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The_Capt

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  1. Like
    The_Capt got a reaction from LongLeftFlank in How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?   
    Further on the RUSI piece - I am interested as to why the authors did not frame their analysis in terms of relative combat power: https://www.thelightningpress.com/about-the-elements-of-combat-power/
    They really have many of the elements in their analysis.  To my eyes, the environment of ‘23 caused at least three pillars of UAs combat power to collapse.

     
    Namely, protection, sustainment and manoeuvre.  They did have effective Intelligence and fires.  Command was spotty according to the authors but if those other three pillars are essentially neutralized, no amount of leadership, command or training are really going to be able to make up for that.
  2. Upvote
    The_Capt got a reaction from Livdoc44 in How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?   
    As much as I hate this, I have to agree.  There is open support for Ukraine everywhere but inside the wire it is becoming an open sore.  I also suspect that all parties want to try and pretend like we are not entering into another Cold War-esque reality.  No matter how much rhetoric is spilled and noises made, no political party wants to commit to that major shift. It is ridiculously expensive, filled with terrible decisions and has pitfalls that can swallow entire nations.
    So if we can quietly put the first war of this new thing to bed, we can go back to gradually building new Iron/Bamboo curtains…now with internet. Canada is the absolute worst offender in all this as we promise 2% GDP spending with absolutely no intention in following through. We will come up with clever “big buys” that take a decade to complete in order to shut up the critics but an increase of that level would hit social programs like healthcare. Shifting money from healthcare to defence is basically putting a gun in one’s mouth in this country.
    My sense is that this entire political generation just want all this to go away.  But it won’t.
  3. Upvote
    The_Capt got a reaction from Livdoc44 in How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?   
    Quick scan and worth the read.  My issue with it and few other assessments like this is that the logic does not fully align well.  The ghist of operational failure was poor western support integration and failure of the UA to sustain tempo, instead relying on a single shock action on what they hoped was a collapsing RA.
    But then when you read the “emerging tactical challenges” we are faced with a lot of reasons why the UA would never be able to sustain tempo - lack of surprise, vulnerability of critical enablers (eg breaching) to precision weapons and vulnerability of logistics lines. Operational tempo relies on more than training and doctrine - which can always be better.  It relies on tactical momentum which this document lays out some very good reasons on why that was impossible in summer of ‘23.  My point being even if the UA was fully equipped and trained, the resources needed to sustain tempo are unknown at this time. The assumption that 12 Bdes could have done the job is based on old metrics that the document itself challenges.
    I have seen this before, especially after the initial invasion failed.  Analysis wrestles with itself as old metrics that fail very often can be explained by emerging phenomena but the analysts never quite make the link. This document clearly spells out that large conventional concentrations are nearly impossible without capabilities that we simply have not invented yet - like c-recon. It admits that one has to effectively create a “snow dome” of protection (see pg 37) yet how that can be accomplished is not clear given the laundry list of challenges. 
    To my mind western doctrine is in a tactical and operational dilemma.  We rely on fast moving fluid concentrations of force to achieve manoeuvre in dislocation of an opponent. And while it is clear the UA had shortfalls, the emerging realities highlight that concentration is not viable for: surprise, critical enablers, and sustainment. Further as remote precision continues to accelerate, protection of concentration of force is getting harder and harder to do.  Concentration as we knew it has become toxic in this environment…hence the rise of denial.
    This really comes down to the weaponization of friction.  We saw elements of this in the opening of this war. The RA did not over extend…it was overextended by the UA. In reality it came damn close to pulling it off so we know that use of mass was technically possible in ‘22.  However by ‘23 it became more problematic as the RA began to catch up with respect to ISR integration.  ISR and long range precision are projecting friction onto an opponent, and as such is making use of mass harder…and in many cases fatal.
