Jeff Duquette

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Since there are no "hard" facts, data can easily be manipulated. Maybe the table was created to justify some sort of tank doctrine for instance.... (It's seems to fit perfectly for the T-34, since he was able to kill a Tiger I and Panther at around 500 - 800 m...)<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> Using that same logic I suppose we could speculate as to the validity of the original test data detailing 88mm accuracy I suppose the thread could follow the line of “My Numbers are better than your numbers”. If you have some real evidence suggesting that the table I have presented is flawed or inaccurate I'm sure we would all like to see it. The crux of this discussion – in my mind – lies in weather test range accuracy can be compared to combat accuracy. I have provided you with a title and author...heres a page number to help you (Page 179). Just to redirect you to my entire post I have provided two other references discussing range of typical tank engagements in ETO 44-45. Do you have some real data to put forth…or are you limiting your supporting arguments to your above presentation? <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Furthermore all testimonies by tankers emphasized the fact that the heavy german tanks engaged regularly over long ranges with success<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> The whole premise sounds pretty vague to me. Again I would ask “Can you provide some real data on to support this statement”? Some real numbers that is. Not the odd account of GI Tanker who swore that the MKIV which just put a 75mm round up the poop-shoot of his M4 was a King Tiger.

I would suggest taking a look at: Major General F.W. von Mellenthin's Panzer Battles. It was just rebulished recently by Ballentine Books and is available at a resonable price.

Here is a interesting table reproduced from S.J. Zaloga and L.S. Ness “Red Army, Handbook 1939-1945” The first thing I noticed is that the percentages don’t seem to add up. I’m not sure what is missing in the table. No doubt unidentifiable damage or range of engagement for some of the sample being considered. Be that as it may. The Real interest is the relative ranges. The vast majority of 75mm kills and a fair number of 88mm plus caliber inflicted kills are both below 600 meters. Certainly in the case of the 88mm plus caliber, 600 meters is well below the effective range of the weapon. I think the original discussion on "the cool gunner" is worth returning too. Test ranges and actual combat data don’t seemingly jibe particularly well. Actual combat statistics ala Zalogas above table is certainly informative relative to the "subtle" differences between controlled gunnery ranges and insitu results. <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>From: The US ARMY In WWII (Green Book Series), European Theater of Operations, “Breakout and Pursuit” by Martin Blumenson. CMH Pub 7-5 A closed terrain example... Tanks generally engaged at distances between 150 and 400 yards... (pg 205)<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR> Another one From: Applied Operations Research WO 291/1218 A survey of tank warfare in Europe from D-Day to 12 Aug 44. The mean ranges of engagement for the period under study are given as 1200 yards in open country, 400 yards in close country. It is stated that percentage losses for both sides are higher in the open. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE> <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR> From:WO 291/1212 Ranges of engagement in the Anti-tank battle. This report is dated December 1951. It was prepared by E. Benn and R. W. Shephard; readers of "Applied Operations Research" (Plenum Press, New York, 1988) by Shephard, Hartley, Haysman, Thorpe and Bathe, will recognize it as the original source of one of the exercise problems contained in that excellent book. As a result of analysis of a number of tank engagements in NW Europe (sic includes Normandy – German Surrender…so very diverse terrain types), it was concluded that P = 1 – exp (–R/K) is a good expression for the proportion, P, of engagements that occur at ranges of less than R yards. For NW Europe, K is about 950 yards. 90% of engagements occur at less than 2200 yards; 80% of engagements occur at less than 1500 yards; 50% of engagements occur at less than 650 yards. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Regarding Artillery in WWII, I have always liked the following quotes from William Depuy. From: “Changing an Army, An Oral History of General William E. Depuy”, United States Military History Institute. Depuy served in ETO 1944-45 from Normandy to the German Surrender as an infantry officer in the 90th ID. He commanded an infantry battalion in the 90th I.D during WWII, and later in his career commanded the 1st ID during the Vietnam War (1966-67). <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>INTERVIEWER: I'd like to ask one last question. When you finished up in Germany at the end of World War It and reflected back on your experiences, what do you recall were your first thoughts as to what your battalion had accomplished and how? GEN DEPUY: One of the comments that I've made has infuriated tie Infantry School. Now. I don't blame them for being infuriated, but I honestly concluded at the end of World War II, when I soberly considered what I had accomplished, that I had moved the forward observers of the artillery across France and Germany. In other words, my battalion was the means by which field Artillery forward observers were moved to the next piece of high ground. Once you had a forward observer on a piece of ground, he could call up five to ten battalions of artillery and that meant you had moved combat power to the next observation point — more combat power than the light infantry could dispose of. Now, you needed the infantry to do that. You needed the infantry to protect them, but the combat power came from this other source, and I think that trend has accelerated ever since. I think the infantry has the dirtiest job of them all. But, if you want to be rigorously analytical about what you're really trying to do, it’s trying to move combat power forward to destroy the enemy, and the combat power that you are moving forward has been, in the past, mostly artillery, and that is even more true today. The infantry has a lot of ears and a lot of eyeballs. Now, it can call forward even more artillery fire and different kinds of munitions — Cannon Launched Guided Projectiles (CLGPs), the Family of scatterable Mines (FASCAMs), Dual Purpose Improved Conventional Munitions (DPICMs). high explosive (HE), smoke, and illumination, and soon they will also have terminally guided anti-armor munitions. The infantry is a sensor. It's a sensory organization that works into the fabric of the terrain and the enemy, and can Call in all of this firepower — including artillery and TAC air that can really do the killing.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> Another Quote from Depuy I found in: Danny Parker’s “Battle of the Bulge, Hitler’s Last Offensive, 1944-1945”. <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>I really believe, based upon my experience [in. WWII], that the combat power provided by the artillery, I'm sorry to say, probably represented 90% or more of the combat power actually applied against the enemy. That's why I say that getting a forward observer to a high piece of ground was the most important function that infantry performed in that war. That is not to degrade the infantry; it's just an objective analysis.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> From: Bill Mauldin’s “Up Front”

