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The US produced about 20 times more oil than Germany. However, the US was operating huge fleets in the Pacific and the Atlantic, huge number of transports on both theaters, and large air armadas on both theaters. More important, Germany's economy ran on coal, not gas. I will try to get the consumption rates, and post them as soon as I have them.

This is not quite accurate. The U.S. was fighting two wars (Japan and Germany). Russian presence in the European conflict was much bigger than the U.S. in any aspect but strategic bombing. Some statistics are worth noting: Germany kept anywhere between 60% and 84% of its troops in the Eastern Front from 1941 until the end of the war. As of 1942, Germany had 65% of its planes assigned to the eastern front. As of 1941 Germany assigned 3.3 million men to the eastern front. As of 1944, despite huge losses, Germany still had 3.1 million men in the eastern front. In 1944, Germany had 117 divisions in Russia. 39 divisions in Norway, Finland, Denmark and the Balkans. 76 Divisions in between Itally, France, and, Benelux. As of 1944, UK had 13,200 planes, US had 11,800 planes, Russia had 14,700 planes. The US supplied some planes to Russia (many more to the UK). Nevertheless, the majority of the planes used by the Russians were made by Russians. At any point in time, The Russians had anywhere between 5 and 6.8 million men fighting in Europe. The combined US, UK and Candian Armies fighting in Europe did not add to half that many men. The Russians lost 12 million soldiers and 17 million civilians in Europe. The US lost 407,000 men. There is no doubt that the US had the largest GDP of all the warring parties. But, a big chunk of that GDP went towards the war with Japan. Furthermore, there is more to war effort than GDP. The U.S. could not have landed in France but for the fact that Germany kept most of its troops fighting in Russia. Germany lost 3.25 million men during the War. Most of those losses were in the eastern front (Germany only assiged 700,000 to the defense of western europe.) Close to three million German soldiers died in the eastern front. If 10% of the German soldiers who died in Russia would have been available to defend France, Normandy would have looked very different. Although the US was the major player in the global war, when you look solely at the European conflict, the Russian war contribution to the allied effort probably matched or exceeded that of the US.

I agree with Retributar. Through 1943 Germany was producing plenty of oil (8.9 million tons a year). Germany suffered a huge drop in production in 1944 (6.4 million tons produced). I don't have quarterly data. But look at the facts: The bombing campaign against oil refineries really picked up in the late spring '44. First quarter producion was probably fairly steady around 2.2 million tons. A bit of guess work, Q3 production may have been around 1.8 and Q3 and Q4 production most have dropped below 1.2 million tons per quarter. That's a 40% drop in production! A 40% drop in production a monstrous drop. But add to that that the bombing campaign hit first the refineries that made aviation fuel... late '44 there was probably no aviation fuel. But that was the result, not the cause, of the bombing campaign. In 1942 and 43 Germany had the oil to sustain a larger airforce. I do not know if they had the industrial capacity to make more planes. Perhapps, as far back as 1940 and 41 they should have built more manufacturing plants, so they could build more planes. But they certainly had the oil. They lost the oil, after they lost the air war.

...this goes to show that best tactics may come to nothing if the srategy is bad enough. Hitler wasted an incredibly good army in aimless pursuits. Hitler never had a strategy to defeat Russia. Think about it: Hitler's plan called for the encirclement and destruction of Russian armies. Barbarosas first objectiive was to destroy the Russian armies. The secondary objective was to take Lenningrad and Moscow. Hitler's was Napoleon's strategy: defeat the Tsar's army and you have defeated Russia. Well, back then the Tsar had only one army. And, any way, the strategy failed misserable for Napoleon. Second, Napoleon had such a hard time destroying the Tsar's army because Napoleon was never able to surround it. So the Russian soldiers often lived to fight another day. Hitler did not learn from Napoleon's mistakes. Hitler's army encircled millions of men in multiple engagements. But the Panzer Forces were too small, and did not have enough tracked vehicles (relying too much on trucks to carry most of the Panzer Grenadiers) to keep a tight lid on the encircled armies. Many Russian soldiers left their equipment behind and slipped through the German lines to fight another day. Much like Napoleon's, Hitler's army was given a task it could not perform. But more important, the defeat of so many Russian armies did not represent any strategic advance. The Russians kept on recruiting more men to make good their losses. And the heavy losses did not diminish the Russians will to fight. Hitler's secondary objective were the capture of Leningrad and Moscow. Again, there is no reason to believe that the capture of those two cities would have resulted in the collapse of the Russian government. Hitler had no strategy for victory. Whatever tactical advantages the German's had, they were useless without a sound strategic plan for victory.