    As to so what for this war?  Well unless the UA can figure out how to project a “snow dome” forward while essentially sanitizing the RA in front of them, we are likely looking at more static attrition warfare.  Further any snow dome must be “logistics lite”.  Long LOCs, highly visible are not working (see pg 21.) I do not believe that better training and planning alone can solve for this. Nor can more conventional equipment. They are not bad nor a bad idea but we cannot throw enough training, planning and western equipment at this problem to solve it.  We need something fundamentally different.  Or a Russian collapse…that would be good too.
  4. Upvote
    The_Capt got a reaction from Livdoc44 in How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?   
    My sense is we are watching a war of exhaustion unfold before us.  Both sides are on a race to the bottom. Russian major strategic mistake - compounding the many that got them here - is that they see, to believe one last hard burn will break Ukraines back.  The more they do this their own burnout point is accelerating towards them.  Neither side really knows when they will hit the exhaustion point but both sides have one.
    The only good news is that I suspect Ukraine has a better sense of where their breaking point may be…or at least I hope so.
  5. Like
    The_Capt got a reaction from A Canadian Cat in How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?   
    As much as I hate this, I have to agree.  There is open support for Ukraine everywhere but inside the wire it is becoming an open sore.  I also suspect that all parties want to try and pretend like we are not entering into another Cold War-esque reality.  No matter how much rhetoric is spilled and noises made, no political party wants to commit to that major shift. It is ridiculously expensive, filled with terrible decisions and has pitfalls that can swallow entire nations.
    So if we can quietly put the first war of this new thing to bed, we can go back to gradually building new Iron/Bamboo curtains…now with internet. Canada is the absolute worst offender in all this as we promise 2% GDP spending with absolutely no intention in following through. We will come up with clever “big buys” that take a decade to complete in order to shut up the critics but an increase of that level would hit social programs like healthcare. Shifting money from healthcare to defence is basically putting a gun in one’s mouth in this country.
    My sense is that this entire political generation just want all this to go away.  But it won’t.
  6. Like
    The_Capt got a reaction from A Canadian Cat in How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?   
    The only thing new in all this might be the levels of FPV in motion at the same time.  You are really describing “mass precision” which we are seeing on defence but have not really seen on offence.  My guess is like everything else for offence they will need 3-4 times as much as they did for defence.  The scale of UAS required to sanitize an area large enough is something we have not seen yet. 
  7. Like
    The_Capt got a reaction from A Canadian Cat in How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?   
    Maybe, however, they really do lay them out very well in the document itself.  Maybe last summer the dots were not quite bright enough, but they definitely are highlighting them.  Last summer though we know the RA relied more on ATGMs and Tac Avn as well.  Their ISR had improved but was not equal to the UA.  That, plus training and planning failures may have compounded to lead to failure.
    I tend to believe that if not for those minefields the UA would have been successful.  Maybe not all the way to Crimea but they would have advanced.  Regardless, as you note, the situation has gotten more challenging, not less.
  8. Upvote
    The_Capt got a reaction from Sgt Joch in How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?   
    As much as I hate this, I have to agree.  There is open support for Ukraine everywhere but inside the wire it is becoming an open sore.  I also suspect that all parties want to try and pretend like we are not entering into another Cold War-esque reality.  No matter how much rhetoric is spilled and noises made, no political party wants to commit to that major shift. It is ridiculously expensive, filled with terrible decisions and has pitfalls that can swallow entire nations.
    So if we can quietly put the first war of this new thing to bed, we can go back to gradually building new Iron/Bamboo curtains…now with internet. Canada is the absolute worst offender in all this as we promise 2% GDP spending with absolutely no intention in following through. We will come up with clever “big buys” that take a decade to complete in order to shut up the critics but an increase of that level would hit social programs like healthcare. Shifting money from healthcare to defence is basically putting a gun in one’s mouth in this country.
    My sense is that this entire political generation just want all this to go away.  But it won’t.
  9. Like
    The_Capt got a reaction from Roach in How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?   
    As much as I hate this, I have to agree.  There is open support for Ukraine everywhere but inside the wire it is becoming an open sore.  I also suspect that all parties want to try and pretend like we are not entering into another Cold War-esque reality.  No matter how much rhetoric is spilled and noises made, no political party wants to commit to that major shift. It is ridiculously expensive, filled with terrible decisions and has pitfalls that can swallow entire nations.
