand, I noticed that you mention SC2 requires 3:1 odds for success. Are you sure about that? And, when some one says SC1 requires 3:1 odds, is this a match ratio or a superiority ration?

I like the new ideas. They are all very good. However, I am afraid they do not address my main concern. We need to be able to spread troops out to cover a wide front and then concentrate them at the precise moment and time to initiate an attack. In SC there is no such thing as concentrating and spreading. You either buy a dense concentrated army or a spred out thin Corps, and thereafter you can never spread and concentrate. I hope Hubert will address this issue later on. Now, back to my original topic. I hope there will be separate attack and defense strengths: Hard Attack vs Hard Defense Soft Attack vs. Soft Defense I feel it is very important to model the fact that infantry is much better at defense than at offense while Armored Groups are good at both Defense and Ofense. Any reactions?

Good question... And what about surrounding a unit with 4 units in the diagonals (NE, SE, NW, SW)?

Hi guys, thanks for your comments. I agree with Slapaho on the way SC makes it impossible to mass units for an attack. I understand Hubert's preference to avoid stacking. Stacking is a pain in the neck. There are many things I don't like about it. It looks ugly, it is cumbersome, and it is not quite as realistic as it seems. In real life, units don't stack on top of each other. Rather, higher command narrows the width of each units front. Furthermore, given the scale of the board (50 miles per hex) and the scale of the units (corps and armies), stacking would make sense only for corps. It does not make sense to stack two or three armies in a 50 mile tile. However, SC badly needs some way of combining corps into an army when you need to mass your smaller units for an attack, and, splitting them back into corps when you need to defend a wide front. It just occured to me one way to solve this problem, which I hope Hubert will read: There is a game called Legion by Freeverse... Great Game. You all should try it. One of the things I like about Legion is the way in which units can be joined. In Legion units combine into an Army. It costs movement (Action) points to join or remove a unit from that Army. Each unit retains its individual characteristics and takes losses independently while in combat. The combined group moves at the speed of the slowest unit. I would allow 2 corps size units to combine into an Army using a scheme similar to Legion's. After spending a set # of action points 2 corps could be combined into an special kind of Army made of the 2 original corps. They would fight together. The computer would add their total strength in combat, and would allocate losses between the two units. As far as the player is concerned the 2 combined Corps would look and feel like an Army unit the player decides to split the unit back into two Sorps (agains spending some AP's). Only Armies formed by combining 2 Corps could be split. These armies fromed by combining 2 corps would count as 2 units for HQ purposes. They would also count as two Corps for "Force Pool Limits". Otherwise they would behave as an army. 2 Corps should cost a bit more than 1 Army since they could join together and then split again. SC really needs something like this. You need corps to cover the huge Russian Front. But you also need to combine these corps into armies to succesfully attacked the enemy line. I would really like to hear from Hubert or one of the other guys close to him on this issue.

I really would like to hear reactions to the idea I introduced above: A tank unit that has not moved at all should be allowed to attack twice, provided both attacks are against the same enemy unit. Please note, I am talking about a tank unit that started the turn next to an enemy unit. The tank unit must not move at all during that gameturn. Provided it does not move, it may attack one enemy unit (the same one) twice. I feel strongly that Armored Groups are more than just Infantry on steroids. In SC, tanks looked like a stronger, faster infantry. Otherwise, they were not very different. The problem, however, was to find exactly what makes the tank different, and then finding a way to model that in a game of the scale of SC. A most important contribution of the Tank (and Armor in General) was that it could continue to advance under enemy fire. How do we model this in a game like SC? These are my two cents: On movement: Armored Groups should move faster through enemy territory and enemy ZOC's. On combat: (1) Allow multiple combats as per above. (2) Allow to retreat prior to being attacked if odds look to difficult. (3) Allow advance after combat.

...by the way, my table above did not show the way I expected it to. Let's see if it comes out better now:To sum up: ----------------Infantry Army-----Tank Group Soft Attack------------2--------------4 Soft Defense-----------4--------------5 Hard Attack------------2--------------4 Hard Defense-----------4--------------5

Yes Retributar. I used the words Tank and Tank Units to mean Armored Groups. I am using SC jargon. I fully understand these Tank Groups represent several armored divisions each including tanks, infantry, artillery, engineers, etc.

