Jeff Duquette

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>It seems that the allied way of measuring accuracy is somwhat different from the Axis charts and diagrams we have seen for measuring gun accruacy, it sort of makes the comparision of modeling accuracy in CM somewhat more difficult.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> Has there been actual German test data posted yet on this thread? Or have we been looking at Jentz's condensation of test data. Perhaps his accuracy tables for the 88mm have been summarized for us lay folks. His present format makes it relatively easy for people to say gee this is the relative probability of hitting such and such sized target at such and such range. Somewhat of a digression here...but I think John alluded to this in an earlier post: Jentz's 88mm accuracy numbers in "Tank Tactics in North Africa" are different from his 88mm accuracy data in "Tactics of the Tiger I". The North Africa numbers are somewhat lower.

machineman: Seems hard to believe (Obviously the guy conducting this test was a "non-cool gunner") The following is the 90% zone for the M48 round including vertical dispersion. Try visualizing the problem in three space…XYZ (i.e. a WWII MBT stands up off the ground - tracks to turret top -- some 10 to 15 feet). The numbers for dispersion shouldn't seem quite as dramatic to you after going through this exercise.

Just an added note...obviously dispersion trends in the vertical plain are also critical to tank gunnery. One additional comment on obscuration problems is that impact of overline rounds will often be blocked from direct LOS of gunners and TC's by the target. Solution?

If a number of rounds of ammunition of the same caliber, lot, and charge are fired from the same position with identical settings used for deflection and quadrant elevation, the rounds will not all impact on a single point but will fall in a scattered pattern. The points of impact of the projectiles will be scattered both in deflection and in range. Dispersion is caused by inherent (systemic) errors such as: minor variations in the weight of the projectile, and moisture content and temperature of the propellant grains, differences in the rate of ignition of the propellant, variations in the arrangement of the propellant grains, play (looseness) in the mechanisms of the carriage, nonuniform reactions to firing stress, environmental effects (gusting winds) etc, etc. It should'nt be confused with round-to-round variations caused by either human (non-cool gunner ) or constant errors (constant error like consistent wind velocity, ambient temperature, etc). Human errors can be minimized through training and supervision. Inherent errors are beyond control or are impractical to measure. The distribution of bursts (dispersion pattern) in a given sample of rounds is roughly elliptical in relation to the line of fire and the intended point of impact. For any large number of rounds fired, the average (or mean) location of impact can be determined by drawing a diagram of the pattern of bursts as they appear on the ground. A line drawn perpendicular to the line of fire can be used to divide the sample rounds into two equal groups. Therefore, half of the rounds will be over this line when considered in relation to the weapon. The other half of the rounds will be short of this line in relation to the weapon. This dividing line represents the mean range of the sample and is called the mean range line. By further subdividing this impact zone we can establish tendency of a sample to fall within some distance from the intended impact point. The 50% zone is simply the horizontal distance over which 50% of the rounds fired will impact, or disperse over. So in the case of the Super M48 @ 2000 yrds, we can expect 50% of the rounds we fire to fall within +/- 14 yrds of the impact point (ie the the 50% zone is 28 yrds). A 10% zone would be a much tighter zone around the intended impact point…I don’t know what the 10% zone of an M48 HE round is, but for the sack of clarity in what I’m talking about perhaps the 10% zone would be something like +/- 3 yrds either side of the intended impact point.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>WO 291/1183 Obscuration problems in tank gunnery. This report mentions a device called "hoonoo", a large baffle fitted 4 to 5 calibres in front of a normal muzzle-brake on a 17-pr, to prevent dust being raised on firing. At 1000 yards, firing a 20-pr over dust-free ground, in 5 out of 10 cases the tank commander could not observe strike, and in 11 out of 20 cases the gunner could not. Firing 17-pr or 20-pr, gunners and commanders could not see their tracer, although observers to a flank could. It is extremely hard to spot APDS impact on the ground or on a tank. "Over dry grassland, trials with a 20-pr gun (MV 4350 ft/sec) both with and without a muzzle blast diffuse) have indicated that there is little chance of successful observation of APDS ammunition at ranges up to 1400 yards, and that the dust raised by blast is chiefly responsible for the obscuration." "In dry weather over dusty ground obscuration is complete, and on a calm day persists up to 10-15 seconds."<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> I threw this up from Macksey before...thought it might be appropriate to take another look at it. <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR> Major Kenneth Macksey MC Tank vs Tank The story of Armoured Battlefield Conflict in the 20th Century. (pg 107) Pieces of such high velocity brought with them, however, additional problems for commanders and gunners. No longer was it possible satisfactorily to base corrections of aim upon spotting the fall of shot, because the shot usually landed before the dust and Smoke from the gun's discharge had cleared away. Field anti-tank gunners often overcame the spotting problem by employing a flank observer: However (sic) tank commanders in a turret, jolted by the discharge, were in trouble. Moreover, although at the shorter (and more common) ranges of engagement, where line of sight virtually coincided with trajectory of projectile over the initial 800 meters and made it necessary only to lay at the center mass of target, the judging of distance at potentially effective ranges out to 2000 meters now became critical. In desert and steppes these difficulties faced the Germans as their Tigers, Panthers, Elefants and several more kinds of heavy Jagdpanzer came into service throughout 1943. The Russians, too, would have to consider it when the greatly improved T34/85 with its three-man turret, thicker armor and 85mm gun appeared in August 1943.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>WO 185/194 Tank and anti-tank armament. "The technique of direct AP shooting at the beginning of the War was relatively simple - after the range to the target had been estimated, the appropriate graticule on the telescope was laid on the target and the gun was fired. If the first round missed the target the gunner (i.e. the gun-layer) assisted, if necessary, by the commander, observed the fall of shot in relation to the target, applied the necessary correction in lay and fired again... The average maximum number of rounds required to hit the upstanding targets used on training was of the order of three." With the arrival of the 75mm tank gun and its HE round, a bracketing procedure was introduced, and used down to ranges of 1,000 yards, rather than applying direct corrections as in AP shooting. "Gradually it was realised that since the 75mm HE M48 Super ranged with APC M61, the principles of direct AP shooting could be applied up to 2,000 yards at least. Beyond this range, or at any rate beyond 3,000 yards,...it was necessary to—adopt a bracketing procedure."<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> Presumably bracketing was conducted with HE to improve probability of spotting ones own round…an HE ground detonation will kick up a great deal more soil and dust that an AP round impacting the ground. [This message has been edited by Jeff Duquette (edited 11-01-2000).]

