Jeff Duquette

Fernando: At the risk of sounding like a smart-ass (and petty), but are you sure you read through the report in its entirety? The following quote which you have attributed to Guderian was infact written by Oberstleutenant Reinhold attached to the 4th Panzer Armee during Operation Zitadelle. <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>“Hits: The frontal armor is sufficient but not the 40 mm thick side armor wich was cleanly penetrated. This caused very many total writeoffs, since Panther burnt out when the ammunition or fuel ignited. Also, the roof armor is too weak. Armor piercing rounds that hit the lower half of the gun mantlet were deflected and penetrated the roof plate. This resulted in driver and radio operator casualties. Strenghtening the armor is not possible, since the suspension is not adequate for a larger load. The new hatch design caused problems, especially for the driver and radio operator. When hit, the hatch cover jams and can’t be opened. If the Panther was to catch on fire, in many cases the driver and radio operator couldn’t evacuate. In action crews don’t close the hatches and accept the loss of protection so that they can still quickly evacuate if a fire occurs”<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> I am not attempting to imply that a man of Guderian’s character and reputation is a liar. The thought had never crossed my mind. The purpose of my post was to indicate that at the time Guderian prepared the report in question, the Panther was a relative new comer to combat. The knowledge base available to Guderian on the vehicles combat performance was therefore still very limited. During its debut the Panthers performance was border line abysmal due to mechanical problems. I think the tone of Guderian’s memo is set when he states “Comparisons against losses of other Panzer units were not made. Therefore the high command and troops quickly jumped to the conclusion: The Panther is worthless!”

beats me

Nice post Machineman. Just to go a little off topic...the development of WWII American tanks and self-propelled tank destroyers is rather fascinating. Aside from US ARMY Armored Force Doctrine dictating that tanks are not intended to fight tanks, the Sherman and M10 were more than a match for 1941 thorough mid 1943ish German Armour. Coincidently this is the time period in which American tank design, which would see, combat in 1944ish battles in ETO was being finalized. The Panther and Tiger were unprecedented relative to the type of combat being seen in Europe during the formative years of American WWII tanks and Armored Force Doctrine. In addition, development of the Sherman and M10 was not based on the fore knowledge of beasts such as the Panther and Tiger existing. So to imply – as another poster above has done --that American tank design and tank destroyer design was flawed is missing the point. Had the US ARMY gone into Europe in 1943-44 and fought against German tanks it had presumed it would be fighting (i.e. MkIII’s and MkIV’s), the Sherman and M10 would have been more than a match in Tank vs. Tank encounters. In fact the M10 with its 3inch gun would have been somewhat of a god on European battlefields. Ultimately the inadequacy of American tanks in ETO can be blamed on the Soviets . Those commie basterds! If the Germans had not been thrust into a situation in which there primary MBT’s (i.e. MKIII’s) were forced to combat T34’s and KVI’s, there would not have been the urgency on the part of the Germans to develop the likes of the Tiger and Panther. By my reckoning the tank that most impacted WWII tank combat was the T34. The American Army’s experience in having to combat superior tanks in 1944 is analogous to, and really no different from the German experience in Russia from 41 to mid 43 (with the exception that German Army the Americans were facing in 1944 possessed far more tactical savvy and certainly had superior crew training, than what German Army was up against in Soviet Armored forces in 41 –43). [This message has been edited by Jeff Duquette (edited 10-08-2000).]

Regarding the original thesis and its reliance on Guderian’s memorandum of early July 1943 (i.e. detailing the invulnerability of the Panther Top armour to HE), consider the following: The Panther’s performance was less than stellar at Kursk. In addition, actual combat service of the Panther was minimal at the time Guderian’s memorandum was issued. I therefore contend that Guderian is basing his assessment of the Panthers top armour having Herculean resistance to HE as being founded in very limited information available to Guderian at the time his report was prepared. Very few Panthers even made it into combat at Kursk do to engine fires, and other mechanical problems. In addition, A large number were immobilized or destroyed in minefields before reaching “the battlefield”. Therefore his conclusions are based upon very limited numbers of machines seeing combat. I contend that, had Guderian written the memorandum in question after a year of hard-core Panther combat service, his conclusions would have been different in this regard. There are too many documented instances of Panthers being damaged and destroyed by artillery fire to support Guderian’s claim (I wallowed through the remainder of Panzertruppen 2 last night and found several additional references to artillery fire damaging\destroying Panthers). Early on in this same memorandum Guderian states the following: <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>On the evening of 11 July (sic 1943), 38 Panthers were operational, 31 were total write-offs and 131 were in need of repair. A slow increase in combat strength is observable. The large number of losses by hits (81 Panthers up to 10 July) attests to the heavy fighting. The deep, heavily mined, main battlefield of the Russians must result in above average losses of materiel through hits and mines. The fact that the Panther appeared for the first time on the battlefield focused general interest. Comparisons against losses of other Panzer units were not made. Therefore the high command and troops quickly jumped to the conclusion: The Panther is worthless! (Jentz’s Panzertruppen Vol. 2 pg 99)<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> Guderian – during the 1941 through early 1943 period -- was painfully aware of the Whermacht’s short comings in main battle tanks (pre-Tiger and pre-Panther) relative to Soviet T34’s and KVI’s and KVII’s. As evidenced in Guderian’s memorandum of July 43, the dismal performance of the Panther at Kursk resulted in a ground swell arising in the German Army regarding the “Worthlessness of the Panther”. I think Guderian recognized the value of the Panther and its abilities to over-match Soviet tanks -- if the Panther could be brought through its mechanical teething pains. To parry the growing “Panther Lynch Mob” growing during Kursk, Guderian rifles off a memo putting the Panther in a fairly positive light. Regarding Kinetic Energy: Again I have to ask you Fernando: why does muzzle velocity have anything to do with high explosives ability to penetrate armor? Common HE munitions have impact fuses that explode the shell into thousands of little splinters and fragments upon striking something. Kinetic energy does contain a “mass” component in its calculation. If the shells mass is being spread spherically around the impact point the mass being applied by the shell to a tanks turret top approaches zero…therefore KE approaches ZERO. I still contend its blast effect that cracks tanks open when we are talking about HE.

what happened to my favorite thread?

