Foreigner

My guess: a judgement call that Lend-Lease aircraft were not used often enough in CM-style settings to warrant inclusion in the already long list of options. The main reason for such a decision might be the lack of sufficient and verifiable data on Lend-Lease aircraft employment in CAS role. On one hand, for quite a long time Lend-Lease contribution to the Soviet war effort, while not denied outright, was generally downplayed when not ignored, and studies of it were certainly not encouraged. On the other hand, it is very likely that Lend-Lease aircraft were indeed seldom used for CAS of ground forces, for various reasons. The Soviets were not very enthusiastic about the fighter-bomber concept: their fighters for most of the war had their hands...er...wings, full of typical fighter duties; they had dedicated ground attack airplanes in the Il-2 family - considerably more effective, less vulnerable, and in ever greater numbers (I believe total production run was around 36,000 - more than any other combat plane model, ever, AFAIK!); they had their own dive bombers to supplement them. So when they used fighters in a ground attack role, it was either in desperation (at the very start of the war), or when they gradually started to run short on air targets towards the end, although they never quite reached the crushing level of air superiority that the Western Allies enjoyed by that time. In addition, a sizeable proportion of Lend-Lease fighters seem to had been grouped and used for duties outside the scope of CM, such as high-altitude interception, area air defense, and to a smaller extent naval warfare and air cover for ship convoys. And if you are not tired of reading this post yet, here's a potpourri of factoids about WWII Soviet air power and CAS... The venerable "Katyusha" MLRS family started with 82mm rockets developed for air-to-air combat, and they are credited with aerial kills (some from I-16s?). But, being unguided, they were soon used almost exclusively against land targets. Later, rockets were introduced for ground and naval forces as well. However, the first truck-based rocket system was 132mm; later, 82mm "came to the ground", while 132mm "went up in the air". The Soviets did develop figther-bomber versions, most notably some "Yak"-7 and -9 modifications, but their production was fairly limited, and some models never made it past trial phase. Of note are two "Yak"-9 prototypes, "Yak"-9T "Tankbuster" in 1943 with a 37mm cannon, and "Yak"-9K "Large-Caliber" in 1944 with a 45mm(!) cannon. Ostensibly for anti-tank role (IMO, by that time the Soviets pretty much had it covered), more appropriate targets for such fighters would be heavy bombers. Germany never fielded them; were the Soviets secretly preparing for a possible confrontation with B-17s? Some sources claim Lend-Lease P-39 Airacobras were used in a ground attack role by the Soviets; most emphatically deny it. I tend to agree with the latter, as the Soviets' main preoccupation seems to had been with "Junkers" and "Heinkel" bombers at low and medium altitudes where P-39's lack of supercharger wasn't a problem, and its 37mm cannon could wreak havoc on the big and slow targets. Most WWII Soviet fighter pilots in their memoirs (at least the ones I'm aware of) seldom mention attacking ground targets, but have a grudging respect for German FLAK autocannons. When ground attacks are mentioned, they were usually "plinking" at targets of opportunity in the enemy's rear. Their favorite - motorcycle riders - even if you miss them, chances are in their haste they will get injured.

IIRC, at least on the surface, the lack of logic in naming the new tank was intentional, to "confuse the enemy". Not only did the two tanks share little in common besides the "Tiger" moniker, but also the "later" "E" index was afforded to the tank that came much earlier. Now, if that sounds overly complicated and not that effective, it probably is, but those considerations have never deterred a good bureaucrat - anytime, anywhere. Of course, there's also the tantalizing question - was this "mix-up" really intentional or was it really a post factum rationalization of the confused and/or overcomplicated design and review process...

Well, to continue the horse analogy further... If you have more than one horse in your cart, no one said you absolutely have to replace them all at once. If you have more than one tank assembly line running, you can modify them one at the time without completely stopping production of the old model until it's phased out. Sure enough, any modification to a manufacturing process or facility will decrease output initially - there's no way around it. The question is - decrease by how much and for how long and (eventually) will the benefit of the change (higher productivity or a better tank model) be worth the "cost" of the change. The extent to which you disrupt your current production will depend a lot on the tank design. Therefore, I think the "cost" estimates for a tank should take into account not only what you spend on each one after everything is up and running smoothly, but what it had cost you or will cost you to set up or increase the production (whether starting anew or converting an existing facility). If we take that into account, the Panther doesn't seem to me to be that cheap. And going back to the beaten "horse analogy", it is one thing to simply fit your new horse into your existing harness with relatively little hassle, and quite another to acually get a new cart because your new horse won't fit into the old buggy...

