Brian

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by Shadow 1st Hussars: Talks have been going on since the late '80's. They'll never decide. Both wheels and tracks have major advantages and disadvantages. I can't really imagine a MBT with wheels......<hr></blockquote> More than likely not, because of the problems associated with weight distribution and vulnerability but say, a "tank destroyer"? Personally, I've always felt the problem for "light forces" is that they have concentrated too much on the belief that only a tank can defeat a tank. If, instead they focused on what can destroy a tank, then it is quite possible to build a vehicle which is quite a deal lighter and still able to take on and destroy tanks at much greater range than the tanks themselves can. By either mixing vehicles or providing one with two weapons (one, such as the 165mm low pressure gun of the Centurion AVRE, designed primarily for bunker-busting/infantry support and say a FOGM or even a Strix/Merlin mortar round), you end up with a vehicle which is considerably lighter and still able to fulfill the functions of a tank. If handled well, tactically, it would even possible to engage other MBT equipped forces. The key though, is moving away from the turret-heads' contention that only a tank can defeat a tank.

Isn't money always the final arbitar, Pillar? Otherwise mech infantry would be riding in APC's as well protected and mobile as the MBT's which they are meant to be protecting, based on MBT hulls themselves. Instead, they get tincans with little real hope of surviving even the smallest calibre weapons. As for political decisions WRT military equipment, its a common failing, in all militaries, even the US one. Remember, your government represents domestic constituencies with vested interests. The result is more often than not, the best, foreign built piece of equipment is not selected over the domestic, second-best or an allies piece of kit is adopted, for "closer integration" rather than a different non-allied nation's weapons which are actually better. Downunder, we have suffered from all these problems and some. An excellent case is the example of the adoption of the M60 GPMG in 1961 to replace the venerable Bren. The weapon which actually won the competition, the FN-MAG58 GPMG ironically ended up replacing the M60, 25 years later. The difference between 1960 and 1985 was that in 1960 the Australian government was seeking much closer ties with the US, whereas in 1985 the party in power sought greater self-reliance and diversification of supply.

Does this mean your all "Moonies" now?

Pillar, your comments remind me somewhat of the debate that has been going on, at a low level, in the Oz army now for most of its existence for the last century. Lacking a clearly defined threat for the most part, we've tended to focus on what we think are likely contingencies, as well as trying to ensure that if the army needs to rapidly expand, in time of war, we have the trained and experience cadre to carry out that expansion. The result has been that defence planning has tended to swing between two schools of thought - "forward defence" or "fortress Australia". Each has had its time in the limelight. Presently, we've moved into another period where "forward defence" has began to find favour with both politicians and the theorists. This has also resulted in, at times, quite considerable inter-service rivalry for funding, as each service in turn has recieved a lion's share of the money, in order to fulfill its part in the grand scheme in things. Its also resulted in some very strange proposals being put forward, the most recent by the Army whom attempted to claim we needed to have a heavy anti-armour capability 'cause the government's policies could see us becoming involved in repulsing a potential DPRK attack on the ROK. After everybody calmed down and had a good laugh, the government clarified its policies a great deal more after that. We are still faced with the problem of no clearly definable threat nor a role for our defence forces beyond the general ones normally associated with them. The government recently promised a massive increase in funding for defence because, in their view, our region has become considerably more volatile. However, when closely examined, the promises were seen to be very much on the never-never...

Jeff, thank you for bringing the Evans website to my attention. Its really very good. As to the non-gun/gun armed OP tanks, I think what needs to be considered is whether or not the vehicle was a "high" or a "low" powered radio vehicle. "High" powered "rear-link" vehicles tended, due to space limitations, in the British Army to have their guns removed, to make room for the larger, bulkier, tube powered radios which long-range comms required in those days. Typically for comms between say regiment and division and division and corps/army, they tended to handle the high volume, long range traffic. Although not exclusively used for morse, that was their primary method. The "low" powered sets where for short-distance comms, usually by voice, rather than morse and would have been less bulky, so the gun (and ammunition) could have remained. I also suspect that the sort of vehicle an OP recieved, depended upon availability and function - as in when and where within the OrBat he was meant to function. If he was attached to an Armoured Squadron, he'd have been more likely to be given a "low" tank with a gun, than if he was attached to an Armed Regt's HQ. I wonder if people were also aware that there were specialised OP and Sigs versions of some armoured cars in the British/Commonwealth armies? A lot of that information has been garnered from a variety of sources on RASigs, including books about Phantom and Spike Milligan's biographical sketches, BTW. He was a gunner and was finally invalided out, for mental reasons, after being wounded as part of an FOO party in Italy in late 1943.