John: Just checking...but you do have access to Jentz's material on British gun accuracy\range for North Africa. 2-pounder, 25-pounder etc?

Hiram Sedai & Fubar: Thanks for your support Chupacabra: Uh…I too like drinking beer and making loud noises in public places too So CM is the first with an operational level and tac layer all rolled into one. Its been cutting edge on a lot of other things…why not this as well. Where there is a will there is a way (or in American terms where there is a Market there is a way). Doesn’t Shogun have some kinda campaign layer? Dunno haven’t played it. I have heard some folks raive about it.

PBEM is a lot of fun but can be kinda slow going. I'm kinda itchin' for TCP capability as well.

Chupacabra: Uh...so you dislike the idea of a campaign layer or you just don’t think its been done? Cause if you dislike it thats fine...but if you think it hasnt been done...well thats another story

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>John: Agreed, problem is their is apperently more German gun accuracy material available then US etc material. I keep hopeing someone will locate US & UK WW2 gun test charts like we have for the German guns.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> That’s the problem with kids these days. All they talk about is German Panzers this, and German Panzers that. You can’t hardly get on the net without finding some web site with a plethora of info on German WWII Armour. I would think WWII ordnance data similar to what Jentz presents in his works on the TIGER I & II would readily be available for British and US AFVs. Maybe there sittin in a pile of notes on Steve Zaloga’s Desk. I do recall reading somewhere that US ARMY tankers would set their coax sights to 800 meters (or maybe it was the AAMG). When engaging a tank…they would employ the MG as a pseudo-range finder. CM has I think modeled this tendency --- at least the visual effect. US Tanks will tend to give a burst of MG fire prior to firing their main gun at German Tanks. Paul: Interesting assessment...seems to verify your previous info from Ft. Irwin trials. I read that AAR and I’m tempted to think that CM’s model is ok. Claus: That seems to be hitting the nail on the head with respect to accuracy. Many of the examples I posted above emphasize the importance of fire, adjust, fire adjust. Bracketing seems to be what’s at issue. A healthy “To Hit” probability increase should be occurring with each successive round fired. Perhaps a graduated function dependent upon range to target and number of previous rounds fired etc. After the bracketing bonus is determined this than is worked into the “To Hit” alogorithim. The danger here is in preventing an accuracy function\model which eliminates the probability of close range misses from occuring. Or bracketing bonuses which prevent third or fourth round misses from occuring. I suspect the games existing accuracy function is graduated with range – as it should be –the closer you are to your target the better the chances of getting a first round hit. Than again perhaps the “To Hit” function simply drops off too rapidly with range. As far as complaining about low hit probability out to 3000 meters, I think typical game map terrain will proclude this from occurring to often. Personally I think tweaking the existing engine to allow some increased hit probabilities out to 2000 meters would be fine. [This message has been edited by Jeff Duquette (edited 10-31-2000).]