I gather Hubert & Co. are giving the final touches to The Editor. Therefore, if they are not already working on the default scenarios, they will probably start doing so any minute. I have been giving some thought to what the relative combat capabilities of land units should be. These are some of my ideas: Infantry was much better at defense than at offense. Infantry needs a three to one superiority to succesfully attack enemy infnatry. A two to one is a toss up. So infantry' soft defense should be twice its soft attack, unless the combat resolution engine already requires 2:1 odds for a succesfull attack. Tank was much better at attacking infantry. Tanks should have twice the soft attack strength of infantry. Defending Armor had an advantage in tank vs tank combat, but the advantage of the defender was not as clear and decisive as in the case of infantry vs. infantry. So Tank's hard attack strength should be 4 while the Tank's hard defense strength should be 5. To sum up: Infantry Army Tank Group Soft Attack 2 4 Soft Defense 4 5 Hard Attack 2 4 Hard Defense 4 5 The above are all for Level 0 units. I also assume the combat resolution engine does not require attacker superiority. I am incorporating the defender's combat advantage into my relative strengths. ...of course I know very little about the combat resolution engine of SC2. Could anyone tell me more about it? Finally, I would like Hubert to consider one last idea: A tank unit that has not moved at all should be allowed to attack twice, provided both attacks are against the same enemy unit. Please note, I am talking about a tank unit that started the turn next to an enemy unit. The tank unit must not move at all during that gameturn. Provided it does not move, it may attack one enemy unit (the same one) twice.

Now, that is a thought. Actually, it seems this will happen, albeit indirectly: Say we are using soft limits. And, Germany already hit its soft limit. So, now each German unit cost an extra 25%. This makes each German unit more expensive than its Rumanian counterpart. Or say we are using absolute limits. And, say Germany already hit its hard limit. Since Germany cannot make any new units, it must resort to the manpower of its allies to build new armies. The idea of having some sort of limit is a good one. However, there is something I do not like about it: Say Germany can make up to 30 infantry armies. And say further it already reached that limit, but subsequently lost 5 armies with the Germans. Can we make another 5 new armies as soon as we have sufficient MPP's? Germany (and England) had serious manpower limitations. As early as 1942, Germany the Wermacht could not draft enough men to replace losses in the eastern front. Germany faced a shortage of manpower much before it faced a shortage of tanks, airplanes, gas or just about anything else. It was the #1 shortage faced by Germany. Replacement of infantry losses (not just creating new armies, but simply replacing losses in existing units) was a huge drain in manpower. The game should find a way to model this fact. One idea: Limit the number of infantry combat points that can be purchased through any calendar year. It should not matter whether the player is buying new units or replacing losses in an existing unit, all purchase of infantry combat points should count towards this yearly limit. Infantry is the most manpower intensive unit. Purchase of Armored, Air and Naval combat points could be discounted at a reduced rate. If a player does not use all available manpower points during a calendar year, all or part of these manpower points could be rolled over for the next year. I would suggest that 80%-90% of unused manpower points are rolled over; 20%-10% are lost.

