Dook

Since you like sharing websites so much, I'm surprised you haven't consulted a very comprehensive one run by a forum member that could provide exactly that information.

From the personal recollections of the platoon sergeant, 3rd Platoon, Company L, 157th Inf. Regmt, 45th ID, during the Battle of Anzio: The machine gun section was caught in the fires of the three machine guns and could not move. The 3rd Squad had not yet come under the direct fires of the machine guns, but was receiving ricochets. I could not reach Lt. Nation since he was caught in the fire of the machine guns. Thinking I would be able to flank the German gun position by using the cover afforded by a small drainage ditch approximately 50 yards to the left, I moved the 3rd Squad to the left. As the Squad reached a position on line with the 1st and 2nd Squads, a German machine gun in 1st Battalion sector opened fire. The Squad was caught in the cross fire and two men were wounded. So what does this historical example tell us? The 3rd Platoon of Company K was on the left flank of the Battalion's attack. It received fire from a German machine gun in the neighboring battalion's sector. So fire from neighboring defender units could affect an attacker's actions. I don't think anybody really debates that though. The real question is what would be the best way to model such a real life incident? - Create some active map edge that would provoke fire if 3rd Platoon approached too close or lingered too long? - Or place a HMG on the flank of the defense and locate the platoon's objectives closer to the middle of the map? I think the latter is preferable. As Steve has suggested, if the active edge is meant to simulate the involvement of neighboring units, why aren't those neighboring units able to engage attackers (or defenders) across the width of the map? In the example above, the German machine gun should be able to fire on any units within range that it can see rather than being limited to firing on units that may or may not cross some arbitrary edge boundary.

Wartgamer and Dorosh, Could you two please take it outside? This juvenile taunting and bickering is growing very tiresome. Thank you.

That particular TO&E shows the .50 cals in other locations and not organic to the infantry companies. According to that TO&E, there were 140 .50 cal HMGs in an infantry division. Most of them, however, were in units other than the infantry regiments. Each infantry battalion had 2 .50 cals listed under the battalion HQ. There were also 3 in the antitank company (1 per AT platoon) and 3 in the cannon company (1 per cannon platoon). Total .50 cals in an infantry regiment = 12. In contrast, divisional artillery had 89 .50 cals assigned: 5 for the divisional HQ battery and 21 for each field artillery battalion (5 in bn hq battery, 4 in service battery, and 4 in each field battery). Engineer battalion had 12 - 3 in HQ company, 3 in each engineer company. Recon troop had 3. Quartermaster company had 13 - 1 in HQ section and 4 in each truck platoon. Ordnance company had 5. Signals company had 6. Note that I just added all the .50 cals shown on the TO&E, located here. I make no claims as to its accuracy. From what I have read, US troops tried to attach a .50 cal to any vechicle that would take one.

Remember, though, that the MG or squad could be in a trench located in open ground. You can't spot the trench outside of 200 m.

Steve, do you know the author, title, educational institution for the thesis you mentioned? I can usually get a hold of most theses if I have a little info to track it down. I would be interested to read it. Thanks.

The AI most definitely cannot see TRPs and is extremely vulnerable to them if they are used effectively. Since the AI's route of advance is usually pretty predictable (it follows cover and tends to go for the closest flag), a TRP placed at a likely massing point can devastate AI attackers. Humans, however, are a different matter. They are sometimes able to predict likely TRP locations and avoid them. TRPs are very useful on heavily wooded maps where your artillery might have a hard tiime acquiring LOS to their targets.

Supposedly the chance of receiving bonuses in a particular category vary based on whether the HQ is a platoon or company/battalion HQ. Platoon HQs are more likely to receive combat and stealth bonuses, higher level HQs are more likely to receive morale and command bonuses. I've never verified this by testing though. The effect of the bonus varies depending on the experience of the HQ, but not the HQ's rank. Thus, a regular platoon HQ with a +2 morale has the same effect on his troops as a regular company HQ with a +2 morale. The only difference is that the company HQ can command any troops, not just one platoon.

Dupuy's books and reports are available through the Dupuy Institute and can be ordered online. Check the prices carefully before ordering though; purchasing some of the longer reports could get very expensive.

Yellow means you are being shot at by the enemy; red means you are shooting at him.

A quick question relating to what Treeburst has dubbed the Wicky Strike: As I recall, if you targeted blind in CMBO, the timer for shell impact would count down at half the normal speed. For example, if the timer showed the strike would arrive in 3 minutes, it would actually arrive in about 6 minutes. The time to impact would decrease by one second for every two seconds of actual time elapsed on the movie replay. Once you gained LOS to the target, however, the timer would start counting down at the normal rate. If you wanted to devote a lot of time to it, this system provided a great deal of flexibility with timing and targeting artillery strikes by moving in and out of LOS. And as long as you regained LOS at the crucial moment, there was no loss of accuracy. I frankly haven't paid as much attention to how artillery works in CMBB and CMAK. Does the timer still work this way?

Tom, I would simply reply that all of what I wrote earlier applies to bailed crews in spades. They shouldn't be able to spot much, should be easily killed, and any information they do provide probably will not be very actionable.

Tom, relative spotting will take care of many of the problems currently associated with the recce and scouting ability of units like the ones you describe (out of friendly LOS, out of command, no radio). If a two half-squads of a platoon, for example, are detached and sent so far ahead of the rest of the platoon that they are out of command, I doubt they will be particularly effective scouts. 1) The half-squads will not have binos and thus won't spot as well as the platoon commander. 2) More importantly, each half-squad will only be able to spot (i.e. detect, classify as hostile, and identify) what it can see. If they are very dispersed, one half-squad probably won't be able to see and therefore spot what the other sees. As Steve noted, you will effectively only have one group of eyeballs looking at each point instead of the approximately 4 or 5 groups in a platoon (one per squad in a 3 squad platoon with one squad split and the platoon commander). 3) The out-of-command half-squads are also more likely to be eliminated/break if they engage. Once they are broken or eliminated, they are not very useful scouts. 4) Finally, you as the God-like player will know about anything those half-squads spot but will not be able to fire on spotted targets with other units unless they too have spotted the target. Thus, you won't be able to drop accurate artillery unless the FO can see the target, AFVs will not be able to provide accurate supporting fire (they can still area fire) unless they too can see the target, you get the idea. I just don't think it's necessary to impose a number of artificial effects to simulate how events would play out in real life.