Why do you presume that you'd be able to detect the fall of the ranging round, in real life, fast enough to be able to react? Secondly, you don't think perhaps the definition of "withdraw" could well be to "move rapidly away from the enemy"? What I find interesting about the "withdraw" command is that it seems to assume retreat (ie runaway) rather than move backwards, using fire and movement.

I was recently playing a night scenario and the first thing I noticed was that the same sounds are used at night as during daylight scenarios. Men shouting, birds singing, equipment banging, etc. Knowing from my own military experience the differences between how operations are carried out between daylight and nighttime, where every effort is made, to be as quiet as possible, particularly when you're trying to sneak around. I was rather surprised to say the least. I do hope that in CMBB there is some consideration to perhaps having a switch so that when a battle starts at night, everybody is quiet but as firing starts, etc., then we gradually return back to the full levels of sound?

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by JonS: Again from C&D: "In late 1944, a 'Beobachtungs Panzerwagen Panther' was converted from rebuilt Panther tanks. The main armament, the 7.5cm KwK, was removed and the front of the turret plated over. In the centre of this front plate were mounted a dummy gun and mantlet, adn to the right, a ball-mounted MG34. On the extremities of the new front plate, armoured flaps covered the openings for an EM 1.25m R (Pz) steereoscopic range-finder. ADditionally, the Beob Pz Wg carried a Blockstelle 0 range-plotting table and other instruments for use with artillery observation." There is a photo showing this thing, and to be honest, it looks pretty poxy - the mantlet looks odd, and the 'barrel' looks far too short. Judging by the hull fittings (MG and drivers port), it looks like it's based on an Ausf D. Regards JonS<hr></blockquote> There is apparently some debate about the numbers produced and whether or not they were ever fielded. From memory, there were about 50 built, which is awfully high for the mere production of prototypes as some sources I've read claim. The "barrel" of the gun, is as you mention, Jon, a particularly odd shape, I can remember attempting to scratchbuild it in 1/76 scale, upon the basis of the pictures I had available some 30 years ago and after several goes managing to created the odd series of curves. Once I'd done that, I was the only wargamer who had one...

Its not that an uncommon problem in AFV's which don't have power driven turret traverse. Even the Panzer IV, Ausf J, actually suffered from it because they were mainly built with only manual traverse. The turret was simply too heavy to be moved manually but the war situation and the lack of copper mean that the Germans simply couldn't afford to manufacture the electric motors needed. The KV II merely was worse.

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by aaronb: If you're going to be that way, do it right. It's "UTC" and has been for years. GMT is from the days of the British Empire - 'Greenwich Mean Time'. And it's a silly request anyway.<hr></blockquote> Gee, obviously no one told the mainframe and unix developers that (ever looked in your email headers as well?). However, on a more serious note, when I saw the title of the thread, I thought someone else had noticed that FO's seem to work on a different time scheme to the rest of the world, in the game. Ever notice that a "minute" for an FO can last a great deal longer than a single turn?

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by Commissar: Actually, one more question: How does this book correspond with other Western works like Ryan's <u>A Bridge Too Far</u>? Are the "facts" in both tend to back up each other or are there major disagreements?<hr></blockquote> No, the facts are generally in agreement. I'm just wading through about half a dozen different books on Arnhem, each dealing with a different aspect or unit which took part, including perhaps the most interesting gem of the lot: van Roekel, Chris, The Torn Horizon: The Airborne Chaplains at Arnhem, Jan and Wendela ter Hosrt and Chris van Roekel, Arnhem, 1998. It never Snows in September, provides a great deal more detail of the German units' accounts (obviously) than Ryan's book. The major events concur, the difference is that the perspective of the narrative is very different. It Never Snows in September, has excellent maps, diagrams and photos, many never before published about Arnhem. I'd highly recommend it. I purchased mine online, along with the other books from the Airborne Forces Museum, in the UK.