Horncastle: Good stuff. Thanks. One question regarding the account by Mjr R.B Moberley 2nd Middlesex on tkaing dugouts near Touffreville. His finds were resultant from carpet bombing during EPSOM or Goodwood were they? PzKpfw 1: so you wet out whistles with promise of an indepth study by the German army on indirect fire dispersion…than you conclude with “Oh sorry the test results were all burned up during the war” Supertanker: Thanks nice account. Intersting too. 120mm is a big thumper. One would think a direct hit on top of a tank would result in some sort of damage. Adds fuel to the controversy.

PzKpfw 1: Excellent post. Great summary of the challenges faced by Soviet Artillery during WWII. I suspect this topic will rear its head considerably following the release of CM2...assuming BTS takes a realistic approach to Soviet limitations on tactical employment of indirect Artillery fire. People will want to know why the Russians never (or rarely have FO’s). Just to add to the reading list for the somewhat more serious...take a look at US ARMY Field Manual FM 6-40 TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES FOR FIELD ARTILLERY MANUAL CANNON GUNNERY, 23 APR 1996 , CHANGE 1, 1 OCTOBER 1999. Yah sure it’s a modern FM, but it will give you an excellent overview of field artillery and indirect fire. http://www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/fm/6-40/toc.htm

Thanks all for the help. I think I'm going to go with MadDog0606's suggestion. Great URL. I had though Nafziger was a Napoleonic War OoB specialist. Didn’t realize he had branched out so much.

I took a gander at the url you provided for Hersants Military Booksellers. Looks interesting. Unfortunately I'm an ugly american...do you know if these folks take overseas orders?