Initial prototypes of the M10 actually did include a canopy or closed topped rounded turret. The lack of a turret top on the M18 should suggest something, since this vehicle was designed from scratch. Certainly expediance in turret size would not have been a consideration in the design of the open toped Hellcat. The following quotes are from: British and American Tanks of WWII, by Peter Chamberlain and Chris Ellis. M10 Wolverine <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>FOLLOWING the successful fitting of a 105mm howitzer on the medium tank chassis, plans were made in April 1942 to mount a high velocity gun on the medium chassis to provide a complementary SP vehicle for the Tank Destroyer Command. Designated T35 this vehicle utilized an early production M4A2 tank chassis, then just available, with an open-topped low-sloped turret adapted from the turret design for the Tl Heavy Tank, and the 3in gun projected for the same vehicle. However, the Tank Destroyer Board asked for a lower silhouette and angled hull superstructure, so an improved design T35EI was drawn up, again on the M4A2 chassis, and incorporating these features. The T35EI was modified with thinner armour than the T35 and the circular turret was subsequently abandoned in favor of a five-sided welded turret. As finalized, the design was standardized in June 1942 and designated M10 GMC. In order to increase production, use of the M4A3 chassis was also authorized and vehicles built on this chassis were designated M10A1 GMC. Most of these were retained in America for training or converted to prime movers, M35. Others were allocated to Lend-Lease shipments to Britain (see below). Grand Blanc Arsenal built 4,993 M10s between September 1942 and December 1943. Ford built 1,038 M10A1 between October 1942 and September 1943, and Grand Blanc built 675 M10A1, September-November 1943. 300 of the latter batch, however, were completed with new turrets as M36 (T71) GMC.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> M36 Jackson <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>IN October 1942 it was decided to investigate the possibility of adapting the 90mm AA gun as a high velocity anti-tank gun for mounting in American tanks and SP vehicles. In early 1943 a trial installation of a 90mm gun was made in the turret of the M10, but the gun proved too long and heavy for the turret which was, in any case, not entirely adequate for the 3in gun. In March 1943, therefore, work began on designing a new large turret to fit the MIO and take the 90mm gun. Tested at APG, the modified vehicle was very satisfactory and an initial "limited procurement" order of 500 vehicles was placed under the designation T71 GMC. In June 1944, the vehicle was standardized as the M36 GMC and entered service in NW Europe in late 1944 where it proved a most successful type able to knock out the heavy German Panther and Tiger tanks at long range. Some tank destroyer battalions notched up impressive scores with little loss to themselves using the M36. A priority programmed to provide more M36 type vehicles to replace the less satisfactory M1O led to the following variants:<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> [This message has been edited by Jeff Duquette (edited 10-08-2000).]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>WO 291/153The effectiveness of PIAT shooting. "User performance with the PIAT is dependent on the accuracy of shooting, the proportion of fuzes detonating on hitting the tank, and the effect of the bomb on various parts of a tank. Trials have been carried out which give information on the first two of these points." 3 serials were fired, one by "average" trained soldiers and 2 by above-average users, one of staff from AORS 6. The results should therefore be regarded as an upper bound on possible performance. The serials were fired using an inert bomb with identical ballistics to the HE/AT round. The target was a Covenanter tank moving at about 10 mph, either crossing at 70 to 110 yards, approaching at 110 to 65 yards, or receding at 35 to 110 yards. Overall percentages of hits were: The percentage of hits "...is noticeably greater with crossing and receding targets, and firers put this down to the 'sense of hurry' that seems to exist when a tank is fast approaching. This appears to be a genuine effect, and not due to chance errors." Percentages of hits on 1st, 2nd and 3rd shots were: "There is no great difference between the percentage of hits with first, second and third shots, although the proportion is slightly greater with the second." Percentages of hits at different ranges were: In the case of receding targets, the range bands are less than and more than 65 yards. "The effect of range on the percentage of hits is not very great; about two thirds as many shots hit above 85 yards as below. It is certainly not possible to obtain a hit with certainty by waiting until the tank is within say 70 yards. The reason for the unexpectedly poor performance at short ranges is presumably the increase in angular movement of the target, combined, perhaps, with the 'sense of hurry' already mentioned." Percentage of hits detonating were: "From these figures it can be seen that about 75% of hits detonate with the DA Fuze 425. No DA Fuzes 426 were available for trial, but it is assumed that a greater proportion of them, perhaps as much as 90%, would detonate." "The average number of rounds in an engagement was 3". It is pointed out that the current ammunition allotment for PIAT is 6 bombs per gun. "It is held by some that the PIAT may not be able to fire as many as three rounds before it is spotted by the tank. This is not proved."<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> The above was derived from: John Salt's anthology of WWII statistical studies. Salt’s primary source is PRO, Kew, mostly from the series WO 291, which are reports and memoranda from operational research (OR) sections during and after WW2. Other useful series are WO 231, military training files, and WO 232, papers from the Directorate of Tactical Investigation

