jtcm

I wish there were a good scenario or OP for recon-- on wheels or foot-- one side has to locate enemy MLR, for an arty strike, or for an attack on the seam between two units, one side has to patrol aggressively to try to kill off any sneaky enemy recon. All this should take place on a huge map, undermanned.

I thought there were rudimentary computers for e.g. AA work (calculating deflection, etc).

Reading another thread ( the "flogging a dead horse" one), I noticed JasonC mentioning a TOT called down on the jump-off point of a German attack, winter 44. From various bits of reading, i remember that a "time on target" strike coordinates fires from several batteries for the shells to land at the same time (Paul Fussell in his memoirs describes this as a "showy technique"). Some random thoughts: do you need a computer to calculate and coordinate this sort of tactic ? Did only the Americans do this ? I remember mentions of this in Pacific, and on EOT. But did Germans use their artillery this way ? Did the Soviets ?

Nice thread. I particularly like JasonC's post re. MEs, the point being that a good, realistic, non-gamey player should be able to defeat the gamey flag rusher. I lately played a frustrating TCP QB ME, in which my opponent rushed the flags, set up a line, while I moved forward with point, overwatch and trailing heavies. I made contact, and prepared firing lines and support groups, in the hope of methodically blasting his squads (with 44 Germans, StG armed) at 150-200 m. I blew it, with my usual mistake: dispersed forces, and tried to pull the trick off across the map, rather than in the Schwerpunkt (memo to self: there can't be TWO Schwerpunkte in a 800 point QB). It wouldn;t have been so bad if my opponent hadn't constantly offered patronizing advice throughout "If you don't play like me you'll never win" "Geting there first" etc etc. ***** I do wonder to what extent the "spreadsheeting" modelizes anything resembling the real life WWII firefight, and at what level. Grunt ? Junior Officer ? Co. commander ? Battn ?

Any good Operation Mars scenarios ?

What a daft thread.

that should be BCMPITWFW

Interesting post-- shows you just how sharp the knives are which Walpurgis takes to the fight. I propse WN for title of BCMPINTWFW. Some thoughts. 1. Does this mean that CMAK implements a "beaten zone" model for HMGs ? 2. Does 100m strike anyone as rather large for a "b.z." ? Do bullets yaw across a circle 100m large at any range ? That's a big circle. Or do trained soldiers flinch when HMG bursts kick up dust up to 50m away ? 3. Did people do this in WWII ? I can think of the description of Brigadier Ritchie-Hook in E. Waugh, Men at Arms, ordering full belts of Vickers fired at target during attack-- not quite the same, in work of fiction. 4. Do people still do this ? Speculative fire ? Preventive fire ? 5. Isn't the downside that your HMGs are less responsive in the overwatch role ?

(BV: sorry for the unclarity, I meant that Sidewinder's infantry screen was suppressed, sort of, by the 50mm mortars). I have pictures I really treasure of Italian pioneers destroying a flame KV in 1942. Evivva !

In fact, the pioneers would have helped a lot to hold the hill against the single PzIV which Sidewinder sent up there: once it crossed the mines, it shot everything up at leisure. I had to close assault it with the Lt. who was commanding the support elements. The mortarmen went on dropping bombs in their tubes until blown to smithereens. Horrible. A single pioneer squad, if placed right, would have been able to stop the PzIV (maybe)-- there was no infy. screen, it was suppressed by the curtain of 50mm bombs.

It's not just the Gymnasium and University systems which should be considered here, but also, I suggest, the apprenticeship system: I assume that it was up and running already by the beginning of the C20th, in fairly recognizable, modern form (Wilhelmine institution ?), and would ensure widespread skills and literacy among the militarizable population.