Actually as I had indicated it has been done by ATOMIC in Close Combat 4 and 5.

All I have energy for tonight. A smorgasbord of tank and anti-tank engagements\sop. The focus of this discussion IMO should be on gunnery and accuracy in general, and not be limited specifically to the 88mm. <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Seek, Strike and Destroy, US ARMY Tank Destroyer Doctrine in WWII. Dr. Christopher Gabel. The direct-fire mission was especially important in Italy, where tank destroyers provided covering' fire for tanks that, being better armored, closed with and destroyed enemy positions impeding the advance of the footsoldiers. Thus, tank destroyers supported tanks, and tanks supported infantry. During the September 1944 assault on the Gothic Line, specially trained tank destroyer gunners supported the advance by placing rounds through the small gun embrasures of German pillboxes at a range of fifteen hundred yards. Even when openings could not be hit, the high-velocity rounds were quite effective against concrete fortifications." Tank destroyers were so valuable as armored self-propelled assault guns that one battalion in Italy functioned exclusively in the direct-support role for four months. (Pg 41) ----------------------------- The M-36 would not arrive in Europe until September 1944, but once it reached the front, it proved to be the only American armored vehicle that could match the heavier German tanks in firepower. One M-36 destroyed a Panther with one round at a range of 3,200 yards' and another fired five rounds at a tank 4,600 yards distant, scored two hits, and disabled the fank. The M-36 was equally impressive in the secondary missions. In the direct-fire role, a 90-mm armor-piercing shell could penetrate 4.5 feet of non-reinforced concrete. (Pg 56)<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>PANZERJAGER, Tank Hunter by William Folkestad Folkestad while crewing a 75mm Pak On several occasions this routine was abruptly Interrupted as, when on one afternoon two T-34s immediately fired on us. A railroad embankment separated us from the Russian tanks parked about 600 to 700 yards distant. When we arrived, instead of our gun leader kneeling down and looking to be sure that we could clear the crown of the embankment, he had simply indicated where to place the gun. When we came under fire, our gunner looked through the cannon's sight to determine the range and swore saying, "I can't shoot. We have half the hill In the gun sight." When the driver saw our signal he came back to help us. We hooked the gun to the half-track and made a circle, dragging it around to a new position facing the T-34s. We stopped less than 100 yards from the embankment where a depression of about two feet allowed us to shoot. Just then our new 1st lieutenant, who was also the company leader, arrived In his open-topped, 4 wheel-drive Kommandowagen. He threw open one of the swing doors and demanded to know why were we not shooting? Our squad leader explained that the gun had been too low and we needed to relocate It onto higher ground. He then turned and ordered me to go to the embankment and give fire coordinates. With an antitank gun you always need to have someone observing out front because with each round fired, the barrel blast sent dust and everything flying up. In such Instances you are unable to see if you hit the target, or the ground In front, to the side or In the back of a tank. My job was to correct the fire and give new coordinates using arm and hand signals. I ran over to the berm, clambered up to the edge and from there began directing fire towards the T-34s. (Just an observation here…tank crews would not really have the luxury of detaching a crewman to the front of their tank outside the zone of flash\dust from firing to observe fall of shot. In addition this procedure was apparently routine amongst ATG crews, as a similar process is attributed to British Anti-Tank Gun crews in “Applied Operation Research” (tanks Paul) as well as “Artillery In the Desert” FMFRP 12-3) Whenever we were uncertain of the distance we fired three shots. The first shot was to the estimated range, for example 600 yards, and discovering that It was 50 yards too short you would add another 50 yards. If you were lucky you got a hit, If not, and you struck behind the tank, you could correct your aim for a third time which generally placed you on target. The Russians saw all the activity we were engaged in and kept us under constant fire. Luckily for our gun crew, the tankers shooting at us were lousy gunners. Each time they were firing It was either too long or too short. Then suddenly, as the driver was moving out of range, they struck our half-track on the back just above the fenders where we had special racks to hold our Tellerminen or T-mines. Tellerminen were so named because of their flatness resembling a dinner plate. Fortunately nothing happened although large shrapnel cut right through some of the mines. There was no explosion because they were useless without their primers in them. If by some freak accident they had ignited, the driver and vehicle would have disappeared. The accident turned out to have a practical side. We later built a sturdy storage box over the back of our half-track where it had been damaged. The two tanks were sitting side by side, at most 30 yards apart, still shooting at us without effect. With our second shot I had the exact distance and we knocked them both out, one after the other. ------------------------- Hornet Combat Demo One afternoon In the fog and drizzle I had an opportunity to watch one of our Hornisse, the Hornet, 88 mm self-propelled antitank cannons at work. Hornisses were open-topped armored vehicles with armor plating surrounding the gun deck. The crew had been issued the same range finder used by antiaircraft batteries. It was incredibly accurate. The front line was 800 yards from our position and 1200 yards beyond Russian tanks were Idling In their forward assembly areas. As I watched through my field glasses the Hornisse cut loose on two T -34s destroying both of them. It was like observing an ant hill being stirred up with a stick. The Russian tankers had thought that they were out of range and they had no Idea what had hit them.