    So if we can quietly put the first war of this new thing to bed, we can go back to gradually building new Iron/Bamboo curtains…now with internet. Canada is the absolute worst offender in all this as we promise 2% GDP spending with absolutely no intention in following through. We will come up with clever “big buys” that take a decade to complete in order to shut up the critics but an increase of that level would hit social programs like healthcare. Shifting money from healthcare to defence is basically putting a gun in one’s mouth in this country.
    My sense is that this entire political generation just want all this to go away.  But it won’t.
  10. Upvote
    The_Capt got a reaction from dan/california in How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?   
    As much as I hate this, I have to agree.  There is open support for Ukraine everywhere but inside the wire it is becoming an open sore.  I also suspect that all parties want to try and pretend like we are not entering into another Cold War-esque reality.  No matter how much rhetoric is spilled and noises made, no political party wants to commit to that major shift. It is ridiculously expensive, filled with terrible decisions and has pitfalls that can swallow entire nations.
    So if we can quietly put the first war of this new thing to bed, we can go back to gradually building new Iron/Bamboo curtains…now with internet. Canada is the absolute worst offender in all this as we promise 2% GDP spending with absolutely no intention in following through. We will come up with clever “big buys” that take a decade to complete in order to shut up the critics but an increase of that level would hit social programs like healthcare. Shifting money from healthcare to defence is basically putting a gun in one’s mouth in this country.
    My sense is that this entire political generation just want all this to go away.  But it won’t.
  11. Like
    The_Capt got a reaction from The Steppenwulf in How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?   
    As much as I hate this, I have to agree.  There is open support for Ukraine everywhere but inside the wire it is becoming an open sore.  I also suspect that all parties want to try and pretend like we are not entering into another Cold War-esque reality.  No matter how much rhetoric is spilled and noises made, no political party wants to commit to that major shift. It is ridiculously expensive, filled with terrible decisions and has pitfalls that can swallow entire nations.
    So if we can quietly put the first war of this new thing to bed, we can go back to gradually building new Iron/Bamboo curtains…now with internet. Canada is the absolute worst offender in all this as we promise 2% GDP spending with absolutely no intention in following through. We will come up with clever “big buys” that take a decade to complete in order to shut up the critics but an increase of that level would hit social programs like healthcare. Shifting money from healthcare to defence is basically putting a gun in one’s mouth in this country.
    My sense is that this entire political generation just want all this to go away.  But it won’t.
  12. Like
    The_Capt got a reaction from kimbosbread in How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?   
    I think the issue is that the central premise of the piece is that resourcing, training, leadership and planning were the critical failures. It then lists a pretty comprehensive list of emerging tactical issues that read as tacked on - “FYI”.  When in reality if one were to solve for the resourcing, training, leadership and planning, there is no real theory of success given the tactical challenges they lay down.  For example, the exposed logistics lines mean that even if the UA had managed a break through, it could not be exploited because supply would have quickly been overextended by a combination of ISR and precision.  
    To my mind, the central issues are the tactical challenges, which are in reality hard problems (a challenge can be overcome by trying harder, a problem must be solved).  The shortfalls in leadership…etc, exacerbated these challenges but were not the core issues.  Based on what they themselves are describing, no amount of conventional mass, training or planning was going to be able to solve the fundamental problem of trying to use tempo/manoeuvre on a battlefield where tactical momentum is not practical.
    Further, the situation has gotten harder not easier over the last year.  I am still it sure that UAS that got us into this mess can get us out but frankly no other solutions seem to be viable.  Other than really expensive and relatively untested technologies that we have not seen at scale.  The UA cannot “mission command” or western equip itself out of this thing.
    It is not a case of disagreement with the authors, it is the emphasis they have chosen to highlight as the core issues of the failures of last summer.
