SteveP

Sorry if this has been answered. Couldn't find anything. I am working my way slowly thru this campaign. In the 10th mission -- Breakthrough -- I ended up wiping out all of the Germans on the map (there were only a handful), but the final scorecard said there were a bunch of Germans (68) still alive and kicking (so I only got a Tactical Victory). I got a Total Victory in the previous mission (Hell in the Hedgerows) and I understand that this had some influence on the size of the German force in this follow-up mission. Could that be the reason for this discrepancy? Just curious.

The OP suggested, at least in part, a misconception that playing RT was necessarily about reflexes ("twitch). If RT were implemented for H2H play, I suppose it would be that way, which is why I would never do it. For solo play, my reflexes are still fast enough to hit the Esc key when needed, which is all I really need them to do (other than hide the game when my wife comes into the room ). Another reason why I don't mind the lack of replay is that I have no interest in micro-managing my units. Doing so would be the opposite of a fun experience for me (clearly a matter of taste). I'm content to let the TacAI respond to highly localized events. In RT, however, I can give or alter orders sooner than if I had to wait for the full minute to finish. I save the game quite often when I am paused, and I have no qualms about going back to an earlier save if it looks like I've done something badly (not an infrequent occurance ) because I missed something that I would likely have seen in replay. Much of what has been said here about the replay feature is perfectly true. It's just a matter of trade-offs.

My age and wargaming experience is similar to your own, I believe. I switched to RT because I could pause the game any time I want (often after less than a minute has passed, but sometimes only after several minutes when there is no reason to stop the action). The only disadvantage is lack of replay, but I regard that as being more realistic. Running the replay over and over so you can glean every detail of what happened to every unit would be something a RL commander could only dream about. OTOH, it would be nice to have a saved movie to look at after you've completed a mission.

I've done it both ways, in RT

This is actually quite realistic. The US could not fire their MGs (or any caliber) from their side of a hedgerow. The MGs had to be moved into the bocage field, or at least set at an entrance into the bocage field. The Germans did not have a problem with this because they had time to create MG nests in the berm. However, I doubt that was BFC's intent. My guess is this something like what happens when you try to move into a building and deploy an MG. Sometimes you can, sometimes you can't (or perhaps it just takes longer to get properly deployed -- haven't figured that out).

Go advice. I mod scenarios and QBs all the time. However, you can't do that with a campaign, which happened to be where I ran into this.

I wasn't aware that someone had tested blank walls. Since we are talking about Northern France and not rural Russia, I would be surprised if barns were porous constructions that reveal people moving around behind solid walls. I don't even think my guys were moving around at the time. AFAIK, the AI won't shoot at anyone until the shooter has a positive ID (though it will keep area firing after it loses the positive ID). If that is correct, then the AI had a positive ID on my squad through a solid barn wall. The only other thing I can think is that the gun doing the shooting was really aiming at something else and got a lucky hit. Not impossible.

But concealment is clearly weak at relatively close range (under 100m, for example), even when the wall is undamaged. I haven't done any testing -- just reacting to a recent event. It would be interesting to know if there is any evidence from RL to support that.

I was surprised recently to discover that they could actually be spotted thru that blank wall. I don't understand the logic behind that, though I could have told them to hide and probably will in the future. I do agree that once they've been blasted after getting spotted that way, apparently the game lets them shoot back thru any significant damage.

Here are some principles about fire superiority that I've learned over time. They are specific to infantry advancing against a well-defended position. 1. The effectiveness of direct fire increases as you get closer to the target. 2. Effectiveness is reduced when infantry are cowering. Also, the ability to move infantry forward while they are cowering is severely hampered. 3. Infantry that is not suppressed or cowering can be moved closer to the enemy using Assault. It is usually best to advance in short hops. 4. It is likely that, given enough infantry units in the attack, at least one and possibly more are in a good morale state to advance. Advance them, not the others. They will draw fire, which helps the ones not advancing to recover their morale. 5. Be very patient. You'll get there. Lack of patience is almost certainly the biggest reason why people have trouble attacking directly into a defended position. (The second biggest reason is that the attack if undersized ). There are all kinds of variations to the question of fire superiority, but I think they all generally start with those basics.

The reason why the bocage region was considered ideal defensive terrain was because the Germans could defend everything they wanted to defend, with the troops they had available. If the Americans had been able to stage flanking attacks in June or early July, the bocage defenses would have been no more difficult to defeat than defenses they had run into in Africa, Sicily and much of Italy (except possibly the terrain immediately surrounding the Cassino abbey). The Germans were also confident in their defenses because they discovered that the American infantry would not, or could not, stage effective frontal attacks on their hedgerow defenses. One might surmise that had the situation been reversed, the Germans might have made faster progress attacking thru the hedgerows, though at a higher cost in casualties than the Americans were willing to incur.

Sorry, poor choice of words on my part. My tank halted before actually going into the hedgehog. At that point, I gave it an order to move slowly thru the hedgehog to the other side (it was just for fun -- I didn't really know what would happen). That was when it took off in a different direction and found a questionable path thru a small hedgerow opening.

No, it didn't widen. That was why the second tank could not go thru the opening when I gave it a direct order to do so.