Before I get lambasted for "Thin Red Line" The Thin Red Line as History How does Terrence Malick's 1998 war movie "The Thin Red Line" hold up against history...seemingly pretty good. Those of us who have seen the movie will remember the epic infantry attack on a ridge somewhere on the island of Guadalcanal. The following is an abridged version of the actual attack conducted by the 27th Infantry Regiment, of the 25th Infantry Division, January 1943. From: Graeme Kent, “Guadalcanal Island Ordeal” Ballantines Illustrated History of the Violent Century, 1971 <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>When the bombing was over, the American troops went forward. The 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry advanced on the area known as 'Galloping Horse'. To the left of 1st Battalion, the '3rd Battalion also went forward, encountering some opposition. Both battalions then dug in for the night. The same pattern was repeated the following morning. After an opening artillery fusillade the infantrymen went forward. This time the 3rd Battalion encountered trouble. Short of water (fresh supplies did not arrive until noon) men began to collapse in the heat. The battalion commander, Lieutenant-Colonel George E Bush, ordered his men to withdraw. As the Americans did so, the Japanese came forward with 90mm mortars, killing a number of the Americans. The next morning the 3rd Battalion was pulled out of the line and replaced by the 2nd Battalion, commanded by Lt. Col Herbert V. Mitchell (Nick Nolte’s Character). Nick Nolte as Lt. Col Herbert V. Mitchell The 27th Infantrys Attack onto "The Galloping Horse" Position The battalion, attacked, up the southern slope of the 'Galloping Horse' area but was pinned down by accurate Japanese machine gun fire. It was a day of confusion but also of individual heroism. The two companies of the 2nd Battalion, existing without water for the greater part of the day, under constant fire from Japanese heavy and light machine guns, tried In vain to go forward. After a time the battalion Executive Officer, Captain Charles W Davis (John Cusak’s Character), managed to take a three-man patrol 'forward and locate the machine gun sites before returning. John Cusak as Captain Charles W Davis On the following morning, 13th January, just before noon, Davis took another patrol forward, this time consisting of five men. They crept to within ten yards of the Japanese machine guns and then, watched by hundreds of Americans on adjacent ridges, charged the guns and put them out of action. Seeing this, the rest of the battalion also went forward and drove the Japanese from their position on 'Galloping Horse'.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> The following Photograph and map are From: “After The Battle” Magazine No 108, editor Winston Ramsey The Real Hill 2nd Battalion Attack CMH write up from: U.S. Army Center of Military History Full-text Listings of Medal of Honor Citations URL: http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/mohiia1.htm DAVIS, CHARLES W. <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Rank and organization: Major, U.S. Army, 25th Infantry Division. Place and date: Guadalcanal Island, 12 January 1943. Entered service at: Montgomery, Ala. Birth: Gordo, Ala. G.O. No.: 40, 17 July 1943. Citation: For d1stinguishing himself conspicuously by gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty in action with the enemy on Guadalcanal Island. On 12 January 1943, Maj. Davis (then Capt.), executive officer of an infantry battalion, volunteered to carry instructions to the leading companies of his battalion which had been caught in crossfire from Japanese machineguns. With complete disregard for his own safety, he made his way to the trapped units, delivered the instructions, supervised their execution, and remained overnight in this exposed position. On the following day, Maj. Davis again volunteered to lead an assault on the Japanese position which was holding up the advance. When his rifle jammed at its first shot, he drew his pistol and, waving his men on, led the assault over the top of the hill. Electrified by this action, another body of soldiers followed and seized the hill. The capture of this position broke Japanese resistance and the battalion was then able to proceed and secure the corps objective. The courage and leadership displayed by Maj. Davis inspired the entire battalion and unquestionably led to the success of its attack.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> Color Images Are all from: Terrence Malick's "Thin Red Line"

Platoon, SPR and the new version of "Thin Red Line". Loved Nick Nolte's charachter.

Sorry, just read Scout PL’s post. I like his insights. I think it would add an additional level of immersion to the game to have some sort of detailed briefing sequence before the start of scenarios. I’m not sure how a briefing sequence would work for point based games...but frankly point based games are always going to result in “gamey” scenarios. Not that I would suggest removing point based scenarios from the game...there way to popular. Unfortunately suicide jeep raids and similar gamey tactics are par for the course in wargaming. You can’t get around this. Regarding Operation Iceburg...please. Lets see the context of this goofy attack. I expect 2nd Lieutenant Numb Nuts didn’t last very long giving orders like that. A poster child for the legalization of fratricide...or “frag-ricide”

Capt. Toleran: It Sounds pretty darn “gamey” to me. Irritating really. It’s akin to folks I sometimes play Talonsoft’s East Front2 or West Front with. After dismounting their passengers they have an annoying habit of using there trucks for recon. ZZZZzzzzz. Come on. Show me some historical examples of suicide Jeep rushes, in which a company commander would tell his men: “Ok boys...you guys race ahead of the main advance till you get all shot up. You’ll be dead but rest assured it wont have been in vane cause we’ll know where the bad guys are.” Everyone please stand while I give a rousing Bronx salute to suicide recon jeep rushes...”RASPBERRY!” Your only consolation is that typically folks with the wits to come up with suicide jeep raids typically don’t have a large number of other tactical skills in their toolbox.

