Dook

There was recently an excellent discussion on the topic of World War II aces on the H-War discussion list. I have pasted in the following post, which I found to be very insightful. It addressess many of the issues, such as the availability of targets, training levels of opponents, number of missions flown, raised by others above. Apologies for the length. "I believe that sheer target availability had something to do with the high scores of many Luftwaffe aces on the eastern front. By 1943 the Soviets were producing warplanes at the rate of something like 1,500 per month. Obviously, competent pilots cannot be produced so quickly,but Stalin was hardly the sort to let all those planes sit on the ground while the German Army still occupied a huge chunk of European Russia. At any rate, the approach of sheer mass had served the Red Army reasonably well when applied to infantry, artillery, and armor--why not aircraft as well? Hurling huge masses of planes, many of them with inexperienced and barely-competent pilots, into ground-support tasks whenever possible meant that a skilled opponent might have a field day. And many German pilots apparently did just that--Erich Rudorffer reportedly shot down 13 planes in a single mission in November 1943, during an action lasting only 17 minutes: in October 1944, Rudorffer shot down nine planes in a single flight, so the first was no fluke (he added two more on a second mission to make it 11 for the day). Emil Lang was credited with 18 victories in a single day, in which he flew three missions. These occasions correspond directly to some of the experiences of US Navy pilots in 1944, when the Japanese were also putting up a lot of pilots with rudimentary (at best) training. On McCampbell's famous flight in which he shot down nine Japanese in October '44 (the single most successful US fighter mission of the war), he noted afterwards that the enemy pilots just kept flying in formation as if nothing was happening, as that was apparently the extent of what they had been trained to do, while he picked them off with relative ease. I read of one pilot during the "Great Marianas Turkey Shoot" who was shuttling his F6F two miles from one carrier to another--not intended to even be a combat mission, but it occurred during a Japanese attack on the US fleet-- and he shot down three enemy planes on the way! Given a lot of poorly-trained pilots who came at you in mass (and who might well be flying inferior aircraft as well), such results are not necessarily astonishing. Another contributing factor was the sheer volume of combat missions flown by Luftwaffe pilots. Johnny Johnson flew 515 combat missions 1941-45, if I recall correctly. The top Soviet ace, Kozhedub, flew 520 missions 1943-45 in amassing his 62 recorded victories. The top US ace, Richard Bong, flew 275 combat missions on two tours of duty in the Pacific, credited with 40 "kills." There was a de facto ceiling on the number of missions American fighter pilots would be allowed to fly-- usually after 250 to 400 missions,they were grounded. One low-ranking American ace who flew 283 missions during the war only fired his guns on 19 of them! Meanwhile, on the German side, Hartmann flew 1,400+ combat missions 1942-45, and was actually engaged on some 800 occasions! Barkhorn, who had been flying since 1940, recorded 2,000 missions during the war (and engaged in actual combat on more than half of them). The German practice of basing their short-legged fighters as close to the front as possible, and of then having pilots fly multiple daily missions (sometimes as many as six or seven per day) as a regular routine further maximized the opportunities for Luftwaffe fighter pilots. However, a "target-rich" environment and repeated daily sorties had a down side, too. What seems to have ensued was a vicious natural selection process, wherein a certain percentage of pilots survived, learned, and became highly successful; while an increasing number of "beginners" failed to survive very long. Even by 1942-43, I've read that in some German fighter units in the east, two out of three replacement pilots were killed or disabled before they shot down even a single enemy plane. I saw a TV interview with Gunther Rall in which he stated that by fall 1944, the average "life-span" of a new pilot was three missions before being killed (this was however in the west, where by comparison the opposing Allied pilots tended to be very well-trained). And, of course, even the Luftwaffe "Experten" in most cases were more than a little lucky, in that they survived their own "learning experiences." Hartmann, for instance, was shot down 16 times in less than three years (and forced down three other times by colliding with debris from his victims, as his trademark was closing to point-blank range). Most pilots who lasted long enough had similar experiences (I mentioned previously that Barkhorn was shot down twice in 1940 without scoring). Adolf Galland was shot down two or three times on the same day! The top 15 German fighter pilots of the war were all credited with over 200 victories, a mark not reached (or even approached) by any non-Luftwaffe pilot. But the number 15 man on that list, Helmut Lipfert, was shot down 13 times en route to that total, all these incidents coming in the east (and all but two of them by Soviet ground fire, which was another "occupational hazard," and not only in the east-- I've read that more P-51s were lost to AAA on strafing missions than in combat with Luftwaffe fighters). Also, the same "natural selection" was at work on the Soviet side-- as the war progressed, they too had a growing core of survivors who had become proficient predators, and their fighter tactics also became generally more effective as a result of lessons learned. Of course, there were still a lot of inexperienced,inadequately-trained pilots on the Soviet side, right up until the end (as evidenced by the fact that even in early 1945 there were reports of Sturmoviks forming "Lufberry circles" when attacked-- a crude but often effective defensive tactic which was not far short of desperation, as it forfeited all hope of either accomplishing the mission or even escaping, in favor of trying to stay alive until the attackers gave up and went away. The number four German ace of the war, Otto Kittel, was killed when attacking a Lufberry circle of Sturmoviks in February 1945) So,despite an enemy equipped with increasingly better aircraft, and with more and more of their own experienced, "expert" fliers, opportunities existed for the top German pilots in the east right up until the end. Although Hartmann once chafed at a person who asked if victories were "easier" in the east, saying something to the extent of "30 of us against 200 or 300 Russians--does that sound "easy" to you?" Having said of of this, one must still also wonder about just how accurate the German victory claims in the east really were. The Germans have stressed how difficult it was to have a "kill" verified and credited, but it is hard to see how an overly rigorous verification process could have functioned in the conditions of the eastern front, especially in the second half of the war. And it is also hard not to assume that the same pattern of overclaiming seen in virtually every other phase of air combat in World War II would not be operative here as well. After all, the Luftwaffe pilots flew the same numbers of missions-- and had plenty of targets--in the west as well, and don't seem to have done nearly as well. That brings us back, full-circle, to the theory that not only the numbers of targets, but the quality of the opposition (in terms of tactics and training,especially, as by 1944 the Soviets had some very good fighter planes in operation with the La-7, Yak-3, and even the La-5FN, the latter introduced mid-43) was central to the paradigm of why Luftwaffe pilots ran up such high scores in the east."