I would agree with the longer developmental cycle for T-34, but the problem with production statistics (or any statistics, for that matter) is that it's like a bathing suit - it shows a lot, but usually hides the most important. For starters, although the Soviet Union had more (potential) resources, no one would argue that the industrial development of Germany was much higher, with a much longer and stronger industrial tradition. As a result of WWI Germany (apart from human casualties) lost some territory, had some serious restrictions imposed by the Versailles Treaty, and had to pay reparations. Not to mention the political and economical turmoil of the Weimar Republic and the effects of the Great Depression. But AFAIK its territory was not occupied by foreign troops, and no signifant fighting went on on German soil (actually, until 1944), so at least the physical stock of capital was not significantly damaged. On the other hand, the Soviet Union had to deal with both a civil war and foreign intervention from 1918 till 1920 (at least). Plus, even Czarist Russia wasn't an industrial power, so the Soviets had to first rebuild the devastation, and then start industrialization in the mid to late 1920s, IIRC, "from scratch". Along the following lines, I remember a quote from a British report on the T-34 that, while noting the crude finish of the armor, specifically stated that it didn't seem to compromise the quality to the welding seams or any other critical performance features. To borrow a quote about AK-47, "...it is a crude design and finish except where it matters most..." (in AK-47's case - the barrel and action). The same British report concludes that "...for a country industrialized so recently..." T-34 was a surprisingly solid and effective design. Another factor to note is that T-34's development started in the interwar years - when no one knew they will be "interwar". War definitely adds urgency - and lack of war always reduces the willingness of any nation to invest in military research and production. While the Panther was comissioned precisely as a means to address an urgent war problem - namely the T-34/KV combo. This article gives some details on why and how the Panther came to be. Then, from what I have read about the air war over Europe, the main industrial focus of allied attacks were first the aircraft industry, then the ball-bearing plants, but that didn't cripple the German war machine (many attribute this to the sound management approach of Albert Speer). The thing that worked was attacks on oil. So I doubt the Panther got the worst of it. And if we mention the bombing of the Reich by the Allies, it will be only fair to note that in 1941 and the first half of 1942 the Soviet's industrial capacity was not only bombed and captured, but what survived was being relocated East to the Urals, so it was at least temporarily out of comission as well. In 1942 they churned out more than 12000 - a four-fold increase over 1941, and I doubt in their third year Panters could have reached such "growth rates" (There were still 4 months to go in 1945). It is entirely subjective, of course, but reading the Desert Fox site's monthly target and production data it seems to me Panther production took off very quickly, but within a year hit a ceiling of about 380/month and flatlined afterwards. But all these comparisons are, IMHO, harder to justify than the more relevant question - if the prices were so similar, why was the PzIV still built at about the same rate as the Panther throughout 1944, as the Panther was superior in many critical aspects? In 1944, more than 600 Tiger Is were built. At an "exchange rate" of, let's say, 2 Panthers to a Tiger, that would mean about 30% boost in Panther output - no chump change. Then why didn't it happen? One obvious answer - "You don't change horses in midstream." But since we are talking costs, if you doubt that your current train will carry you to the other side, a more appropriate question would be - "How much would it cost me to change my horses?" And in my mind, this should include not only the sticker price (which might or might not be what you actually pay), but the oats you need to feed the horses, the immunization shots and veterinarian's fee, the price of the horseshoes and what you pay the blacksmith to nail them on, and the beer for the groom that will finally change the horses for you. Finally, one interesting thing I only recently learned about tanks with forward drive sprockets (among others, the Sherman and the Panther) - for any significant repair or overhaul of the transmission, you had to take off the turret first. A little bit of a hassle, isn't it?

