lassner.1

This replay is just too well done! I can hardly wait to see how this turns out !!!!

******************SPOILERS****************** * * * * * * * * * * * Well, I have to say that this scenario is eminently winnable as the German player, although it can be close. As the German player I won a tactical victory against a very good defending opponent. The key is time and force management. I began by dropping smoke from my 81mm mortar (it came in on turn 3 – I did *not* use pre-planned) in order to cover *all* my recon elements, minus 3 Pzkpfw IIs, which made a dash for the light woods on the extreme left flank. As soon as they were across the open and into the light woods (about hundred meters in) I began moving them SLOWELY to the right and up towards the victory location on top of the hill. In this way, nobody could shoot at them until the range was so close that I could deliver effective firepower as well as bring in 81mm OB mortar support if necessary. I did send three Pzkpfw IIs to over-watch the small farm with the victory flag on the left flank. Then once the real meat of my attacking forces came in I began to assemble them behind the lip of the steppe (for protection). Once I had enough armor assembled (Pzkpfw IIIs and IVs) and my recon elements were approaching the flag on top of the hill through the light woods, I launched my armor assault directly upon the flag on top of the hill. Once they had covered about ½ the distance to the hill I launched the infantry in halftracks with a smoke screen to protect them most of the way. Some of the infantry made for the small farm on the right flank as well. To make a long story short I carried both positions with light losses. I also managed to send some Pzkpfw III elements through the light woods along the left flank and caught his T-34s on the reverse slope in a pincer, eliminating them. While I did take light to moderate casualties doing this, I had enough left-over for the victory.

Very nice!

*lights pipe and pulls up chair*

That is really fantastic work. I think you just joined my top-three list.

Gordon, This was really going out with a bang. I am very sorry to see your efforts (mostly) coming to an end. Thanks for all the great work! Alexander

lol - at least it gives some indication of how unsatisfactory is the "work" done by the likes of Carrell ...

A good starting point for what the Germans did right and wrong at the operational and strategic levels during W.W. II include: "Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg" a 10-volume series from the Militaergeschichtliches Forschungsamt. "Hitler's War in the East, 1941-1945: A Critical Assessment" by Rolf-Dieter Müller & Gerd R. Ueberschär. The three volume series entitled "Military Effectiveness" Allen R. Millett and Williamson Murray eds. "German Military Effectiveness" by Williamson Murray "The Roots of Blitzkrieg" by James Corum "Clash of Arms: How the Allies Won in Normandy" by Russell Hart.

Onodoken, I must, respectfully, disagree with you most profoundly. It has well documented that Guderian, Manstein, Rommel and other leading Generals of the Third Reich either knew about the extermination activities taking place in their sectors and did nothing, or purposefully turned a blind eye to the fact that this was taking place. I suggest reading some of the numerous articles/books by Gerhard Weinberg on this subject, for starters. These three in particular, among others, received millions of Reichmarks in payoffs from the Nazis. cbb, In fact I am very well read and interested in the Eastern Front and I remain of the view that “Carrell” is a liar, propagandist and untrustworthy source on the war in the east.

Michael, Well, as you may know there is quite a fight going on between Browning and Goldhagen (at least as much of a fight as one is likely to see between scholars!). Personally, I find that Browning’s explanations as expounded in the last two chapters of “Police Battalion” (as to why ordinary men participated in state sponsored extermination) are far more convincing than those put forth by Goldhagen in “Hitler’s Willing.” I would add that the most recent edition of Browning’s book also has an extremely well argued response to some of Goldhagen’s more outlandish assertions and counter-arguments. Indeed many – perhaps most – leading Jewsish and non-Jewish academics in Holocaust studies are in disagreement with part-of/all-of Goldhagen’s thesis (see, again, the expanded edition in Browning’s book for a good starting point). These objections have been born out by my own personal discussions with Gerhard Weinberg (retired from North Carolina) and Carol Fink (OSU). I have even begun to wonder whether Goldhagen is, in fact, anti-Christian, or perhaps just anti-Catholic, in light of his most recent work “A Moral Reckoning: The Role of the Catholic Church in the Holocaust and its Unfulfilled Duty of Repair.” I would write a bit more on that tonight but I have a batch of exams that have to be graded by Monday, and I am “im Begriff” of grading. Suffice it to say for tonight that I have serious reservations about Goldhagen: there is, to my mind, much more sophisticated work that has been done. I’ll try to say more tomorrow or this weekend as time permits. Alexander