  13. Like
    The_Capt got a reaction from Billy Ringo in How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?   
    Quick scan and worth the read.  My issue with it and few other assessments like this is that the logic does not fully align well.  The ghist of operational failure was poor western support integration and failure of the UA to sustain tempo, instead relying on a single shock action on what they hoped was a collapsing RA.
    But then when you read the “emerging tactical challenges” we are faced with a lot of reasons why the UA would never be able to sustain tempo - lack of surprise, vulnerability of critical enablers (eg breaching) to precision weapons and vulnerability of logistics lines. Operational tempo relies on more than training and doctrine - which can always be better.  It relies on tactical momentum which this document lays out some very good reasons on why that was impossible in summer of ‘23.  My point being even if the UA was fully equipped and trained, the resources needed to sustain tempo are unknown at this time. The assumption that 12 Bdes could have done the job is based on old metrics that the document itself challenges.
    I have seen this before, especially after the initial invasion failed.  Analysis wrestles with itself as old metrics that fail very often can be explained by emerging phenomena but the analysts never quite make the link. This document clearly spells out that large conventional concentrations are nearly impossible without capabilities that we simply have not invented yet - like c-recon. It admits that one has to effectively create a “snow dome” of protection (see pg 37) yet how that can be accomplished is not clear given the laundry list of challenges. 
    To my mind western doctrine is in a tactical and operational dilemma.  We rely on fast moving fluid concentrations of force to achieve manoeuvre in dislocation of an opponent. And while it is clear the UA had shortfalls, the emerging realities highlight that concentration is not viable for: surprise, critical enablers, and sustainment. Further as remote precision continues to accelerate, protection of concentration of force is getting harder and harder to do.  Concentration as we knew it has become toxic in this environment…hence the rise of denial.
    This really comes down to the weaponization of friction.  We saw elements of this in the opening of this war. The RA did not over extend…it was overextended by the UA. In reality it came damn close to pulling it off so we know that use of mass was technically possible in ‘22.  However by ‘23 it became more problematic as the RA began to catch up with respect to ISR integration.  ISR and long range precision are projecting friction onto an opponent, and as such is making use of mass harder…and in many cases fatal.
    As to so what for this war?  Well unless the UA can figure out how to project a “snow dome” forward while essentially sanitizing the RA in front of them, we are likely looking at more static attrition warfare.  Further any snow dome must be “logistics lite”.  Long LOCs, highly visible are not working (see pg 21.) I do not believe that better training and planning alone can solve for this. Nor can more conventional equipment. They are not bad nor a bad idea but we cannot throw enough training, planning and western equipment at this problem to solve it.  We need something fundamentally different.  Or a Russian collapse…that would be good too.
  14. Like
    The_Capt got a reaction from Baneman in How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?   
    And how do you know that I am not already in one? Definitely not a compete grasp. If I can make a claim it is that I have spent a lot of effort and time exploring what we do not know…and it is a vast space.
    I do not lay down my credentials because most would not believe them. That said, I have been working at a national military advice level for over ten years.  I have worked strategy/policy, force development, operational and tactical levels of command, two wars and a bunch of smaller crappy ops.  I was on the team that saved Canada over +2 billion on one occasion of bad capability ideas.
    And on the side I teach the next generation coming up at our war college.
    But in the end as far as this little corner of the internet is concerned, I am in fine company.
  15. Upvote
    The_Capt got a reaction from chris talpas in How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?   
    My sense is we are watching a war of exhaustion unfold before us.  Both sides are on a race to the bottom. Russian major strategic mistake - compounding the many that got them here - is that they see, to believe one last hard burn will break Ukraines back.  The more they do this their own burnout point is accelerating towards them.  Neither side really knows when they will hit the exhaustion point but both sides have one.
    The only good news is that I suspect Ukraine has a better sense of where their breaking point may be…or at least I hope so.
  16. Upvote
    The_Capt got a reaction from hcrof in How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?   
