Roach

That would in turn undermine the whole defense of a "western order" and reward Russia for the war.  On top of that Ukraine has shown no interest in giving up a position of full restoration of the national integrity of Ukraine.  NATO membership isn't really relevant and there in no telling how long and convoluted that process might become.  As it stands Ukraine is being backed by almost the full arsenal of NATO so there isn't much incentive to even consider a compromise especially considering Russia's stated positions.
Russia needs to be clearly seen as having lost this war after all the sacrifice Ukraine has given.  Short of that Russia will continue some form of aggression to continue to destabilize things.  That in turn would also hold up membership.  This isn't about Donetsk, but rather the example the Ukrainian people have set.  That is the threat Ukraine represents.

Pardon my words, but the balls on this man to venture to Snake Island….for those who can’t see the video,  Zelensky visited Snake Island, leaving behind wreaths to honor the fallen. Did so by boat.
 

That is exactly the plan from what we have seen so far.  A death by inches so that Russia can come to terms with it.  All war is negotiation and that also means the players must negotiate with themselves.  The fact that Ukrainians have to die to make this happen is something we had better not forget when it comes to guaranteeing their security and rebuilding their nation once this war is over.  We are killing Russia softly while Ukraine pays the bill and we owe them a lot for it.

Because, like Oryx, they cite only confirmed deaths rather than estimates. As I said.

Sure I remember. That was the RBMK reactors like at Chernobyl. They had a "positive temperature coefficient"  or  "positive reactivity coefficient" (those mean the same thing) meaning that as temperatures in the coolant increase, the nuclear reaction rate increases, which increases temperature, which increases nuclear reaction rate.....  you can see where that leads. HOWEVER, this is not the design of these reactors. These are more "typical" reactors that have a "negative temperature coefficient".  Reaction rate decreases as water temperature increases. Should be obvious that that is beneficial and is how most reactors are designed. I believe RBMK reactors were the way they were for weapons materials production, for one thing. They also had no containment, which the Russians justified by their strict operating procedures preventing accidents. Ironically, Chernobyl's root cause was a) the violation of multiple operating procedures and parameters, b) running an unapproved test procedure, c) lack of understanding by the operators of the physics of the plant and the indications they were receiving (those are related). 
It's nothing to do with steam by the way. (probably the translation or lack of accurate knowledge by the original writer). It's water. Steam is transparent to neutrons so really has no effect on reaction rate, other than if you've got steam in the core you've got NO cooling, which is of course, very bad. Steam flow is an incredibly poor heat transfer mechanism. Steam is the RESULT of efficient heat transfer.
In my qualification training (18 months) to be licensed for start up testing of US Navy reactor plants one things was drilled into us (well, many things, but) That was "Believe your indications and act on them".  If you have an indication of something going wrong and you take all the steps to shutdown and "put the plant is a safe condition" (that's the key words), you can't go wrong. You may waste time if it turns out to be faulty indicators, but you won't break the plant or kill someone. Our motto in the shipyard nuclear test organization - "When in doubt, shut it down"   An operating sub doesn't necessarily have that option, but many times they do, and that's the reason why we build and test them so well, so that it doesn't come up.
I have had to argue that point a few times with my upper management. "I was there. I had the watch. My decision."    I mean, it's the entire reason they spend 18 months and who knows how many $$ to license us!
Dave
 

Now it appears that it was 5 drones, not 20+ drones.  Armed with little explosives and, possibly, designed to not even detonate.  It was symbolic, not destructive.  But yet, here we are debating war crimes.   A lot of "what-about" comparatives to exponentially different levels of destruction and intent.   Trying to link Ukrainian actions to horrific events of the past--and it's quite possible this debate is nothing more than intentional Russian psy-ops to discredit Ukrainians and deflect from Russia's own behavior.
Let's put this in perspective.  5 light-weight possibly armed drones flying around a neighborhood of Moscow oligarchs versus  Russia's intentional and repeated bombing of civilian infrastructure with heavy duty weapons for 14 months.   There is no comparison.
Just my opinion, but how about we postpone this debate until if/when Ukraine actually starts intentionally bombing civilians? Until then, I think it's nothing more than Russian psy-ops.
 

