jtcm

Thanks, Adam. I also look forward to JasonC's post (is he saying that "there is no such thing as 100% exposed open ground, or that historically, even when faced with open ground, firing patterns are such as to nullify really high expoure in most cases ?) I should modify what I wrote about Laffargue's 9 May 1915 attack. His comapny took losses from the moment it went over the top; Laffargue writes that he took it forward in 50-80 m bounds, taking shelter in ditches, etc, until they got fairly close to the German ttrench (80m !), and there form up in line and start trading fire with German defenders, including a HMG. More losses taken (2 squads wiped out), and Laffargue sees the red mist, and his story gets a bit hazy there-- but he seems to indicate assault, firing on the run, on the trench. Not sure how reliable all of this is, but that's what he writes. I post this as a service: his memoirs are actually quite tedious. His "Livre du soldat", post WWI small arms manuals and small-scale tactics manual, might be different (a google search shows that it went through 200+ editions, down into the 1950s

It might also be of interest to give a summary of Laffargue's first action, 19-20 August 1914. Picture the letter T. The horizontal bar is the German position, on high ground (held by Bavarian Division); let's call it the Baronville heights. The vertical bar is a ridge, 3 km long, leading to the German position. Let's call this the Marthyl ridge. A road runs along this ridge (the Chateau Salins-Baronville road). The sides of the ridge are scalloped with gullies and outcrops. 19 August. The French attack along the Marthyl ridge, using the road as their line of advance. They advance in large infy formations, like those Michael Dorosh mentioned (120+ men). Battn after Battn is shelled to pieces by "heavy arty" (105mm ?). Laffargue's formation deploys, gets shelled, he takes his platoon forward in search of dead ground, and ends up marching off the Marthyl ridge, taking shelter in one of the gullies on the left side of the ridge. Night falls. Laffargue pulls his men over the ridge, to the right hand side of the "vertical bar", with the rest of the French formation (division ?). 20 August. The French march up to the ridge again. This time, the Germans counter-attack, from their right (i.e the left side of the T), swinging units out of line and using the ridge (the vertical bar) to mask their movement. They crest the ridge and shoot it out with the French formations. One of the units, on the extreme right of the Germans (extreme left of our imaginary map) meets no opposition, so marches over the Marthyl ridge (the vertical bar) onto the French-held, right hand side. They are spotted by Laffargue's platoon and get checked by long range rifle fire by Laffargue and other units. At this point, the Germans counterattack from their left (the right side of our map), and take the French units under crossfire. The French break and withdraw in disorder. And for Adam's question about how long range rifle engagements work / feel like-- on 20 August, Laffargue is marching his platoon in column up one of the gullies on the right hand side of the vertical bar of the T (Marthyl ridge), when suddenly he starts taking casualties. He has no idea what's going on, but his men stop, kneel, wheel to the left--presto, a firing line. He scans the landscape with binoculars, and notices a "dotted line of grey"-- the Bavarian unit that's crested the ridge. He estimates the range at 800 m and calls out aimed fire on the enemy, but his men have already started fire. He looks at the Bavarian line, and sees it "underlined with rifle impacts", and occasionally one of the dots resolves into a flailing human figure. Note that his men have no scopes, but are firing with bolt action Lebels (I assume) over iron sights; the sight picture Laffargue sees in his binoculars hints at pretty rapid, if aimed, fire (I always thought that a British specialty). It's interesting that in 1914, Laffargue actually leads his men with a drawn sword. In 1915, he charges with a rifle.

Thanks, I'd forgotten about the haystack with the two snipers. Faithful to Tom Hanks' injunction in Da Vinci Code ("Quick, a library !"), I went to look up what i could by André Laffargue. Found his Memoirs, quite amusing in a old-timey sort of way. He describes in detail a. his first action in 1914, French attack taken apart by German 105mm arty. (At one point, they repel a German counter attack with rifle fire at 800 m). No mention of MG fire in this early battle, but much trepidation about the accuracy of German arty (and comaprison with the puniness of French arty). b. the attack he took part in on 9May 1915: heavy French arty prep (including 75mm fired at wire ?), then infantry advance. What happens is quite interesting: the advance gets roughed up by MG fire, at 200m, his plt hits the ground under MG fire, and shakes out into some kind of firing line, and starts to duel the MGs, as far as I can make out, with rifle fire. He thinks this a bad idea, so, by personal example (he goes beserk at this stage), starts to advance in leaps and bounds, 80m bounds, alternating with periods of aimed rifle fire, and also firing on the advance (the things you can do with a bolt action !). His plt. imitates and shadows him This suppresses the defenders enough for his plt to rush the trench. Laffargue is shot in the knee during the melee in the trench, but his plt clambers out of trench 1, and captures trench 2. During his stay in hospital (and physiotherapy), Laffargue writes his memo on "How infantry should attack", with JasonC mentioned earlier (inspired by his reading of a similar doc. by a Russian officer about tactics in 1905), sends it to Foch. Foch likes it, has it printed and distributed. Sensation, Laffargue is decorated (and promoted to staff duty). He duly writes his second work, "Infantry in the attrition battle" (mostly about how arty should be used to widen penetrations, as far as I can tell). (He also dreams up in 1916, during the Somme-- a moderate success from his viewpoint-- a flank offensive where deep penetration is to be exploited with armoured cars, but that's another story). I thought this might be of interest-- I read this in the original French, and not sure how accessible this is. Laffargue's original memo might be more difficult to find !