I simplified my narrative (as always). Sidewinder's probe's were nothing more than two half-squads, sauntering in plain view, on my left. My conscript "speed bump" line let them come to 150m, then opened up. One German half-squad bit the dust, one ran away. No overwatch elements. This was literally just to test the waters, and also, knowing sneaky Sidewinder, just to fixate my attention on the left while he was preparing his haymaker on my right. 50mm mortars: I just grouped those I had with the rifle plts. I know they're really grenade throwers with a 600 or 800 m range. I thought 4 of them together might make the Germans pause for thought. I opened up with my left rear ATG because Sidewinder had to go-- I felt it a shame to end the game without letting those guys take their shot, and their bow. Once the hill was seized, my goose was cooked-- but I had thrown two squads in cover, perpendicular to my original line, to greet any infantry that came over the hill crest to start rolling up my line, and the left rear ATG was the ace in my tattered sleeve. Two further thoughts: 1. Had I been in SW' s place, I would have attacked more ponderously-- infy feelers across map, o'watch support, tanks out of sight-- and lost. SW's flank break in was just right. 2. Had I thought Aha, the hill is the key, and put strong infy close defence as well as long range fire elements with fields of fire over VFs, my concentrated troops would have been open to arty strike. Morale of the story: if you are a struggling player, like yours truly, do not visualize how your plan will make you win (fond visions of burning German hulks on the steppe, while my men put their budyennovsk caps on their Moisin bayonets and shout Urrah at the fleeing fascist vipers), but how it might make you lose. As a con man says in a David Mamet film, "I just figure out what a smarter guy than me would do, and then I do it".

I hesitated about purchasing a 82mm FO, but would have needed a TRP or two-- and that would have taken away from the backbone of the defence-- trenches and ATG. No ATRs in Aug. 1941... No it's really my crap skills at: 1. reading a map 2. reading opponent's mind 3. "driving" units around. If I figure out how to do it I'll post pictures of the massacre.

Or: how to lose in 15 turns. Played against Sidewinder-- first game in ages for both of us. Axis attack, armour, high quality troops; Soviet defence, infantry, low quality. Farmland, modest hills, moderate woods. The Soviet line: a green rifle co. with HMG support elements and organic 50mm mortars; a plt of pioneers for at work; some at mines; a conscript plt; two 76mm guns, long barrel; trenches. The terrain: an inverted T crossroads in front of my sector. A small hill on the left. In the centre, a wide dip in the ground-- with the VFs. On the right, above the dip and alined with it, a splendid, noble hill, with some woods. My line: trenches in the dip, for a nice reverse slope defence. In front of the line, the conscript plt, split in half squads, as outpost line. Just behind them, under command of the major, the pioneers, in woods, when the tanks come close. Support elements: left rear, one ATG and one HMG, in trench; on the hill on the right, under command of a Lt. with good bonuses: one HMG, one ATG in trench, and four 50mm mortars within command of the Lt. The enemy side of the great hill is protected with AT mines. Here come the Germans: I see 4 PzIVs on my right, in column, and some infy moving out on my left. The enemy scouts hit my op line, are driven back. End of overture. Heavy enemy arty starts falling on the hill. More enemy infy moving towards the hill. I can't get good suppressive fire from my op line on the infy. I concentrate mortar fire on the enemy infy. feelers-- plenty of mortar ammo. All's well. End of Act I. Enemy tank moves towards the hill. I could take a shot with my left hand ATG, at 600 m, but only 7% chance of kill. Let it come, it'll founder on the mines at the foot of the hill.. Enemy infy now has started climbing the hill, in spite of constantly adjusted and concentrated mortar fire. End of Act II. Enemy tank has crossed the at mine belt with no damage. Right-hand AT has good shot at another tank, 79% chance. It takes the shot, immobilizes the tank, but is destroyed by return fire. Desperate attempt to relocate infy. to defend the hill. End of Act III. Enemy tank shoots up all the support elements on the hill, destroys my infantry reinforcements: 75 mm fire, coax and bow mgs make mincemeat of everything. Sidewinder crows in triumph. Enemy Infantry mops up. Other enemy tanks move up and seize the hill. ENemy now controls dominant ground above my reverse slope defence, and has enfilade fire over all positions. I open up with my left hand ATG, which is promptly destroyed by short 75mm fire. ENd of Act IV. I surrender, to avoid the slaughter of Act V. What I was hoping would happen: enemy frontal probe, gets bogged down in the op line and pinned by long range hmg fire. Enemy infantry pushes past OP line, gets stopped by fire from trenches on reverse slope + fire from support elements on the hill. Enemy tanks move forward to reinforce, get shot up by interlocking ATG fire. ATGs get knocked out, tanks move forward, get close assaulted. What happened: Sidewinder correctly analysed what I had planned (reverse slope ambush), assaulted what I thought was my strongest point (concentrated support elements on hill), and smashed it, since I had not thought of protecting it (would have weakened my oh-so-well-though-out op line +mlr). The at mines proved no problem at all. The 50 mm mortars inflicted no casualties on the advancing enemy infy. Hindsight: I wish I'd seen what SW would have seen, and prepared a little trap on that hill. Complementary reading: Arrian, Anabasis, Book 3, chapters 13-20 or thereabouts, for Alexander at Gaugamela-- everything you need to know about tactical thinking.