Lucero, Are you using a Mac? The TPG site, for some reason, doesn't work well with Safari. Try using Firefox - it works well.

I read the review on Amazon and the reviewer sounds like he doesn't know what he is talking about. It also sounds like he is playing with a ridiculous number of units on very large maps. In a Combat Mission game, you give your orders to your units and hit the go button. The computer then calculates the results to be displayed in a one-minute movie. If you play with the number of units the designers intended (roughly a reinforced inf. company with some tank support) on reasonably sized maps (approx. 2 sq. km or smaller), the turns don't take long to calculate - a minute or two at most on my obsolete 350 mhz Mac. I regularly play battalion sized engagements with no noticeable delays. If you push the game's limits to the absolute edge, like the reviewer apparently did by putting 50 tanks on a huge map, turn calculation can take longer. I've never played a game that big so I don't know the exact amount of time required. In any case, download the demo, play it, and decide for yourself. If you like it, buy it. If you think the demo scenarios are way too small and you want to play games that are 10 times larger, CM may not be for you.

I just finished a PBEM Soviet assault across a river in which the Pioneers were critical to my success. I had 4 companies - 2 rifle, 1 SMG, and 1 Pioneer - plus 5 T-34s and some arty - against a German rifle company, 2 88s, 2 StuGs, some 75 mm arty, and a lot of mines. I split up the pioneers and sent a platoon or so with each assault group and kept one squad in reserve. They cleared daisy chains and used their demo charges to knock out one of the 88s. They would have killed the last StuG too if my opponent hadn't surrendered. Their ammo seems bottomless and, as JasonC says, the company commander is very useful too. Every Soviet attack/assault of sufficient size would benefit from using at least a company.

76mm, not sure which battle you're thinking of, but it's not 73 Easting. 73 Easting was a real battle - the Iraqis were in prepared positions and the US cav troop came over a dune and found themselves facing a significantly larger force. You might be thinking of the infamous "Highway of Death," the shoot-up of the Iraqi columns as they fled Kuwait City. Air power, not armorm, did most of the damage there though.