Gots to Agree with BTS. There seems to be large number of pretty bright folk here on this board. Unfortunately, along with sharp intellect, there is often a larger ego rolled into the package. All to often we seem to get caught up in nonchalant comments and lose the context of what is being discussed. I have often thought that if we posted to forums in a manner similar to the way we would talk face to face with people, many of the pissing contests would be eliminated. If someone gets pissy…ignore them. There are plenty of other folk here that discuss things in a reasonable manner. The fact that we have anonymity when posting to forums shouldn’t really give us the right to be rude or brash to each other. We’re all basically here because we have common interests and a common hobby. Now lets all sit down and sing “Kum By Yah” together.

Aloha Greg!!! How the hell are you...this is the same Jeff Duquette. I'm still wallowing in wargames. This is too amazing. Send me an email at jeffduquette@hotmail.com

BTS: I think If you read my post there is no attempt to mislead. Read the qualifier at the bottom of the list. Regarding a baptism of fire not qualifying a unit toward veteran status, brief interludes on the Eastern front certainly pulls these formations out of the realm of "Green". In essence what you are saying is that 2 of 18 formations I listed had no combat experience. In addition, the 2 formations of interest contained large cadres of veterans culled from other battle hardened formations. That hardly is misleading with respect to the original post by Aussie Smith indicating a 25…75 split. The fact is the vast majority of German formations doing the lion’s share of fighting in Normandy were veteran formations. These were the folks that held the line from initial invasion up till Falaise. Again the point being, there were very few Commonwealth and American formations going into Normandy with even cursory combat experience. In addition Green American and Commonwealth formations did not have the advantage of drawing experienced cadres of NCO’s and Officers from veteran formations. The American and Commonwealth Armies in ETO learned their trades on the job against a German Army with 5 years of prior combat experience. The topic at hand would certainly be interesting to discuss if we could move beyond the standard pissing contests, which seem to dominate this forum.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>As to the Vet/conscript point well I'd say the German Army in 1944 in the west was about 25% (NCO's/Officers) Vet 75% other (green/raw/old/young).<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> I’d be curious as to where you are deriving these figures. Regarding German formations in the West that actually did the lion’s share of the fighting, you are basically looking at the cream of the German Armies fighting formations available in 1944. These to include: 1st SS Panzer Division 2nd SS Panzer Division 9th SS Panzer Division 10th SS Panzer Division 12th SS Panzer Division 17th SS Panzer Grenadier Division The Panzer Lehr Division 2nd Panzer Division 9th Panzer Division 11th Panzer Division 21st Panzer Division 116th Panzer Division 3rd Fallschirmjager Division 5th Fallschirmjager Division 6th Fallschirmjager Regiment (This list excludes numerous veteran infantry formations such as the 91st Air Landing Division, 352nd Infantry Division, 84th Infantry Division etc. etc.) With only a few exceptions, all the above were veteran formations. Even the newly formed Hitler Jugend Division contained a large core of veteran NCO’s and Officers from the Leibstandarte Division, hardened from several years of Eastern Front Combat. One the opposite side of the coin, A relatively large proportion of Commonwealth Formations that went into France were green. And Virtually all of the American Divisions going into France with the exception of the 1st ID, 4th ID, and portions of the 82nd Airborne Division were green. Almost no battle experienced junior grade officers or NCO’s were available to be spread amongst American Formations going into France. There seems to be a perception that the Allied Armies in Europe faced a lot of sad sack German Units in 1944, and that the real war was being fought in the East. I reckon we can debate all day as to the relative contributions the Soviets and Allies made to the defeat of Nazi Germany, and the difficulties each front faced. However, it’s often best just to go straight to the source...from the supreme generalissimo himself: <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Fuehrer Headquarters 3 November 1943 Directive No. 51 “For the last two and one-half years the bitter and costly struggle against Bolshevism has made the utmost demands upon the bulk of our military resources and energies. This commitment was in keeping with the seriousness of the danger, and the over-all situation. The situation has since changed. The threat from the East remains, but an even greater danger looms in the West: the Anglo-American landing! In the East, the vastness of the space will, as a last resort, permit a loss of territory even on a major scale, without suffering a mortal blow to Germany's chance for survival. Not so in the West. If the enemy here succeeds in penetrating our defenses on a wide front, consequences of staggering proportions will follow within a short time. All signs point to an offensive against the Western Front of Europe no later than spring, and perhaps earlier.” The Fuehrer<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