The question posed by my OP is whether the AFV would have gone thru that gap if it had been the only way to get around an obstacle like the hedgehog (and you ordered it to move thru the obstacle not thru the gap). I don't know, but it would be interesting to do a variety of tests.

I ran into a hedgehog on a key road. I decided to give my tank a slow move order to the other side, not really expecting it to do anything, but curious. However, the tank immediately took off in a different direction, and ended up moving thru a soldier-sized opening in a hedgerow which allowed it to bypass the hedgehog. Hmmm ... So I gave a second tank explicit orders to move thru that same opening, thinking maybe there was something unusual about it. No dice. So I moved this second tank over to the hedgehog and gave it an order to slow move to the other side of the obstacle, just as I had done with the first tank. It did exactly the same thing as the first tank -- moving thru the same opening in the hedgerow that it wouldn't move thru when given explicit orders to do so. My guess: somehow the imperative to find a path to an impossible destination caused the tanks the move thru an opening just because it was an opening.

Well, as I said, it's just my opinion, but ... There are two components: concealment and cover. The fact that you can spot them to shoot at them from any distance greater than grenade range is a strong argument that concealment isn't realistic. In July, tanks were using MGs to spray the entire opposite hedgerow because they couldn't spot anything. They fired WP into the opposite corners because the Germans obstinately continued to place HMGs there -- but they weren't getting spotted by the tanks. The only way the Americans were able to concentrate fire on the enemy in the hedgerow was from close range. In my view, the hedgerows should provide better cover for a prepared defense than any of the other fortification types (e.g., trenches, foxholes) we encounter in the game. That's my interpretation based on what was reported about bocage fighting. The only way the Americans could overcome a hedgerow defense was by assaulting at very close range with infantry. Folks have to judge for themselves whether that is what they experience in CMBN.

Note: Players who already find that fighting in the hedgerows, in the typical CMBN scenario or campaign, is too difficult and frustrating won’t benefit from these suggestions. These “Rules” are about making things a bit more challenging. Fighting in the bocage terrain was among the most difficult tactical and operational problems the American army ever faced. In keeping with that, I try to follow some simple rules to make the experience in CMBN a little more realistic. To help with understanding the rationale for each rule, I have added some telling quotes from “Busting the Bocage” by Captain Doubler (which is essential reading. It can be found here) 1. Demolition: “… other conditions prevented the burying of explosive charges. Digging holes large and deep enough for the explosives in earthen embankments covered with vines and filled with roots proved too laborious…. Since an attack could proceed only as fast as charges were emplaced and detonated, slow moving American attacks would allow the Germans to coordinate their hedgerow defense better. Engineers and infantrymen would also be dangerously exposed to German mortar fire while planting demolitions. Though technically feasible, burying explosives by hand was a procedure both too difficult and tactically unwise.” For missions set in June, I try to leave the engineers in the setup zone, or at least avoid the use of demolition in the hedgerows. In July, I use demolition only to open gaps for AFVs, since there is no evidence that demolition was ever used to create openings for infantry. On the other hand, there is this: “… companies could not deploy and maneuver because of thick vegetation and the compartmentalized nature of the terrain. Platoons were forced to hack their way through the dense vegetation because German defensive fires covered all natural breaks in the hedgerows.” Since infantry in CMBN aren’t allowed to hack openings in the hedgerows, one could rationalize the use of demolition for that purpose. I don’t do that, however, unless the map virtually requires it. 2. AFVs: “The hedgerows' earthen embankments and heavy vegetation were almost impassable obstacles for the M-4 Shermans. Tanks could not lead the attack through the hedgerows nor support leading infantry attacks with maingun and machine-gun fire…. The hedgerows kept the tanks from maneuvering freely, and poor observation prevented the tankers from using their longrange main guns and machine guns. Tanks unaccompanied by friendly infantry were easy targets for German infantry armed with explosives and panzerfausts. Reluctant to operate within the confined spaces and tangles of the hedgerows, tank commanders kept their vehicles road bound.” In June, I do not move AFVs into bocage fields even when there are openings big enough for them (which seems to be common practice in the design of maps for CMBN scenarios, campaigns and QBs). I keep the AFVs on the roads. I also don’t allow AFVs to fire through hedgerows until July, and even then I limit this to medium or heavier tanks. 3. Combined Arms: “Another cause for poor tank-infantry coordination was that many infantry commanders had not worked with tanks before and lacked sufficient experience concerning how tanks should be used in conjunction with infantry. The exact details of how tanks and infantry should work together were largely neglected …. The din of battle and roar of tank engines drowned out voice communications between tank commanders and troops on the ground. Infantrymen could not get the attention of tankers who were busy inside their vehicles. Unable to communicate during combat, infantry squads and tankers failed to coordinate their fires against the Germans.” I don’t allow infantry to spot for armor until early July, unless the parent unit is an armored division. Otherwise, armor has to spot targets for itself. 4. Heavy weapons: “Unable to use normal techniques of fire and maneuver, American commanders were also powerless to influence the battle with increased firepower. Heavy vegetation and the close proximity of the German defenders made it impossible to bring forward and set up heavy machine guns.” “... hedgerows and the close combat conditions made the observation and adjustment of mortar and artillery fire almost impossible. American and German units often fought one another at ranges of less than 300 yards. Short distances made calling for artillery fire risky, since unadjusted rounds could easily land on friendly troops. Many engagements were fought at such close range that even if friendly rounds landed on German positions, the effects of shrapnel and concussion would endanger American lives. Unable to observe the enemy and to call fire on him from a safe distance, infantrymen were deprived of field artillery and mortar support.” I try to avoid firing HMGs and MMGs (which were considered heavy machine guns in the quote above) from the protection of a hedgerow when attacking. I also try not to use mortars against enemy troops firing from behind a hedgerow, if I have already advanced infantry into the intervening field, especially in June. I treat guns (such at AT guns) the same as HMGs. Some maps don’t make it practical to follow these rules and still achieve the objectives. Also, IRL fighting in the bocage, especially in June, caused a very high casualty rate among the attackers. For some missions or campaigns this can be a major problem. So I tend to be flexible in adapting these rules to the situation. Do these rules make bocage fighting too hard? IMHO, the hedgerows in CMBN don’t provide the level of concealment and cover that they did IRL, and scenario designers sometimes don’t take full advantage of the defensive possibilities in constructing AI Plans or unit selection (for example, too few snipers and TRPs). So the resulting battles aren’t necessarily as nasty or bloody as they would have been IRL. But the rules force you to consider the tactical problems in a way that would have been more familiar to the American commanders at the time. FWIW