(Pg 80)<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>From: The Development of German Defensive Tactics in Cyrenica—1941. FMFRP 12-99 Perhaps the most outstanding single element in German defenses was the 88-mm gun. It sometimes opened fire at ranges up to 2,000 yards, but was most effective at about 800 yards. The 50-mm and 37-mm antitank guns opened fire at between 400 and 800 yards.(Pg 60)<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Artillery In the Desert, FMFRP 12-3 Other difficulties arise in the desert which only keen eyes and training can surmount. There is the real problem which a forward artillery observer has in identifying his own bursts among the dust, and heat waves when other units are also firing. Judging distance In the desert is as difficult as on the ocean. Lack of familiarity with the size and appearance of armored vehicles at various ranges is a frequent cause for misjudging distance (personal observation…this seems to have been relatively crucial to the successful employment of German Zeiss Optics. A gunner had to be familiar with potential target sizes) . The fact that the enemy opens fire does not invariably mean that the enemy is within range, for he can misjudge also. But it is even more important to remember that all tanks are not equipped with the same type of gun. German tanks armed with 75-mm guns can open effective firing at a range of 2,000 yards. Antitank guns with a smaller range waste ammunition by returning fire and, what is worse, give away their own positions.(Pg 42-43) ----------------------- Direct laying – Usually the 2-pounder anti-tank batteries are directed not to use direct laying on tanks until the tanks are within 800 yards of their positions. For 25-pounder, direct fire is held until the enemy vehicles are within 1,000 yards. Opening at 600 yards has been found to be too short, because enemy machine guns are within their effective range. At 800 yards the antitank gun is still comparatively accurate as at 600 yards, whereas the machine gun has lost considerable accuracy and is likely to penetrate the gun shields.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR> From the book. “Freineux and Lamormenil” by George Winter “I saw a flash from the panzer, the shell hitting the building near the eve of the house, sending debris all over us. The panzer then fired another round and missed, hitting the same area. Returning fire, Graham’s gunner got off two or three rounds but was unable to score a hit since the German was in a depression … “I then looked to the right across the valley and saw a flash from another panzer about 2000 yards away. I then gave the gunner orders. “Right front! Right front! Range 2000! Fire! After firing I saw the AP with tracers in direct line, but short. I then ordered the gunner, ‘Up 2! Fire!’ The second shell went straight into the back of the panzer and it started burning. I was watching it with field glasses and to my surprise saw another panzer move from right to left behind the burning tank. I then gave the gunner orders. ‘Left! Up 2! Fire!’ The shell went straight in to the rear.””(Winter 34-35) The advance of the 2nd SS Panzer Regiment along this route was halted partially by the Shermans of Vance and Graham. The 2 M4A1(76)Ws stood their ground and stopped a superior force from advancing into the town of Freineux. At the end of the battle 8 Shermans and 8 Panthers were totally disabled or destroyed.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>From: The Battle of Kursk by David Glantz The Wehrmacht began developing a heavy breakthrough tank prior to the 1941 encounters with the T-34. This entered series production in the autumn of 1942 as the Tiger I heavy tank (Mark VI). Armed with a version of the formidable 88mm antiaircraft gun and fitted with armor that was impervious to contemporary Soviet tank and antitank guns, the Tiger I was the most lethal tank on the battlefield in 1943. It could stand off and decimate Soviet tank formations from ranges of over 1,000 meters, where it was invulnerable to Soviet return fire. For example, on 5-6 July 1943, two companies from the 505th Heavy Panzer Detachment (battalion) destroyed III Soviet tanks for a loss of only 3 of their 15 Soviet tactics were to close with the Tigers as rapidly as possible and engage their thinner side and rear armor. These tactics were difficult to execute and the two Tiger detachments (battalions) during Citadel lost fewer than 10 tanks in combat while destroying several hundred Soviet tanks.