I looked up Winter's memoirs, "Beyond Band of Brothers". He writes that E Company maintained a good pace in the snow in its initial advance, then stops inexplicably; he then sends Speirs to take over, etc. He also says that he set up two MG sections, not two MGs-- I assume this means 4 MGs ? So the attack is supported by 4 HMGs, + E. Co's organic support weapons-- mortars surely, not sure about M1919s

Forgive me for being a bore. I looked at Ambrose, Band of Brothers, on the attack on Foy. What seems to have happened (not entirely clear from the narrative) is this. *2nd Battn of 506th Reg. ordered to attack Foy. E company ordered to attack over 200 m open ground (with some haystacks) (I company also sent into the attack elsewhere). Battn HQ sets up 2 MGs in support, they lay down suppressive fire, E Co. moves out in skirmish line, 3 plts abreast, ordered to move out as quickly as possible to Foy. * They receive negligible fire (rifle potshots). *First plt falls behind during the advance, clearing out some outhouses and farm buildings (small German outpost captured, interrogated ["Where are the other defenders", which shows that the German main line has not shown itself yet], then killed when one of the prisoners reaches for a pistol). *Commanding officer of E Company unnerved by first plt. falling behind, stops the advance, pulls sec. and third plt. into some form of column or fire base, sets up his mortars and HMGs, and orders first plt to flank [sounds like my CM playing style] *At this moment, as first plt. is setting out on its flanking move, it takes 5 casualties from aimed rifle fire. *The account doesn't make this clear, but I assume that this is the moment when German defenders actually open up, at less than 100 m range. ("Sitting ducks"). *Another officer takes over command, pulls first plt. back, and somehow frontally assaults his way into the village. He also personally somehow works his way to I company and back. *This officer mentions being shot at with an 88mm on his way to take command of E company, so I assume that, indeed, the defenders did open up at some point. *The reader is explicitly told that this is simply a rear-guard action, very skillfully fought, by the Germans. *The episode of the TV series may have conflated this action with the much more violent attack on Noville ? Well, that's Ambrose. No doubt there's a better account. But it's clear that it's not a dense line of guys in greatcoats running out into MG and rifle and gun fire and mortars while their Battn commander shouts "Keep moving", and only stopping when their lily-livered CO loses his nerve, it's a long skein-like skirmish line walking under a suppressive barrage from HMG, against a defender who's holding his fire, and in fact only opens up once he sees the threat of a flanking move.

Foy: well, yes, the facts are (I assume) respected by BoB makers-- assault floundered, change of leadership, attack broke through; yes, the breakdown of the incompetent, Yale educated captain (or whatever it was) is portrayed very strikingly. But the movie isn't just supposed to tell-- it's supposed to /show/. I enjoy the detail (look, a BAR guy; look, the field dressing taped to the webbing; look, some soldiers are wearing improvised snowsuits and have tied sheets around their helmets), the desaturated colour, the faces-- but I just don't know if an infantry Co. in the assault /looked/ like this-- long lines assaulting. The Germans also only appear as snowsuited men, standing around, often in the open, and falling back. Relating to the subject of this thread: aimed rifle fire, ample use of sharpshooters, HMG and LMG: did men really rush out into the assault in long firing lines in the face of that sort of defence ? Maybe they did (Paul Fussell's memoirs start with an incident where his Company shelters behind a railway embankment, set up two HMGs (M1917s), then go "over the top", which gives Fussell an odd WWI deja vu feeling-- but, I suppose, precisely because this was not what a usual infantry assault looked like)-- but I'd like to be sure, before "believing" in what I see. Otherwise, I might as well read a JasonC boiling down of infantry AARs-- and try to imagine, like generations of people did when reading about combat, before the invention of moving pictures

Caught an episode of "Band of Brothers" being re-broadcast, "The Breaking Point", Bulge and Foy. Terrifying portrayal of barrage (by simple 81 mm mortars, as a dud shell shows at one point) in woods, with treebursts; and assault on Foy portrayed as great lines of infantry in greatcoats rushing at snowsuited Germans in a village (the Germans merely seem to fall back before the heroes of Easy Company). The portrayal of infantry assault did bother me (no packet movement or fire and movement, no real suppression effect by HMGs, unscathed infantry dashes and casualties only at pretty close range), but I relaxed when I realized I was watching a game of CMBO.