Lack of turret top functioned to increase speed and maneuverability by reduction in vehicle weight. More importantly lack of a turret top significantly increased crew visibility. Stealth and ambush, followed by rapid displacement were in theory the method by which SPTD’s were to engage enemy tanks. Going toe to toe with full blown tanks was not in keeping with TD doctrine. Some top cover expedients were constructed insitu by various ordnance units. Photo and artistic rendering is provided in images below (images from: M10/M36 by Wojciech Gawrych…great pictures, unfortunately for me the text is all in Polish) Some brief notes on the development of the self-propelled tank destroyer. <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR> From: Seek, Strike, and Destroy: US Army Tank Destroyer Doctrine in WWII, by Chritopher Gabel “The execution of tank destroyer doctrine obviously placed a great deal of reliance on the ability of men and equipment to outmaneuver and out-shoot enemy tanks. Early in 1942, when FM 18—5 was being written, most tank destroyer battalions possessed towed antitank guns drawn by standard trucks or half-tracks, even though the favored battalion table of organization called for self-propelled weapons. Bruce (who was promoted to brigadier general on 16 February) decided to adopt self-propelled weapons, even though General McNair continued to favor the towed gun. McNair insisted that the self-propelled gun was too large to be readily concealed, that it would be an unstable firing platform, and that it was less dependable and more expensive than the towed antitank gun." Despite McNair's objections. General Marshall favored experiments with self-propelled mounts. McNair acceded, but he was never really reconciled to the self-propelled weapon. The specifications that Bruce laid down for the ideal tank destroyer weapon were very demanding: simple design, low cost, readily mass-produced, light weight, high mobility, with a three-inch gun to be manned by a crew of five. The efforts of the Tank Destroyer Center to have such a design put into production met with resistance from the Ordnance Department, which pushed its own deigns regardless of Bruce's requirements. A Special Armored Vehicle Board, chaired by Brigadier General W. B. Palmer, attempted to reconcile such disputes. Palmer noted that the representatives from the Tank Destroyer Center were inflexible in their demands, and that they were possibly asking too much in the requirements they put forth. Late in 1942, Bruce obtained approval from the Palmer Board for a tank destroyer design that met his specifications. The new weapon, designed from the ground up to be a tank destroyer, was orginally called the T-42. After a number of modifications, which included upgunning the original design significantly, the T-42 was eventually redesignated the T-70, and when accepted for full production, the Gun Motor Carriage M-18. The M-18 could achieve speeds of over fifty miles an hour and weighed less than twenty tons. It had a ground pressure of only 11.9 pounds per square inch, less than twice that of a man (seven pounds per square inch), which ensured that the M-18 could traverse most of the ground that a foot soldier could." Armed with a powerful 76-mm high-velocity gun, the M-18 was indeed an impressive weapon by 1942 standards. The one drawback to this, the "ideal" tank destroyer, was that it did not enter production until mid-1943." In the meantime, the tank destroyer battalions would have to make do with expedient weapons that could be quickly produced and, although far from ideal, would still allow training in tank destroyer doctrine. The first expedient, the M-3 Gun Motor Carriage, was a standard M-3 armored personnel carrier (the half-track) with a World War l-vintage 75-mm field piece mounted on the bed. Of eighty-six M-3s built in 1941, fifty went to the Philippines for use as self-propelled artillery; the remaining thirty-six were used to equip the 93d Antitank Battalion. The M-3 was standard equipment for tank destroyer battalions through 1942-43. Another expedient, the M-6, was a light three-quarter-ton truck with a 37-mm gun mounted in the rear. Except for a gxm shield, the M-6 had no armor and was intended solely for training parposes. A third expedient, the M-10, is often considered to be the first true tank destroyer (in the sense of the term that denotes a weapons class). The M-10 utilized the chassis of the versatile M-4 medium tank (Sherman), was powered by reliable fcwin-diesel engines, and mounted an obsolete three-inch antiaircraft gun in a folly rotating open-topped turret. General Bruce disliked the expedient weapons, especially the M-10, which he believed was too heavy and slow to execute tank destroyer doctrine. He also feared that a large-scale M-10 production effort would delay the development of the M-18. AGF overruled Bruce's objections in May 1942, ensuring that in 1943 the M-10 would become the principal tank destroyer Weapon."<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

FM 17-15, Tank Platoon, CHAPTER 3 Tank Platoon, Reaction to Indirect Fire Drill <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>When the platoon (sic M1 tank platoon) receives unexpected indirect fire, it moves out of the impact area unless it is also engaged in direct fire contact or is directed to remain stationary. TCs place their hatches in the open protected position; other crewmen close their hatches. Crews also close ballistic doors (M1A2 crews stow the CITV). They mask based on the automatic masking criteria established in the OPORD or if they suspect the use of chemical agents. The platoon leader sends a SPOTREP to the commander. If the platoon is moving when it receives suppressive artillery fire, it executes an action drill to avoid the impact area or continues to move to clear the impact area and continue the mission (see Figure 3-17). If it is stationary, the platoon should attempt to clear the impact area. (NOTE: Several factors, such as the commander's orders or the enemy situation, may prevent the platoon from moving during direct fire engagements or defensive operations. For example, the commander may require the platoon to occupy hide or turret-down positions while continuing the mission. In such a case, the platoon leader must request permission from the commander before clearing the impact area.) Once the platoon clears the artillery impact area, individual crews place their hatches in the appropriate position, open ballistic doors (M1A2 crews turn on the CITV), check antennas, and return to positions or continue the mission. The commander should address the platoon's reaction to anticipated indirect fires in the actions on contact subparagraph of the OPORD. When the platoon receives anticipated indirect fires, it reacts according to the commander's guidance, which it should already have analyzed and rehearsed. If the platoon needs to execute a course of action different from that directed by the commander, the platoon leader should request permission from the commander before executing the alternate action.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

