jtcm

first flight sim i'd played since Chuck yeager, so i was overwhelmed by the detail and realism. i tried a silly trick but couldn't make it work-- loading the i=153 with underwing rockets, meant for ground work, and using them in aerial combat. actually it did work once in a h2h pass against a Me-109. the next second the debris from the me knocked my i-153 out of the ssky (at least I think that's what happened)

thanks but I don't have AK. Long live realistic scenario MEs

I agree with WN--don't like MEs-- usually because I play against flag rushers, and I find it difficult to visualize them in historical terms. If you were given orders to e.g. seize high ground or occupy a village or move to contact and move up to the crossroads, in real life would you dash headlong to the objective ? Not knowing whether the enemy had already occupied the objective ? Or would you marshall your task force in a column of march, with scouts, flank cover, etc ? -- the latter, i think, is the historical solution; yet if you apply it, all that happens is that your opponent has rushed into advantageous positions, and you end up mounting a probe or hasty attack with odds against you. How often did it happen in historical circumstances that e.g. a Battn commander was told "Recon tells us that an enemy Battn is half a mile off the objective which we want to seize. Quickly, beat him to it" ? Maybe this theme has been flogged to death in an old thread in 2001; but I would really enjoy playing a "real life" style ME, i.e. engagement from the line of march, with flags unimportant or even absent. I think I read (Zaloga ?) a description of how the Soviets doctrinally conceptualized MEs, complicated deployment of various elements (scouts, tanks, BMPs, organic SP arty) from the line of march to hold, envelop, destroy and bypass any obstacle met en route; I think I read AARs for such battles in the post War US Army "Small Unit Actions" series for the E. Front, which is presumably where the Soviet doctrine developed; if I remember rightly, there also is in one of the Harold Coyle novels (the one set in Iran) a hair raising description of two battn strength columns, one Soviet and one US marines, both engaging in 'recon in force' / raiding, at night time-- the two formations brush past each other in a patch of Central iranian desert, and at first only their extreme flank elements actually engage in combat-- before both commanders understand what's going on, swiftly if messily wheel their armoured columns round, slug it out, and try to locate each other's flanks. Those are the sort of MEs I'd like to play, Not the CM version as now exists.

maybe areafire-arrhea would be technically more correct

where did I read the following story: officer walks by mg blazing away, observes that the enemy is out of range, only to receive the answer " I know. Sir, that's where i intend for him to stay"

Lately played flight sim, IL-2 (i think that was the title)-- got to fly a Polikarpov I-153, excellent experience (biplane fi-bomber). Set up a quick battle, where I was minding my own business in my I-153 and get jumped by 2 Me-109s. Got trounced of course any number of times. My mistake: I prayed and sprayed whenever the MEs got within sight. I knew that the way to go is wait till the enemy plane filled the gun sight, then let rip; the only time that happened I actually shot up the Messerschmitt in front of me. But instinct took over each time-- the temptation to blast away whenever the enemy planes seemed within reach was too strong. Lesson for CM here, too: all too often, the temptation is "I see him" and firing at enemy sightings. No: seeing or perceiving the enemy is normal and welcome in combat situation; you have to hold fire until you know why you're firing, and that you're actually in a situation to do some harm. Until then, just digest the situation and hold back. Just a thought, anyway.

acting bttn commander = of little import in scheme of things... Two thoughts -- only in armoured units do Bttn commanders actually get to lead from the front and shoot at people -- next time I play CM and get beaten, as usual, i'll console myself by saying it wouldn't have mattered in the bigger scheme of things ! 8-)

Br. Reid's done his primary research in the sources : that's what gives him authority, and not smug pronouncements about "we in the family of military historians". Well worth noting.

