LongLeftFlank

Dude, you have four posts on here? and to dignify your track record with the term 'drive by spamming/trolling' is a severe insult to spammers/trolls. Articulate actual arguments here, or just bugger off.

But retaking the north bank of the Dnipr is a long way away from retaking the land bridge. And it's not about what we think, it's what Putin can get away with forcing Russia to think. .... So restating my prior case, if the liberation of Kherson (north bank of Dnipr) does not come with the effective destruction of the Russian armies currently occupying it, it is tragically NOT decisive, at least not by metrics that matter in terms of Russian regime change (and reinvention of Russia on more constructive terms for its own people, not to mention its neighbours and human civilisation in general). ....While if it does include decisive defeats of the Russian armies, then by definition the door is open to the restoration of the 2014, and perhaps the 2002 frontiers. In effect, the UA has cracked the code, as the Americans did in Normandy and elsewhere. But nobody has shown me a convincing path to that yet.

And Steve, I agree 110% with that one liner! If there's a single 'bullet' that describes this entire thread, that is it! But if they are going roughly 1 to 1 for an extended duration, and without defeating the army in open battle, of a country 2.5 times their size, that does NOT work. Like all historical comparisons, the Normandy analogy is imperfect.

Yes, I have an annoying tendency to reedit my posts, but you will find I broadly agree with you.

Fair enough, and no offence was intended. Enforcing the schools desegregation of 1956 (where the Arkansas NatGuard was not reliable, and Eisenhower knew it) was truly important and honourable work. ...And while I am far from being in the Woke category, or a fan of social engineering in general, in spite of the grandstanding and opportunism, I also try to look at it more philosophically as settling the unfinished business of Jim Crow, which ultimately leads to a stronger, more united Republic.

I truly hope you're right, but I fear I am. Absent an undeniable battlefield defeat, I believe the 'cursed capacity for suffering' persists well past the fall. Galeev's 'North Korea' scenario, to me, is baked in. Its 2-5 year consequences for Russia will likely be catastrophic and civilisational. But that is cold comfort to Ukraine, which will also lose those years, and a generation permanently scarred, or forced abroad to eke out a living, or normalcy for its own children.

Yup, which is why it is so important that the Ukrainian army attack and defeat (destroy/rout) a Russian army on at least one front. Progressive nibbling, even if it eventually frees Kherson and perhaps even Izium, is simply playing Russia's (new) game at this point. Permanent loss of the land bridge makes Russia master of the Black Sea and creates a long front within range of major Ukrainian population centers and allows them to reinvade in the future. Nobody is going to invest in chip fabs or car plants in Dnepro or Odessa, within MLRS range. Ukraine will again be Okrajina, an armed no-mans land, living in permanent twilight. It will be a very sad end to the war.

I wrote a whole paper on it in uni, mate (1985); it's how I graduated. When the 1991 coup was tried against Gorbachev, it was VDV (103rd Div, Tula-Ryazan) rolled into Moscow, and then back out again. As you suggest, things have diversified and complexified a good bit since Putin took over, but the political role of the VDV remains. I absolutely agree on military clan not being allowed to take charge. Russia's rulers have carefully innoculated themselves against Napoleons -- usually by shooting them on various pretexts -- since 1918. Arguably as far back as 1825 when Tsars stopped being appointed and violently deposed by the army.

Good info, thanks. I may not be being clear, sorry, but nobody seriously disputes the political role of the VDV in supporting the internal Russian power structure (a legacy of the USSR). They definitely aren't the only formation tasked with preventing/countering coups (Taman Guards, MVD, OMON and now Rosvgardia, not to mention Kadryov's boys who are Putin's personal vassals), but they are part of the complex. Not unique to Russia either; the US 82nd Airborne has special internal duties as well.

Yeah, I agree, a top turret HEAT penetration is gonna be pretty effing nasty, regardless whether a brew up follows immediately. It might be a touch less painful for the crew, actually, albeit nothing left to send home to Momma.... But on the battlefield, humans will grasp at whatever folk wisdom they can to persuade themselves to keep going.