A German opinion on the Sherman <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>The preferences of the crews for lighter, more maneuverable Panzers was recorded in a report written on November 1944 by Albert Speer on his trip to Italy during 19 to 25 October 1944: On the Southwest Front, opinions are in favor of the Sherman tank and its cross-country ability. The Sherman tank climbs mountains that our Panzer crews consider impassable. This is accomplished by the especially powerful engine in the Sherman in comparison to its weight. Also, according to reports from the 26.Panzer-Division, the terrain-crossing ability on level ground (in the Po valley) is completely superior to our Panzers. The Sherman tanks drive freely cross-country, while our Panzers must remain on trails and narrow roads and therefore are very restricted in their ability to fight. All Panzer crews want to receive lighter Panzers, which are more maneuverable, possess increased ability to cross terrain, and guarantee the necessary combat power just with a superior gun. This desire by the troops corresponds with conditions that will develop in the future as a result of the drop in production capacity and of the fact that, because of a shortage of chrome, sufficient armor plate can't be produced to meet the increased production plans. Therefore, either the number of Panzers produced must be reduced or it will be necessary to reduce the thickness of the armor plate. In that case, the troops will unequivocally ask for a reduction of the armor thickness in order to increase the total number of Panzers produced. (Jentz’s Panzer Truppen Vol 2 pg 150-151) <HR></BLOCKQUOTE> Another…Shermans on the Eastern Front: <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>The combat power of the Sherman tanks with Russian crews doesn't appear to be especially high, because the Russian tank crews have very little faith in this tank. Many times, crews abandoned Sherman tanks that were still serviceable after receiving the first hit. This Sherman tank, just like the T34 tank has not evolved to withstand the superior effectiveness of the Pz.Kpfw.lV and Sturmgeschuetz weapons. In general, firefights are conducted at ranges between 1200 and 2200 meters. (Jentz’s Panzer Truppen Vol 2 pg 219) <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Fernando: You recognize of course that I was joking about the 3 to 4 mils of extra armor being some sort of significant difference between the Panther and Churchhill top armour. That is certainly an interesting find on your part regarding BTS using 17mm. Perhaps a difference in apparent hardness or some such thing…or a judgement call on relative armor quality? Did the Germans face harden their turret tops…seems like that would have been a waste of time and money, but I don’t know for sure. My personal opinion regarding the whole matter: I think Fernando is probably partly right. There are no doubt instances of direct hits by sub-100mm HE in which little apparent damage occurred to late war tanks. The Churchhill tale would seem to imply invulnerability of this tank type to direct hits from 25 pounders. It doesn’t seem like much of a stretch to think tanks with similar levels of top protection would be equally invulnerable. Of interest, and something which has not been discussed is the context of Guderian’s report regarding the Panther (and its invulnerability to sub-150mm artillery munitions) His report was written during Kursk, and its entirety should be examined for relative context (I will scan and post the entire report if anyone is remotely interested). On the other hand there are certainly accounts of HE damaging and destroying late war tanks via both near hits and direct hits. Take an hour and skim through Jentz’s Panzer Truppen Vol 2. I found at least 12 accounts in the first half of the book detailing damage or destruction of tanks via indirect artillery fire...and the book isn’t even about tanks vs. artillery. There is at least one account of a Panther being lost as a result of a direct hit from Soviet 152mm HE round. Other artillery damage\kill accounts: <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>“Panzer-Brigade 112 was sent into action on 12/13 September against the American breakthrough southwest of Epinal. During this necessary action, the Brigade lost almost all of its Panthers and half of its Pz.Kpfw.lVs to fighter-bomber attacks, artillery fire, and tanks. The (Panther) Abtellung/Panzer-Regiment 29 was practically destroyed. They still possess four operational Panthers.” (Jentz’s Panzer Truppen Vol 2 pg 197)<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>”3. In spite of their heavy armor, the Tigers are also forced by the enemy's air supremacy, very well directed artillery fire, and 9.2 cm anti-aircraft/tank guns to follow the basic tactical principles that apply to the leichte Panzer-Kompanie: camouflage, terrain exploitation, and hidden firing positions! .” (Jentz’s Panzer Truppen Vol 2 pg 190)”<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> Ron already posted this one: <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>The British analyzed Panzers captured in Normandy from 6 June to 7 August 1944 to determine how they had become casualties. Of 110 Panzers examined, 53 were caused by armor-piercing shot, 8 by hollow charge projectiles, 9 by artillery high explosive shells (sic. that’s less than 10% of the entire sample), 1 by mines, 7 by rocket projectiles from aircraft, 3 by cannon from aircraft, 7 were destroyed by crew, 4 were abandoned and 18 were due to unknown cause. (Jentz’s Panzer Truppen Vol 2 pg 189)”<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>The first loss sustained in action was a Tiger which had one radiator destroyed by an artillery round and had to limp back toward Cori in stages. Twelve Tigers were thus left in action during the night of 23/24 May 1944. (Jentz’s Panzer Truppen Vol 2 pg 148)”<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>During combat on 23 and 24 May 1944, the company lost six Panthers as total write-offs in exchange for destroying a total of 33 enemy tanks. Five Panthers (401,411,414, 415, and 422) burned out due to fire from enemy tanks. After running out of fuel, and already damaged by hits from enemy tank fire, Panther 433 burned out when hit by artillery fire. (Jentz’s Panzer Truppen Vol 2 pg 147)”<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>…we were subjected to well-placed heavy artillery fire. Panzer 725 (sic these are Panthers) was immobilized by hits (right track off), immediately followed by the turret being hit. Panzer 733 fell out almost at the same time due to a hit in the gearbox. (Jentz’s Panzer Truppen Vol 2 pg 142)”<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>…We again received very heavy barrages from enemy artillery along further stretches. A ricocheting round knocked a head-size hole in the belly of the hull and damaged the fuel pump of the Pz-Kpfw.IIIH (L24) being towed. (Jentz’s Panzer Truppen Vol 2 pg 140)”<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>…Battle on the heights: At first, the Panzer-Abteilung was subjected to well-directed artillery fire from Sarje. A Pz.Kpfw.lV of the Stab was hit in the suspension and immobilized. (Jentz’s Panzer Truppen Vol 2 pg 118)”<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>…28 July 1943 Strong artillery fire near Catenanouva. During the night, Panzer-Zug Hoffman and one Fallschirmjaeger-Zug conducted a counterattack. Losses: 1 Pz.Kpfw.lll received a direct hit from artillery fire and was a total write-off. (Jentz’s Panzer Truppen Vol 2 pg 105)”<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> In addition, there are several statistical studies clearly indicating evidence of tanks being damaged\destroyed by indirect HE fire. But the stats aren’t overwhelming by any means. Sample numbers as low as 3.3 % and seem to max out at about 14.5%. I think tanks are tough to kill by HE, but not impossible. Why: a) Because it is difficult for FO’s to hit pin-point targets with indirect artillery fire. There are too many variables that result in slight shifts of shells away from the intended point of impact. Read Ron’s post above. In addition: <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Our own artillery tire has often proven to be a handicap in fighting and destroying enemy tanks. Hardly had a Panzer ranged in on an enemy tank when it would be enveloped by a wide spreading cloud of dust and smoke which was immediately created every time the artillery fired. The enemy tank could pull back over the ridgeline under cover of this cloud of dust and smoke and take up a new position. After Panzers and Panzer-Jaeger open fire against enemy tanks, the artillery starts to fire even though they very seldom can obtain a hit on these small, individual targets. Therefore, artillery batteries must immediately cease firing when Panzers and Panzer-Jaeger start to engage enemy tanks. (Jentz’s Panzer Truppen Vol 2 pg 219)<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>For a while we are right between his tanks on the left and ours coming up on the right. One of his with an 88-mm gun (probably a Tiger) is in a copse near the Caen—Falaise highway firing from a hull-down position. He's so bloody close – only about two hundred yards away - that each time he fires, the muzzle blast bangs our ears together and flattens the grain all around us as the shot screeches overhead and a shower of sparks goes up from one of our tanks up on the hill, which he keeps hitting until it brews up. So I put a battery of mediums (sic 25 pounder howitzers) on him and hammer him for about half an hour. (I may not have knocked him out, but I'll bet I loosened up the bowels of that crew.) George Blacburns: The Guns of Normandy. Blackburn served as an F.O.O. in the 2nd Canadian Division, ETO, 1944. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE> Sometimes even when a direct HE hit is scored, a tank isn’t always damaged by direct hits from HE (especially smaller caliber HE rounds). c)Tanks being shelled will have a tendency to displace if they can. A whole series of commands between FO and FDC would result as artillery attempts to “track” displacing tanks and keep them under fire. From the Panther Battalion of the 116th Panzer Division during fighting in Normandy: <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>“Shortly thereafter, the artillery fire started again. The hits came close to the Panther. Only by continuously changing positions were we able to prevent artillery fire from having any effect” (Jentz’s Panzer Truppen Vol 2 pg 190) <HR></BLOCKQUOTE> Jarmo: Good catch on the "direct" fire in Cav’s reference. I missed that first time around. It certainly is realistic to think that the 105’s were firing HEAT. A similar account (read it somewhere) regarding a battery of 105’s attached to TASK FORCE SMITH (early days of the Korean War). The battery was attacked by NKA T34/85’s. The battery succeded in holding the T34’s at bay (and destroying several) till their HEAT ammo ran out. They switched to HE which apparently had little effect. The battery was subsequently over-run.