(Pg 18)<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>From: St. Lo, Historical Division US War Department Regarding Panzer Lehr Counter Attack outside St. Lo July 11, 1944 To the west of le Desert, approximately ten German tanks drove north on the unimproved road leading from the le Hommet-d'Arthenay cross-roads to le Charlemenerie and succeeded in reaching a point just south of le Scellerie. Here the column was stopped when the 3d Platoon, Company A destroyed the leading German tank after losing one of its own M-10's. To deal with the German threat in this area, the Company A commander reorganized his tank destroyers and requested a company of infantry as reinforcements. While awaiting the arrival of these troops, the TDs spotted three Mark V tanks on the road west of la Scellerie and opened fire, destroying with 12rounds the tanks and one half-track. Later in the morning. Company C, 899th Tank Destroyer Battalion, holding positions near la Charlemenerie, knocked out its first German tank of the campaign. A well-camouflaged Mark V, carrying several soldiers and accompanied by others on foot, rounded the west corner of the crossroads below la Charlemenerie in front of an American tank destroyer. The M-10 opened fire and with two shots destroyed the German tank, killing and wounding several crew members and scattering the rest. (NOTE: Although ranges are not specifically mentioned in these two AAR’s Fritz Beyerlain indicated that the failure of his counterattack was partly attributable to the close ranges of tank combat in this area of heavy boccage. He indicated receiving a great deal of well directed concealed fire from tanks at ranges of 200 meters. So presumably the above ranges were probably between 200 to 400 meters). Later in the chapter regarding the same series of close quarter SPTD engagements vs Panzer Lehr tanks: Another Panther thrust in the early afternoon toward la Charlemenerie, near the la Caplainerie road junction, was stopped by two of Company C's tank destroyers with the aid of Company F, yd Armored Regiment (Combat Command A). The Company F tanks were located in orchards on either side of the road waiting to take part in a 47th Infantry mission, while the two M-10's were holding positions on the road about 200 yards from the American armor. As the Mark V's appeared, Company F opened fire with HE at a range of 400 yards. The Panthers continued to roll, however, and the leading tank broke through to fight a duel with an M-10 at a range of 120 yards. The Mark V was damaged by TD fire, but it returned a shot, hitting the TD and wounding or killing three members of the crew. The other M-10 then opened fire, finishing the Panther with two shots. Then, spotting another Mark V, the TD fired ten rounds into the suspension system of the Panther, which sideslipped helplessly against the bank on the east side of the road and hung there in a tangle of matted hedgerow and churned mud. The crews, who had left their tanks when they were hit, were tracked down by infantry and captured in a farmhouse in the vicinity. The slaughter of the German armor continued. As the 1st Battalion, 47th Infantry moved down the road west of la Charlemenerie to contact the 3d Battalion, the first two M-10's in the column spotted two Panther tanks approaching from a lightly wooded area to the left front. Before these tanks could get into action, the TD's opened fire with their 3-inch guns at a range of 170 yards, knocking out both Panthers. A few moments later a third Mark V was discovered on a farm road to the east. Both M-10's fired on it, and ten minutes later this third tank was found pitched inert against a hedgerow. None of the enemy tanks had been able to fire on the 1st Battalion before being hit.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>This one is pretty interesting. From: The Anvil of War, German Generalship in Defense on the Eastern Front. This particular section of the book is by Generaloberst Erhard Rauss “Military Improvisation during the Russian Campaign”. (Don’t ask me for additional context on this one as there is none) "Painting silhouettes of the most common types of enemy tanks in front view and profile on the shields of artillery and antitank guns proved a very practical antitank defense aid. The vulnerable points were marked in red. In addition there was a warning sign on the shield: 'Observe carefully, take good cover, and open fire at a maximum range of 1,000 yards.' The distances were indicated by markers on the ground at 200-yard intervals in all directions so that reference points for the exact distance were always available."<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>From: Anzio Beachead, 22 January – 25 May 1944. Center of Military History, US ARMY. German counterattack by the 3rd Panzer Grenadier Division and the Infantry regiment Lehr (309th Panzer Grenadier Regiment) on the northern sector of the Anzio Beach Lodgement. Engagement Range appeared to have been approximately 600 yards. US Army tank type was apparently 75mm Sherman. German tank types are not indicated…presumably since this was a Panzer Grenadier Division tanks were perhaps: STUG’s, MKIV’s or MKIII? “Two enemy tanks approached down the road. Concealed by the cloud of dust around the house Sergeant Keyser moved his No. I tank out, knocked out one enemy tank with three rounds, and with four rounds set the other on fire. Well-placed shells disposed of the crews as they attempted to escape.”(Pg 72)<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> [This message has been edited by Jeff Duquette (edited 10-30-2000).]