If that is what make you sad and only thing you thought about, pack some tranquilizer medicines and try a walk in Warsaw, Bełżec, Majdanek or myriad other places fathers and brothers of those "killed children" crossed. Or see empitness of Jewish quarter here in Lublin, where entire vibrant city stood- and now is a grass field with single lamp. Even better, one could reach for some memoirs of III Reich slaves, who also died by thousands in those air raids. Very different picture will emerge than this cheap sentimentalism, I assure you.
Btw., since you have visible inclination to levell victims with perpetrators, when war end try visit place in Kyiv called Babyi Yar. It was bombed by Russians early in the current war, where family including small girl burned alive in a car. Quite symbolic connection between two wars.
Back to the topic.
Folks, keep proportions here, ok? Several small drones with 20kg warheads (or even without them) flew near windows of botox-covered lovers of some Russian oligarchs and some cry as it would be carpet bombing of Japan. It's war, let's move this discussions on moral high ground when something size of Iskanders start to fall on Russian cities daily.
More interesting question is if USA gave green light for this or not. If they did, I think it speaks volumes how our perception toward Ukraine changed positivelly.

So essentially, they operate on about the same level as my cat.  It knows when my wife goes in the kitchen it sometimes gets a treat.  So every time she heads to the kitchen the cat perks up, even if she was in the kitchen just 5 minutes ago and already gave her the treat.  Keep in mind she only gives the cat a treat once a day and usually in the evening.  Doesn't matter to the cat.  Could be 11am, she's headed to the kitchen ergo maybe a treat!  To give my cat some credit, she just turned 20.

There have been some pretty terrible videos linked here. By terrible I mean things like splicing together entirely unrelated - in time, space, or even war - pieces from various places to ... tell a narrative? Of something? I guess?
It's happened often enough that, by and large, I don't bother with any of them. IMO, at least some of the folks posting links here are - at best - entirely undiscriminating in what they chose to watch and link. Either that or they're addicted to giggling.
This thread might be the single best piece of crowd-sourced OS analysis of the war available, but that doesn't mean that everyone posting here is contributing to that value.

You know the more I think about this the angrier I get.  This is an egregious double standard against Ukraine coming from the “experts”.
The course of this war for Russia - 
I will invade and crush you…fail
Ok, now I will create 20 sieges and crush you…fail.
Ok, getting serious now.  I will WW1 blast you in the South - we really only wanted that anyway, create cauldrons and crush you…fail.
Ok, ok, you asked for this, I will create multiple Stalingrads on defence and you will die trying to take your country back…fail.
Alright you have really ticked me off now, prepare for human waves and a winter offensive…fail.
That is it!  I am all out of patience and now you are in for it.  Prepare to die on the Putin Line!  (And western pundits are buying into it)
Meanwhile “Ukraine is barely hanging on and maybe we should rethink about support because they have not driven the RA into the sea yet.”  I mean c’mon, with friends like these…

Masters of mocking the Orcs:
 
 

Sorry for off-topic, but this proposal keeps coming up on this thread so I feel I should address it from perspective of someone who lives in Taiwan.
Something most "put a bunch of marines of Taiwan" takes are missing is the voices of the Taiwanese people.
Even though most Taiwanese do not consider themselves Chinese, also most Taiwanese do not favor changing the status quo. The country is in a bizarre place because it's plainly evident to everyone - including China - that Taiwan is already an independent country with its own government, laws and military... but nobody can actually say that out loud. Any time other countries try to engage with Taiwan, politically or militarily, both that country and Taiwan gets punished. Which maybe doesn't faze the US, but they're the richest and most powerful country in the world! Taiwan is a small island located right next door to the second richest and second most powerful country in the world, who also happens to be their biggest trade partner - the ultimate frenemy.
Putting marines on Taiwan is just moving a chess piece for America, but for Taiwan it is a major change to the status quo, something that could affect the lives of everyone in the country - potentially for the worse. As a democratic country, there are a lot of different opinions on this, and with the presidential election coming up in 2024, no candidate wants to be shown as the one who let the Americans mess up the economy. This is probably why the meeting with Speaker McCarthy happened in California and not in Taiwan, because the Taiwanese government doesn't want to escalate tensions, especially not ahead of a political campaign.