There are some scattered post in this site suggesting Germany could not field more armored units or air fleets because of lack of oil production. However, the record shows that oil shortages occured because Germany did not field enough planes to protect the German skies. Germany had the oil to field more planes - and more tanks. I do not understand why the German high command did not push for the production of more planes prior to 1943...

Thanks for all the good info, Retributar. In support of your post, oil production in Germany dropped from 8.9 million tons in 1943 to 6.4 million tons in 1944. The figure is most impressive when you realize that most of the drop probably took place in the later months of 1944. I do not have data for 1945.

Thank you. Very good... Sorry I did not notice your topic earlier.

First, I am not suggesting that Germany was short of oil. On the contrary, my point is that absent allied bombing, Germany had enough oil. Second, the German spearheads were short of oil only because supply convoys could not reach them. The 101's defense of Bastogne made it impossible for supply trucks to get through. Since trucks could not go cross country, they needed the roads. That's why Bastogne was so important. My tribute to the guys that defended Bastogne; they were given a truly important and difficult task. The Germans faced in the Ardeness the same problems faced by Patton a few months earlier. And, there are plenty of examples on all sides during WWII where different armies had to stop their advance because logistics could not keep up. It happened to the Brits and Germans in North Africa. It happened to the Russ and to the Germans at different point in the eastern front. This is not to say that either of this nations could not support their armored formations due to lack of oil production at the home front. A lot of German planes were destroyed in the ground because of lack of oil towards the end of the war. That shortage was the result of allied bombing and the Russians taking the Ploesti fields. Prior to that, Germany had enough oil to conduct the war. Also, bear in mind that most planes of WWII era needed special fuel. When allied bombers hit the refineries capable of making airplane fuel, they left the planes without fuel even if there was oil, and, fuel for the tanks. Germany's true shortage was manpower. Germany's war against Russia failed, more than anything else because it did not have enough men for the job. At its peak, Germany had 3.3 million men in Russia in August 1941. That was the peak. At the same time the Russians had 5.3 million men in arms. That was the low for the Russians. Germany never recovered the losses of the 1941/42 winter. Russia had a steady increase of men in arms throughout the war. And, because the front was so vast, this differential in men made it impossible for Germany to hold the line. It was the exact opposite of the Termopliae. In a narrow fronts, quality was everything. But in the endless Russian front numbers overwhelmed quality.

Some data on the Luftwaffe: Halfway through the war (June 1943) Germany had 4600 war planes. I have no info on fuel consumption. My guess is that armored groups (including tanks and all supporting vehicles) burned a lot more fuel than planes.