Cav Scout: <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Artillery vs. Tanks Lieutenant Colonel F. Q. Goodell, Field Artillery, Observer with VI Corps, Italy: "Direct fire of 105-mm howitzers is credited with stopping the German armored threat on D+4. One battery knocked out five tanks with six individual rounds at a range of two to three hundred yards."<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> Now you’re talking! Did you find this at the USA MHI web site? I was going back through Jentz’s Panzertruppe as well as scouring other sources for historical examples of artillery fire and its effectiveness (or ineffectiveness) against tanks. I will try and post this info tonight or tomorrow. Was the above account from Salerno or Anzio? Regarding player performance, and their tendency to whine when wargames don’t go there way...commonly placing the blame on the historical inaccuracy of the simulation rather than their own poor judgement I am all too familiar with the phenomena. A lot of folks claim infantry is to weak, and Tanks are to strong in Close Combat. I say: “They just don’t understand the game or the simplest of combine arms tactics”. Use historically valid tactics and you would be amazed at how successful you can be in CC. I suspect the same is true of CM. Jarmo: Yes I’m sure it was fear of Artillery. Look at Doyle and Jentz’s: Tiger I, Heavy Tank 1942-1945, Osprey Military, copyright 1993. Pages 12-17 describe various improvements to the Tiger I during its service history. The date of the improvement (March 1944) should indicate something to you with regard to your conjecture on this point. This type of guessing is what I was alluding to earlier about posters and anecdotal information. [This message has been edited by Jeff Duquette (edited 10-06-2000).]

