gunnergoz

The FG42 was in no way related to the MG42 and cannot be called a stripped down version of that weapon.

Consider the balancing act designers have to juggle between armor protection, firepower and mobility. The Germans had seen how limited the manourverability and reliability of the Tiger was, even after improvments. The Panther, with a very similar drivetrain, had to give up some weight on the chassis to afford it improved mobility and reliability. Top armor was probably seen as an acceptable trade-off considering that a tank attacked from an aircraft has numerous other vulnerabilities besides top armor (like open hatches mentioned earlier, suspension components, external fuel, etc. This is my theory, anyway.

I've read and seen documentaries that both have veteran flyers commenting upon how they would ricochet their .50 rounds into the underside of armored vehicles. A really good, experienced pilot could use that tracer stream like a fire hose and get bullets pretty much where they want them. That's about 80 rounds per second beating the ground, surely enough to cause some significant hits, directly or through ricochets.

PaintshopPro 7 is what I use (along with Photoimpact) and it works fine. What's more, you can download demos of both and try them out for free. Highly recommended.

Regarding development lines, recall that the "daddy" of these tanks was the M3 series of desert fame. The army found numerous shortcomings with this tank's internal arrangements and armor layout, for instance the assistant driver had almost no way out of the tank if the turret was turned the wrong way. The Army was very pleased with the mobility and reliability of the M3 drivetrain and suspension but one issue remained: they wanted to move away from radial (aircraft-type) engines in tanks so that production of radials could be devoted to the air forces. The result was the development of the twin-cadillac engined M5 series with it's superior armor and hull lay out. The turret was not that much improved over the M3 but did include the stabilizer. Around this time, the army asked it's tank-automotive team to redesign the M3 series to a hull that had the excelent armor layout and ease of access of the new M5 hull. At the same time, the M3A3 turret was adapted to British standards with a turret mounted radio (hence the big protrusion on the rear of the M3A3 turret), improving access to the radio and making more space in the hull sponsons for ammunition. This improved turret eventually found it's way, with some more modifications, into the M5A1.

Thanks Wadepm, I forgot about that excellent site. When I looked it over again I went to check out the M8 Greyhound out of curiousity as it carries the same gun. Interestingly enough, the ammo storage arrangements are simpler, permitting 16 rounds in the turret itself and the remaining 70 or so rounds in the hull very accessible as there was no basket to deal with, the seats being suspended from the turret ring. One thing I noticed about the site's section on the M5A1 was that the author insisted upon referring to the tank commander as "the loader" which confirms the difficult position the crews of these tanks found themselves in without a dedicated loader aboard. Still, it seems that ammo accessibility was best in the M8 armored car and perhaps this should be reflected in the game as well...But of course BTS has made it clear that it won't be addressed for a long, long time, and then in some future engine release. Tanaka: Good luck finding an M3A3 to examine in the US: they were shipped off to the UK, France and China during the war and none were ever issued to US forces except perhaps in the CBI theatre. You might get lucky at Aberdeen Proving Ground but I hear access there is very limited these days. [ March 10, 2002, 12:52 PM: Message edited by: gunnergoz ]

I've seen Enemy At The Gates with my Russian/Ukrainian wife at least twice. Her reactions are interesting...she is intreagued and a bit flattered that westerners would make such a film but at the same time she is disappointed with elements of the film (shooting one's own troops, the bombastic commissars, etc) that conflict with history as she was taught it in the land where the battle was fought. She still struggles with the concept that western histories might have greater truth than ones she's read of or heard from surviviors or relatives of participants in the battles. Still, she and I commend Hollywood et al for attempting such a film in the first place. The Eastern Front is a topic all too seldem brought before Western audiences and if it is, it is almost invariably from the German standpoint. The film tried to bring a difficult topic to the audience, made more complex by the need to educate, depict and weave a story all at once. Economics of course must twist all into a totality that will bring a profit in the theaters and will encourage video tape/dvd purchases later, otherwise major studios, investors, producers and packagers/distributors won't go near the thing to begin with. As a grog, I can rail on and on about all the defects in the film's script, acting and execution. As a consumer, I'm satisfied that the compromise we ended up seeing was the best possible under the circumstances. My conclusion: always carry a grain of salt into the movies with you...the popcorn tastes better and the films irk you less