As off 1943 Germany was producing 8.9 million tons of oil. Oil production dropped sharply in 1944 as the allied bombing campaing stepped up. A panzer division armed solely with Panzer III's and Panzer IV's would burn 23.7 tons of oil per 100 miles of advance. A panzer division armed with the heavier Panther V and Tigers could burn up to 35.8 tons of oil per 100 miles. Let us assume for argument's sake that a Level 2 or Level 3 Panzer Group in SC2 will represent: 3 Heavy Panzer Divisions Armed with Panther V's and Tigers, 3 Medium Panzer Divisions Armed with Panzer III's and IV's, and 3 Panzer Grendediar Divisions with no tanks. We could reasonably guess that such a Panzer Group would burn 220 tons of fuel per 100 miles of advance. Now, the real question, is how much this Panzer Group is going to move during an average week. It will have weeks where it will advance (or retreat) 300 miles. But it will have weeks in which it will sit and wait. The largest advane made by any Armored Group during WWII during a single year, was that of Guderian's Panzer Group. It exceeded 1,000 miles - including the detour to meet with army group south. But that was quite exceptional. And, fortunately for Guderian, he did not have the heavy gas guzzlers of 1944. Any way, if we assume an Armored Group will advance 1,000 miles per year, each Armored Group would consume some 22,000 tons per year. Now, the problem with those numbers is that it does not take into account additional gas consumed during combat maneuvers. It also does not take into account repossitioning of units behind the lines, nor consumption of fuel while the unit is not advancing. Off the top of my head, we can safely assume that an army size Armored Formation (9 divisions) would consume 8x22,000 = 176,000 tons of fuel per year. Since Germany produced 8.9 million tons of fuel in 1943, a Panzer Army would have consumed 1/500th of Germany's Oil Production. It is important to note that through most of the war, German Oil production sufficed to sustain the needs of the Wermacht and the Luftwaffe. It was only after Allied bombings disrupted German Oil production, and, the Russians took the Ploesti Oil fields that Germany started to feel the pinch. And, even then, they were able to mount strong armored attacks like the Ardenness offensive in December 1944.

Expanding on my prior entry: We must distinguish between strategic reconn and "operational" reconn: There is one type of reconn regarding factories and railroad crossings, and the effects of strategic bombing. This type of reconn is completely irrelevant to SC. There is a second type of reconn regarding the location of large concentration of troops. Say we call this operational reconn. That is the type of reconn we are talking about here. And, I do not think it was the job of strategic bombers to conduct operational reconn.

I agree with your remarks regarding reconn by bombers. In fact, I would not allow bombers to conduct reconn, period.

A further note on the motor pool of German Panzer Units... As of 1941 the 9th Panzer had 1644 trucks. A third of thos trucks were assigned to combat units. Two thirds were used for supply. I understand this was typical of hte Panzer and Panzer Grenadier Divisions. So the 29 Panzer and Panzer Grenadier Divisions participating in Barbarosa must have added somewhere between 45,000 and 50,000 trucks. These numbers do not take into account 2 Panzer and 1 Panzer Grenadier in North Africa, nor any other units assigned elsewhere. It also does not take into account that there most have been trucks and other vehicles assigned to army and army group headquarters.

Thanks for your comments, pzgndr. It sounds good to me. By travelling at night, and staying under during the day, a sub should be able to avoid detection by airplanes... And, given the scale of the map and WWII tech, I doubt radar and sonar would have worked well enough at the time to make any meaningul difference. As someone else mentioned earlier, subs became vulnerable when they attacked, otherwise they could remain hidden pretty much at will. That is why they were such a dreadfull weapon.

Most of the German army walked on foot and rellied on horsed to carry supplies and to tow artillery. Having said that, the Panzer Divisions were usually motorized. As of 1941, the typical Panzer Division had: One Armored Car Battalion with 24 armored cars One Motorcycle Battalion with several hundred motorcycles. Two Tank Batallions with a combined total of 100-150 tanks. One Mechanized Infantry Batallion with 40-50 halftracks. Three Motorized Infantry Batallions with a combined total 100-150 trucks. One Motorized Engineer Batallion with some 50 trucks 200-300 trucks to tow artillery. So each Panzer Division had over 200 tracked vehicles, a large number of motorcylces, and, 500 trucks permanently assigned for combat duty. They also had a large number of supply trucks and repair vehicles. The Panzer Divisions could not have achieved the large penetrations they performed in France and Russia without motorizing infantry, artillery, engineers, and, supply. The Panzer Grenadiers had no tanks. Instead they had 2 batallions on halftracks and 4 batallions on trucks. The German Army, however, had two problems: Out of a total of 149 divisions, only 29 were Panzer or Panzer Grenadier divisions. The Panzer and Panzer Grenadier divisions needed a larger proportion of (and artillery) infantry mounted on halftracks. The Tank component in 1941 was probably enough since most Russian Infantry units lacked sufficient artillery and anti tank units. Furthermore, the Russian tanks were spread out thin in formations no larger than a Brigade. Hence there was no need to bring together more than 150 tanks per division. But the supporting arms needed better cross country mobility.