Paul: Great post...I think this is the track this discussion should be taking. I have been cracking the books in attempt to collect enough WWII AAR’s regarding rounds fired, range of engagement, and results of engagements to derive some reasonable feel for accuracy. Jentz includes several relatively detailed accounts fitting all three requirements in both Panzer Truppen II and Tiger Tactics. However, I feel like a fair amount of information should be gathered from non-Jentz sources. Again the problem becomes one of: “gee is the AAR being reported because it is something extraordinary or is it a typical event”. Most folks aren’t particularly keen on writing personal tales in which they fired 15 rounds and still couldn’t hit a tank at 500 meters. Conversely if they nail a target at 4000meters you can bet everyone in the division is going to be yakking about it. Just a side note: Regarding “Applied Operations Research” the Brits concluded after studying a great number of tank engagements in ETO 44-45 that there didn’t seem to be any specific tendency on the part of German tankers to engage targets at extended ranges more often than British tankers. My personal conclusions from game testing are that engaging tank targets at 2000 plus meters (assuming your tank can even see the target at 2000) is a waste of ammunition. But in my case I will simply adjust my game tactics accordingly. I am just as content to remain in a concealed position till the bad guys are at 1000 meters…than open fire. So in that sense I’m not chasing my tail with game testing.

You got it John...I thought it was pretty odd me-self. Did another test...same range except 1 Tiger I (Elite) vs 5 Sherman MKV. (Green). The map is featureless other than a long 3 meter high berm\embankment which I place the Tiger. Played 40 turns and typical ranges remained between 1800 to 1900 meters. The Tiger fired off all but 2 AP rounds in 40 minutes. The Tiger started with an upload of 41 AP rounds. The Tiger Killed 3 Shermans in that time. Granted the AI tends to be a little squirley in that the majority of firing was against moving targets. I Guess I didnt buy into how bad you folks were making this issue out to be. Now that I have been fiddeling about with some of my own tests I am begining to scratch my head a bit on why CM gunnery accuracy is as poor as it is. All I can think of is that any target aquisition\target bracketing is not really much of an advantage in the game. That combined with very low "To Hit" probabilities.