With respect to turret basket size being a part of the equation, the photos I've seen make it clear that the baskets were pretty much the same external dimentions between M3A3 and M5 series tanks...there was simply not that much room to spare in there. Ammo stowage did vary considerably, however, with M3A3's rated to carry 174 37mm rounds (144 in commmand versions), M5's rated at 123 rounds and M5A1's carrying 147 rounds. It seems that only about 6 rounds were carried in the turret basket of the M3A3, with the rest distributed in boxes on the sponsons and hull sides next to the basket. It is not clear from my source (Hunnicutt again) whether the 6 rounds in the basket were common to all 3 versions. This could very well be the source of the firing rate discrepancy if different baket loadouts can be confirmed in the M5 and M5A1 models...Hunnicutt does not provide an ammo load distribution sketch for these latter two version. Assuming that there was a similar distribution in all 3 tanks (which seems reasonable to me given the similarity in baskets between versions) it does serve to clarify why hight ROF would be very difficult to maintain. Either the gunner or commander would have to be fishing around for fresh rounds outside of the turret basket, which also would preclude rotation of the turret unless they wished to risk life and limb in a crushing accident (which did occasionally happen in tanks anyway).

The gyro stabilizer was designed for elevation only and I have read darn little anywhere of its use in combat by American lights or mediums. Most American memoirs mention disconnecting the device before combat. Consequently I'm not convinced that the gyro stabilizer impacted this purported ROF differential at all. While looking at doctrine and training is a valid endeavour, I don't recall ever coming accross any significant differences between the British and the Americans in how crews actually fought these tanks, so I can't buy this as the source of any difference. The ROF is limited by the two man turret and the built-in quandry that this placed the crew in during stressful situations. There would be a strong tendency for the gunner to keep his eye in the sight to remain effective, especially in a furball with multiple targets around. At the same time, the commander would want to maximize his situational awareness by either sticking his head out of the hatch or keeping his eyes upon his vision devices; thus he would probably would be reluctant to dip down into the turret and feed rounds into the breech. Yet, some compromise had to be made in combat and this is the crux of the matter and probably why the practical rate of fire was so much lower than the 30 RPM that could be safely done on the range with no one shooting back, which I agree was probably attainable if the commander did nothing but load for the gunner. My theory is that the light tank commander probably had to split his attention by taking some time to load the rounds himself, meanwhile hoping that he didn't miss seeing something deadly around the tank. With this two man turret ordeal, I'm even more convinced that the gyro stabilizer and it's attendant doctrinal "fire while moving" theory was impractical and that the troops knew it. A moving tank is hard enough to fight from and demands a commander's full attention. However, during movement, the gunner would have time to reload and get his eyes back into the sight so that when the next halt was called, he would be ready to acquire the target and fire. Does anyone in the Forum recall reading veteran light tankers' accounts of what the actual loading and fire drill was in both training and practice? This would be most helpful if we could pinpoint historic practices. I think the answer lies elswhere if there is ever a reply from BTS about the light tank ROF discrepancy. Speaking for myself, I think the difference is spurious but I welcome the BTS gang to persuade me otherwise. [ March 09, 2002, 10:55 PM: Message edited by: gunnergoz ]

Where do we find such men...?

I did my Groggy duty and looked up the M3A3 and M5/M5A1 tank data in Hunnicutt's STUART A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN LIGHT TANK. According to Hunnicutt (probably the best American tank engineering historian who's books are invaluable to us grogs), both tanks used the identical 37mm Gun M-6 in Combination Mount M-44 in the M3A3 and M5A1 and Combination Mount M-26 in the M5. The gun is uniformly rated at a maximum rate of fire of 30 ROUNDS PER MINUTE. The differences in gun mounts were minimal and did not impact operation of the weapon. So, if you ask me, BTS has made a distinction in the tank models' where none actually existed. BTW, I recognize that ROF at 30 RPM would be probably impossible to attain operationally, but I'd venture to guess that a motivated and trained crew could possibly crank out 12-15 RPM in a pinch. The only trouble is, the commander would have to give up commanding to focus upon loading the piece for the gunner, as there was no loader in this series of tanks. And what would be the benefit of having no one to point out targets to the gunner? So, practially speaking, the gunner has to load the weapon too, thus taking his eyes of the sights and having to take time to reaquire the target. It's too bad they couldn't fit the automatic version of the 37mm gun into these tanks...while the muzzle velocity might be a bit less, it would be easy to load a magazine adapted to the tank turret that could hold perhaps 50-60 rounds. That would have been a Spahpanzer Killer Deluxe!

There was a version of the Pz III that was adapted to snorkel underwater for limited distances and could have been used of Sealion by being launched from barges offshore. There's no way that they could have made it accross the open channel alone. About a regiment's worth was made and they ended up on the Eastern Front, where they could be used to cross some rivers submerged. This was a very risky proposition in any case...if the tank stalled, all the crew could do is flood the tank and swim out using momsen lungs or small O2 breathing tanks.