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by Commissar: Granted, the composition of a KG tended to vary since there was no standard organization and was more ad-hoc, but I was wondering if there tended to be a typical rank for COs of kampfgruppen. Did they tend to be above hauptmann/hauptsturmfuhrer in rank? Was it all over the places?<hr></blockquote> As I'm presently reading "It Never Snows in September" - the German account of Market-Garden, it talks a great deal about the many ad-hoc KG which were created and operated in and around that operation. I'd suggest that while taking into account what the others have said in the thread, that the majority of KG commanders tended to be usually about Lt.Colonel (or SS equivalent) in rank. You might get lower ones or even higher ones but Lt.Colonels tended to be the ones who had the required amount of authority, training and experience to be able to get such ad-hoc formations to work (and were usually in command of the unit which formed the core of the KG).

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by JonS: Just as well he did though - go the Sappers! You know you're all Gunners at heart Ubique JonS<hr></blockquote> Nice scene. Would never have happened in real life (and it apparently didn't). Officers don't get down to arguing promotion dates. Its usually experience and senority of service (in toto) and perhaps most importantly, corps. They tend to know whose the better soldier as well. Only real asses make an arse of themselves over such matters.

My apologies for not getting to this sooner, Mattias. <blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by Mattias: Interesting, a situation similar to the one facing the Germans when they tried to fit their AT guns into their tanks. However unless I'm reading his book wrong it means we will have to pin another error on Peter Chamberlain (In this case in "British and American tanks of world war two). He writes (in the 2000 edition): "Vickers-Armstrong developed a new "compact" version of the 17pdr with a shorter barrel, shorter breech and lighter weight. Known originally as the Vickers HV 75mm (HV : High Velocity), but later called it the 77mm gun, it had a performance and penetrating power only slightly inferior to the 17pdr and fired the same ammunition." I always assume the term "ammunition" is used with regards to the whole shell and casing package, and that in this case the same ammunition could be used in both guns. Just for future reference Brian, are you sure your source is correct? It certainly sound like he has looked into it but I'd just like to know M.<hr></blockquote> What you've quoted is exactly the same as I have in my 1975 edition. I usually take Chamberlain and Ellis' work with some grain of salt, Mattias. Afterall, they were the ones who published, in reference to the Covenanter Bridgelayer: "Mainly used for training and development work...A few of these vehices were used by the Australians in Burma in 1942."[p.36] The only problem is, there were no Australian troops fighting in Burma in 1942 or any other time! The only Covenanter bridgelayer the Australian Army recieved during the war is still sitting in the Armour Musuem at Pukapunyle. Just as the British found with the vehicle, its cooling system was complete inadequate, only more so, in Australia's warmer climate, so it never left here and it was never used on operations. My source, on the otherhand, David Fletcher, is the Head Librarian at the Royal Tank Musuem, Bovington. He's written extensively on British armoured developments and has published some excellent books on the topic. I'll think you'll find what he says is a great deal more accurate than what Messrs Chamberlain and Ellis have to say, on the topic. The chambers of the 77mm and the 17 Pdr were very different shapes so they could not fire the same round, they could however fire the same projectile. QED. This doesn't mean that Chamberlain and Ellis are wrong on everything, just those two items.

Perhaps people will not understand why tank commanders were willing to risk life and limb by travelling head out, in order to gain that extra chance of seeing the other bloke before he saw you? I've travelled in AFV's cross-country. The view, as noted, is terrible.

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by Andreas: Hmm, maybe because fortifications were a lot more important in Italy then they were in NWE (outside the Siegfried line) - also, the lower number of tanks and the particular lay-out of the Italian countryside may increase survivability of Sextons. Finally, a hang-over from the desert times. I believe 8th Army did things differently in some respects. But to be honest, I am just guessing.<hr></blockquote> Most of the Sexton/Priest Regiments in Italy were original converted from towed Field Regiments originally, in the Desert. As Artillery tended to have a much greater chance of aquiring experience and surviving, they'd have been composed of quite a lot of "old timers" who had been taught how to fight tanks and had the chance to practice it for real, against the Afrika Korps. All that combined would I have thought, tended to make 8th Army RA extremely experienced.