Fernado: Jentz -- in Panzertruppen Vol 2 – has the Churchill MK III rated with a turret roof thickness of 19mm and the MK IV with a roof thickness of 20mm. It was that extra 3 to 4 mil advantage that the Churchill had over the Panther which made them invulnerable to 25 pounders. If only those Panthers had a full 19mm.

Ron: Great web page...a gold mine of WWII statistics. Thanks much for the URL. Scout: Let me try and explain the scientific method. First off a controlled scenario should tell you weather its possible to actually kill a tank with a mortar or artillery barrage. The reasoning behind controlling input parameters (like not letting the tanks move or fire back) is to get away from "gee I had some mortar dude kill tanks a bunch of times, It was pretty cool". What the heck does that really mean. Was the tank moving...what kind of tank was it...are you sure some 75mm PAK didn't kill the tank while you were away gettin' a beer or takin' a leek? I have only been playing the game about 3 weeks and I already killed at least 3 Panthers with limited indirect HE...not all the concentrated hvy HE nonsense folks are talking about doing in these point based scenarios. Some of these kills were moving too. Does that make my game experience more valid than yours? Not really. As far my little experiment's correlation to the real world...or should I say to the real game...if I cant kill or damage tanks under extremely controlled conditions…than I sure as **** can't kill them during a game in which only a numb skull is going to sit in the same spot and let his tanks get hammered by an 8inch howitzer barrage. My little experiment is an attempt to validate weather the game engine will let you kill tanks with indirect fire or not. Since you're a skeptic...give it a try. Actual results during game play may vary. As far as tanks moving out when ever their under HE fire, thus making them pretty much invulnerable...I have already posted some historical cases in which FO's were calling in fire on stationary tanks for relatively long periods of time without even scratchin the tank\tanks. How do these accounts fit into the puzzle? [This message has been edited by Jeff Duquette (edited 10-05-2000).]

Ron (or should I say Paul Vebber and John Waters ): Excellent post! Did you notice weather Paul had indicated a reference to his AFV casualty stats? I have also posted several studies regarding AFV battle damage vs. causation. The statistics I have seen in some cases are actually indicating higher tank damage assessments than what these fellows have dug up, but not by much. The lowest case study I found is the famous 3.3 percent HE damage for the British 21st Army Group in 1945. The high side was an incredible 14.5 percent for the Soviet 1st Tank Army during Kursk. Five other case studies run between 5 to 12 percent tank damage attributable to HE. Someone on a previous posting within this thread had alluded to the relatively high numbers of indirect HE tank casualties which occurred during Normandy or the Bulge. The actual numbers do not seem to support this assessment. Another unfortunate example of folks putting forth unsupported anecdotal information as fact. I think the average reader would be rather flabbergasted as to the actual impact (or lack thereof) of TAC air on Tanks in Normandy as well…but that's for a different thread Paul's assessment of target coverage area of an indirect fire mission relative to area occupied by a tank, is also an excellent exercise in showing how unlikely it is that tanks would actually be hit by the average battery fire mission (except by pure luck). Again this goes directly back to the case of either high-density fire missions being required (i.e. multi-battalion fires using TOT) or tight clusters of vehicles being required to really see damage occurring as a result indirect artillery fire. I would however, like to indicate that - based on review of Jentz's Tiger 1 study - that various improvements were performed on the Tiger 1 to reduce potential damage from HE. These included a thickening of turret top armour from 25mm to 40mm (I think this occurred sometime around March of 44). In addition, thicker driver hatches, and some sort of turret ring protection were provided to limit damage occurring to these areas as a result of indirect HE fire. I think an interesting exercise is to construct a 500 meter by 500 meter CM map in the scenario builder…put 4 MKIVs (or favorite tank of choice) on the map, and an Allied FO\FOO. Put the tanks on ambush so they don't kill the FO…than target the tanks with HE (play the game hotseat so you can control both sides). I think you will be surprised how effective artillery is in this game. One thing I would like to add…although indirect HE in CM my seem pretty brutal to tanks…its impact relative to the destructive power of artillery barrages in Close Combat 3 is like comparing a pop-gun to a nuke (with CC3 being the nuke).

Well after some controlled player made scenarios in which I wanted to see the effect of Indirect Artillery (FO’s and FOO’s) and mortar teams vs. tanks. I came up with the following: The 81mm, 3in, 60mm, and 2inch mortars are very devastating against stationary MkIV’s. Basically pitted one or two teams of each mortar type against 2 MKIV’s. Performed several iterations of one mortar type vs. the MKIV’s. Placed the MkIV’s on ambush so they wouldn’t fire back. Tanks were buttoned-up and stationary (they had to just suck it up). I came to the conclusion that even light caliber mortars will take out MKIV’s on a regular basis, if the tanks sit still, and don’t fire back. I couldn’t tell you if there is a historical precedence for 2inch mortars taking out tanks…I certainly have never read about such a thing happening. My gut feeling is that this would have been a relatively rare occurrence in combat. An odd side effect was that the light mortars will not “hold” their target. Moreover, they would fire one round and than lose there red target line for the remainder of the turn. I had to continually retarget the tanks between successive turns.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Hmm, what's the thickness of abrams top armor? Does anyone know?<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> Jarmo…top thickness is beside the point To elaborate on the point being made; Even today a controversy exists between the ARMY Artillery School and Armor School as to the effectiveness of artillery against tanks. Thickness and armor composite may be different than WWII, but tank killing artillery munitions are considerably different as well. Hmmmm... M712 Copperhead, XM898 SADARM, M741A1 RAAM, M718A1 RAAM, FASCAM. Gorilla: another nice web site. [This message has been edited by Jeff Duquette (edited 10-03-2000).]

