Foreigner

It seems that a common shortcoming of nearly every user of intelligence information is to tend to believe (and reward) the kind of (favorable) information they want to believe. The "armor intelligence" game betweeen the Soviet Union and Germany prior to June 1941 besides being a good example of that common bias, is also quite ironic, in a way. It might have been Guderian who claimed that he got his first inkling of the trouble to come when Soviet Russia and Germany were still cooperating, and a Russian delegation visited Germany. The Germans were accomodating enough to show them their newest prototype (PzKw - IV, I believe), but the Russians kept insisting they be shown the "really good" tanks, unconvinced to the end that was Germany's top-of-the-line AFV at the time. Those who wanted to could draw the conclusion the Russians had something pretty advanced to benchmark against, but few could resist the always-popular and "politically correct" approach of discounting unfavorable intelligence as "propaganda" and deliberate disinformation. Both sides stuck to their prejudices. In particular, Hitler never fully believed data he had gotten about Soviet armor strength and production capabilities prior to "Barbarossa". In a unique recording (a taperecorder was "inadvertently" left on after an officially sanctioned interview) of a meeting with Finland's Fieldmarshal Mannerheim some time into the war (late 1941 - early 1942, IIRC), a very unusual Hitler - pensive, almost melancholic, nothing like the fiery speaker familiar from newsreels - can be heard acknowledging he hadn't believed intelligence about the Soviets, and he had been unpleasantly surprised by the sheer mass of Soviet resistance. Still no comment about relative quality, though - but then, he wasn't the one facing enemy armor on the battlefield. On the other hand, the Soviets (or at least some influential people - mosts sources finger Artillery Marshal Kulik) - were convinced (some say - because of German disinformation) the Germans possessed 35 - 55 ton tanks (with corresponding firepower), so designers and manufacturers were directed to develop appropriate countermeasures. In effect, that determined the design requirements for T-34, KV-1, and the 57 mm M1937 ATG, among others. However, when the Germans attacked, the Soviets faced concentrated forces of relatively light-armored tanks, while their major AT assets, tailored for the wrong purpose, were too few and dispersed to make much of a difference. What's the moral of the story? IMO, any gross bias in sizing-up their opponents ultimately hurts military commanders. So if bias is unavoidable, maybe fortune favors the one who errs the less?

All the information I've read about the T-34 definitely states that the barrels were for spare fuel. Actually, they do not seem to appear as a part of the standard equipment until the T-34/85 model. I am not sure about the remote drop capability, but I was also under the impression that they were put only on long road marches. The way they are attached to the hull (with belts) also suggests they were not really intended to be constantly carried around.