I have a problem with wartime pricing of any kind, because all belligerents employed at least some form of additional central government intervention in the economy - be it simple rationing, price/wage controls, centralized resource allocation, forced labor... In such an environment prices would not accurately reflect the relative availability/productivity of a particular resource - be it raw materials, precision tools or trained technicians, and there are no simple solutions to that problem. For example, if the Panther and Tiger II were relatively "cheap" for their fighting capabilities, why were they not produced in greater numbers? One possible answer is "wrong decision due to stupidity/conservative thinking/inertia/political infighting..." However, a much more realistic answer would be along the lines of "scarce materials/lack of trained workforce/insufficient production capacity/the need to extensively modify existing production lines/..." And IMHO it is precisely such resource scarcity that is not adequately reflected in wartime prices (even corrected for exchange rates) - especially so for the German economy, which was in the most severe resource crunch. Now let's assume copper is the only restricted resource, and assume that a Tiger II uses twice as much as a Panther. So by building a Tiger II you are effectively giving up two Panthers. Will accounting "cost" show the Tiger II as being twice the cost of a Panther based on the usage of copper alone? No, unless both tanks are made of copper only . Will the battlefield "feel" the absence of two Panthers? My guess, yes. Will the benefit of one Tiger II outweigh the benefit of two Panthers? Open for debate, but not in this post. So, IMO, to work out a really meaningful and comprehensive comparative "war economics" cost estimates for any vehicle, you need to identify the critical scarce resources for each economy, set a "fair" price for each resource and obtain reliable data on how much of each any particular vehicle used up. Throw in such indirect costs as lifetime operating costs (fuel consumption, anyone?), training, costs of adapting or expanding production... If it looks bad already, it gets worse. Unless vehicles are so accomodating as to come up consistently better or worse in all parameters, you also need some system of rating or assigning relative weights so that you can come up with a single "cost" value. And to top it off, you have to convince others that your prices and weights are the right ones. I suspect any argument over those would make a Peng™ thread look like a church ice-cream social. Anyway, just thought the thread and the forum could use a little more confusion...

Hmm, I can see it now - "Reservoir Tigers"... Didn't a Quentin-what-was-his-name-again make a scenario like that and where can I DL it? Was it CMBO-compatible? :confused: I was looking more for reports on Allied countermeasures (apart from forcing BTS to make captured STs available to the Allies ), but this is good too. Thanks, Ace Pilot!

OK, we have one report of an immobilized and abandoned Sturmtiger, but has anyone succeeded in KO-ing one yet? I mean, through penetration or perforation or sending them IRS audit notices ?

In this thread some players complain that the Allied M17 halftracks (quad 50-cal MGs) did not do a good job at what they were primarily supposed to do IRL - protect ground troops against aircraft attacks. Given that (according to preliminary reports) CAS is much more affordable and cost-effective in CMBB, it is very likely (as many posts have noted) that aircraft will be seen much more frequently in CMBB battles. Which raises the question - what are the AA assets avaliable to the players, and how effective are they? Has anyone out there had experience or run tests with those? Will any of the CMBB-"haves" be kind enough to share impressions with the CMBB-"have-nots"? Going off on a tangent... This might have been discussed before, but I would also like to see players being able to purchase air cover as well as air support. It would probably have to be abstracted (like off-board AA batteries or fighter cover/escort of varying reliability and scale), and could mitigate or completely neutralize the enemy's CAS. Of course, fighters might never show up, or get tangled up with the fighters the enemy has purchased. Or they could be allowed only for the attacker/defender and not in ME, or... I don't know how hard it would be to achieve, but I get the feeling it will have to wait till the engine rewrite (code name "Project Neverland" ). Still, one can dream...