One thought. CM does model spotting rounds being fired…or at least I think it does. Historically, savvy soldiers in the open recognized spotting rounds for what they were and would attempt to displace prior to FFE. I think if a player is wizened to the ways of the game you may be able to recognize spotting round for what they are and displace voluntarily. I personally would prefer to suck it up, and control any displacement on my own during the next order sequence. I suspect that there may be some other players out there that don’t feel comfortable with the AI arbitrarily moving their tanks about even if they are being subjected to artillery fire. There is the potential for BTS inserting some displacing routine which would result in further aggravating players. Players begin complaining because their vehicles are moving out of impact areas right into the line of fire of some Panther 300 meters away that’s snooping about on a HUNT command. I think BTS has come forth with a suggestion regarding laying out a testing routine for the game relative to the effects of artillery vs tanks. It seemingly is an issue of potential interest even to BTS, given that a reasonable play testing routine is put forth. It seems to me that any additional anecdotal discussions on the matter are rather fruitless. It would perhaps be interesting to hear your thoughts on establishing a play testing criteria with respect to the issue at hand. Or perhaps your thoughts on how a displacing routine would work.

Fernando: The web site you posted is an excellent source of information. I have had it book marked for some time now. Much of NATHAN OKUN's web page focuses on armored piercing rounds penetrating face-hardened armor (there is also an excellent write up on the eace hardening process of armor plate). AP vs Armor Plate is a somewhat different mechanism than what we have been discussing regarding High Explosives effect on steel plate. I did find his right up on ship fired high explosives rather interesting and found the following quote. <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>If the projectile has a nose fuze, a detonating booster, and a detonating filler, as did U.S. HC projectiles, British HE projectiles, and German Spgr.m.Kz. projectiles, hitting a solid homogeneous, ductile iron or steel plate will result in the projectile detonating almost instantly, with rather a reduced dependence on the striking velocity until that velocity gets rather high, because the projectile will move a rather small distance before the filler detonates and essentially removes most of the projectile's mass sideways in a very short time compared to the forward speed of the projectile.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> Regarding face hardening of armour, I don't think turret tops and tank decks were typically outfitted with FH armour. The process of Face Hardening was both very time consuming, and a very expensive process. Undoubtedly placement of FH armor was restricted to portions of tanks most likely to struck by armoured piercing rounds. Typically that would include the glacis, hull sides, perhaps turret face and sides. -------------------------- Banshee I would suggest trying the experiment I was discussing on page 5 or 6 of this thread. My personal observations was that Tanks will displace without being ordered when subjected to direct Mortar fire. I found this rather interesting and credited it to some sort of crew morale thing. After reading BTS's comments it sounds like this is a deliberate attempt on BTS's part to take care of your 1 minute of terror concerns. However, when subjecting tanks to indirect artillery fire (i.e. FO directed fire) I was not able to recreate a situation in which Tanks would displace out of impact areas of their own volition. ------------------------ Side Note for anyone interested: If you want a concise set of articles on the mechanism of Armour penetration by solid shot vs. armour plate take a look at the following URL: http://www.wargamer.org/GvA/index.html Guns and Armour 1939 - 1945 by Scott Cunningham. An excellent reference web site for WWII Armour.