    Further on the RUSI piece - I am interested as to why the authors did not frame their analysis in terms of relative combat power: https://www.thelightningpress.com/about-the-elements-of-combat-power/
    They really have many of the elements in their analysis.  To my eyes, the environment of ‘23 caused at least three pillars of UAs combat power to collapse.

     
    Namely, protection, sustainment and manoeuvre.  They did have effective Intelligence and fires.  Command was spotty according to the authors but if those other three pillars are essentially neutralized, no amount of leadership, command or training are really going to be able to make up for that.
  17. Like
    The_Capt got a reaction from The Steppenwulf in How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?   
    My sense is we are watching a war of exhaustion unfold before us.  Both sides are on a race to the bottom. Russian major strategic mistake - compounding the many that got them here - is that they see, to believe one last hard burn will break Ukraines back.  The more they do this their own burnout point is accelerating towards them.  Neither side really knows when they will hit the exhaustion point but both sides have one.
    The only good news is that I suspect Ukraine has a better sense of where their breaking point may be…or at least I hope so.
  18. Upvote
    The_Capt got a reaction from Plinko in How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?   
    Quick scan and worth the read.  My issue with it and few other assessments like this is that the logic does not fully align well.  The ghist of operational failure was poor western support integration and failure of the UA to sustain tempo, instead relying on a single shock action on what they hoped was a collapsing RA.
    But then when you read the “emerging tactical challenges” we are faced with a lot of reasons why the UA would never be able to sustain tempo - lack of surprise, vulnerability of critical enablers (eg breaching) to precision weapons and vulnerability of logistics lines. Operational tempo relies on more than training and doctrine - which can always be better.  It relies on tactical momentum which this document lays out some very good reasons on why that was impossible in summer of ‘23.  My point being even if the UA was fully equipped and trained, the resources needed to sustain tempo are unknown at this time. The assumption that 12 Bdes could have done the job is based on old metrics that the document itself challenges.
    I have seen this before, especially after the initial invasion failed.  Analysis wrestles with itself as old metrics that fail very often can be explained by emerging phenomena but the analysts never quite make the link. This document clearly spells out that large conventional concentrations are nearly impossible without capabilities that we simply have not invented yet - like c-recon. It admits that one has to effectively create a “snow dome” of protection (see pg 37) yet how that can be accomplished is not clear given the laundry list of challenges. 
    To my mind western doctrine is in a tactical and operational dilemma.  We rely on fast moving fluid concentrations of force to achieve manoeuvre in dislocation of an opponent. And while it is clear the UA had shortfalls, the emerging realities highlight that concentration is not viable for: surprise, critical enablers, and sustainment. Further as remote precision continues to accelerate, protection of concentration of force is getting harder and harder to do.  Concentration as we knew it has become toxic in this environment…hence the rise of denial.
    This really comes down to the weaponization of friction.  We saw elements of this in the opening of this war. The RA did not over extend…it was overextended by the UA. In reality it came damn close to pulling it off so we know that use of mass was technically possible in ‘22.  However by ‘23 it became more problematic as the RA began to catch up with respect to ISR integration.  ISR and long range precision are projecting friction onto an opponent, and as such is making use of mass harder…and in many cases fatal.
    As to so what for this war?  Well unless the UA can figure out how to project a “snow dome” forward while essentially sanitizing the RA in front of them, we are likely looking at more static attrition warfare.  Further any snow dome must be “logistics lite”.  Long LOCs, highly visible are not working (see pg 21.) I do not believe that better training and planning alone can solve for this. Nor can more conventional equipment. They are not bad nor a bad idea but we cannot throw enough training, planning and western equipment at this problem to solve it.  We need something fundamentally different.  Or a Russian collapse…that would be good too.
  19. Upvote
    The_Capt got a reaction from poesel in How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?   
    My sense is we are watching a war of exhaustion unfold before us.  Both sides are on a race to the bottom. Russian major strategic mistake - compounding the many that got them here - is that they see, to believe one last hard burn will break Ukraines back.  The more they do this their own burnout point is accelerating towards them.  Neither side really knows when they will hit the exhaustion point but both sides have one.