If it gets to be too much to bear, do what I do...turn of your monitor during the battle replay.

I think you're right on. BTS is very disciplined and they seem to be on track. Nothing I've heard on the forum would lead me to believe that there are any obstacles to an on-time release. Besides, June 22 has a certain ring to it, doesn't it? Of course this is just my opinion, I have no inside skinny to share.

Exactly...which is why CMBB is going to give scenario designers a wonderful playground in which to play balance games for us. The Soviets will get quantity, perhaps, or positioning on the battlefield, while the Germans get the leadership and cohesion edge. Alternately, the Germans might be severely handicapped in ammunition or by fatigue, while their opponents are on foot or may be raw recruits, or both. Because of these broad variables, I think that CMBB has the potential to become a "classic" wargame in ways that CMBO did not approach. The see-saw nature of the war in the East gives us wonderful lattitude to design scenarios that have great variety, challenge and unique flavor.

Nice job of clarifying that for us, Jason. I'm fond of the Staghound and would have liked to see it myself...

Spazman, IRT your final question on the "science of camouflage" you will find that it is in part art but still, to this day, there are numerous serious practioners and developers of camouflage. There is little doubt that the Germans in WW2 were advanced and influential in this area. The US and GB did adopt suggested vehicle patterns but they were fielded haphazardly based upon local needs and command preferences. Very recent uniform designs have been implemented by the Canadian forces and the US Marines. The technology is being moved into the direction of combat uniforms made of a garb that will "study" the environment and actively adapt to match it's color and patterns. Science fiction stuff surely but it will be fielded in the next decade. Vehicle patterns have been studied to death and several different studies and types have evolved over the years. The current US pattern is based upon postwar Budeswehr designs that seem to be working pretty well. Vehicles too will some day adopt active paints and coverings. All this technology comes at a steep price but on today's battlefield, you need to be able to see the other guy before he sees you, if you want to survive. I hope this goes a little way towards answering your latter question.

With all due respect, what's so sacrosanct about their writing that it has to be taken at face value? Ever hear of self-interest? Or outright deviousness or the desire to justify one's actions? How about the capriciousness of ego or the fact that even a first-person observer can get the facts wrong? I'm sorry, but I don't think that any author is above critical examination and refutation with cause.

Damn, Shadow, there's an echo in there!

I'm curious to see it myself. I have the book but am reluctant to read it as I lost too many contemporary school chums to those battles and that war...silly sentimental me, eh?

Most on-map artillery in CMBO is represented as firing over open sights, i.e. direct fire. The exception of course is mortars firing under the control of command units. Indirect fire by any weapon would, to some degree, involve a minimum range as the rounds are lobbed over intervening distance to the target. CMBO is not presently configured to represent non-mortar unit indirect fire missions from on-map units. This is unfortunate and has been discussed extensively in the past in other threads. I'd love to be able to use the M-8 HMC or the Sherman/105 in the indirect mode, but alas, this is not currently possible. [ March 02, 2002, 03:03 PM: Message edited by: gunnergoz ]

Personally, I find Glantz to be a pleasant read. The Kursk book mentioned is really only his translation of a Russian study of the campaign...very detailed but plodding and groggish. Glantz' own work is very interesting because he gets deep into Russian archival stuff that few others do. I'd give him a try, and BTW his book "When Titans Clashed" was excellent IMHO.

I heard that the Germans resorted to 105mm field guns, 105 howitzers and even larger calibers as available. BTW a recent thread asked what was the earliest day that the Germans ran into the T-34. Glantz in "When Titans Clashed" says that the first contact took place on 6/23/1941, on the second day of the invasion. What a shock that must have been to some poor landser... :eek:

It's probably just me, but don't the gun barrels look just a llittle too short and fat? Just thought I'd mention it... Michael</font>

Someone (JasonC?) made a passing reference to the SU-76 being used in an indirect fire role. I was of the impression that the SU-76 was pretty much strictly used in a direct fire role and seldom, if ever, did indirect fire like the M-7 Priest or Wespe. IIRC it saw less indirect use than did the US M-8 HMC or the Sherman 105. I'm not sure if this was due to doctrine or for some other reason. Can anyone clarify the issue for me? It sure looks from the outside as if it could have been a dandy light SPA article, yet it was used as an SPG/ATG. Anyone read Russian articles dealing with the issue?