(I mean tactical advice DURING TCP game, of the type "if u want to win you shld rlly attk bettr" etc)

I usually play for atmosphere rather than winning-- so end up losing. It may be a problem playing against the half dozen or so "Experten" in the game, e.g. WN, Graves, etc-- their knives are so sharp, their guns so big, you usually never know what hit you. At least you can appreciate e.g. the overwhelming drive of WN on the attack, or the inextricable defenses he seems to weave-- tactics as the art of "making things go wrong for the opponent". It's very clear, playing top players, that luck doesn't just happen-- the Schreck shot misses, or the impregnable trench line melts away, because of thought and in-depth knowledge of mechanics. What I can't stand: gloating, tactical advice, and map-rushing MEs.

Apologies for no map. I don't have grabs from this particular fight. Next AAR I'll try this Imageshack thing. JasonC: thanks for comments. Yes, it was a L-shaped ambush, with short side on left. Yes, the map was a bit problematic re cover, especially falling back to shelter from frontal fire and clobber the guys on the side. Yes, it was a case of tickling rather than punching (my usual tactical mistake). In this particular case the problem was exacerbated by arrogance: I saw what happened (well led ambush), but thought that Vet SS would simply shoot their way out of it, in a toe to toe slugfest. What happened was a classic case of tactics as "discomfort imposed on the opponent"-- whenever I tried to concentrate fire on the side, the enemies from the front would suppress my squads, whenever I tried to fire at the enemy line in front, the partisans on the side would pop up, dust themselves off and open fire with the Maxims. My company moving forward simply pancaked into a small space, and the fire from the the Maxims suppressed whole platoons at a time. My men inched forward until they finally got a fix on the enemy line in front, and blew it away (or burned it out)-- only to flounder in front of a second, fresh, line. During setup phase I had joshed with Akula: my SS men were going on R&R, would eat the partisans and return to base for breakfast. Turned out to be nice fight-- I highly recommend "SS vs Partisan" probes for historical, yet balanced games. I also hope you noticed the three different writing styles: official German-style prose; Landser-novelette; socialist realism.