Part of the reason Germany did not invade Sweeden is because Sweeden was selling its ore to Germany. First, it is worth pointing out that Germany had plenty of ore. Sweedish ore apparently was better for making some extra hard steel used in Anti Tank munitions and some other specialized work. Germany did not have that much to gain from occupying Sweeden It was already getting the ore it needed. It had to pay for it. But keeping an Army in Sweeden would also be very expensive. And, even if Germany occuppied Sweeden the ore would not be 100% free... Germany had to invade Norway for three reasons. First, if the allies took over Norway they could bomb the hell out of northern Germany. Bases in Norway would be sufficiently close so British Fighter could escort bombers attacking northern cities in Germany. Second, if the allies took over Norway, they could seal the German Navy and U boats in the Baltic Sea... and, even more so before the fall of France. Third, during the winter, Sweedish ports would freeze and could not ship its ore to Germany. During the winter, Sweedish ore was shipped to Germany through Norway. If the allies took the port of Narvick they would cut off all winter shipments of ore from Sweeden to Germany. Fourth, by occupying Norway, and gaining Finland as an ally, the Germans blocked British access to Sweeden. The British would have to retake Norway before attacking Sweeden. And the Sweeds could not sell its ore to the British since they had no way of getting it out of the Baltic Sea... once Germany took over Sweeden. The coup the grace would come from Russia. When Russia attacked Finland, Finland was forced to allign with Germany. This left Sweeden effectively encircled. Sweeden was pretty much cut off from the world. It could not trade with anyone but Germany. And neither the Brits nor the Russians could attack Sweeden before first running over either Norway or Finland. It made no sense for Germany to keep several armies occupying Sweeden when Sweeden had no choice but to sell its ore at cheap prices to the Germans. The challenge for Hubert is to find a way to represent how Hitler cornered the Sweedish. I would suggest that as long as Norway is controlled by the Axis, some of Seeden's MPP's should be passed on the the German economy... Any other ideas?

I agree with you WC. But finding a correct formula for implementing your idea wont' be easy. For example: It does not make sense to allow 6 French Armies to rellocate to England while France is fighting for its own exisntance. However, the British and the French did plan and almost conducted a joint invasion of Norway prior to the German invasion of France. It does not make sense to allow Finish troops in North Afrika. But, what if Russia was already defeated. Or, what if the British attacked Finland in 1940. One suggestion: Most countries should not be allowed to move units out of their country while there are enemy units within their borders. I would excempt England, Germany, and Russia from this rule. I would not excempt France, Italy, Canada, or the U.S. So, if France wants to move units into England, it better do it before the Germans cross the border.

You can run Windows XP in a Mac. It is called Virtual PC and it is sold by Microsoft. Windows is a poor copy of the Macintosh Interface. The Macintosh interface was originally developed by Xerox. In the 1980's Microsoft and Apple entered into some joint development programs in which Apple provided some of this tech to Microsoft. Microsoft later used that tech to develop Windows. I have used Windows and Mac, both as an end user and for lightweight programing of databases. The Mac is vastly superior. And, it is not more expensive... when you measure all the factors that add up to final performace, and when you consider all the software that comes with your mac, it is more than competitive. Unfortunately, too many people out there chose their computers based on the number of drawers they have filled with pirated software. These people don't want to change their plataform because they don't want to "lose" the closet full of useless pirated disks. So they never try new plataforms. Their loss. Virtual PC costs just a bit more than Windows XP. If I had a PC, I would have to buy Windows XP any way. And, I don't have pirated software.

Yes, but those French troops were surrounded and they could not contribute to the defense of Paris or the rest of the country. Furthermore, my guess is that those men would have been ordered back to defend their home country but for the fact that France fell so quickly there was not a chance to ship them back. I would agree to allow French Troop surrounded in a port city to be evacuated and to re appear a couple of turns later as Free French units in England. ...but, only if they are cut off from Paris. In addition, these units should be subject to some combat loss to account for the loss of equipment and a rearguard dettachment.