This I can definitely agree with. Just because Russian troll farms try and push certain talking points, or try to stir up and magnify disagreements in general, it doesn't automatically follow that they are creating problems that didn't exist before. Or even that they have much effect at all.
Britain joining the EU created (economic) winners and losers, and leaving the EU also creates winners and losers. Telling people who are genuinely better of personally for leaving the EU that they only think that because they've been fooled by Russian trolls is...odd. And for some people, the sovereignty issue *is* important and would still be a decisive factor even if they thought the country as a whole would be worse off. There have always been people who thought that, before the UK joined the EU, the whole time we were in, and during Brexit.
I don't agree with them in the slightest: I'm very pro UK being in the EU, and don't give a fig about nationalism and sovereignty vs the EU. But I can accept that others genuinely have different opinions for valid reasons that I just don't happen to share.
To dismiss the whole of Brexit as a result of Russian interference is to ignore that Britain really is very divided in attitudes to Europe and the EU in particular.
 

Up till early 2020 I was part of the project that was removing the FOW from our army. Despite it procuring exactly zero weapons systems, it was - is - eye-wateringly expensive, and involved - involves - completely rethinking how the army works operationally. We had to consider the full range of procurement activity (what the Pentagon refers to as DOTMLPF) and that takes time.
Among other things, we had to consider how much of the army to de-FOW at any given time. "Obviously" you want to do it all, like yesterday, but that would mean taking the army offline for about two years while it was re-equipped and retrained with it's new capabilities. Politically that is obviously unacceptable - you can't just not have an army for a couple of years on the promise that it'll be better, I swear, when it comes back. Plus, of course, the capital cost of doing it all at once is intolerable, and probably worse than all of that you would be baking in future obsolescence - all that shiny new kit, a whole army's worth - is going to time out in a few years, meaning you're up for a whole army's worth of capital purchase again plus the requirement to take the whole army offline again. So we were enabling capability bricks at a time, and a lot of thought and effort and trialing went in to figuring out what that actually meant - you want whatever you deploy to be able to talk to itself, which means taking a slice across the army - some guns, some grunts, some loggies, some sappers, some armoured, etc. Which is great from a deployable capability perspective, but wildly inefficient because you're doing a bit of this, and a bit of that, and some of those. And you don't get long term efficiencies either, because the tech is moving so fast that the next time you do a chunk of the each the tech has moved on so you don't want to just buy more of what was great last year because now it's obsolescent. Which means a whole new cycle of testing and selection and integration and training. All of which means that the whole programme is going to take years longer than if you were able to just take the Army offline for a couple of years. And, in fact, the programme will never be completed because the relevant technologies will keep moving forward while the in-service kit will keep becoming obsolescent and obsolete, so we're now on an unwinnable treadmill of going around and around the army upgrading this and that and the other to keep this overall capability relevant and competitive until the heat-death of the universe.
But despite all that, despite all the rework and despite never quite being able to deliver the dream, one of the most frustrating and wasteful components of the whole programme was the extraordinary amount of time and effort we spent proving that we weren't wasting either time or effort. And that was necessary primarily because of all the people out there who think that "the bureaucracy" is the problem.