I find myself unable to refrain from posting on the issue of our friend “Carrell” and others who have put forth the clam that Nazi Germany was prosecuting a “preventative” war. Few if any serious scholars accept this arguement. Indeed, my doctoral dissertation “Peace at Hitler’s Price: Austria the Great Powers and the Anschluß 1932-1938” (Ohio State university 2001) dealt extensively with Nazi state policy and strategy in the Interwar Period (if you are a glutton for punishment you can go look it up all 800 pages at the OSU library). I spent over two years in European archives from London to Budapest, and so far as I am concerned there can be no talk whatsoever of the Hitler regime prosecuting a “preventative” war. What the Nazis were able to do is to use the specter of future Soviet aggression – which was, not without reason, a real concern to many European leaders – to coax some French and especially British statesmen into giving the Third Reich a relatively free had in central Europe in exchange for assurances that German armaments were, as Hitler put the matter to the British directly, directed towards the Soviet Union. Moreover, Foxbat is quite correct when he speaks of the “covert lies” to which “Carrell” resorts. Distortion was (and remains) standard operating procedure for the Nazis who were the masters of linguistic perversion and, as George Steiner puts the matter, anti-language. The matter of Nazi linguistic perversion with regard to the Holocaust, in particular, is dealt with extensively by such scholars as, for example, Henry Friedlander, “The Manipulation of Language,” in The Holocaust: Ideology, Bureaucracy, and Genocide” Henry Friedlander and Sybil Milton eds., (New York, 1980); Konrad Ehlich, Sprache im Faschismus (Frankfurt am Main, 1989); Cornelia Schmitz-Berning, Vokabular des Nationalsozialismus (Berlin, 1998); Michael Burleigh, Death and Deliverance: "Euthanasia" in Germany 1900-1945 (Cambridge, 1994); Christopher R. Browning, Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland (New York, 1992). But, in fact, Nazi linguistic perversion is pervasive in the German diplomatic record, to include conversations among and between Nazis and their agents, since they regularly blackmailed one another. While anti-language in the diplomatic record of the 1930s is used in the service of activities less malevolent than those of the Holocaust, it is no less distorting. From Franz Papen, to Konstantin Neurath, to Hitler, Hermann Göring and Rudolf Hess, the Nazis – including Carrell – and their agents were and have remained, pathological liars who, in addition, regularly employed euphemisms of the most insidious kind. Carrell’s book is of extremely questionable value. Stick with Earl Ziemke, Glantz or any of the other respectable scholars that have been mentioned on this page already. BTW – much of what I wrote above goes for Manstein and Guderian.

To get the most out of OB morter-fire I suggest using the command that allows you to set the timing for the OB FFE for any turn of the game. The disadvantage is the inflexability of doing so, but they are spot-on when it comes to accuracy. Lately, while I am on offense, I have been using 120mm OB morters to deny terrain to my opponents, thus securing flanks for armor/infantry assaults.

Here here Foxbat!

Well, I don’t want to overstate my case since the following suggestion may be unrealistic, but the one thing that I would like to see – given the near impossibility of achieving a hit while moving (in this case retreating) – is for the retreating armor to stop momentarily while squeezing off a shot. At least this way they would not be running away AND wasting ammunition!

I have to say, that is some fine-ass grass!

The thing that is MOST frustrating about this armor behavior is the following. In CM:BB the chances for a moving AFV with a cannon (X) to hit a stationary target (Y) is (correctly!) very slim. In other words, if X is to hit Y, X should STOP. So when X (with a fair-to-good chance to kill its target) begins, instead, to back away from Y, X usually foregoes whatever chance it had to kill Y. It will be unlikely for X to score a hit, and X will, instead, probably be picked off by Y. This behavior seem far more exaggerated in CM:BB than it was in CM:BO, and it can be rather frustrating.

Very nicely done. I have just added it to my bmp file!

Good points have been raised, and I must say that I consider "Dergratschi Roadblock" and "Magnuszew Bridgehead" to be eminently playable. But they are certainly the largest size operation (and battle for that matter) that I would enjoy playing. For me it is not the map size that is the problem, just the piece density: I, for one, do not want to manage a battalion’s worth of assets. And since one tends to loose a fair amount of equipment in most battles of an operation, I do not mind the “size” of the operation reflecting the reinforcements (i.e., I don’t mind a “large” operation if that operation is “large” based upon reinforcements that will trickle into the operation over, say, ten battles. I guess I would just like to say to those people who do design operations, please try to make more medium/large size operations. There are those of us who are very fetched with them!

A consideration for those who design operations: There seems to be a real shortage of medium and small operations in CM:BB. Are there any designers out there who are currently designing this size operation? If not, are there any designers who are considering creating small to medium size operations? I would be most interested.

I have to say that your mods were (are!) always at the top of my list. I am sorry to see you go; maybe inspiration will come again. If it does, I know that I will love the results! Good hunting.

bump

I have not been entirely systematic about it, but it does seem as if what you say is true. I have seen this far too often.

A very favorable review - and well deserved.

This is top quality work; simply outstanding.

Biltong, Sorry, but could you email the rules to me once again? My wife accidentally deleted them. lassner.1@starpower.net Thanks!