Gonzo journalist Butusov continues dancing close to the flame.... Lethal game of volleyball. Fetch the Roach, muthaf***a! [health warning: pro-Russian sources above] Russians are determined to take this city, one way or the other, progress on other fronts be damned. Although losing their Kherson bridgehead in exchange is going to hurt. I am increasingly convinced they are looking to wind down their invasion of Ukraine and cut their massive losses. They are looking to 'rationalise' a new frontier/front along various river lines and claim 'mission accomplished'. They then go over to the defensive, fortify like mad and continue the attrition war, hoping to kill Ukrainian kids about 1 for 1. And start whining for a cease fire, 'plebiscites', peacekeepers and, of course, an end to sanctions. Which the Chinese and other weasels (Erdogan?) will vigorously back, for reasons I don't want to sidetrack into again.

https://www.economist.com/interactive/international/2022/06/15/does-the-tank-have-a-future?etear=nl_weekly_5 More red meat for the treadheads here to rip into! The T-72 is the Toyota Corolla of tanks—a mass-produced stalwart of armies around the world. Lol, they dream of having a fraction of the Corolla's mechanical reliability. I'd say it's more like a Ford Taurus. Having ammunition and crew sit together is a design flaw. No wonder the Russian (T80) tanker above said they don't carry more than ten rounds. A typically pragmatic (if not fatalistic) Russian workaround, and the fact (assuming it's a fact) that the Ukrainians don't gives an interesting case in point about how different they really are culturally. Compare British and Americans, or Indians and Pakistanis. Or Hong Kongers and mainlanders.

If true, there is unquestionably a political element. A large part of VDV's job is to keep the rest of the Army in line. Commanders are neither selected nor replaced for military reasons (save death). @sburke P.S. One for the future scenario design file.... This guy's feed tracks the naval war such as it is, for those interested (I have other priorities) @Harmon Rabb

I don't post 'boom!' videos much anymore unless they have tactical interest, but this thread provides videos showing the action, and terrain, around Borodychne (road to Sloviansk) from 4 June when RA finally got around Dovhenke to present. The town is still contested. DefMon3 shares some of his tradecraft. @Combatintman

While we're posting rando comedy, here's a nice analogy for the Russian attack strategy in the Donbas....

3-5 short bullets, please, on why I should spend my time watching this? Who is this guy? Because sorry, your reco carries very little weight at this time.

Nah, that's ok. We're a luverly bunch of coconuts here, with thick scaly hides.

You are awesome, brother! Very glad you have joined our conversation. That said, we naturally note that 'anecdotes' do not themselves create 'data'.... and the bit about the mad fieldcraft skilz of 'Achmat'. Wow, talk about brand endorsement. Why not throw in an obligatory genuflection to the 'paramount importance of Party political work' while you're at it? ...Also, even if he's being dead candid in most of his opinions, nobody really knows what the enemy's condition is, so the conclusion about all the first line UKR crews being dead and gone, yeah, we shall see about that one, boychik.