one thing that kind of catches me in the last few dozen pages or more (okay a lot more at how fast this thread grows) is how laser focused we are on the frontline battles in a few locations trying to analyze force loss ratios etc and watching videos of folks at the squad level and how intense the fighting is.  From that we seem to be trying to extrapolate a whole strategic scenario.  
This seems to be a pretty poor way to try and build a picture knowing as we do that Ukraine has been given a lot of long-distance strike capability to target Russian logistics, command infrastructure and critical nodes for defensive capabilities (AD, EW, comms etc).  The reporting on this would have to come from higher level sources which to credit the UA are very quiet.  If Kharkiv taught us anything it should be that the UA is not going to telegraph their real plans.
Personally, I am more of the mind to be patient, not try and analyze how each and every individual squad size confrontation has gone or how many inches of progress the Russians might have made today.  We likely have a couple of months for both the weather and UA preparations to reach a point they feel they are ready.  in the meantime, they'll continue to hit RA critical infrastructure degrading the RA capability to respond when an offensive does get launched.
While China may be looking to provide the RA with military supplies, as @The_Captkeeps pointing out, the ability to integrate a lot of the technical stuff simply doesn't exist within the current Russian forces.  Yeah they might impact some local capability, but if and when the UA dislodges the front, I don't expect that to help RA do much more than what they did in Kharkiv- run for the border.  Trying to organize those mobiks in a counteroffensive seems to be really far-fetched.

If I may, I wanted to come back to this post cause it triggered me, being a pilot myself.
In the civilian aviation industry we have fought hard and long to establish a pretty damn great safety track record.
‘Just Culture’ (or one of its many synonyms) is one of its pillars and means that when things go wrong, personel should feel they can report on it without having fear of being met with discliplinary actions by the company or risk of being proscecuted by law enforcement *as long as there is no intentional harmful or gross negligence* . By gaining a lot of information on what happened and not asking ourselves *who is responsible*, but rather *what can we learn to not have it happen again* is the driving factor and has proven to be successful.
Yet, the trend I’ve seen (with the rise of social media to name one big factor) is that this foundation is becoming shaky under the constant pressure of the (percieved?) importance of showing the public you (enter corporate/law/governmeny entity here) have things under control and show all those people who scream for heads to roll that its being managed and they shouldnt worry. Let’s be honest; the prime reaction of most of us will be : ‘who dunnit?!’ not ‘why did it happen’ .
Entities like D.A.’s know very well the the importance of public opinion, by there very nature they will always have an adversarial relationship with the ‘just culture’ way of thinking. And in my experience this slippery slope has angled more steeply toward easy wins by crowd control , which is something I look at with worry. 
 
Integrity is a very important thing. I believe that most people come to their job and not have the active thought to sabotage or neglect their duties willfully. On the contrary, they are doing their job to their full capacity and with good intent.
 
Now we look at the military pilot. Do you really feel he singlehandedly should be held responsible for his actions he does under order of his superiors while his country is at war? That looks to me like a cheap PR win to the hungry crowd more than a decision based on integrity. He’s the easiest target.
I fully understand an argument might be that he is a thinking individual and should have opposed to carrying out his orders, but that is from the point of view of the other side of which there always be at least 2 in a war. One side approves, the other does not. Its hardly a good point to make generalisations about for how to treat individual soldiers. Besides, don’t we have the Geneva Convention for this (if he ended up being captured)?
So, all german soldier should have been prosecuted individually after WW2? No, the people with the plans were and officers and officials propagating those plans were and then a country was put under sanctions to ‘punish the collective’.