Could you write in the names of real life cities in the map without making the particular tile into an SC city with industrial production. ...after all, learning of geography and history is a good thing.

I got the math, thanks. Fortunately for the airfleets, they have a lot of planes, and they do not have to cover the whole circle. More than half of this circle falls within friendly lines. Remember airfleets are usually stationed a couple of tiles behind the front lines. So a lot of the "cicle" falls within friendly lines. Let's say that on average about 1/3 of the circle falling in enemy lines. So, as per your example above, the airfleet only has to cover 27,000 miles (81,000/3 = 27,000). And we have week long turns, so we have 3,000 miles per day. Assuming an entire air fleet assings only 30 planes to reconn, that means each plane has to cover 100 miles per day. Now, I do not remember how many planes are represented by an SC air fleet. But, in SC 1 an airfleet costs more than an entire infantry army or armored group, so my guess is that it represents quite a few planes. An army must have thousands of guns, let alone small arms and other equipment. An armored group must have several hundred tanks, plus trucks and halftracks for the infantry and artillery., guns, small arms, etc. If an air fleet costs close to as much as an infantry army or armored group, it should have hundreds planes. Now, say an airfleeet has 900 planes, but sends 300 on recon for a single day. Say each plane covers 100 square miles, that means in a sincle day you cover 30,000 square miles. But, as I mentioned earlier, we only have to reconn enemy territory, so at most we need to recon 27,000 square miles. An airfleet could probably reconn 27,000 sq. miles of enemy territory within his 81,000 sq. mile range in one day while using only one third or maybe half of its planes. Air fleet reconn probably generated more data than intell could absorb and process. My guess is that a lot of good good reports bungled up durring WWII (on all sides).

Makes sense... Now, what about spotting of other units, and, spotting by other units. Bad weather should give a random chance for any unit to miss spotting any other unit. If the fog is bad enough, even battleships could fail to see each other.

German Combat Doctrine of WW II was rooted in the experiences and advanes of WW I. Around 1917 the Germans implemented new combat doctrines for Attack and Defense. These new doctrines were way ahead of the allied combat doctrines. Unfortunately for the Allies they failed to grasp their importance until hammered during the first half of WW II. Most historical work on WW II focuses on the Wermacht's attack capabilities. And, unfortunately, pays undue attention to the tank, and, misses the broader picture, of which the tank was but one part. During WWI, the warring nations dig their armies in trenches. The attacker would bombard these trenches for several hours, or days, and then mount a massive infantry attack in the hope that enough men would survive the killing ground to take the enemy trenches. As a general rule, many defenders did die during the initial bombardment, but enough survived to cause very heavy casualties on the attacker. It was usually a slaughter fest for both the defender and the attacker. The Germans realized there was a better way to defend and to attack. First, let's talk defense. The Germans were able to mount these amazing attacks because they realized they did not need that many men to hold the line, and hence could concentrate their best fire power in a decisive point. The Germans had a pretty sophisticated defense doctrine. I encourage you to read the following article: http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/Wray/wray.asp#ted In 1917 the German's developed the new defensive doctrine which they called Elastic Defense. The Germans wanted to keep their main defensive line outside enemy sight so enemy artillery could not home on thier possitions. So they would place their main line of defense in a reverse slope or behind woods or villages. And, in order to keep spotter off their main defensive line, they would set up a front line screen mainly responsible for stopping spotters and reconn parties. The first line would fall back along protected, prearranged paths as soon as the main attack started. The main defensive line (the second line) was not meant to be impregnable. Instead, local commanders were suppose to counter attack to close in gaps as they were openned. When a breach was openned, German artillery would pin down the attacker, while Allied artillery was ineffective at pinning down the counter attackers because of their reverse slope possitions. The Elastic Defense proved very effective during WW I. During WWII the Russian front was so vast it was impossible to cover the whole front with a continuous line of men, let alone a double line. But in Italy, Normandy, and the Hurtgen Forest, the Allied troops suffered heavy losses when facing this type of defense. As for the attack, we have talked a lot about it in other posts. German Blitzkrieg was not about the tank, was about combining the mobilite of the combustion engine (tank, halftracks, trucks, and planes) with the storm troop tactics of WW I. During WW I the Germans realized it was suicidal to keep on sending men into no man's land to be slaughtered by machineguns. They realized that enough Allied men survived artillery bombardments to mow down attacking waves by the thousands. But they also realized that those men survived the bombardment because they laid low as the bombs were falling around them. The idea: to attack the enemy trenches while the bombs were falling on the enemy. It sounds suicidal. But it was not. The bombardment had two phases. The first phase covered the front line. During the second phase, bombs would stop falling in prearragend spots or gaps. Bombs would fall behind and on the sides of those prearranged spots. The defenders, not knowing what was going on, would keep their heads down. And the storm troopers would advance through these prearranged gaps in the German bombardment. It worked. Storm Troop Tactics called for artillery to suppress, not to kill the enemy. Artillery suppressed the enemy so the storm trooper could close in for the kill. The German would adpot these same tactics to the armored formations of WW II. In the attack, artillery or planes would suppress enemy fire while tanks and infantry mounted on halftracks closed in. On defense, armored units would act as the fire brigades, counter attacking any breach in the main defense line. Of course, these fluid tactics required better communication procedures, batter ways of giving orders, more sophisticated relationships between commanders and junior officers, etc. And, of course the allied did learn as the war progressed and managed to close the gap. But, at the beginning of the war the Combat Doctrine and Command Structure of the German Army was vastly superior to that of any other country it fought during WWII.