This was an interesting test: One Tiger I, Elite SS crew. vs. Ten Stuarts, British Green Crews. Setup test range of 2000 meters. Placed Tiger on a 3 meter high embankment (elevation 10). Remainder of map was flat (elevation 7). Placed 100 meter land marks so range was easy to determine. First go around was Tiger at 2000 meters. The Tiger was unable to spot any Stuarts, yet was receiving accurate fire from the Stuarts. Tiger was eventually destroyed by a hit in a weak spot...or some such thing. Second Go around I placed the Tiger at 1500 meters. The Tiger was able to pick one Stuart off after 4 rounds...the Stuart had moved to a range of 1200 meters before being spotted and destroyed. After the one KO’d Stuart the Tiger was unable to identify any more Stuarts from a range of 1500 meters. However the Stuarts were able to engage the Tiger with accurate fire at 1500 meters. I than preceded to move the Tiger to 1000 meters range, but the Tiger was still unable to identify Stuart targets. The Stuarts continued to issue accurate fire at the Tiger from 1000 meters.

seems we are the only interested parties left

John: Have you received any kind of feedback from Zaloga on the T34 destroyed relative to range table he had included in Red Army Handbook?

I like a platoon of MKVIb's

I posted this on a somewhat unrelated thread…thought I would try it in an independent thread. Run it up the flagpole and see who salutes or who urinates on the pole…so to speak. Personal Opinion here...CM2 Campaign Layer: I think it would be interesting if BTS expanded upon operations in CM2. Something akin to Close Combat V’s Campaign layer would be an interesting addition, with the stipulation that a campaign game editor is intrinsic to the game. The campaign layer could be a simplified version of an operational level wargame akin to a small game of Operational Art of War. A player commands a division or Corps at the operational\strategic level. For example ISS Panzer Korps Counter Attacks around Kharkov Winter 42-43...Mainstein’s Relief Attempt of Stalingrad…German relief attempt at Korsun...Segments of the Stalingrad Battles, etc. Operational\strategic layer moves are handled on a strategic layer map. Combat resolution at the strategic\operational level is handled via small unit combat actions on a formal Combat Mission map. A certain amount of abstraction would be required to keep actual tactical battle sizes manageable\playable. So perhaps a battalion at the operational level is modeled as a combined arms company during combat resolution on the tactical level. Results of the combined arms company tactical battle would be considered to be reflective of the entire battalions performance. Attrition within individual units is tracked between battle rounds. Practical Limitations and Immersion: I don’t pretend to know much about wargame coding so I don’t know what practical road blocks would be encountered to curtail such a game addition. What I do know is that putting a series of tactical level engagements into a larger scheme\big picture context is a lot of fun, and adds numerous additional challenges to players. The results are furthering player game immersion with respect to husbanding resources for the long haul…allowing some control of operational level maneuvers…where and when battles are fought, and what units will fight these battles, etc.

To further muddy the waters regarding Soviet Combat Casulties suffered during WWII, one source of descrepency lies in the incidence of multiple wounds being suffered by the same soldier. Incidence of multiple wounds could potentially skew our perception of over all combat casualty statistics. From: Colonel-General G.F. Krivosheev’s ”Soviet Casualties and Combat Losses In the 20th Century” (pg 88, 89)

Future U.S. "ground warfare" will be cute, flak-jacketed, armored underweared mom & apple pie infantrymen with cheese-eatin' grins singin' kumbaya and God Bless America with the local whomever's we have come to save and make part of the U.S. market share. Now if'n they don't see it our way...well the U.S. Air Force & Navy slam a few smart munitions up and/or down their poop shoots till there ready to sit around the fire again like good little boy scouts singin' kumbaya and buyin' Pepsi's, Samsonite luggage and Puppy Chow for their dog that they just had to ate yesterday. As for the rest of the world, they will still try and kill each other man to man, gun to gun, and tank to tank whenever they get a chance. Just ask Ivan and Joe Grozny.