Have a look at the "Defence of Duffer's drift"— by Swinton, "inventor" of the tank

Thanks Adam. Will write to you-- but why not post them here ? (good thread, btw). A well known classic: http://regimentalrogue.com/duffersdrift/Duffers_Drift.htm Aimed rifle fire, field guns; ranges: 100 m during night infilftration; aimed rifle fire at 1500m (!) by the British (!!), on mass target (supply column)-- and effective, too; long range accurate fire by Boers; 800 m open fields of fire considered good; use of trenches and field fortifications. Also "mad minutes" during ambushes.

is there any "lessons learned" primary document for the post Boer years, that produce the "Old Contemptibles" of the BEF in 1914 ? (Is the practice of *rapid* aimed volley fire at long range [e.g. five rounds rapid fire by whole units at 600 yards on single targets] a British specialty to increase range of engagement vs. Boer-style sharpshooting at extreme long range ?) Small arms manuals, tactical manuals ? Russo-turkish war of 1877 might also be relevant to all this.

Why do the French hold such strong belief in the offense, pre-1914 and indeed (I think ?) into 1915 ? Cultural reasons, I suppose (neo-Bonapartism ?); is it belief that the Mle 1893 75mm field gun will help them blast through rifle held defenses ? (If so, why does that not happen ?) I also remember reading something by M. van Creveld--(perhaps in Transformation of War ?) arguing that there was some logic to the cult of the offence (namely that rapid infantry assault in the face of aimed rifle fire and even Maxim fire had succeeded during the Russo-Japanese war, and had been observed to do so by Western observers).

Wow. A quick Google search shows that Andre Laffargue died in 1994. I remember reading something about use of Chauchat by French-- in the assault, specifically against German HMGs (but this somehow does not seem borne out by the remarks from Fernch Regimental commanders, in the weapon-by-weapon survey commissionned by Petain in 1917: mostly praise for the Chauchat in the defence-- which perhaps is relevant for this thread)

Powerful, specific, cliche-smashing summation. What's the French for "packet movement" ?

Actually, what is the best counter against an "overloading a sector" attack ? in CMBO days, I would try to waltz in with a counter attack against flanks or rear. With CMBB mg suppression effects (remember the shock when they were introduced !), this became even more idiotic than it was with CMBO. Additional point: JasonC, are you claiming that with right odds, an attritionist, firepower deliberate attack is simply not stoppable in the end ? (all things being equal). As the bald leader says in Seven Samurai, "Defence is by far the hardest form"

Good post URC. M1TP: what a great game ! Debussing infantry with Dragons ! Hammerhead TOW-armed tracks ! Hull down positions ! I remember once shooting down a hovering Mi-24 Hind with my Abrams main gun. In a fit of enthusiasm, I also shot down my supporting Apaches.

Nice. The proportion "in woods", not 2 on 1 SMG, but 3 or 4 rifle squads for each SMG squad, is revealing.

I'd love to see the others, yes. I must say I find the "getting second squad on specific shooter" bit difficult: my point squad stumbles into a SMG ambush, gets shot up, I rush a squad in to alleviate the pressure, but fear that second squad may, in turn, fall into an ambush, etc.

Actually, I tried again. AI had 4 Cos of Reg rifles. I had SMG Co. October 1941. Woods. My setup: in thick block of woods ahead of flag, plt A in line, plt B on the right flank, refused, plt C minus one squad as second line, Co. commander and one squad as flying reserve. AI came on in mad bull style. Ran into the first plt: very quick firefight resulted in ammo depletion— and 270 casualties for AI. I sent in C plt just behind first plt. Tried to withdraw plt A-- one squad got away. C plt then was up for it-- caused 120 casualties. As it was buckling, I threw in Co commander, his squad, and B plt swinging in from the flank. Result: 7 casualties for me, hundreds for AI. Conclusions ? Actually, JasonC's right-- the AI finds it difficult even without having to fight against obstacles, etc, to even dent a SMG co fighting without any great tactics. What I said earlier, "numbers eventually tell, even when AI is driving", is wrong. The deadly thing is not slugging it out with SMG-men close range, it's having their friends come and join the party: their arguments are just so much more emphatic. AI found my flank, and several squads had found angles to concentrate fire on my extreme left squad and had it pinned. I sent in a squad of SMG-- which just waded in and devoured one of the AI's flanking squads, and broke the AI's flanking move. How do you break SMGs in woods ? Which is sort of how we started. Once, fighting against GravesRegistration, I remember seeing with surprise a block of heavy pines erupt with explosion after explosion-- he was using pioneers and demo charges as "stun grenades" to fight his way into what he thought was a SMG infested grove. Actually, it was empty, so that his pioneers were DC-less for the real firefight. [ May 23, 2008, 10:51 AM: Message edited by: jtcm ]