"Pi R Squared" would not be the most approriate conversion rate here since planes fan out when conducting reconn. A fighter's range is determined by dividing its total range in three parts: one part to go, one part to fight, and one part to return. A reconn's range is determined by dividing its total range in three parts: one part to go, one part to recon, and one part to return. The proposal to reduce the recon range by 1 tile sounds fair to me. But, I would also add a random chance of a unit not being spotted at all. Units that moved last turn (unentrenched) should be easier to spot. Units taht did not move last turn (entrenched) should be harder to spot. Also, land units should be able to conduct slower night moves to avoid being spotted by aircraft. A unit conducting night movement, can only move 1/3 of its total AP but finishes its movement with entrenchment level 1 which makes it harder for enemy planes to spot it. As a matter of fact, I would always assume that unit moving only 1/3 of its total AP allowance, finishes the turn in entrench level 1 so it is hard to spot, and it is ready to defend from attack. (It should not take a whole week to dig a foxhole. )

I would go much further. In the 1940's bad weather often men planes would not even take off, let alone, patrolling large areas out at sea, with no reference points, and winds that take you off course so you cannot accurately calculate your location. And even if you take off, you rely solely on eye sight to find a sub... in bad weather. It sound really tough to me. And if you find one sub, you have to attack that one sub, and keep on searching the area for the rest of the pack represented by the unit counter we see on the SC map. The likelihood that you will be able to successfully spot enough of the subfleet, so you may attack it and cause material damage at the scale represented in SC is pretty small. I would reduce the likelihood of spotting subfleets during bad weather by 80%.

Germany invaded Russia (1941) with 17 Panzer Divisions, 11 Motorized Divisions, 1 Cavalry Division and 120 infantry divisions. At the time Germany also had a Panzer Corps in Africa. True, most of the army was on foot. But keep in mind this was a huge army. And note that Germany had several times more armored and motorized divisions than than the US and Great Britain put together.

What is the "soft build penalty"? Does this have to do with the soft force pool limit? What is the "industrial modifier"? I see you can edit the combat attributes of each unit. Great! Can you edit the production cost as well? ...e.g. make armored groups army size, so it is stronger, but more expensive...