Co Vet SS + 2 82mm mortar + flamethrower, probe against Partisans (Akula), dawn, Spring 1942 At 6.30 we reached our jump off line. The terrain rose gently towards the treeline where we suspected that the bandits’ outposts were hiding; in between, patches of wood promised good cover for infantry advance up close to the suspected enemy position. As the sun rose, we set up the MG34s and the mortars on our left, under direct orders of the commanding officer, to provide fire support over open ground 450m from the objective. The infantry started moving forward in the open, soon taking harassing fire from heavy sniping weapons, probably anti-tank rifles used in an anti-personnel role. The platoons manoeuvered forward, to a patch of light woods in the centre of our sector, and which lead foward up the slope. As we pressed on in the cover of this light copse, we were surprised to take heavy fire directed simultaneously from our left and our front, namely rifle fire with Maxim support, from several positions in platoon strength in heavy cover at about 200 m. As we turned to the fight, we expected to achieve fire superiority rapidly, thanks to our armament and our support group, but the dispersion of the bandits’ positions, all firing in a massed fashion against our assault elements which were concentrated in a relatively small space of unsatisfactory cover, and the distance at which our support elements were located, resulted in our assault troops being embroiled in a fifteen minute medium- to long- range fire-fight, during which casualties were sustained and ammunition expended, especially that of the support heavy mortars but also that of the squads LMGs, to little effect, since there were always enough bandits in action to hold up our advance with skilfully directed fire from two directions, and any suppressed enemy units, especially their machine guns, rallied with surprising rapidity, in order to resume effective action. Just before this firefight broke out, two squads grew separated from the main advance but decided on their own to carry out flank reconaissance on our right, using cover and dead ground. During the firefight, which they understood was happening from the heavy volume of fire, they sought to turn the enemy’s position, and in their belief, due to their unimpeded progress, that they had located an open flank, pushed forward hastily and without sufficient reconnaissance precautions, thus falling into an ambush from a flank guard of estimated platoon strength with machine gun support, and taking overwhelming casualties in the first exchange of fire. Later in the fight, the remnants of one squad (MG 34 + riflemen in support) recovered from their shock and set up an overwatch position hence effectively preventing the enemy’s flank units from shifting to the main firefight, by driving them back into covered positions with aimed rifle and LMG fire. In the centre, some assault units recovered tactical initative to the point that they formed as an ad hoc attack group, led by command-capable NCOs and junior officers, and pressed forward on to the limits of the woods our men were occupying, and conducted a frontal engagement with the bandits in these woods. Concentrated firepower at close range, and exceptionally bold action by the flamethrower team, quickly drove off the enemy units. However, in trying to pursue and exploit, our infantry soon found a second position of fresh enemy infantry, ranged at a treeline along the tactical crest of a low saddle, and forming a line which we were not able to impress. At this point, we had taken significant losses, and command and control of the assault units was non-existent. We therefore staged a withdrawal, under cover of our support heavy machine guns and of mortar smoke. ***** A last effort, Kameraden ! Under our frantic, heavy covering fire from all sides, the flamethrower man rushes forward, shouting hoarsely, and stops and squirts a long bright burning jet into the trees, again and again. The partisans have finally broken, and we rush forward into the wood, past the Russian dead, shooting at the fleeing bandits. The flamethrower operator is slumped, dazed, exhausted; his supporting man is wounded, has fallen behind in the assault. We pursue. But suddenly the trees come to an end, and from the other side of the clearing muzzle flashes appear all along the treeline, out of the dark, with Russian shouts. The distance is under 100 m, and the bullets zip into the trees or strike the pine needles on the ground. We fall flat, trying to mount a response. But our light machine guns are empty from so much firing. Three whistle blasts ! Nothing left to do today. We fall back, cautiously, under harassing fire from the Maxims. ***** The little Soviet captain looked around at his assembled men. He flicked away the last of his cigarette, before starting to speak. The first step had been to organize the partisans in a military fashion, into squads and platoons; the second had been training for small unit tactics; now was time for the third step. “Now, we know the Fascists are sending a company of SS-men to see how we’ve been doing these last weeks. There’s only one route that’s dry enough for tactical movement, so we’d better prepare a little party for the sons of bitches. I know of four ways of killing Germans. The first is tanks. The second is artillery. However, before Stavka decides on parachuting tanks or heavy mortars, we’ll have to make do without them. The third is fire-sacks and the fourth is defence in depth. Fire-sacks first: it’s best if you fire all together at Fritz, from at least two directions...”

How about aCMBB "Berlin 1945: Breakout" operation ? would be ideal for solo play as Germans ag. AI

If anyone recognizes himself in the opponent please let me know-- this game dates back to early summer 2003, I think.

Thanks for the advice ! and sorry for absence of map. I should make clear that the central block of woods led straight into the depth of the enemy line, so much so that the trench network was in fact in the rear part of these woods-- it was a close range SMG etc fight in woods against entrenched enemy. Even the Co command element and the plt command grounds were in the firing line, burning up their ammo and shooting away at the Germans, killing them in ones and twos with each exchange of fire. If my opponent had had a TRP in front, and called down something nasty, it would ahve been over. The Su-76s were played aggressively, in the hope of making him reveal his AT network. It sort of worked, but was very costly.

Apologies for no map-- I found these notes on my hard disk and thought I'd upload them, for fun. JasonC: that's basically a correct analysis of what happened (and what usually happens when I fight)-- empirical, Wile E Coyote (if X fails, try Y), rather than concentrated violence. My first Co. effort ran out of juice after shooting it out with a Sturm plt in trenches (horrible), my second Co. got nowhere (didn;t have the patience or the skill to tackle a good reverse slope defence), the third Co. had good overwatch and clear fields of fire and blew the defenders away (should have started there)-- but the clock had run down and one half of the map was still in enemy hands. My opponent was /very/ heavily into ATGs. Incidentally I dislike map edge crawling, But I should learn to concentrate.