Thanks for the reply. But AI attacks are just rushes, and all you did is set up some wire and mines, so that an AI Battn just piled into it (including, no doubt, mortars and HMGs), and then you tommy-gunned them to shreds. Good fun, no doubt, Straight woods fight, limited LOS no wire or TRPs, SMG hasty blocking force against vastly superior forces that simply rush on, i.e. AI or indeed human opponent trying to overcome the LOS block factor by simply overloading any firefight with lots of rifle and LMG armed shooters from different angles hoping that some get shots in before the SMGs mow down all of their opposing squads. In this set up, can you win (against AI or generally) ? Probably, if you use the brilliant micro-tactics that Walpurgis Nacht / Faustius (is he still around ?) used to apply-- i.e lots of small ambushes and fall backs, with carefully calibrated arcs and checkboard lines, and "stops" on the flanks to prevent being overrun from the side. I'm not patient enough to pull that off, even against the AI. No idea if this is historical.

What a great way to piss off a loyal customer base. Can you say "jump the shark" ?

I'm with KHuNT and Lethaface. No good to say "turrists", these guys could be Sunni fighters, Shiite militias, or foreign jihadis AKA Al Quaida in Iraq/ Islamic emirate in Iraq (tiny proportion of insurgency in Iraq). They fight US forces for a variety of reasons and according to a variety of local dynamics.

Some other views http://www.tomdispatch.com/post/174887 http://www.tomdispatch.com/post/174817/carnage_from_the_air_and_the_washington_consensus

JasonC: yes, but try a block of woods, and a SMG Co alone, against 4 Cos of German Rifle (Regs). No wire, no HMGs, just swarms of infy pushing against and around your "buzzsaws". Fight on line, or fight deep, or counter-attack-- in the end, AI numbers will tell, I think. But it's true that I'm not as careful at "driving" infantry as you clearly are ! The highest kills I got were for a squad set up in cover, but with good LOS to a clearing-- the German follow-up / overwatch units still deep in the woods, the German front squad in open ground but within good SMG range of my Sov SMG squad-- the result was German squad after squad fed into mincing machine, in quick succession. [ May 22, 2008, 03:30 PM: Message edited by: jtcm ]

I should add that if you play a SMG Co against a Rifle Battn, even in woods, even against AI, you will lose-- at some point the 9mm runs out, or some guys get pinned, and then the rifle guys just swamp you.

Actually, I was inspired by the topic, so ran two experiments: 1. Against AI. Take a SMG Co. Give the AI 1200 points worth of infantry. Set up your defense in woods. Watch the AI human wave your SMGers. After the battle is over, find out which of you squads has highest kill count (one squad had 60). 2. Against AI. Give the AI the SMG Co. Take a regular rifle co., 2 HMGs, 1 plt of pioneers (6 squads+ fts). Move up against the first objective (block of woods + flag) that must be held by AI. Set up: as many squads as possible to have LOS to the outer zone of woods. AI will have set up there, so when he opens up against your point squads, blast him away with return fire from comfortable range (150-200m). When AI exposed squads have run away, enter the woods with your boarding party-- all pioneers + fts, and 1 plt of rifle. Find and destroy remaining SMG squads in woods. You have one objective flag. AI will react by sending other SMG squads to counter-attack. If they come across open ground, your HMGs and mortars will have been set up to make this difficult. If they come under cover, even a disorganized, throw-the-kitchen-sink, AI-organized counter attack will mess you up: close encounters between fresh SMG squads and your depleted assault party (with, usually, guys all over because of the necessity of developping divergent and overlapping angles of fire and pin on the SMG squads) will be (as JasonC said once, I think), like seizing a buzzsaw. The result of these encounters will be to throw you back, or out. If, however, you still have some overwatch, you can then try to catch the counter-attack elements as they approach the edge of the woods. Just some thoughts !