No we are not.  I have not posted my military resume for some very good reasons, but let’s just say it is extensive.  And there are a lot of other business experts posting here as well.  A guy I work with noted that we are one of the few professions that has to put up with this much amateur armchair quarterbacking - pretty sure chest surgeons are not on a forum trying to explain by-pass surgery to a bunch of guys who played Surgeon Simulator 2, and then get accused of “talking down”. (Who am I kidding it is 2023…)
Ok, so the “curve” you are boiling this down to appears to be a magic 65000 troops to do a break out battle in the south before the RA can (and here you get a bit muddy) - get reinforcements or Chinese-backed capability in place to deny it until the Second Coming?  So a force generation competition “curve” with some pretty vague components.  Or more simply put “the curve of the UA generating Attack faster than the RA can generate Defence” and based on your assessment Ukraine is behind that “curve”?
Ok, let’s just put all the other inconvenient facts about force generation to the side - because why would we need any of that getting in the way? - and roll straight into your simple model.
Yes, your wargaming experience has taught you well….attacking is hard and costly because you have to get out of your hole, move in the open into defences that are by-design aimed at skewing force ratios…at a tactical level.  At operational and strategic level Defence becomes far more costly because of frontage and depth.  Now if all you have to do is defend a narrow defile in Greece - with a ridiculous Scottish accent - your problem is pretty easy.  If you are defending about 800kms of frontage in depth of land you stole, from an opponent with all the ISR and accelerating levels of precision strike while your own AirPower is not working and getting blown up in strange smoking accidents…well let’s just say your Defensive curve is pretty f#cking steep.
So while we are clearly at “Amateur Pearl Clutching Day” again - oh, I tried polite, but the gods of Dunning-Kruger and “I have an internet connection” clearly rule these lands, so we are at “Grasshopper”; unfortunately you are not in range of a well aimed rice bowl being tossed at your head - just employing your adorable little model, Russia’a defensive problem is absolutely enormous.  Like epic historical big.  Way back we did some back-of-cigarette-pack estimates that the RA would need around 1.5 million troops in-country to secure that line in something that resembles completely air tight. And last I checked they are no where near that “curve”.  In fact even employing old Defensive ratios the RA would need around 20k effective troops (meaning at equal or better quality) to defend against this 65k being generated in the UA backfield…in the right location and able to react quickly enough, and supported/enabled, to counter along a 800km front.  So you tell me, in your well informed opinion, just where the RA is on their force  generation curve to solve that one?
Ok, back to UA problem. 65k troops is the number that came out of that EU report.  It is roughly 3-4 Divisions, really a modern Corps and a heavy one.  If the UA had that force today on top of what they are employing to bleed the RA white, this war would likely be over in a few weeks. In all three major UA operational offensives the UA did not need anywhere near that level of mass.  All three were variations on the theme of corrosive systemic collapses that were projected onto the RA, they were done with frankly baffling force ratio closer to 1:1 or in the case of Kyiv completely upside down.  
So what?  Well first off Attack-Defence ratios are in the wind, at least on the UA side.  They retook Kherson at a 1.5:1 attacker to defender ratio, while successfully defended Kyiv at as high as a 1:12 defender ratio.  The RA has had nearly an inverse result, massive overmatch ratios do not work, nor do traditional defensive ones.  The determinative factor appear to be ISR advantage, combined with an ability to generate ersatz Air superiority through deep precision strike.  Bottom line, there is not much good news for the RA with respect to mass.
Next, corrosive strategies are a thing.  The RA did not simply “over-extend” they were made to be “over-extended” by cutting up their entire military system front to back.  Even if they dig in - and based on the ground they have to cover, it will be shallow - they are not immune to whatever this thing is.  All those minefield are useless if the guns covering them are dead or cannot get ammo.  Nor can the RA plug holes if their C2 is slow (it is) their LOCs visible and hittable (they are) and they do not have robust logistics to sustain a counter move (they do not).
So when I hear Ukraine shooting for 65k, I do not think “hmm clearly this is what they need to win this war”, I think “hmm, Ukraine is already thinking about the next one”.  Regardless, based on the steady stream of hints - ATACMS training, whisperers of engineer equipment and a steady stream of troop training going on all over freakin Europe, I am betting the UA is actually ahead of “the curve” for a spring-summer offensive when compared the the RA problem-set.  Will it be easy? Of course not.  Is the UA demonstrating that is is near a breaking point - not even close.  The large drunken guy swinging in the bar right now looks like he also has stage 4 pancreatic cancer, and it ain’t Ukraine.
Now I would really like to unpack the southern axis Melitopol problem based on what we do know but that will have to wait a bit.