I admit I have not read "Fighting in Hell", but there are some inconsistencies in the statements from that book as quoted in a previous post. First of all, the quotes claim Il-2s appearing in 1943(?), and dissapearing soon after(??). There were, of course, different modifications of the plane, but the basic model had been in service since well before Barbarossa and soldiered on throughout the whole war. Most characteristically, all accounts of the battle for Berlin from the Soviet side prominently mention the fact that in the last days the Sturmoviks were initially forbidden from sortying for fear of hitting their own troops. Then infantry commanders specifically requested that the planes be allowed to just fly overhead. According to field reports, the sound of the engines of the "Meatgrinder from hell" was usually sufficient for the German defenders to start taking cover and reduce the volume of their fire. Not bad for a plane that had "disappeared from the scene". All in all, about 40,000 were made, which is a pretty large number. I will be making some wild guesses here, but the only way to explain such inconsistent (IMHO) statements would be if they relate to a particular (not very sucessful) modification of IL-2 (like the ones with 37mm cannons), a particular sector at a particular time, or the fact that as the war progressed, the importance of the plane as an anti-tank weapon diminished. Instead, towards the end of the war Il-2s were widely used to suppress AA batteries - which is no mean feat to do in a plane. Of course, that led to increased Il-2 losses, but once the AA guns were supressed, heavier (and more vulnerable) bombers could breathe easier. Il-2s were not some invulnerable überaircraft: the could be and were shot down; they were not without their drawbacks and shortcomings; they did not appear as a finished and refined design overnight; and, in tactical use, their coordination with ground troops was probably far from perfect. But it was probably the first true and most effective close support combat aircraft of its time, for it was designed to operate at extremely low altitudes against small targets while able to absorb a staggering amount of punishment (I remember an estimate that Il-2 had 100 times the combat endurance of Ju-87). Some accounts mention planes safely reaching base with holes in their wings "large enough for a man to pass through". But don't take only my word for it. The Following is probably the best site I could find with a quick Google search. A surprisingly good (though not perfect) source is the web site of the game "IL-2 Sturmovik". This list of in-game aircraft has brief details on practically all modifications of the plane that have seen at least some combat (AFAIK). For the impatient ones (or those who have nothing better to do than read long posts) , I've given some details and tidbits below. The most distinct characteristic of the plane was the all-around "stressed" steel armor protection of all the vital "intestines" of the plane - engine, fuel tanks and 4 bomb compartments. Even the cockpit canopy was made of "armor glass" more than 2in thick. The wings and the tail section of Il-2 were not armored, though, and unlike the pilot, the rear-facing machine gunner was not comletely protected by armor, as well. This was because, though present in the original test designs, the rear-gunner position was "designed away" in the first production planes, and then hastily reinstated at the end of 1941. And since there was no time to redesign the "armor box", the rear-gunner was tucked with his back to the ouside of the rear armor plate. Initially he didn't even have a decent seat, but was suspended in something like a harness. The 20mm and 23mm cannons of Il-2 were only effective against soft-skinned vehicles; the plane's main anti-tank weapons were 82mm (later 132mm) rockets, heavy HE bombs and (after 1943) shaped-charge PTAB bombs. Versions equipped with 37mm cannons were field-tested in 1943; they were able to achieve side and rear penetrations and immobilizations of Pz-IIIs and Pz-IVs from reasonable combat distances (some claimed Panther kills), but the recoil was too strong to control and speed and handling suffered too much, so the overall combat effectiveness was lower. AFAIK, versions with 45mm cannons never made it past prototypes. Unfortunately, this interesting article on The Rusian Battlefield site has not been translated yet. The Soviet pilots were fairly confident in the survivability of their Il-2s, but quickly learned not to fly straight at Tigers - after all, the latter's 88mm was a modification of a Flak gun, and sometimes could be elevated high enough to deal with a low-flying and fairly slow plane - especially if it made things easier for them by not taking evasive action. Those who have read D. Loza's memoirs in their entirety can remeber a similar episode, when one of Loza's comrades used the 76mm gun of his Sherman (again based on a AA gun) to down a He-111. Especially during the initial years of the war in the East front, Il-2s which had dropped their bomb loads often used their cannons in air-to-air combat. SOP for an Il-2 pair when attacked by fighters was to form a circle - each plane protecting the other's rear - and thus creep back home. And although fighters had a definite advantage in such a fight, it didn't mean automatic victory - one Soviet Il-2 pilot was credited with 6 downed German fighters over the course of his career. More interestingly, though, Il-2 was fairly effective against German bombers: while they could not outrun or outmaneuver it, it could shrug off their defensive MG fire and thus could afford the luxury of firing from very short distances indeed. In fact, work was started on a pure "armored fighter" version, but by the time it was ready there were enough aircraft better suited for the task. Regarding another post on this thread, Il-2 had both instant-action and delayed-fuse HE bombs. The latter were used to avoid blast damage when dive bombing (remember, Il-2 is primarily a low-altitude plane), and as such were used mainly for fixed targets. Instant-action bombs were released from level flight. Finally, it was not unusual for Soviet pilots to transport "stowaways" - an extra person - in the hollow tail section of their planes. Thie seems to have been a popular way to speed up the transfer of ground crews to a new location.

During the war, the Soviet tanks did use up twice as many HE rounds as AP rounds... for what it's worth

Dear MikeyD, This is what I remember about the design history of T-34/85... The first T-34s equipped with a 85mm gun (model D-5T, used also in the KV-85 and IS-1 tanks), produced in the "Krasnoe Sormovo" works (Gorkiy? Not sure, maybe, but definitely not Nizhniy Tagil) indeed had 2-man turrets, but some estimates say less than 300 of those were produced (compared to a total of about 22 000 T-34/85s during the war years only, which makes it what, 1.5%?). Some authors actually argue that, since there was no official designation of these tanks as T34/85s, "they don't count", but that's probably nitpicking. What is true, though, they were definitely a stop-gap measure, abondoned precisely because of the 2-man turret limitation. The D-5T was a gun design ready, tested and running well before the onset of 1944, but it could not fit well enough into the 3-man turret being developed at the time, so the usually hasty wartime Soviet designers took an extra couple of months to complete a new 85mm gun (ZIS S-53) that didn't have this problem. As soon as this new gun was ready, even the factories producing the version with the D-5T gun started switching to the new design. All in all, the initial version of the upgunned T-34 enjoyed a full production run for only a couple of months (Jan - Mar 1944). For more details you can visit a number of different sites, probably the most complete one being The Russian Battlefield site. Edited: in first draft erroneously assigned "Krasnoe Sormovo" to Leningrad/Sankt-Peterburg, as that city was still de facto encirled in 1943 and defintely could not develop and test a new gun [ September 05, 2002, 06:53 PM: Message edited by: Foreigner ]