AlfieE: Try the following address. Portions of the Normandy Peninsula are covered with air photos. Not sure your area of concern is covered, but its worth a shot. Click on the red shaded area to pull in closer and closer...eventually the red shaded area will convert to air photos. http://terraserver.com/CMap.asp?PPD=8&R=14&C=31&W=0&T=0&ClickAt=?0,0]http://terraserver.com/CMap.asp?PPD=8&R=14&C=31&W=0&T=0&ClickAt=?0,0]http://terraserver.com/CMap.asp?PPD=8&R=14&C=31&W=0&T=0&ClickAt=?0,0 [This message has been edited by Jeff Duquette (edited 10-11-2000).]

Hay cyrano01: Guess I misinterpreted your post. And here I was lining up some good Rhino Tank photos to add to this thread I haven't noticed problems with wheeled vehicles crossing baby hedges…but than I guess I haven't been watching close enough. I'll give it a spin tonight and see what's what.

Couple reasons why wheeled vehicles can't cross hedges (in my opinion). First there was a distinct difference between what we commonly think of as a hedge, and what is implied by Normandy Boccage. The following is a cross section of a typical Normandy Hedgerow or Norman Boccage. Picture and text are from a US ARMY pamphlet released during the war. Another photo showing a typical Normandy sunken road, bordered by hedgerows\Boccage. As you can see boccage was a fairly significant terrain feature. The reason behind only Allied tanks having hedgerow-crossing ability is strong founded in history of the Normandy Campaign. Allied tanks were fitted with impromptu hedge cutters prior to the commencement of Operation Cobra. These hedge cutters (resulting in tanks being nicknamed "Rhino" tanks) consisted of scrap steel welded to the front of allied tanks. A lot of the scrap steel was taken from German beach obstacles along Omaha and Utah beaches. These Rhino tanks had the ability to cut through the dense foliage at the top of Boccage. Omar Bradley, after seeing a demonstration of "Rhino" tanks was so impressed with their Boccage crossing abilities that he ordered all American Tanks and Tank Destroyers be rapidly outfitted with the Rhino cutters right before Operation Cobra. In order to ensure surprise, he also order the employment "Rhino" tanks be restricted until the start of Cobra. American ordnance crews succeeded by Herculean efforts to outfit about 2/3 of all American tanks and tank destroyers in Normandy by the commencement of Operation Cobra. Wheeled vehicles couldn't realistically cross boccage for two reasons <LI>Inability of wheeled vehicles to bust through the dense foliage mantling the top of Boccage embankments. <LI>tendency of such vehicles becoming high centered on the steep earthen embankments at the base of boccage while trying to cross such an obstacle. So in my humble opinion this inability of wheeled (and half-tracked vehicles) to cross Boccage is not a game glitch or game bug in CM. What it represents is a very realistic attempt on the part of BTS designers to model the historical difficulties associated with the Normandy Hedgerow Country. [This message has been edited by Jeff Duquette (edited 10-10-2000).]

BTS: Sounds like a winning idea. I would have to agree with all your assessments. I personally think a direct hit by a artillery round is more than likely going to shake things up in a tank (penetration or not). Tankers had a healthy respect for artillery and would displace if the situation allowed it. I think round dispersion and probability of impact is at the hart of the matter. The concern would be tweaking the game to far in the opposite direction, resulting in players "pooh-poohing" indirect artillery fire (ala Talonsoft's modeling of the effect of indirect artillery fire on tanks in East Front II and West Front…i.e. nil) I am personally more at odds with CM's modeling of light and medium caliber mortar fire and its impact on tanks.

Germanboy: Thanks for the post. By all means interject into Fernando's and My discussion on minutia. I think the subject at hand its interesting to us…perhaps it has less interest to other folks Weinie I have to agree. It doesn't seem right. Mortars seem pretty potent and quite readily take out tanks with top penetrations. I haven't killed a Panther with a 2inch mortar yet, but have succeeded in taking out numerous MKIVH's. Fernando: Again I suspect you are right regarding incidence of Panthers being impacted by lighter caliber HE and surviving unscathed at Kursk. Undoubtedly Guderian's assessment of the top armor was based on actual after action reports. My feeling is that as more combat experience was gained with this vehicle, more than likely it became apparent --- if we are to take other action reports as true regarding tank casualties resultant from HE --- that the Panther could be vulnerable to top hits. So sometimes an HE round hits a Panther and does nothing, sometimes an HE round hits a Panthers and it damages or destroys the tank out right. Or sometimes an impacting round does no physical damage to the machine, but the concussion resultant from the impact\blast kills the crew on the interior. In the latter case the tank isn't necessarily damaged, but it is out of action for the purposes of the immediate battle. Ordnance folk eventually come along and recover the tank, haul it back to their maintenance yard, hose the old crew off the floor and walls of the tanks interior, slaps on some new paint, and prest-o change-o the tank is back in business. Ready for another bright eyed crew.