I believe that he is referring to the pretty complex factors at play within force generation.  These are more than a simple target number, which is pretty much entirely quantitative; however, even that has to be taken into account with respect to both attrition and requirements within force employment models - more simply put “how many people are Ukraine losing, compared to how many they need, compared to how many they can produce?”  At least three dynamic “curves” there, and we have not even rolled in the curves for the Russian side of this as we have two systems in competition.  More broadly, there is also demographic and other elements of national power at play - your posts seem to suggest that all Ukraine has to do right now is fight, but that have a lot of other things going on to support that, or simply exists as a society, which all take human capacity - running of government, industry and trade etc. (and it ain’t all “the women folk” who are doing it).
And then there is the qualitative dimension.  On paper Russia is producing tens of thousands of invading troops, but what is that troop quality compared to the fewer Ukrainians (if it is indeed fewer)?  This just scratches the curves of troop specialists and critical enablers.  The UA is not just stamping out infantrymen they have to train up engineers, gunners, medics, logistics, Recce, intelligence, HQ staff of all shapes and a sizes - everyone of these have a “curve” of both production and how “well” they are prepared before they are operational.
And then there is equipment production curves versus losses.  These need to be linked to human force generation as we do need to arm them with something.
And then there is “how much is enough” training?  Is qualitative demand being met, that is a feedback loop from the field that constantly needs to be adjusted.  And then there is the qualitative curves effects on quantitative, and vice versa.  This in it self creates a curve over time in comparison of the RA.
And then there is force integration - how much can the existing system absorb effectively….a lotta curves.
Basically he is suggesting, somewhat sarcastically, that your analysis and assessment was a little shallow, and your deductions/conclusions may need a revisit.  The fact that he can do that in one sentence should suggest that the individual has a level of expertise on the subject, and perhaps is worth considering the point.

1 year of the war is passed. From the start of the invasion and to the huge count of air and missile strikes. One of my friends has been killed by wagner artillery in Bohorodichne village near Bakhumt. My father-in-law has been killed by storming the defensive enemy positions in the Kherson region 1st of October. I gave 3 of my salaries (all what I have)on the first day of the war on the military budget. Thanks to all of you, thanks for your help. Taking carry of our refugees, helping our soldiers to destroy enemy forces with AT weapons, artillery, APS, AFV, and Tanks, peoples who served in foreign legions. Thank you for giving billions of money to support our economy. Special thanks to battlefront for small support for me, when I asked about a discount, they gave me 2 games with all DLCs for free - I didn't expect this. Some of my relatives were in Kherson in occupation, and all high-value electronic and expensive things were looted from them by Russian forces. And now we don't fear rocket strikes (10 times they exploded 700-1000m from my house) we don't fear nuclear threat, we don't fear the second army in the world and you shouldnt. Sorry for we English would that what I want to say for all of you, I can tell you many things about the war but first i will try to improve my language knowlages.

well Steve at some point you'll have to adjust CM for women in combat.  You'll be so woke.  This woman is awesome.
The Witch of Ukraine Reveals How 'Teeny-Weeny' American Weapons Are Beating Russians (yahoo.com)

For the non-Mil here (such as myself), these observations from a relative in the British Army:
The fella fighting was going through a mag every couple of seconds. They all need to be reloaded. The grens are shipped in two parts,  fuse and body and they have to be married almost immediately beforehand. The RPG warhead has to be fused, and married to the motor. The frightened bloke did well to keep at it. He came out to fire at one point, but fighting bloke told [him] to get back in.
There is enough work in that intensity to take half a section* out just maintaining the fire. In a platoon the Reserve is constantly rebombing the mags and sending them forward. That pit was held because of the sheer amount of suppressing fire that bloke laid down, and it was only possible with the support from the frightened guy.
[The Shooter] has been in that position for weeks, but I’m surprised he didn’t have a firing ledge cut into to get better visibility.
You’d wonder at the BMP crew. They just ate a RPG, and second one, and didn’t return fire into the position. Might have been too close to depress their cannon.
Yeah, milchat is laughing at ‘most engagements are at up to 300m’ yeah chew on 30m.... 
So the comments I've seen (not here) mocking the second guy are just sheer, stupid amateur ignorance. In a fight everyone plays a part and not everyone is a hero every time. Artillery explosion overpressure waves and constant combat (and the threat of combat) do awful things to the human brain.  The bravest man can be steadily reduced to a nervous cat with enough concussive impacts.
The "scared"  guy could just as easily be the hero next time.  Or not,  but who knows - unless you're in the fox hole and you're him or his shooter buddy. No one else knows. Any commentary beyond that is just talking uninformed ****e. 
 