Cav Scout: The impression I've gotten from various folk presently serving in armor branches of the army\marines regarding the effectiveness of indirect artillery fire vs armor are about as diverse as the opinions thrown out on this thread. This is an interesting remark from a US ARMY Armor School memo: <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR> "...the Armor School nonconcurred with the Artillery School regarding the suppresive effects of artillery...the M-1 main battle tank cannot be destroyed by artillery..."<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> With respect to Schugger's comments...the original discussion started regarding a "stock" CM scenario (Chamois I think...1st Polish Armor vs. 2nd Panzer). Polish artillery assets consist of a single battery of 25 pounders. I managed to kill a cluster of vehicles consiting of: a Panther, a MkIVh and Halftrack with the 25 pounder battery. Another poster describes the same scenario in which he lost a Panther to this battery of 25 pounders. [This message has been edited by Jeff Duquette (edited 10-03-2000).]

First and foremost, excellent post Grisha. You have obviously done some homework. The Sherman weighed in at approximately 32 tons, and had an approximately 60in diameter turret ring. The Sherman could easily have been upgraded with a larger turret and gun (up to and including a 90mm main gun...remember that the Israelis Army eventually upgraded the Super Sherman to a 105mm main gun). The Armoured branch of the U.S. Army did apparently want an upguned version of the Sherman as early 1942 (chief talk was focused around installation of the 3in AT gun). The eventual plan would evolve toward a 90mm upgunned Sherman, as well as new larger Tanks with 90mm guns (presumably the something along the lines of the M26). However, Army Ground Forces (AGF) wanted the Sherman to function as part of maneuver elements only (breakthrough and exploitation…not tank fighting). Under this doctrine/philosophy tank vs. tank fighting would be left solely to Tank Destroyers and Anti Tank Artillery. AGF had the ultimate authority over the structure, weapons and doctrine of the US Army during WWII. The lack of a heavy tank in the US ARMY arsenal in 1943 and 1944 was a deliberate implementation of Doctrine. Weather the doctrine was flawed or not is not really worth debating. It does however go along way toward explaining the lack of a heavy tank in American arsenal in 43-44. Regarding the obstinacy of high-ranking folks such as Eisenhower digging in their heels on this issue, other than never having seen this implication associated with Eisenhower's name before, he would simply have been implementing official doctrine. Gen. Leslie J. McNair commanded the AGF at that time when inclusion of a heavy tank would still have been realistically possible. McNair was the man behind the Tank Destroyer concept. In order to understand the design and use of American Armour during WWII, you have to understand McNair, his philosophies, and the politics of the US Army General Staff both before and during the early days of WWII. There is an excellent work available at CMHI on the Tank Destroyer: its evolution, doctrine, and proposed employment. Goes along in explaining this whole issue. Just a side note: Ironically McNair was killed at the very onset of Cobra, when some of the Allied Carpet bombing fell short of its intended mark. Regarding someone's suggestion of putting side-by-side accounts with German tankers, great idea...real easy to suggest. A tad bit more difficult to do the legwork associated with such a suggestion. If you are going to cast out arbitrary criticism of someone else's "sweat", how about backing it up with some research of your own.

Yo Gorilla: If your up for it, drop me an email when you get the full blown version. We can do some Play by Email Games. My Address: jeffduquette@hotmail.com

Kinetic Energy: The kinetic energy model the majority of us are familiar with is basically laid out in a form similar to the following: The Kinetic Energy of an object is equal to half its mass multiplied by its velocity squared. Or: K.E. = 1/2MV^2 (excuse my use of the "^" symbol for an exponential…no super script is available for UBB.) Where M is the mass of the shell and V^2 is the decent velocity of the shell at the instant the shell impacts. At the instant of impact, kinetic energy begins to degrade through friction…i.e. in the case of an AP round; the shell expends its kinetic energy in piercing an armored plate of a tank. Pretty basic. High Explosive Rounds The majority of common High Explosive rounds being employed during WWII were designed with an impact fuse. In other words the shell casing bursts into deadly little fragments and splinters upon impacting: the ground, or a wall or a roof, or the deck of a tank, etc. In the case of a High Explosive round impacting the deck of a tank; At the very instance when any penetration of the HE round begins (i.e. penetration in the since of what we would expect to occur during the progress of an AP round through armored plate)...the HE shell casing bursts. The fuse in the shell does its business and the round explodes. Ideally the fragments are spread radially away from the point of impact. Funneling of fragmentation into the point of impact would defeat the effectiveness of High Explosive rounds. Kinetic energy of an HE shell (and therefore the decent velocity of the shell) is lost or more properly radically redirected following the shell burst. In other words there is really no mass to apply the downward velocity to. Back to our original kinetic energy model of ½ MV^2 As M approaches zero, KE also approaches zero. This is loosely analogous to HEAT munitions or other shaped charges. Velocity of impact for a HEAT round has nothing to do with penetrating capability of the munition. Armor Penetration occurs as a result of a very focused explosion. The obvious problem with the HEAT analogy would be (as Fernado has already indicated) the blast from a high explosive round is very unfocused. It spreads out away from the impact point, with the intent of imparting kinetic energy to those deadly little fragments and splinters. But incase there is some confusion on this point, the kinetic energy present in fragmentation has nothing to do with the decent velocity of the HE round prior to burst. The energy imparted to fragmentation is done so via the energy of shell detonation. In addition much of the energy from the blast is dissipated in friction to the areas surrounding the blast. Be that: pushing huge masses of air molecules away from the blast point, shattering structures, or displacing soil and rock mass (and leaving large impact craters in the ground). Even if we assume that tiny shell fragments and casing splinters are contributing to armor penetration...consider the following: The velocity of a pressure blast emanating away from TNT at detonation is occurring at over 6,000 meters per second. The muzzle velocity of an 88mmL56 firing (i.e. a Tigers I's main gun) firing Pzgr. 39 is about 773 meters per second. Now assuming absolutely no frictional loss of the Pzgr 39 as it speeds its way toward its intended victim, pushing aside countless O2 and other gas molecules effortlessly (i.e. ignoring air friction), we are still looking at the velocity squared term in our original Kinetic Energy equation of 60 fold between the Pzgr 39 and shall fragments propelled by a exploding HE round (6,000^2 relative to 773^2). To further magnify the relative unimportance of HE shell impact velocity to armor penetration or tank damage, HE typically is traveling at considerably less velocity than an armored piercing round fired from an 88mm. But again, by design, a HE shell with a properly functioning detonator will break into thousands of pieces at the instant of impact. So I would still contend that a HE shells impact velocity has "no significant" contribution to "penetration" or AFV damage. [This message has been edited by Jeff Duquette (edited 10-02-2000).]