IIRC, the designers designated those locations as landmarks as well as objectives, so when both landmarks and objectives are turned on (made visible on the map) you get the same names twice.

Well, there are already movement commands which will cause a squad to move in single file, somewhat spread out, team by team (in fact, I gather some people think this is a defect in the game design ). The slow command will not do that, of course. But the AI is capable of it. Probably the easiest solution would be to allow engineers to use the mark mine command anywhere (though perhaps with some increased risk). I would think that would be realistic, since a set of mines in one location suggests the strong possibility of a larger field of them.

If I thought that were true (in BFC's view), I probably would not play the game. The micromanagement would be too tedious for me, though I know other folks love it. I think being able to split into teams to deal with a distinct tactical problem is a great feature. Moving a whole company thru a keyhole in the minefield, team by team, is too much work for my tastes.

Picture a linear minefield. One of your squads stumbles upon one of the minefield segments (and stops immediately, so that only one of the segments is discovered). You bring up engineers to mark that minefield segment. How do you get the next squad safely thru that one segment of the minefield without hitting the neighboring minefields? IRL, the squad would crawl in something of a single file across the marked field. In CMBN, each of the teams in the squad follows it's own path, which inevitably means more casualties. I have not found a solution and I wonder if this is a flaw in the AI's pathfinding system. I know already that one can solve this by breaking up the squad into teams. IMHO, the game shouldn't require that level of micro-management to handle this. OTOH, it's possible that this is what BFC expects players to do in this situation. Just wanted to put the question out there.

I don't know if this helps, but thru much of the fighting in the bocage, German snipers were probably second only to the mortars in casualties to American infantry caught in the bocage fields. The MGs were mostly effective at keeping the infantry pinned down in the middle of the fields, where they could be hit by mortars or picked off the snipers. The snipers could kill them as they hugged the ground, which was apparently harder for the MGs to do. One top commander estimated that half his casualties were from snipers during one operation. Another PL reported losing an entire squad of inexperienced infantry to a single sniper in a matter of a few minutes. They were all flat on the ground at the time. FWIW

The "Busting the Bocage" study said that Shermans could move over and thru low bocage. However, they kept getting destroyed by infantry AT weapons when they did. Perhaps they risked getting bogged or damaged as well. I don't know. In any event, the American army stopped trying to run Shermans thru any type of bocage (i.e., any hedge built atop a substantial earthen berm) unless cleared by explosive charges first. BFC did not choose to model the ability of Shermans to cross low bocage (which would have to include the vulnerability to AT weapons). OTOH, they made it way too easy, safe and quick to blow tank sized holes in the bocage. On the whole, it may balance out in a reasonable way.

I posted about my experiments with that quite awhile ago, in a thread I started about problems with bocage cover/concealment. My experiments indicated that the trick didn't make enough of a difference to offset the problems (e.g., the trenches gave away their locations even when the trenches themselves weren't spotted). Of course, someone might construct a scenario using that trick, and if everyone is pleased with the results, I'd have to take another look. In the meantime, I tried to find other ways to deal with the fact that bocage in CMBN didn't provide realistic cover/concealment.

Frankly, I'm still learning how to do this. I had never done scenarios before, but I was disappointed not to see bocage scenarios that were as nasty and bloody as the real thing (which some gamers naturally hate -- as did the American infantry who had to fight in that terrain ). So that led to this series. A campaign isn't on my radar screen at this point. What I would like to do next is see if I can make one of these scenarios in which the AI is able to execute a strong attack, without having to resort to totally unrealistic force complements or tricks. It may not it possible, but I've learned a few things, so we'll see.