Regarding Amedeo's second post... It is quite possible that the 1km button-up range comes from pre- or early-war regulations, but I distinctly remember reading in Soviet war memoirs that fairly early on tankers were officially and specifically instructed (by high-rank order - Army commander? can't remeber now) to stay UNbuttoned until "direct fire contact". Also, a SOP of early Soviet tank tactics was the "Do as I do!" (Delai kak ya! ) order/signal, in which the subordinate vehicles were supposed to follow the actions of the HQ tank. AFAIK it is not modelled in the game (though a possible "Follow the leader" was one of the most popular requests), though to some extent can be replicated by the player by giving simulataneous movement orders to the whole platoon (while unbuttoned). It would alleviate the huge movement orders delay problem with buttoned-up early Soviet tanks within LOS of a HQ tank (it doesn't take much communication to follow a fairly big diesel-exhaust-smoke-belching, dirt-kicking chunk of metal around). Of course, with such tactics, if the command tank was KOed, problems arose (in fact, the "herd mentality" of this approached helped more experienced gunners identify the HQ tanks and make them priority targets). There were SOPs for such eventuality (unless specifically designated, Tank # 1 took command of the platoon, etc.), but one could not replace the regular commander's experience. Finally, while the T-34s retained the 2-man turret until the T34/85 version (1944?), they started getting a radio each way earlier. I am sure some grog can provide the details.

Think the 88s were powerful? Imagine 100mm FLAK guns....IIRC, some of those FLAK towers in Berlin mounted those - but they could not depress enough to engage ground targets with DF, so when the Red Army stormed Berlin (and Soviet ground attack planes didn't fly many sorties for fear of hitting their own troops), their awesome firepower was of little use at that crucial moment. Though I think those might have caused some major headaches for Allied bombers during raids on Berlin.

Regarding "alternative" uses of ATRs... Russian snipers frequently used ATRs to shoot more distant and important targets - like machine gun(ner)s and bunkers' firing slits. The heavier bullet and the higher muzzle velocity meant a more stable trajectory for a longer distance, and a hit was guaranteed to cause major damage. The contemporary Browning 50-caliber sniper rifle is a good illustration to that approach - it fires the "Ma Deuce" round, which some say was originally designed for AA role and then proved useful against (light) armor, and others say it was the other way round (sorry for the pun). The most dangerous things to a tank in combat is to go "blind" when vision devices are damaged. No matter how thick and strong a glass (or plastic) block is, a strong enough round can damage it enough to render it useless - and during WWII the 14.5mm ATR round was usually strong enough. According to Soviet reports, that is exactly how one of the very first Tigers was captured - by taking out its vision equipment with ATR fire. So small arms fire at a tank is not completely useless.