That's where I am too. I worry that for all our confident theorising, the front 'freezes' along the Dnepr land corridor and Sievertsi Donets (yes, no doubt the Russians will eventually vacate Kherson and east of Kharkiv). Ivan will dig in, revert to 1980s tech and mine the sh%t out of everything. So by fall, the sheer human cost of retaking the lost lands becomes higher than even the hardest line Ukrainians can stomach. While Putin manages to keep the lid on far longer than any non-Russian could possibly imagine. I could absolutely be wrong, sure and the Russian collapse could be sudden, and astonishingly rapid. I absolutely hope so. ...But for all the fog of war, I am still seeing Dmitro struggle to hurt Ivan on the attack for longer than a day or two. Even the many far better military minds on this board have not been confident enough to articulate the likely tipping point and its key catalysts. 250 NATO guns? Drones all grounded by date x? Ball bearings? Multiple causation? No doubt it will all be perfectly obvious in hindsight. 1. In WW1, the French were fighting in their heartland as well, against a hated foe, and did it skilfully and bravely, but their army eventually cracked under the sheer weight of firepower plus failed counteroffensives. In this technological era, the meat grinder is sped up; we don't yet know how fast. And the Yanks are not coming. 2. Like Russia, Ukraine is not a young country demographically. Deaths and permanent injuries that go far north of 100k are going to be a generational debilitation. 3. Russia's 'best and brightest' are heavily dodging service, letting the weight fall on non-Slavs, rural folks and the unfortunate separ populations. In contrast, the entirety of Ukrainian society is serving (except for the nearly 15% who are refugees). This is tremendous, except when the flower of their society perishes or is broken physically and/or emotionally. 4. At the end of the day, Russia's population is still 3.5 times as big as Ukraine's, even with all the disunion and cavils. In short, there's a *lot* of ruination in them still, at very basic levels. So in the gruesome math of this war, Ukrainian kids must find a way to resume material outpacing in terms of killing Russian kids, who aren't obligingly rolling forward in their zinc coffins so much any more. Or else, we are looking at a terrible stalemate where all the small victories and enemy blunders won't reverse the losses of the first 2 weeks. [/rollercoaster]

1980s vintage tanks in action..... ....

[Pfarrer] SIEVERODONETSK /1600 UTC 15 JUN / RU continues to commit to a bloody urban fight-- sacrificing its advantages in maneuver warfare. FEBA reported as stable. Reports indicate ~500 civilians are sheltering under the AZOT chemical plant. RU would prefer to capture AZOT intact 1. Rust belt maze from hell. And another one is waiting across the river, the refinery complex at Novodruzhesk, now heavily fortified. And there's another further back at Siversk. 2. And here again are the Big Red Arrows of Doom! (Those are the ragtag separs I showed 2 days back using antique RCLs and LMGs) 3. Foreign legion still east of the river? My guess is no.

https://warontherocks.com/2022/06/strange-debacle-misadventures-in-assessing-russian-military-power/ Western defense analysts have long debated the efficacy of battalion tactical groups, but no credible analyst would have predicted that the Russians wouldn’t use them, opting instead to send unsupported small units into a gantlet of ambushes. When Russian forces have deployed in these groups, they’ve been badly understrength.... If Western analysts erred regarding Russian logistics and command and control, it was in assuming Russia was aware of its limitations and would craft limited war plans to minimize them, rather than exacerbate them by launching a massive multi-pronged invasion of the second-largest country in Europe. But here comes the punch.... The obvious temptation is to discount the potential performance of Russian forces. While tempting, this would be foolhardy. In the near term, this approach would likely underestimate Russia’s capacity to resist Ukrainian counter-offensives. Russian forces clearly lacked the logistical and command capacity to execute audacious regime-change operations, but these shortcomings will be less problematic in a defensive posture nearer Russian territory. A maximalist strategy to expel all Russian forces from pre-2014 Ukrainian territory might therefore be morally satisfying, but militarily infeasible. (Goes on to talk about China, which I find off topic although others seem determined to discuss at length here)

There will be a democratic Russia, but not as Russia is understood today. Putin is ending his thousand year Reich in only twenty. So stand up now, Belarusian, Novgorod, and Belgorod-Voronezh (Don-Volga) Republics! These new republics, combined with Poland, Ukraine and the Baltics and fueled by copious Western (and JP-KOR) capital will create a medium-to-high tech manufacturing macro-region of some 120 million souls. All the infra and resource basics are there, and the human capital is good. For numerous reasons, the global economy needs a second 'workshop' centre to (peacefully, we hope!) counterbalance a sharp-dealing China. This could well be it. .... And Muscovy will either get with the program, or else become a geriatric ghost town within 10 years as its resource regions inexorably peel away and turn to China. [/Hard yards ahead, but I reckoned we could use a little optimism for a change here]

I think this argument's a bit pointless at this point, mate. We'll know the truth when the war is done. Since this seems to be a specialty of yours, do you have any info on where these systems (regardless of origin) are active now? I saw a video which I can't find now of one of the big SAM systems rolling fairly far forward into the Donetsk salient, which surprised me.