sorry...double post [This message has been edited by Jeff Duquette (edited 10-10-2000).]

Machineman: Although the Allies first encountered the Tiger in Tunisia and again in Sicily, the numbers present were relatively small. There was never much more than an under strength company of operational “big machines” present in German OoB’s in either of these Campaigns. Allies again encountered very limited numbers of Tigers around Salerno as well. With respect to Panthers in Italy…there was a single battalion present in Northern Italy at the time of the Salerno landing. If memory serves me (and now that senility has set in…my memory probably doesn’t serve me ) but that lone Panther Battalion did not participate in the German Counter attacks against the Allied lodgment at Salerno. Armed with the knowledge of a very limited number of encounters by Allied tanks with German Heavies in 1943, perhaps an individual with a great deal of insight, forethought, initiative, influence, and power that would have been required in overcoming the inertia of industrial retooling, and by passing a well entrenched tactical doctrine, could have taken the bull by the horns and succeeded in putting significant numbers of the M26 in the field by June of 1944 (wow! is that really a sentence?). The differences we’re talking about are the relative numbers of tanks involved and their ability to influence the battlefield beyond token tactical encounters. The Germans were not facing an under-strength company of T34’s here and one or two KV’s there. They were literally facing thousands of T34’s and KV’s between Jun 41 up until the first few Tigers began trickling onto the Eastern Front in the Winter of 42-43. In spite of this overwhelming superiority the Soviets possessed in both tank design and relative numbers, when do we begin seeing the first appearance of the MKIVF2 with its 75mmL48 on the Eastern Front? And even the appearance of the MKIVF2 is really a stopgap measure (ala the Sherman 76mm or Firefly). When the going gets tough, the tough get going…yet we are looking at a design and test time lag of perhaps a year and half to two years before Panthers and Tigers begin to appear on the Eastern Front. Yes you are right regarding the T34 and KV being a strategic level surprise in June and July of 1941. But by August of 1941 the cats were out of the bag and the clock for design and retooling should have started ticking. Many German tank crews and numerous high ranking German officers were well acquainted with the decisive advantage T34’s and KV’s possessed over their own equipment within one to two months of the onset of Barbarrossa. Relative to the Allied experience in Europe and Africa, the cats were still only trickling out of the bag in 1943. Few Allied tank crews and even fewer individuals in places of authority would have had direct experience\knowledge in encounters involving Heavy German Armor in 43. The most common armor engagements in Tunisia, Sicily and Italy would still have been encounters between M10’s\Shermans and MkIII’s\MkIV’s and STUG’s. I think only after several weeks in Normandy did the realization set in regarding how overmatched Shermans\M10’s were by German Panthers and Tigers. The Allies after all, did not have three years of Eastern Front hard knocks to rely upon in honing optimal tank development\design. And although the Commonwealth was certainly battle hardened from numerous years of fighting in the Desert, German equipment trickling into North Africa was not always top notch. The Brits, after all, considered the Stuart and Grant-Lee to be first-rate tanks for fighting the Hun in Africa, and at El Alemain the Sherman was a relative godsend. I think it is perhaps easy for us to come to the conclusion --- given 20/20 hindsight --- that the Americans and British should have somehow anticipated the looming superiority of German tanks in 1943. I also think it is easy to ignore the tremendous amount of time required in not only the design of a tank, but also the time and materials required in design and construction of manufacturing facilities for a new tank. Tack onto to the above the time required to manufacture significant numbers of a new tank. Rex_Bellator: But you have to like the Achilles and Fireflys and their 17 pounder. [This message has been edited by Jeff Duquette (edited 10-09-2000).]