Just to add my 2 pennies' worth... The Russian/Soviet military terminology tradition generally stresses the distinction between "purely" automatic weapons (that can provide continuous fire as long as the trigger is depressed and ammunition is fed - full-auto in Western terminology) and self-loading weapons - "Samozaryadnoe oruzhie" - that feed ammunition automatically, but require the shooter to release the trigger before each subsequent shot - semi-automatics in Western terms). All Soviet rifles, carbines, LMGs and MMGs of the WWII years (with two exceptions) were designed for the 7.62mm x 54 R 'Mossin - Nagant' full-power rifle round (circa 1900s). In fact, this round is still in service with the PK "Kalashnikov" GPMG line. In 1936, the Red Army officially adopted AVS-36 Avtomaticheskaya Vintovka Simonova obr. 1936 g. - Simonov's Automatic Rifle M1936, with a 20-round clip, selective semi- and full-auto fire. The permanently attached bayonet could swing down and serve as a "monopod" support. As a compromise between a rifle and a LMG it was similar to the US BAR; unlike the BAR, it didn't make it long into the war. Though some tens of thousands were produced, it was not liked much by the Soviet military - complex and expensive to produce, difficult to service in field conditions. The military also complained that the average foot soldier would use ammunition "ineffectively" with a full-auto weapon. Even before Barbarossa it was being phased out; for a short time after, those remaining in service were used up mainly as substitutes for LMGs. AVS-36's intended replacement was Tokarev's semi-auto ("Self-loading") rifle SVT - Samozaryadnaya Vintovka Tokareva M1938 and M1940. Long, heavy and generally unwieldy - even the "lighter" M1940 version - it was also fairly complex to produce and a pain in the ... neck to keep in operable condition - especially the "lighter" M1940 version. Still, the Soviets were determined to equip the army with SVTs, until the start of hostilities forced them to fall back on the bolt-action Mossin-Nagant rifle as more sturdy and easier to mass-produce. For the rest of the war this last design (originally dating back to the 1890s) became the single most numerous individual infantry weapon (more than 10 million were produced, plus sniper and shorter "carbine" versions). Still, some SVTs remained in service throughout the war - they were liked by snipers, who, of course, knew how to maintain them and didn't mind the extra effort. Finally, after the 'intermediate' 7,62mm x 39 M1943 round (of "Kalashnikov" fame) was adopted by the Red Army, the first design to use it was Simonov's semi-auto carbine SKS-43 Samozaryadniy Karabin Simonova M1943. It is reported to have undergone field trials before the end of WWII, but never saw widespread service in that war. The principal Soviet MGs were covered in some details in several posts; I would only like to add some tidbits. The tank version of Degtyaryov's LMG did not have a stock; and was used by the infantry for lack of anything better. More often than not it was used by surving crewmembers of KO'd tanks who took it off their disabled vehicles and fought on foot alongside the infantry. As to the Maxim's wheels, it can probably be argued which one is faster and/or easier to relocate - a lighter tripod mount that has to be disassembled, hauled on one's back and then reassembled or a heavier wheeled carriage that you can drag behind you. Having done none of those, I defer to the more experienced members at this forum for comments. During the war there were several unsucessful attempts to design a lighter air-cooled MMG for the full-power 7,62mm rifle round. Goryunov's SG-43 ("Stankoviy Goryunova") M1943 was the only one accepted, and details of its service are sketchy. Around the same year, Degtyaryov designed a LMG for the 'intermediate" 7,62mm x 39 round. Like the SKS-43, the RPD-43 (Ruchnoy Pulemet Degtyaryova) M1943 saw limited use in WWII - little if any beyond the stage of field trials. The 12,7mm DShK HMG Degtyaryova-Shpagina Krupnokaliberniy - a Degtyaryov-Shpagin collaboration, had a wheeled carriage as well as a couple of tripod mounts, but was mainly fitted to AFVs. Towards the end of the war, the Soviets designed a 14,5mm HMG Valdimirov's KPV - Krupnokaliberniy Pulemet Vladimirova - a dual- role anti-aircraft - anti-light armor MG much like Ma Deuce, based on the 14,5mm ATR round. Again, it didn't see much service in WWII. The Soviet WWII SMGs were designed for the 7,62mm x 25 pistol round. Although less popular and numerous than the ubiquitos PPSh, the first SMG to enter Red Army Service and was Degtyaryov's 'machine-gun pistol' M1940 Pistolet-Pulemet Degtyaryova PPD-40. Shpagin's PPSh-41 SMG Pistolet-Pulemet Shpagina M1941 was the product of a search for a simpler and cheaper SMG design. IIRC, about 2 million were produced. There was also a PPSh-43, which utilized a regular 30-round clip instead of the 71-round drum, but by that time the even simpler design of Sudaev's PPS-43 Pistolet-Pulemet Sudaeva M1943 SMG with a telescopic metal stock had become the favorite of the "target audience" - vehicle crews, scouts and paratroopers. The PPSh did have two distinct advantages - it allowed selective semi- or full-auto fire and its solid wooden stock could come very handy in hand-to-hand combat. With lend-lease Shermans, Soviet crews sometimes received Thompson SMGs, but considered them too bulky for the confines of the tank. Some of them might have found their way to the infantry, there are no reports to that extent. The principal sidearm of officers and vehicle crews throughout the war was Tokarev's TT "Tulskiy Tokarev" semi-automatic pistol M1933, designed for the same 7,62mm x 25 round, although at the very beginning some were armed with "Nagant" six-shot revolvers and small numbers of a fairly unsucessful design by Korovin. Finally, there were the ATRs, but there are probably more than a few threads already devoted to those. Hope this made for an interesting (if long) reading.