I think CM2 Russian Front is an Excellent Idea. CM2 will need a lot more variety in building geometries. In addition if heavy street fighting is to be modeled I expect some coding challenges will be associated with large building interior fighting. Present model does not include interior walls, stairwells etc. Could be interesting. Personal Opinion here...CM2 Campaign Layer: I think it would be interesting if BTS expanded upon operations in CM2. Something akin to Close Combat V’s Campaign layer would be an interesting addition, with the stipulation that a campaign game editor is intrinsic to the game. The campaign layer could be a simplified version of an operational level wargame akin to a small game of Operational Art of War. A player commands a division or Corps at the operational\strategic level. For example ISS Panzer Korps Counter Attacks around Kharkov Winter 42-43...German relief attempt at Korsun...Segments of the Stalingrad Battles...etc. Operational\strategic layer moves are handled on a strategic layer map. Combat resolution at the strategic\operational level is handled via small unit combat actions on a formal Combat Mission map. A certain amount of abstraction would be required to keep actual tactical battle sizes manageable\playable. So perhaps a battalion at the operational level is modeled as a combined arms company during combat resolution on the tactical level. Results of the combined arms company tactical battle would be considered to be reflective of the entire battalions performance. Attrition within individual units is tracked between battle rounds.

I want a game where my soldiers are hated by the folks back home. I also would like to see a game in which my soldiers patrol countless turns through malaria infested jungle only to find there are no bad guys included in the scenario. Also, gimme a game in which operations consist of weeks worth of patrolling, highlighted only by the occasional GI stepping on a land mine (and of course the week would have to simulated in minute long turns). I also would like to occasionally play as the NVA or VC. I think it would be fun to be an NVA Company subjected to Arc Light. Perhaps an optional Jane Fonda VC triple-A unit for firing at low flying F4’s would be nice. Barberella could be rendered in all her 3D splender. Now that would be a great game option.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Jeff, as I have gone into before here & in the other topic you brought it up in, that order did not hold up past Bagration's commencement and really went out the window after Falaise.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> John But it's such a great directive to quote. I can't help throwing it out whenever possible. If I could figure out a way to work it into the discussion on 88mm accuracy...shoot...I'd put it in there too. The rest is all just speculation. Fun to discuss. I have seen this same discussion on several other forums. Very popular subject matter. It typically seems to go nowhere. Nothing is resolved and no ones minds really get changed. But I am enjoying the information you folks are throwing out. Anyway if this threads intent is to get a show of hands for who wants CM2 in Russia, I got two hands raised. In my mind there is no better subject matter for wargames than the Russo-German War. Tank variety, scenario variety, terrain variety...the Ruskie Front has all the right ingredients for great wargames. [This message has been edited by Jeff Duquette (edited 10-27-2000).]

I suspect that this wont change anyone's preconceived notions of the relative importance of the western allies impact in Europe…its still interesting. Adolf Hitler words <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR> Fuehrer Headquarters 3 November 1943 Top Secret The Fuehrer OKW/WFSt/Op.No. 662656/43 g.K. Chefs 27 Copies Copy No.____ Directive No. 51 For the last two and one-half years the bitter and costly struggle against Bolshevism has made the utmost demands upon the bulk of our military resources and energies. This commitment was in keeping with the seriousness of the danger, and the over-all situation. The situation has since changed. The threat from the East remains, but an even greater danger looms in the West: the Anglo-American landing! In the East, the vastness of the space will, as a last resort, permit a loss of territory even on a major scale, without suffering a mortal blow to Germany's chance for survival. Not so in the West! If the enemy here succeeds in penetrating our defenses on a wide front, consequences of staggering proportions will follow within a short time. All signs point to an offensive against the Western Front of Europe no later than spring, and perhaps earlier... signed: Adolf Hitler <HR></BLOCKQUOTE> An on-line hypertext version of this directive is available at: http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/wwii/7-4/7-4_d.htm My personal two cents on the subject:The Soviets probably would have won the war in Europe without the Allied invasion, with the stipulation that the German troops tied down in France, Italy, Norway, Holland, Greece remained tied down to counter a potential Anglo-American push in these areas. I also believe the Anglo-Americans would have also eventually won the war, with or without the Soviets. In either case the war in Europe would have been protracted one or two years. In the case of an Anglo-American War unassisted by the Soviets...the Germans would have become the wieners of the Nuclear Bomb lottery. Defeat of Japan in this hypo-scenario...who knows...surrender in 47-48ish. Grisha: You commie sympathizer! Whittman is goin down buddy. You maybe be good at killin helpless half-tracks…just wait till my super Fireflys start pumpin 17 ponder rounds into your hide. Photo courtesy of the most excellent Russian Military Zone. URL for the Russian Military Zone Web Site: http://history.vif2.ru/ [This message has been edited by Jeff Duquette (edited 10-27-2000).]