Henri: It’s not particularly incredible. I mentioned this study in my very first posting on this thread (see page 1 of this thread). The critical section of this report can be viewed at: http://www.geocities.com/jeffduquette/tank_casualties.html I have also elaborated on similar statistical studies in this thread conducted by Richard C. Anderson for the Depuy Institute…see my post on page 4. Statistics on Soviet vehicles, 1st Tank Army, Kursk showed slightly over 14 percent tank casualties attributable to HE. With respect to my previous mention of the British study, 21st Army Group, look closely at the dates covered…should reveal something to you regarding the low percentages of Commonwealth tanks suffering damage from HE. I don’t know about a 25% ratio in CM, but from what I have seen the CM stats certainly seem somewhat on the high side relative to real world numbers.

Well I think we can still be friends even if we disagree about artillery vs. tanks. I did read your last message as being sarcastic, I see now I misinterpreted the content. Please except my apologies for being terse. I felt you we’re being overly stubborn\obstinate on this subject. I have played the Chamois Scenario…and low and behold I managed to Knock out a vehicle cluster consisting of a Panther, MKIVh, and a halftrack. Did this all with a Polish 25 pounder barrage. Coincidence? Perhaps. Having played that scenario and seen this effect was what originally brought me into your thread. I agree with your original assessment that artillery is not as potent in the real world relative to how it is being represented in Combat Mission. As you have indicated an exploding artillery round can do a lot of damage to a tank even without penetrating armor. This is seemingly consistent with historical accounts I have read, and I agree with your assesment. However, we seem to disagree on why real world artillery was not as effective as what is portrayed in the game. My feeling is that inaccuracy of indirect fire is the reason we dont see more HE kills. Your argument is that HE is very ineffective against armour. I suspect the real truth lies somewhere in between my extreme and yours.

Your not really reading my posts are you Yield stress is yield stress. It makes no difference weather a steel beam has plate thickness of 2 inches or 2 feet. If the yield stress is 50ksi than its 50ksi. A 50ksi No. 4 rebar has the same yield stress as a 50ksi No. 8 rebar. You seem to be confusing “force” with “stress and pressure”. I will try another tack, but as we are fond of saying in America "You can lead a horse to water, but you can't make him drink" . An Excellent Article on the subject at hand has been written by: Richard C. Anderson, Jr. for T.N. Depuy Journal, and is conveniently entitled: Artillery Effectiveness versus Armor. <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>The TDI search found that an average of 12.8 percent of tank and other armored vehicle losses' were due to artillery fire in seven cases in World War II where the cause of loss could be reliably identified. The highest percent loss due to artillery was found to be 14.8 percent in the case of the Soviet 1st Tank Army at Kursk (Table II), The lowest percent loss due to artillery was found to be 5.9 percent in the case of Dom Butgenbach (Table VIII). The seven cases are split almost evenly between those that show armor losses to a defender and those that show losses to an attacker. The first four cases (Kursk, Normandy I, Normandy II, and the "Pocket” (sic The Falaise Pocket)) are engagements in which the side for which armor losses were recorded was on the defensive. The last three cases (Ardennes, Krinkelt, and Dom Butgenbach) are engagements in which the side for which armor losses were recorded was on the offensive. Four of the seven cases (Normandy I, Normandy II, the "Pocket" and Ardennes) represent data collected by operations research personnel utilizing rigid criteria for the identification of the cause of loss. Specific causes of loss were only given when the primary destructive agent could be clearly identified. The other three cases (Kursk, Krinkelt, and Dom Butgenbach) are based upon combat reports that—of necessity—represent less precise data collection efforts. However, the similarity in results remains stricking. The largest identifiable cause of tank loss found in the data was, predictably, high-velocity armor piercing antitank rounds. AP rounds were found to be the cause of 68.7 percent of all losses. Artillery was second, responsible for 12.8 percent of all losses. Air attack as a cause was third, accounting for 7.4 percent of the total lost. Unknown causes, which included losses due to hits from multiple weapon types as well as unidentified weapons inflicted 6.3% of the losses and ranked fourth. Other causes, which included infantry antitank weapons and mines, were responsible for 4.80% of the losses and ranked fifth.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> Now if we assume that your premise of indirect artillery fire being ineffective against AFV’s is correct, how do you account for the above statistics? [This message has been edited by Jeff Duquette (edited 09-30-2000).]

Sorry, forgot to finish with Bill Mauldin