Thermal sights no doubt provided an advantage at 73 Easting, but the advantage didn't really matter. USMC M60 tanks without thermals, 120 mm guns, DU ammo, and composite armo suffered even fewer tank losses against Iraqi heavy divisions that fought back. At the NTC, engagements between M1-equipped US units and the T-72-equipped OPFOR almost always result in a victory for the OPFOR.

I don't mean to pile on here, but I also don't see how 73 Easting supports an argument that the outcomes of battles are determined by the performance of a few extraordinary individuals (outliers). In that battle, one troop from the US 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment (9 M1 Abrams tanks and 12 M3 Bradley fighting vehicles) met and destroyed 37 Iraqi T72 tanks and 32 other vehicles in about 40 minutes). Later action involving additional US and Iraqi forces resulted in a total of 113 Iraqi AFVs destroyed and some 600 Iraqi casualties. One Bradley and one crew member were lost to Iraqi fire (another Bradley was lost to friendly fire). Although 73 Easting was a resounding victory for a smaller force against a larger force, it was in no way unrepresentative of other engagements during the Gulf War. At Medina Ridge, the 2nd Brigade of 1st Armored annhilated the 2nd Brigade of the Iraqi Republican Guard Medina division in 40 minutes. At Objective Norfolk, two battalions from the 1st ID destroyed more than 100 armored vehicles from the Iraqi Tawakalna and 12th Armored divisions with a loss of only two Bradleys. Every engagment in which there was a head-on clash between US forces and Iraqi forces ended up the same way - a decisive victory for the US forces. Nor does it seem that the performances of particular individuals accounted for the lopsided victories. At 73 Easting, 85 percent of the 215 shots fired by 2nd ACR crews hit their targets. Everybody shot and shot well. 73 Easting was not an example of a battle being fought and won by the outliers. It was an example of a numerically inferior force with superior doctrine, organization, training, logistics, and personnel decisively beating a larger but less skilled force. Stats and the core of the argument above are found in Stephen Biddle's "Victory Misunderstood: What the Gulf War Tells Us About the Future of Conflict," International Security (Autumn 1996). See also his new book, Military Power (2005).

MikeyD, Hold on to your old Mac to play the CMx1 games and buy an Intel chip Mac for the new ones. The PowerPC Macs running OS X can't play the old games and are no longer state-of-the-art so they are not worth buying anymore (even though I bought one last year). A PC won't be able to play your current CMx1 CDs (except CMBO) so you would have to buy new ones. Plus you'd be stuck with a PC. The new Macs should be able to play new CM products, although you might have to wait a little while longer for them.

Thanks for the replies. I guess the answer is to have another Pioneer squad with more demo charges nearby in case they are needed.

I run all the CM games on either a Blue & White G3 350 mhz with (until last night, when I added more) 128 MB of SDRAM or a Clamshell iBook Special Edition 466 mhz with the same amount of RAM (I think). They both run and look fine. Depending on your space and money available, I would recommend getting a desktop Mac rather than a laptop for playing the CMx1 games - the larger screen makes a big difference.

Read here for the mortar rotation trick.

Sergei, I have used some of your very excellent 2x2 km maps to create my own quick battle maps. I have cut out small bits of a couple maps and added setup zones and flags. I would like to post these at the scenario depot for others to enjoy. I would, of course, acknowledge your original authorship of the maps. Do I have your permission to post them?

In one of my current CMBB PBEMs, I managed to sneak a Soviet Pioneer squad close enough to a German 88 to hurl a demo charge at the beginning of the following turn. The squad obediently threw the charge, knocked out the gun, and then tossed its second charge for good measure. I really could have used that second charge to go after a StuG lurking nearby. Is there any way to limit the number of charges a pioneer squad throws? Perhaps by using some trick like the mortar rotation trick that limits the number of rounds a mortar fires in a turn?

Mods have no effect on how the game works, just on how it looks and/or sounds. Players don't need to have the same mods installed to play each other. One player can have his CM modded out the wazoo while the other has the stock version and it won't make any difference in gameplay.