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by Andreas: Hehe - yes. I am not so sure about this for the Wehrmacht though. I would be interested to see the training schedule for a Hummel crew, as opposed to that for a Stug III crew. My suspicion is that they differ markedly, despite both being in the Artillery branch of the service. But I just don't know it.<hr></blockquote> I'm glad that someone has their brain switched on, Andreas. I suspect you'd find that there would be a scale of training - obviously the expressly designed AT SP guns, such as the Nashorn/Hornisse would have a lot more training than say a Stug crew who in turn would have a lot more AT training than say a Hummel crew. Then, experience would have to be a factor to be considered - Stugs quite often found themselves acting as Panzerjaeger, which isn't what they were meant to be doing, while occasionally even the poor Wespe and Hummel crew would have been (primarily I suspect on the Eastern Front) called upon to kill tanks if a breakthrough occurred and they were threatened. In the British/Commonwealth armies, a similar situation would have ruled - Archer crews obviously had a lot, while Sexton/Priest crews would have only a small amount of training (unless they were in Italy - can you guess why?).

Mmm, I would think that the SP version of a Field Gun would have its crew trained in a similar manner to that of the Field Gun. Of course, that will mean you'll need to know what the definition, role and function of a Field Gun is, to understand the point I'm making (hint, what is the secondary role for Field Guns?

Apologies. Fixed. You can now find my email address (which you already have, anyway, Michael). Send your suggestions!

I've prepared a webpage here, showing a method I've developed for turning paper or scanned maps into CM game maps. Others might find it interesting and useful. It includes my first scenario, the Commando raid on Vaagso in December 1941.

Very nice. One question though, where's the surf?

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by Slapdragon: Yes, iron, as lead was never used in cannon (to heavy actually).<hr></blockquote> Too expensive, more like.

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by xerxes: I want a .50 caliber vickers! Was there really such a thing? -marc<hr></blockquote> Yes. It was fitted primarily to ships on 4 or 8 gun mountings and to the Vickers series of light tanks used early in the war. However, because of the round utilised (not the same as the US .50 cal) it wasn't anywhere as reliable as the .303in variant. It was largely replaced by a weapon which was only marginally better, the 15mm BESA, which was used in the Light Tank Mk.VII and the Guy/Humber Armoured Cars. Its interesting that in both cases, scaling an extremely reliable weapon up to a larger calibre did not transfer the reliability of the weapon but rather created a whole raft of other problems, associated usually with feeds and so on.

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by busboy: However, if you want to try, Patton's 3rd Army, on paper, is the most efficient army in history I believe. I'll dig out the numbers if you'd like. (Date in operation-date of end of war, casualties inflicted, taken, territory taken, ect.) <hr></blockquote> I rather think you're overstating the case a bit. "Most efficient in history"? Come now, I think you'd have to find the Mongols were that - their empire ranged from Poland to Korea. <blockquote>quote:</font><hr> As for Hannibal. He was brilliant, but the Romans he faced at Caenne were led by a bumbbling command structure. Two councelor armies were combined...and the councles took turns commanding. Caenne was a masterpiece, but if one competant Roman had been in command, Hannibal would have been slaughtered and the Second Punic war would have eneded right there. But he did win and...he did nothing. He marches up to Rome, lobs a spear at the walls, but cannot take it. One of his own generals told him "You know how to gain a victory, but you know not how to use one." <hr></blockquote> You don't think the same could be said for Patton and his 3rd Army? His success it might be suggested, could only be achieved because he did not face the cream of the enemy's forces and the enemy was hamstrung by an idiot CinC. If Patton had been faced by the same forces as faced the British in the Eastern sector of the bridgehead, you don't think his performance might have been a tad worse?

So, if people would like to email me with the exact names of towns/cities/landmarks I'll see how hard it is to get 1:25,000 & 1:50,000 maps for them from my source in St.Petersburg.