Massimiliano, Grazie mille! What a fantastic resource. One note for others - it requires MS IE as a browser.

For those of you who are cheapskates like me, Wilbeck's thesis from the Army's Command and General Staff School is available for free: <a href="https://calldbp.leavenworth.army.mil/carl/2003011508525769/wilbeck/wilbeck.pdf#xml=/scripts/cqcgi.exe/@ss_prod.env?CQ_SESSION_KEY=ORUOPWTMSIWQ&CQ_QH=125083&CQDC=8&CQ_PDF_HIGHLIGHT=YES&CQ_CUR_DOCUMENT=1" target="_blank">Swinging the Sledgehammer: The Combat Effectiveness of German Heavy Tank Battalions in World War II</a> by Maj. Christopher Wilbeck

Tarkus, If you don't look at the final map, how do you know who really controls all the flags in order to determine whether to impose new conditions for the next game?

A few of the basic but big differences between playing v. humans and playing v. the computer: 1)Command of units - A decent human player will almost always have his units in command and will have them cooperate to achieve some effect. For example, humans will have pairs or even platoons of tanks work together to hunt enemy armor and infantry. The computer rarely uses its units effectively - infantry squads are often out of command and tanks operate singly. 2) Combined effects of units - A good human player will combine the actions of his units to achieve some greater effect. For example, two tanks may shoot and scoot on the left side of the map to draw the fire of an enemy heavy tank; then, two tanks crest a hill on the right side to take shots at the heavy tank while its side armor is exposed and its turret is facing the wrong way. Other example might be feinting with infantry to the right while the main attack sneaks around to the left or holding back in a meeting engagment and then walloping the objective with heavy artillery. The computer is incapable of timing or integrating the movements of its units at that level of detail. 3) Route of advance/lccation of defense - The route of advance that the computer will follow and the location of the defenses are pretty easy to predict once you've played for a while. Humans will often follow a less obvious route or place defensive forces in unexpected locations. A related point is that the computer does not take advantage of its potential ability to predict defensive locations. Thus, it won't use HE to knock down the one tall building overlooking the battlefield to prevent you from placing a FO there; a human player will. 4) Use of artillery - The computer cannot match a skilled player in its use of artillery. It tends to dump an entire FO's load on a single target, and only after something has been spotted there. It cannot create a fire plan for timed fires and also tends to use smoke inappropriately. Depending on the forces and the terrain, a skilled human player can wreak havoc with artillery and little else. I'm sure others will add comments, but those are the four broad categories I see where a human player outmatches the computer. Talking smack to a computer gets pretty boring after a while too.

You could also check out my scenario "Cecina Counterattack" at the Scenario Depot. IIRC, it involves the 16. SS Pz Div., supplemented by a heavy tank battalion - the 504th I think.

African American soldiers comprised between 6 and 9 percent of the Army during World War II (6 percent in 1942, almost 9 percent in 1945). In 1942, 48 percent of African-American soldiers were assigned to the Service Forces; by 1945, that figure had increased to 75 percent. In 1945, African American soldiers made up 44 percent of the Quartermaster Corps, 33 percent of the Transportation Corps, and 20 percent of the Corps of Engineers – the three branches with the highest number of unskilled labor jobs. Percentages in the combat arms ranged from 1 to 5 percent in 1945, although they were higher in earlier years. Among the ways African American soldiers were directed into service units was through the use of standardized tests. In the early 1940s, levels of education for African American males lagged far behind their white counterparts, although there had been significant gains since World War I. Partly as a result, African American recruits tended to score lower on the Army General Classification Test. Educational levels don’t explain everything, however; the conditions under which the tests were given and the attitudes of the testers also varied according to race. One result of this process was that 33 percent of African American registrants were classified as 4-F compared to only 16 percent for white registrants. Almost all of the difference was attributable to failure to meet minimum educational requirements. Few distinctions were made among African American soldiers, however, when assigning them to units. Those who were high school graduates were assigned to about the same branches as those with only a grade school graduation. The proportion inducted among African Americans of military age was also substantially lower for those living in the South than those living in the North. Note too that starting in 1944, the percentage of African American soldiers serving overseas as a portion of their total strength was higher than the number of white soldiers. The preceding information is from Stouffer et al., The American Soldier, vol. I, pp. 489-502.

Flag placement is the other issue in which I am most interested. Any and all comments are welcome though.

Paul A., I would be very interested in any comments you have regarding the scenario. It uses a historically accurate map and forces, but may not be balanced. You can post them here or at the Proving Grounds. Thanks for trying the scenario. Dook

:eek: Sounds like you need to change schools.

Not possible. Captured troops become unarmed and can't recrew their weapons. They can, however, escape if they are not or only lightly guarded and some of their compatriots get close.

Admiral, I use a Mac with OS 8.6 and IE 5 or 5.1 (I'm at work now and can't remember exactly) for the Mac. A fairly pathetic rig these days, but it still runs CM fine. Let me know if you need any more info.

POW duty is a waste of a valuable asset for your company HQs. They can command the slower moving support weapons during an advance, help rally broken troops, or command a specially chosen task force of squads plucked from various platoons and other units.