July 1944, our Battalion attacks, towards a German held wooded ridge, which dominates open and slightly dipping ground, with some cover. Two companies frontage, one company in reserve, one special assault platoon with SMGs; one platoon of assault pioneers; SU-76s distributed across the front to deal with MG-42s (penny-packet, infantry support, slow because out of command reach of their Lt.-- what the hell); one platoon of T34-85s to deal with armour close up; one platoon of SU-122s for luck. In the centre of our sector, a big clump of woods leads straight up to the enemy-held ridge: perfect to unleash an assault group-- one rifle platoon, spread out in half squads, to move to contact, a SMG platoon to blast away anything the recon platoon finds, and one rifle platoon to support and to hold. Once the infantry has broken through, it will roll up the enemy line, while the armour lines up to support their progress in parallel, but from afar. A second company will launch a holding action on the left. The third company waits behind the first. Is Fritz waiting ? Heavy weapons groups set up, to hose the woods, if necessary; SU-76s move to just outside LOS ; the artillery fire plan in our sector calls for 120mm preparatory fire to fall on the woods. Here it comes; infantry moves out. The forward elements reach the treeline without trouble. Speed is of the essence: the SMG platoon crosses the open ground to the woods, fast, with no trouble; the rifle platoon follows. Our preparatory barrage has lifted, and the recon platoon spreads out within the woods. Meanwhile, on the left, a support group sets up; the company moves to its jump-off point; the enemy position must be at and behind the ridge, here undulating and lightly wooded In the centre, the recon elements drive on: they locate and wipe out two weak enemy outposts, half-squads. They push forward: a wire obstacle, with some gaps. Just behind, an enemy trench line, at the crestline. It could be worse. Our preparatory 120mm barrage has fallen short. The recon plt. stops and regroups. The SMG plt and the rifle plt. move up. On the left, the usual game of escalation has occurred. Heavy weapons have emplaced, infantry has moved out, hit the ground under MG-42 bursts; a long range firefight ensues; a SU-76 has ground forward, and squeezed off a few shells; a 75mm ATG has knocked out the SU-76, then another; the company has taken the ATG under fire, while mortarmen adjusted the range; the ATG has been silenced. The enemy advance line has been eliminated or driven off, under assistance from the heavy weapons group, and the ridge has been reached, but there is a strong reverse slope close defence behind it; the advance platoon has been routed by close range, concentrated fire; a SU-76, engaged rashly, is lost to ATG fire. Only desultory action: long range exchange of fire with some Germans who seem to be relocating along exposed parts of their line, disorganized attempts to gain a toehold on the ridge and build a base of fire or find enfilade fire on German squads. The heavy weapons group tries to relocate, but is caught by long range MG fire in the open, and slinks back into cover. In the centre,a short range firefight breaks out, between our assault elements and the Germans in their trenches. They are powerfully armed: Sturm elements, in the defence. At some points, the German trenches are within LOS of the wire, and our men cannot progress. At others, our men cross the wire, protected by dead ground, and engage the Germans at point-blank range. The SMG men pour in fire; the various elements get confused; the Major commanding the company throws in whatever he can muster into the meatgrinder, and directs the fire of whole platoons, or their equivalents, SMG and rifle mingled in the fight, upon single German squads. a german sally is driven off. The Germans finally are all dead, wounded or driven out. But the assault elements are terribly shot up, and their ammo badly depleted. They rest in the first German trenches, and seart re organizing. One squad, fitter than the others, sneaks off sideways, towards the enemy line on our left, under cover of woods, then scattered trees: maybe it will be able to crawl up on an enemy MG team or mortar position, or even an ATG pit, and spray it with rifle and SMG fire ? This might help the stalled attack on our left. But the four or five men, wandering in the midst of enemy positions with no recon or overwatch elements, blunders into a German rifle squad, which gets off the first volley. Hoarse shouts, a hurricane of fire, silence. No survivors of this infiltration group. Bad tactics, immediate retribution. There remains one Company: it is launched on a set piece attack at a brisk but methodical pace over open ground on our right, towards the wooded ridge that makes up the enemy line in our sector. The enemy holds his fire. Armour moves up, ready to support or exploit. By the time the enemy opens up in force, it is too late: the whole area in front of him is swarming with squads and platoons, in good cover, moving in bounds, spread out, backed up by well sited support groups; the layered return fire, a well rehearsed routine, from rifle platoons at 150m, snipers at 200m, HMGs and mortars at 300m, armour at 500-600m methodically sweeps him out of his foxholes in the tree line. A 75mm IG fires, in desperation, at our infantry line as it pours out fire; it is instantly pinned by Moisin, Degtyarev and Maxim fire; mortar shells suppress the crew; a SU-76 trundles up and silences the gun by direct HE. Our first elements reach the ridge: here the enemy line is surprisingly thin, near collapse. Two platoons turn towards their left, to start rolling up the line; one remains, to try to clean up some stubborn elements. There is a gap in the woods, between the segment of the ridge we have just seized and the woods where our assault group wore itself out; all the armour rushes towards this gap, pioneers embarked. The pioneers disembark when they find a mine belt and start breaching it with demo charges, the T-34s drive through the avenue cleared among the mines; but the Su-122s drive through the minefield, one is immobilized by a mine blowing off a track, the others pass. The rear part of the central block of woods is revealed to be strongly held by the Germans, in trenches; it is systematically raked and pounded with HE and MG fire from the T-34s and Su-122s, including the immobilized one, before infantry rushes in, to start tackling squad after squad of German infantry. Some plts from the central assault group join in the fight. Our infantry even surprises and wipes out an ATG nest. The Germans try to shift some infantry from his right flank towards the point of our break in; they get pinned by rifle fire from the remnants of the original assault group. Our armour rushes out-- too rashly: it is taken by flank fire from an ATG battery on our left: in quick succession, the T-34s are destroyed, before they can do any harm to the enemy right. The Su-122s hang back, their ammunition low; the few remaining Su-76s hesitate. The support groups have been left behind by our advance, and are only now starting to relocate; our attack on the left has long petered out, with little ammunition or fighting power. Our infantry is still rooting out the Germans in the woods. Regiment HQ calls in. How is the attack developing ? “Could be better. We've breached the line, but there's a stronghold with 75s on my left that's given me hell. I need some time".