    The only good news is that I suspect Ukraine has a better sense of where their breaking point may be…or at least I hope so.
  20. Like
    The_Capt got a reaction from A Canadian Cat in How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?   
    Quick scan and worth the read.  My issue with it and few other assessments like this is that the logic does not fully align well.  The ghist of operational failure was poor western support integration and failure of the UA to sustain tempo, instead relying on a single shock action on what they hoped was a collapsing RA.
    But then when you read the “emerging tactical challenges” we are faced with a lot of reasons why the UA would never be able to sustain tempo - lack of surprise, vulnerability of critical enablers (eg breaching) to precision weapons and vulnerability of logistics lines. Operational tempo relies on more than training and doctrine - which can always be better.  It relies on tactical momentum which this document lays out some very good reasons on why that was impossible in summer of ‘23.  My point being even if the UA was fully equipped and trained, the resources needed to sustain tempo are unknown at this time. The assumption that 12 Bdes could have done the job is based on old metrics that the document itself challenges.
    I have seen this before, especially after the initial invasion failed.  Analysis wrestles with itself as old metrics that fail very often can be explained by emerging phenomena but the analysts never quite make the link. This document clearly spells out that large conventional concentrations are nearly impossible without capabilities that we simply have not invented yet - like c-recon. It admits that one has to effectively create a “snow dome” of protection (see pg 37) yet how that can be accomplished is not clear given the laundry list of challenges. 
    To my mind western doctrine is in a tactical and operational dilemma.  We rely on fast moving fluid concentrations of force to achieve manoeuvre in dislocation of an opponent. And while it is clear the UA had shortfalls, the emerging realities highlight that concentration is not viable for: surprise, critical enablers, and sustainment. Further as remote precision continues to accelerate, protection of concentration of force is getting harder and harder to do.  Concentration as we knew it has become toxic in this environment…hence the rise of denial.
    This really comes down to the weaponization of friction.  We saw elements of this in the opening of this war. The RA did not over extend…it was overextended by the UA. In reality it came damn close to pulling it off so we know that use of mass was technically possible in ‘22.  However by ‘23 it became more problematic as the RA began to catch up with respect to ISR integration.  ISR and long range precision are projecting friction onto an opponent, and as such is making use of mass harder…and in many cases fatal.
    As to so what for this war?  Well unless the UA can figure out how to project a “snow dome” forward while essentially sanitizing the RA in front of them, we are likely looking at more static attrition warfare.  Further any snow dome must be “logistics lite”.  Long LOCs, highly visible are not working (see pg 21.) I do not believe that better training and planning alone can solve for this. Nor can more conventional equipment. They are not bad nor a bad idea but we cannot throw enough training, planning and western equipment at this problem to solve it.  We need something fundamentally different.  Or a Russian collapse…that would be good too.
  21. Upvote
    The_Capt got a reaction from dan/california in How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?   
    Quick scan and worth the read.  My issue with it and few other assessments like this is that the logic does not fully align well.  The ghist of operational failure was poor western support integration and failure of the UA to sustain tempo, instead relying on a single shock action on what they hoped was a collapsing RA.
    But then when you read the “emerging tactical challenges” we are faced with a lot of reasons why the UA would never be able to sustain tempo - lack of surprise, vulnerability of critical enablers (eg breaching) to precision weapons and vulnerability of logistics lines. Operational tempo relies on more than training and doctrine - which can always be better.  It relies on tactical momentum which this document lays out some very good reasons on why that was impossible in summer of ‘23.  My point being even if the UA was fully equipped and trained, the resources needed to sustain tempo are unknown at this time. The assumption that 12 Bdes could have done the job is based on old metrics that the document itself challenges.
    I have seen this before, especially after the initial invasion failed.  Analysis wrestles with itself as old metrics that fail very often can be explained by emerging phenomena but the analysts never quite make the link. This document clearly spells out that large conventional concentrations are nearly impossible without capabilities that we simply have not invented yet - like c-recon. It admits that one has to effectively create a “snow dome” of protection (see pg 37) yet how that can be accomplished is not clear given the laundry list of challenges. 