I'm not attributing the crisis of 1941, as analysed by JasonC, to planned economy--JasonC points out effectiveness of Sov war economy from start. In fact I woukld have thought a planned economy would have been particularly adept, because of the hypertrophy of the state's capacity for requisition, at war footing operations. I think that was the argument of "Sodorov" in "Inside the Red Army". So my point is that even a planned economy found it hard to cope with supply at the sharp end. So in turn, I'm wondering if a planned economy had particular factors that might have contributed to the mess ? Just a thought.

Fascinating series of posts. I remember a similar post by JasonC re melting away of Grande Armee in 1812-- again looking at bigger, "men in war" rather than "men in combat" problems. Very striking also that the Soviet "upper line" commanders already very good at operational thinking, but the actual instrument found lacking-- rather similar to what many had predicted the Warsaw pact army would have been like in case of a shooting war in Central Europe. Notable also how a command economy, based on central planning, could not confront the task of combat logistics. The question asked by an earlier poster remains: how did the Soviets crack this problem ? Dissolving Mech armies is one thing; but what was the situation like e.g. in spring 1942, or summer 1944 ? Vaguely relevant: a recent article in the NY Times re. slowness of supply of body armor to US troops in Iraq. NB how ceramic plates and socks were all classified as "priority: urgent", which in effect meant that nothing was. War as managerial exercise, war for management consultants. NYT 7 March 2005

another thought: I have a feelling that Treeburst's Rifle 1941 squad vs Smg squad shows that, even at close range, even in woods, if a SMG squad stands like a log. loses the first trigger pull, and lets itself be shot at by two groups of men with rifles running circles around it, and firing from widely divergent angles, it will swiftly have enough and run off. Not necessarily unrealistic. But if the SMG squad decides to fight, after the first minute, and can shake off the first shock, e.g. by splitting to fight, or by turning its full attention on one of the halfsquads and chewing it up good, the outcome might be different ? Or have I missed something ?

Just some random remarks re historicalness (which, for me, does matter: I enjoy losing "with atmosphere" rather than playing to win-- but then I'm a poor player) In CM, when two half-squads fire on one whole squad, the latter can only trade fire with one of the half-squads, due to game engine limitations. Treeburst 155 has criticised this as unrealistic: how can 10 men defeat 10 men in a shoot out ? (as opposed to 20 men, 2 squads, defeating 10 men). But what does happen in real life when a squad starts taking fire, say lmg + aimed rifle fire, from one direction (=faustius' A half-squad), and then close range smg fire from a flanking, assaulting half-squad ? Treeburst protested against the CM situation, where not one man in the squad fires against the flankers; but how would a squad, in real life, react ? It would have to make some difficult decisions, under fire-- how to distribute volume of fire ? Concentrate or disperse ? Right now, the CM engine solution (1 squad fires at one half-squad) corresponds to the sergeant or whatever shouting "concentrate your fire on those guys" as a matter of SOP, rather than everyone deciding, for himself, to spray in direction of whichever of the two opposing half-squads to fire at. Not necessarily un realistic; though I don't know what real life norms, and practices, were. Quite a while back, I posted something about tactics, as described in the Osprey book on the German infantryman, 1933-41 (vel sim). Infantry assault tactics were half-squad-o-centric as a matter of course: one half-squad lay down suppressive fire with the MG 34, the other leapt and bounded till it came to SMG and, especially, grenade squad (shades of WWI bombing tactics here). At the time, JasonC [does he still post here ?] and others recommended against using split squads in the attack; I thought this a simplification, for the sake of gameplay. So possibly not so a-historical ? But I still loathe the idea of having to micro-manage herds of h.s. If I played CM at all (which I haven;t done in six months), I'd stick to Co sized actions. Sorry for the johnny-come-lately post. Enjoyed the thread. Peace to all.