*In the BA a Platoon is made of Sections. In the US they're called squads or teams (I believe? ). 

Homicide is the act of killing a man
Regicide is the act of killing a king
Fratricide is the act of killing a brother (or, more generally, any blue-on-blue)
Matricide is the act of killing your mother
Countryside is the act of killing Piers Morgan

first we insult the morons, now we insult the twits?  Next we'll be trashing the village idiots. this has got to stop.

This seriously gets ridiculous. So now everyone who isn't firmly in the "Russia sux, lol, Ukraine has already won" camp is pro Putin? Really?

Ok, last chance and then maybe we put it down?  Maybe there is no fundamental common ground. 
Let's talk about negotiation and positions thereof because before this war is over we may have to swallow some salt.
First off the Russians are clearly "occupying the territory that want" - the 900 casualties per day on attacks in Jan kinda suggest that they are not done yet.  So Ukraine could sue for peace, I am sure Putin would be an a##hat and drag all sorts of concessions, like formal recognition of annexed territories and neutrality, so Russia could try again in 5 years. 
The simplest answer is "why should Ukraine negotiate when it can still take back more of what it lost?"  Here is where the disagreement lies.  Many think this is impossible, clearly Ukraine and the western powers disagree.  We are not going to sue for peace until we absolutely have to...and we are not there yet. 
Awhile back I went on about measuring war by assessing the comparative options each side has in the conflict.  I demonstrated how the Russian strategic options space has been compressing, quite dramatically from its start state on 24 Feb.  So what has fundamentally changed?  Russia has not expanded its options spaces at all - actually not true, it bought a bunch of Iranian drones and did a soft-mobilization, so there is that.  Ukraine on the other hand is only going to negotiate when it is out of viable options.  This is not a poker game, it is an existential war for this country.  I argue pretty vehemently that Ukraine as of 6 Feb 23, is not out of options and all that western hardware says we don't think so either.  So they are not going to negotiate, and neither are we because no one has to yet.  This is not "bad statesmanship" it is good "warfare".
Now let's say Ukraine gets to the doorstep of the Crimea...I know, a really long shot based on your assessment.  But if they do, the question will be asked..."is retaking the Crimea a viable 'good' option?"  It is that 'good' that is going to stick.  It is at those pre-2022 but post 2014 lines that options for Ukraine could take a hit.  Ukraine has every right to retake those territories but should they...now?  Very tough question, and we discussed it at length - lot of emotion in the question.  Not going to open it up here, but as a hypothetical if Ukraine runs out of viable good options for offensive action due to political reasons within the post-2014 areas, well then negotiation will no doubt be discussed.  
Personally I do not like it and would love to see Russia pushed back to her own borders but there are some pitfalls and serious traps in all this that I cannot un-see.  Regardless, until Ukraine and the west are at that point, why would they vie for peace now?  Because Russia is big and bad...I think they shot that bolt already.  Because Russia may exhaust them...well maybe, maybe not.  I come from the school of not tapping out when I think the other guy may win.  I am not doing it until they win, and even then reserve the option for low-level insurgency and subversive warfare in the backfield...but that is just me. 
So yes, we may have to sit down to a negotiation table before this is over.  But we want it to be from a position of strength, and last Fall was not strong enough.  And we obviously think we can make it stronger.