Actually Hungary was probably the ONLY European German ally to "go down fighting" and NOT switch sides. All the other Axis partners at one point or another surrendered to the Allies before Germany fell, and most (can't vouch for all) declared war on Germany or fought German troops (if for a short time). Indeed Horty (Hungary's leader at the time) considered surrendering as the war was winding down, so Hitler sent Otto Scorzeny (hope the spelling's right) first to kidnap Horty's son, then Horty himself. This prevented Hungary for getting out of the war earlier. Indeed, the battles around Budapest in 1945 were probably comparable in fierceness (if not scale) to that of Berlin. Even in May 1945, after Berlin had fallen, IIRC there was still some fighting going on in Czechoslovakia and Hungary - but Czechoslovakia was consider an occupied country, not an Axis ally.

As would be expected, the effect of HE on tanks depends on the blast power of the shell, and is sometimes not trivial at all. IIRC, Russian sources claim that a direct hit (over open sights) from a 152 mm ML-20 gun/howitzer HE shell (~48.6 kg/107 lbs) to a tank turret was enough to send it flying. Probably, we are not talking KTs here, but late Pz IVs are a safe bet. I also vaguely remember someone posting about large caliber US self-propelled howitzers (M7?) used in AT role in Arnheim - and I don't think those had (or really needed) AP shells (correct me if I'm wrong). P.S. (Edited for more accurate shell weight) [ April 23, 2002, 06:08 PM: Message edited by: Foreigner ]

I might be beating a dead horse here, but I came upon some wildly conflicting pieces of info on the production of Soviet ATRs in 1941. On one hand, the article on the Russian Battlefield site states that in 1941, "...some 600..." PTRDs were produced. On the other hand, the following Russian-language article on the OSTPANZER site (attributed to a staff member of the Central Museum of Russian Armed Forced) states that during 1941, 17688 PTRDs were produced. Interestingly enough, all other ATR production figures are practically identical in both articles. Definitely, one of these numbers is plainly wrong (and possibly both?). Anybody interested to provide some third-source info? By the way, according to the second article, the ATR designs were cleared for production at the end of August 1941, and they first saw action on 11/16/1941 in the defence of Moscow.

OOOOPS! Faulty memory! Thanks to Mattias for establishing the correct number of ATRs at the end of 1941. As far as how they quickly racked up production, in 1941 a massive amount of industrial equipment and workers were physically being relocated to the Ural Mountains; by the end of 1942 most facilities there were working to capacity.

There were two models of WWII Soviet ATRs. The Degtyarov PTRD was a single-loader, but was available (although in limited quantities) as early as couple of months after the launch of Barbarossa (by the end of of 1941, there were thousands produced, IIRC). The Simonov PTRS was a semi-automatic with a five round magazine, was more complex and expensive, and by the time it was put into production the urgency had gone and it never got very popular. Among other things, snipers in Stalingrad routinely used ATRs to take out machine gun nests and fortifications (much easier to hit a firing slit); there were also reports of strafing aircraft shot down by ATR fire. Even "The Big Cats" were not competely immune - lucky or well-aimed shots could easily damage vision devices rendering the crew "blind" (according to one report, one of the very first "Tiger" prototypes troop-tested in the winter of 1942 was captured this way). Although probably not worth modelling all possible uses, in CMBB ATRs might quickly become "the poor man's small caliber Flak".

John Kettler, I am glad you found my post interesting. Unfortunately, most of the sources I've used inthe past are not readily available now. I believe there's a host of other people around who would be in a much better position to provide hard info. But I can share from memory some curious tidbits about the Po-2. The first Polikarpov's design for a training aircraft was a failure. The man took it to heart, and his next plane had a number of almost astonishig features. It would not enter a spin, unless deliberately forced into one; to recover, one just had to let the flightstick go and watch the plane do the rest. Flight instructors are rumored to have told their students "not to interfere with the plane flying". With the engine off, the plane could glide for a long time, since its rate of descent (the speed at which it lost altitude) was half that of a parachuting man. This feature made them almost undetectable in night raids (until the bombs started falling, of course). It also enabled them to fly low and slow, improving accuracy, so IRL "WMC" probably would have gotten that supply depot. As it were, as light (night) bombers Po-2s were employed to strike at field headquarters, communication facilities, and other "point targets", often zeroing in on the glowing cigarettes (you'll be surprised from how far you can see them in a dark field, away from city lights). Who said smoking was not hazardous? In fact, it was Po-2s that opened the Berlin Operation in 1945, even before the artillery barrage. Initially it was belittled, even ridiculed by both sides - the Germans called it "Russian Plyboard", the Soviets - "Corn Farmer" (the equivalent to "Crop Duster"). But the "drafted trainer" earned its respect. There were rumors among German foot soldiers of a silent plane that could see in the dark, hover over the target, and fly in reverse, and the all-female Po-2 regiment was known as the "Night Witches". The Russians called the plane "King of the Air". With all that, Po-2 had one terrifying drawback - if set on fire, it burned down completely in less than a minute... The plane enjoyed a long life - IIRC, although officially discontinued, it was still produced on a small scale well into the 60s. Hope this made for a fun (if long) reading. Best regards, Foreigner