    To my mind western doctrine is in a tactical and operational dilemma.  We rely on fast moving fluid concentrations of force to achieve manoeuvre in dislocation of an opponent. And while it is clear the UA had shortfalls, the emerging realities highlight that concentration is not viable for: surprise, critical enablers, and sustainment. Further as remote precision continues to accelerate, protection of concentration of force is getting harder and harder to do.  Concentration as we knew it has become toxic in this environment…hence the rise of denial.
    This really comes down to the weaponization of friction.  We saw elements of this in the opening of this war. The RA did not over extend…it was overextended by the UA. In reality it came damn close to pulling it off so we know that use of mass was technically possible in ‘22.  However by ‘23 it became more problematic as the RA began to catch up with respect to ISR integration.  ISR and long range precision are projecting friction onto an opponent, and as such is making use of mass harder…and in many cases fatal.
    As to so what for this war?  Well unless the UA can figure out how to project a “snow dome” forward while essentially sanitizing the RA in front of them, we are likely looking at more static attrition warfare.  Further any snow dome must be “logistics lite”.  Long LOCs, highly visible are not working (see pg 21.) I do not believe that better training and planning alone can solve for this. Nor can more conventional equipment. They are not bad nor a bad idea but we cannot throw enough training, planning and western equipment at this problem to solve it.  We need something fundamentally different.  Or a Russian collapse…that would be good too.
  22. Upvote
    The_Capt got a reaction from dan/california in How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?   
    My sense is we are watching a war of exhaustion unfold before us.  Both sides are on a race to the bottom. Russian major strategic mistake - compounding the many that got them here - is that they see, to believe one last hard burn will break Ukraines back.  The more they do this their own burnout point is accelerating towards them.  Neither side really knows when they will hit the exhaustion point but both sides have one.
    The only good news is that I suspect Ukraine has a better sense of where their breaking point may be…or at least I hope so.
  23. Upvote
    The_Capt got a reaction from dan/california in How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?   
    That is a bit simplistic as well. If an order for 100k Bradley’s was placed one could expect economies of scale, this is true. But a Bradley is made of a lot of stuff and an order that big could actually drive prices up as the Bradley is competing with a global supply chain.  Even internal to the US it would drive up demand that may very well outstrip supply in some key areas.  Modern IFV are not simply a metal box with a larger gun.  There are sensors, optics, complex engines and drive trains…and now we are layering APS and extra turrets.  There is no realistic scenario where a next-gen IFV is somehow cheaper than simpler armored vehicles.  Same goes for tanks, aircraft and ships.
    Modern military equipment is increasingly expensive - we call it military inflation.  This is real global inflation plus the increased requirement costs, plus good old defence industry gouging.
  24. Upvote
    The_Capt reacted to Anthony P. in How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?   
    It's been a frustrating and confusing experience seeing the Republican party pivot from hawks drooling at the prospect of finding an excuse to invade another Middle Eastern country to just saying "eff it, let's go for straight up treason to own the libs or something".
  25. Like
    The_Capt got a reaction from A Canadian Cat in How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?   
    That is a bit simplistic as well. If an order for 100k Bradley’s was placed one could expect economies of scale, this is true. But a Bradley is made of a lot of stuff and an order that big could actually drive prices up as the Bradley is competing with a global supply chain.  Even internal to the US it would drive up demand that may very well outstrip supply in some key areas.  Modern IFV are not simply a metal box with a larger gun.  There are sensors, optics, complex engines and drive trains…and now we are layering APS and extra turrets.  There is no realistic scenario where a next-gen IFV is somehow cheaper than simpler armored vehicles.  Same goes for tanks, aircraft and ships.
    Modern military equipment is increasingly expensive - we call it military inflation.  This is real global inflation plus the increased requirement costs, plus good old defence industry gouging.
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