Did I read somewhere (Keegan WWII history?) that the Soviets in the period between the wars organized a demonstration of paratroopers for foreign observers, complete with band ? I seem to remember the band landing on its feet, and starting to play its instruments. That, too might be myth or propaganda. But it hsa the right 1920s-1930s surreal-modernist feel to it !

Would be worth trawling the memoirs of the French commanders (De Lattre) to see if they're picking this stuff up in North Africa, or if they're reading De Gaulle's interwar programmatic books. The Invalides museum does have a good section re WWII-- very French-oriented (though not biases), The Desert war exhibit does have a lot of stuff re French experience (e.g. in building gun fronts with 75mms)

I know who Massu was. I just wonder where the Free French learned how to fight with combined arms so devastatingly-- Gaullian doctrine ? US doctrine ? N. A. experience ?

Where did Massu and the French learn how to fight like that ?

(Off topic) Laze and Blaze: I seem to remember reading that in 1991, a M1 was taken out by perfect hit on the turret ring. That would make sense in view of your remark re shot trap on the Abrams.

There is scope here for a great war novel, re. Russia July 1941, along the lines of chaos, incomprehension, blindness etc that JasonC sketches out. Something like Mailer, The naked and the dead, trasposed to the E. Front. Or you can just play CMBB and dream of such a novel.

John D Salt: I'd never paused to reflect that the "not the scratch upon them" stories might be wistful tall tales rather than real anecdotes. Paul Fussell writes that he did see a German squad dead in their positions; that they might have been killed by a TOT is his speculation. I thought pressure waves from HE blasts killed by rupturing internal organs; but freely, and thankfully, admit that I know little on the subject.

Paul Fussell in his memoirs describes seeing a German squad, men all dead, still in firing positions-- and guesses that they were done for by overpressure from a TOT-- just to confirm Wartgamer's point about the overpressure being increased by the shells all falling together.