Actually, the Soviet PTABs (AT bombs) were not "cluster" bombs, as they were not fastened together in any way - they were just piled up inside Il-2s' bomb compartments. Since they were small (the designation 2.5 probably stands for 2.5kg/5lbs of weight), you could fit many of them inside, and when released, they fell in a fairly long stream. They utilized a shaped charge, and struck from above - on the thinnest top armor, at angles close to 90º. If deployed correctly, that practically doomed any armor in their path - some 40 m long, IIRC. I've also read an account of Po-2s successfully using PTABs to attack concentrated German armor in the Korsun operation (February 1944, I believe). The surprising thing is, this trainer-turned-light-night-bomber-reconnaissance-and-much-else was used during daytime, as low overcast prevented all other, more "serious" aircraft - both Soviet and German, from operating successfully. I know the occurence might be too rare to deserve modeling in CM:BB, but imagine the tension for the German player from knowing that even overcast weather is no 100% guarantee against air attack. By the way, despite its flimsiness, Po-2 could carry up 350kg of payload - the regular bombload for Il-2 was about 500kg...

AFAIK, blunt-nosed AP rounds have a lower tendency to ricochet from sloped armor - the cap "anchors" when it touches the armor and helps "turn" the round closer to meeting the armor plate "head-on". Also, nose caps were made of softer metal covering an extremely hard and sharp core tip. For whatever reason having a thin layer of soft metal between the striking core and the armor plate increased penetration ability (IIRC, the theory goes that in the microseconds after the cap first touches the armor, during which time the core goes through the soft cap, the heat generated in the process is enough to warm up and "soften" the tiny spot on the armor plate where the core utlimately strikes).

My knowledge of German is rudimentary, but I believe "Volk" (pronounced "Folk") is the word for "People, Nation" - from here "Volkswagen" is translated as "People's car", so every working German "voluntarily" had a part of their wages withheld to finance the construction of the plant to build what would eventually become the "Beetle" - dressed in military fatigues it is known to the CMBO crowd as "Kubelwagen". But I digress... AFAIK Volksturm were "home defence" forces that included men who under normal circumstances would not be considered "fighting material" - underage boys and overage men, people with substandard health. I am not sure if those included able-bodied men not sufficiently trained for regular army duty. I am fairly certain though, that those were hastily assembled and trained to much lower standards than regular army units. Still, they were able to make a strong enough impression in close quarter battles and ambushes. Volksgrenadiers, on the other hand, have always been regular army formations, although they might have had different TO&E. Maybe that was some kind of a honorary designation, or a part of the military tradition. While both of the above denote military units, Volksdeutsch is a generic name for all ethnic Germans living outside Germany. In particular, there was a sizable German community along the Volga in Russia (dating as far back as Catherine the Great - Empress of Russia, born Sophia, a German princess). Of course, when the war broke out, Stalin prompty whisked them away to Middle Asia...

I thought I'd add some interesting tidbits about T-34 and how it affected subsequent German AFV development. As early in 1941 German generals demanded that if a tank comparable or superior to T-34 cannot be designed and produced "from scratch" in short time, then at least a captured one should be copied exactly. It didn't work - not only for "national pride reasons", but because - strange as it might seem - German industry at the time hadn't got the resources and capabilities to do so on a large enough scale, in a short enough time, from the shortage of additives (such as chromium, vanadium, nickel) necessary to make stronger steel armor, to the diffuculty of making a lightweight diesel (T-34's engine was cast alluminum), to the problems of welding thicker armor plate (one of the reasons the Tiger had no sloped armor - sloped armor requires longer welding seams). When the initial projects for what was to become the Panther were submitted, one was rejected outright because it was too similar to T-34. Again, "national pride" was cited as a reason, but there was another perfectly logical and compelling reason - front-line German commanders feared possible misidentification of the new tank by the German troops on the battlefield.