Liam, The Germans had millions of men in arms. They knew how to make trucks and armored vehicles. But, they did not have the industrial capacity to supply trucks for each an every squad in the German Army. They could only afford to make enough trucks, halftacks, armored cars, and tanks for the 300,000 men that compromised their armored formations. The armored formations required a lot of motor transport, both trucks and halftracks. All their artillery was towed by motor transport, else it could not keep up with the tanks. Each armored division had a mechanized infantry brigade. Their anti tank and anti air batteries were towed or self-propelled. They had armored cars for recon. And they had thousands of trucks carrying the supplies necessary for the fighting men. Horse Drawn were used to supply slow moving infantry, not for the panzer formations. The Germans concentrated available motor transport on their panzer formations. Rommel's Afrika Corps, for example, was fully motorized. That's why Rommel was able to outflank the British so many times. And, about the same time, when the Germans invaded Russia, the Germans fielded against the Russians 4 PanzerGroups each of which was fully motorized. One thing I like about the new game design is that players will have to face the decission of whether or not they want to incurr the extremely heavy cost of motorizing each and every unit. I think most players will find that most of the time it is not worth it. If the sole purpose of a unit is to defend a port city in norther France. If it is going sit on that city until a huge armada comes to blow it up, what's the point of spending valuable limmited resources to motorize that unit when you need those MPP's elsewhere? ...it was not a matter of having the technology. It was a matter of allocating limited production resources. By the way, not every U.S. troop was motorized either. As a matter of fact, few U.S. units had motorized transport permanently assigned to them. Many units shared motor transport from a common pool. Use of that transport was prioritized by high command... Men from units that received lower priority had to march. Compromise between quality and quantity was commonplace in WWII: Before the war started, the Luftwaffe chose the Messerchmitt over a superior ****e Wolf model that was more expesnive. At the time the Messerchmitt was superior to any plane fielded by either the Polish, French, or Birtish Air Forces. The Russians opted for "slower" machine guns that could be easily mass produced (were cheaper). The Sherman Tank was not as good as many of the German Panzer V or Panzer VI, but it could be produced in high quantities. The trade off of quantity vs. quality was always there. And it was not merely a matter of "discovering" the necessary "technolgy". Most often it was simply a matter of having sufficient industrial capacity to produce enough of it. We seem to forget the vastness of WWII, and the incredible effort made by all warring parties. We think of Iraq 2003-04 as a huge troop commitment. The U.S. has around 130,000 men in Iraq. In the scale of SC that amount to just a couple of units. Germany was fielding 15-20 times that in 1941. On the day Germany invaded Russia, 1.300,000 German soldiers crossed the Russian border. The German army surrounded entire Russian Army Groups of several hundred thousand men each in pockets that were the size of U.S. states. And, this happened not once, but several times. Yet, this is only the tip of the iceberg. Germany had to supply ammo, gas, uniforms, and everything else for those troops. On top of that, Germany had to replace huge losses in men and equipment, year after year starting in 1939 and all the way until 1945. FInally, consider that Germany is much smaller than the U.S. and, and, further consider this was 63 years ago. The industrial commitment was monstruous. Germany knew how to make trucks, armored cars, tanks, planes, you name it. And made plenty of them, albeit not enough to win the war. What is surprising is not that Germany was short of trucks. What is truly surprising is that they had enough horses...

I agree. Yet one more shot at trying to bridge a compromise: Say on the day of capitulation, all French units adjacent to a port have a random chance of evacuation... unless there is also a German unit adjacent to that port. So, as soon as Paris falls, you either counterattack, or run to the port cities. But the Germans also run for the ports. This is exactly what happenned in 1940... Evacuated units would re-appear after a couple of turns in a random port in the UK, but at reduced strength to account for lost equipment and also to account for the elements of any rearguard and security force left at the port of departure.

Thank you for your comments Dessert Dave. My reaction: First, Tank Groups should always be faster than the fastest motorized Infantry. Armor allows you to move all the way into the combat zone, trucks do not allow that. If the best motorized infantry has 6 AP's, Tank Groups should have at least 7 AP's. Besides, my feeling is that Tank Groups should have close to four times the speed of foot infantry. So, if the basic foot infantry army has 2 AP's, Tank Groups should have around 8 AP's (+/- 1). Second, any country that has the technology to build a Tank Group, also has the technology to build trucks, and whatever else is necessary to haul and infantry army. It is essentially a problem of cost. Therefore, I would give all countries the technological know how, but I would not motorize any of the units starting on the map on day 1. If the Germans want to motorize, they have the technology, but they would have to upgrade their units at a huge cost. ...remember, the Germans had PanzerGrenedier Divisions as early as 1939. They chose to pair those PanzerGrenedier Divisions with Panzer Divisions to form the Panzer Corps. But the Germans clearly had the technology to make a fully motorized (or mechanized) infantry army. In fact, they only had to bring together their PanzerGrenedier Divisions to form a PanzerGrenedier Corps or a PanzerGrenedier Army. This was purely a matter of choice. There is a great biography of Heinz Guderian which explains why they made this choice. I will try to get the reference for you later.