It could be that the AI gives all its units hide orders at the beginning of turn 1 but that if one of the AI's units can see one of your units while it's plotting its turn 1 orders, it will unhide the units that can fire on your unit. It may also be that borg spotting works differently for the AI. Spotting one of your units mid-turn may alert all of the AI's units, allowing those within range who have a reasonable chance of doing damage to open fire. Maybe this discussion should also examine the preliminary bombardment behavior of the AI. Most experienced players know that putting useless units within sight of the AI during setup can prompt it to waste its artillery in a turn 1 barrage. Sometimes, however, the AI fires a turn 1 barrage when it can't see any of my units. It typically targets some patch of cover. I have no idea what determines this behavior.

Correct. Correct. As John K noted, tanks provide no cover by themselves - for infantry or other tanks. They exist as points with no volume for purposes of cover calculations. When they brew up, on the other hand, the smoke does provide cover. Apparently, this is going to change for CMx2. Tanks will block line of fire, although not line of sight. I think I got that right, but you might want to wait for someone who pays more attention to the CMSF boards to confirm.

That would be me.

The title of the thread is self-explanatory. The patch is described as v. 1.02 on the download page although v. 1.03 is downloaded. Please fix or do somefink!

There are several recent examples of weapons systems that are not yet in full-rate production being pressed into action when a conflict begins and they are deemed potentially useful. JSTARS in Desert Storm and Global Hawk in OEF are two of the most well-known ones. If Stryker MGS's were available, they would likely be used.

Some of us still play on Macs and thus can't use PBEM Helper.

This happens somewhat frequently to me. It seems to depend on the program used to send the email. Web based e-mail (i.e. e-mail sent by logging on to a site, such as Gmail, Hotmail, etc.) often gets corrupted when I send it. The same file sent with a stand-alone e-mail program will have no problems. I also sometimes receive game files embedded as text that don't suffer any corruption. It's just a pain to copy the PBEM data, paste it into a word processing program, and save it as a .txt file.

Direct HE fire will render a minefield safe to cross, although as juan g notes, the minefield marker will not disappear, so you don't know exactly when this occurs. In a recent PBEM, I had an opponent's massive armored force completely bottled up because I put mines at a key chokepoint and he forgot to buy engineers. He spent 4 or 5 turns shooting at the minefield with HE from at least 4 or 5 different AFVs and then successfully crossed. I don't know when the minefield became inoperable. Also, you sometimes might see an AP minefield without any of your troops setting it off if you have routed the enemy's troops and they retreat through the minefield.

There is, however, a workaround. When creating a scenario, you can set the time period so that you can purchase the units you want and then change the time period after the units have been purchased.

Zalgiris, Thanks for the very helpful information. I realize now that the Brescia Division is more properly written as motorized Brescia Infantry Division with the caveat that the division was really only partially motorized. Indian 3rd Motor Brigade left Delhi for Egypt on 22 Jan. 1941. Disembarked at Suez on night of 6-7 Feb. 1941. Arrived in western Cyrenaica on 29 Mar. 1941. Repulsed an Axis attack at Mechili on 6 Apr. 1941. Most of the brigade was taken prisoner on 8 Apr. 1941 after an attempt to break out from Mechili failed. So, they were there. At the moment, the only description I have is that they were indeed mobile and good troops, but vastly underequipped. Thanks again.

Does anyone have information on the size of the various units engaged in Rommel's Cyrenaica campaign from late March to early April 1941 (just the move from El Agheila to Sollum? The units in question are: Axis - German 5th Light Division, Italian Ariete Armored Division, and Italian Brescia Motorized Infantry Division. Allies - UK 2nd Armored Division, Australia 9th Infantry Division, and Indian 3rd Motorized Brigade. I have some OOBs and other information for the Axis units that indicate total Axis forces numbered about 25,000 men - 9,300 in the 5th Light Div., something less than 7,500 men in the Ariete Div., and something less than 11,000 men in the Brescia Div. I don't have the same kinds of numbers for the Allies. At the moment, rough totals of men and tanks (where applicable) that were available for each of the units is probably enough. Thanks in advance for any help.