True enough, one or the other would do. ...well, it is not quite that simple, there was more than meets the eye behind this: First, it is true that the German officers were expected to have more initiative. It is also true that C3 was set up to allow for that kind of initiative. Take for example the manner in which orders were given. In most other armies a commander would order a subordinate to take a hill, a town or a bridge. In the German Army the commander was expected to explain to the subordinate officer orders the commander had received from his superiors. The commander was also expected to explain where the main effort of the attack or defense would be. Finally, the commander was expected to explain to the subordinate the "effect" they were trying to have on the enemy (to flank, to supress, to overrun, to breakthrough, etc.). In this manner the lower ranking officers could understand the larger scope of things and take initiatives that made sense within the larger context of the action. Second, the German Army practiced combined arms tactics, including armor, air support, infantry, artillery, engineers, etc. The German Army was the first to do so, and they were very good at it. Third, the German Army was an army that moved. They were alway looking for ways to maneuver around the enemy. And, again they were pretty good at it. Evidence of how much the Germans valued maneuver was how many men they dedicated to recon. A German Panzer Division would have three time as many men in Recon as the American counterpart. Fourth, the German Army polished their radio communication procedures to allow more effective communications between units during the fast paced armored engagements. Fifth, the German Army was the first army to stablish procedures to allow armored spearheads to call for artillery and air support while on the move. Most often the Germans used this support to suppress the enemy while the tanks and infantry closed in for the kill. So they did not need very accurate or very prolonged bombing. Short bursts at the right moment would do. Now, many of this things may be common place in the US Army today. But, the U.S. learned a lot of this from the Germans. It was not quite this way prior to WWII. This is a good idea. As I mentioned earlier, I do not care whether you call it Combined Arms, C3, or whatever... True, but someone suggested reducing the number of the HQ's the Allies have (at least at the begining), as a makeshift alternative to a C3 tech. This I don't like because it woud force the allies to keep their armies close to the cities, and essentially prevent them from attacking even the Italians. Now, I believe that the German Panzer formations had superior C3 and combat Doctrine, which gave them and edge over their allied counterparts. But, I also realize that the Allied armies could give adequate supply to their armies even if they were halfway accross the globe. To remove the HQ's would reduce movement, and would reduce combat readiness by too much (unless the Allied plaber stays put in his/her cities). ...so, I do not support the idea of reducing the number of HQ's the allies have. ...the remedy would be worse than the illness. However, I like the idea of reducing the HQ ratings of the Allied HQ's. Along this line, these other alternatives could work: Alternative #1, restricting the apperance of better Allied HQ's until later in the game. ...so the first allied HQ's are not their top generals. Alternative #2, give veteran status to the German HQ's that start up the game. The Germans conducted more extensive excercises prior to the war. They gained a lot of good experience in these excercise that lead to the development of a better combat doctrine. Besides, the German's experience with storm troop tactics in WWI proved most important - that is where Rommel came from. Alternative #3, start the game with the best German HQ's. Manstein was not a Field Marshall, but he was in the General Staff and he drafted the plan for the attack on France. I am not very enthusiastic about Alternative #1 since it is kind awkwardl. Alternatives #2 and #3 achieve the same results in a smoother way.

Thanks for your response Edwin. I proposed C3 tech would have 3 separate effects on the game: Effect #1: An HQ could serve more units as per your quote above. Effect #2: The combat readiness contribution that an HQ gives to its units would be higher. Effect #3: Combat units with higher C3 tech would have higher combat readiness than regular units. Insofar as Effect #1 is concerned, you are right - more, or less, HQ's would do the job. However, I think the real value of C3 tech lies in Effects #2 and #3. These would allow low tech German Armor to perform better than higher tech Russian Armor. Now, I hear you, but what iff the Russians or the Americans do not have HQ's? Well the fact is that the Americans will most likely have an HQ when they land in North Africa in 1942 or 43. And, the Russians will have Zuhkov to defend Moscow and Stalingrad. Because HQ's are also the source of supply in SC, you cannot denny HQ's to the Allies. However, historically, having adequate supply (read HQ's) did not do the job. Through the first half of the war, fully supplied Allied armored formations regularly underperformed their German counterparts despite adequate supply. And, Russian armored formations continued to underperform pretty much through out the war.