I have a feeling that the 'using people's living room as toilet' practice is actually quite widespread. I seem to remember so,ething like that in the documentary on Chechnya ("the Shamanov column"); various stories of schools; etc, used as latrines by troops in WWII; and my grandmother's memory of the passage of Soviet troops in her village, in Manchuria, in 1945, when they drove the Japanese out (they set up a field kitchen in the village; billetted troops in houses; afterwards, **** everywhere in the houses)

Hi Dandelion, Glad you liked the article. To be more charitable than you: the author of the book has done a lot of primary research, and come up with specific findings in his field of expertise-- medical history. Being a good historian, he tries to give an interpretation and explanation for the whole thing-- reads up on military history, etc. But you can of course disagree with this; seems like it has so,e weaknesses; calling the 15th Panzer elite because its a Panzer unit would be a typical slip made by a non-military historian. Now you have a good source problem: conflict between official sources (German regulation) versus enemy sources (british intelligence reports, post battle debriefs). None of these two is more "real". But the Brits were surprised by german sloppiness in sanitary ,atters AGAINST their prejudices, which rather tells in favour of it giving good evidence. Re. combat officers being too high and mighty to care where they crapped-- we'll have to read the book... If the author presents specific evidence, rather than speculation, then we'll have to accept it-- though of course I doubt there's an interview with a wounded tank commander saying "yeah we're too hoity toity to care about hygiene"--it's more a question of perception by other services. `Very interesting problems of perception, reporting and reality-- best book I can recommend is jean Norton Cru, Du temoignage, re WWI accounts. Excellent, we seem to have driven everyone away from this thread by our blather Regards jtcm

Dandelion: I don't know anything more than what I wrote; here's the URL to the article: http://www.oxfordtoday.ox.ac.uk/features/05.shtml I hope it works. The book is in fact out already. The "Italians must be unsanitary" of course reflects nothing more, I think, than British prejudice-- as does their surprise at what they perceived to be German neglect in the matter. The article quotes only British sources-- an old tradition, starting with Siborne's history of waterloo, in which only British witnesses were interviewed-- no French, no Prussians, no Belgians.

To Dandelion: the article is the summary of a book called "Medicine and Victory", forthcoming; it may be wrong, but I've summarised the summary of its findings-- the Brits were fastidious about hygiene ("fight the Fly Axis !" etc), and shocked by German neglect in such matters; the comment about the combat officers being too high and mighty to give a crap about crap based on interrogation of German and Italian prisoners. The Brits were actually surprised that the Germans were so lax; they'd expected it from the Italians. The article also has stuff on blood transfusions (Germanshad plasma but not enough blood, again neglected this aspect)-- German wounded in hospitals always shockingly pale; and, finally, penicillin. **** A bit more than "every one poops their pants in combat", i think, is involved here. As the Canadians say, never eat yellow snow.

Just read article in recent issue of Oxford Today (fundraising mag. of Oxford University) called "Victory and Medicine"-- contrasts extreme care taken by Brits in sanitation and health, with haphazard attitude of Germans and Italians during N. African campaign. Lots of Germans out of combat because of disease, especially among elite units; men weakened by disease, at El Alamein. Apparently, German combat officers considered such matters as sanitation beneath their dignity; the officer in charge of sanitation for the Brits observes, in a post Alamein report, that German positions were easily identifiable by the faeces strewn about them. A suggestion for CMAK battles, then-- Axis troops' combat power should be automatically weakened by diarrhoea, etc; and various terrain mods suggest themselves. (and I've yet to buy CMAK)

Don't pre-target bottlenecks with a fire plan (too late now !)-- but keep your FOs for reactives fires in the defence:pin with HMG, and call down fire missions. In the defence, use fire lanes to disrupt enemy concentrations at their jump off lines. You don't want to hold him up by making a bottleneck impassable-- your HMGs will do that. You want to drop HE on plts and kill and rout them.

Long-range HMG fire to pin and suppress, yes-- but in CM as in RL, it's the HE, doing its "unbelievably cruel work" (as Paul Fussell, a WWII combat vet, puts it), that kills, wounds and drives crazy. Of course, if you mostly have direct fire, lowish calibre guns, and your opponent is advancing in open formation across a big map, in open ground rather than in air-busrt fertile trees-- how will you make him concentrate to drop whatever precious indirect fire HE assets you have ?