Jeff Duquette

Thanks John...that's the way I read it too Early Panther Conceptual Design...Image From the most excellent "Achtung Panzer Web Site" URL: http://www.achtungpanzer.com/intro.htm Some definite "I wanna be a T34" influence going on there.

Agree completely John. Unfortunately I always feel the need to bring the discussion back to game terms. How does the advantage in German Optics play out in terms of “To Hit” calculations? What is your feeling on CM’s modeling in this respect? Is the model ok…or does it need tweaking. Maybe you have already expressed your opinion in a previous postings and I missed it in between all of my blabbing How do you read the 17 pounder optics? Regarding Korea…I wonder if perhaps American main gun optics were replaced with more of a Zeiss type optics after the war. Doesn’t seem like it would be too much of a stretch to upgrade tank optics.

Another Shocking experiance with the Villers Boccage Scenario was that at least two Sherman III's start the scenario with no main gun ammo. Presumably these two tanks represent British command tanks who's main guns had been removed to make room for additional radio gear?

once you have used a 21" you wont go back to smaller monitors.

John I know what your saying, and perhaps German Tank crews should be getting a beefed up percent “To Hit” on both first and subsequent rounds fired. But I also think that the Tz9b is a rather subjective form of range finding…very dependent upon crew training and experience (this is where the elite crack (pot) German Tiger gunners come in). A gunner has to be familiar with prospective target sizes and than “guestimate” how much of the 4 mil ranging triangle the target fills to get a “feel” for range to target. In addition he has to do this while remaining “cool” (i.e. putting on a pair of ray-bans sunglasses, a silky jacket that has “Leibstandarte Bowling Team” stenciled on the back, and smoke Camel Cigarettes). Granted it is better than the US method of fire and adjust, but Ziess aint a coincidence or stereoscopic system in which a 2,000meter range can be estimated within +/- one meter. On the other hand WWII anti-tank gun crews are often captured in contemporary photos using Coincidence\Stereoscopic type range finders (or maybe I’m thinking of Flak 88 gun crews). Anyway the point being that these ATG folks have a relatively accurate tool by which to establish range, and from the digging I’ve been doing range estimating, and excitable gunners are the two most contributing factors to “misses” in tank on tank or tank on ATG encounters. In addition it is easy for a gun crew to place their spotter outside the zone of dust and flash from firing (and the plume of smokeless powder ) in order to observe fall of shot or a rounds tracer element. So I guess in my mind the standard to compare to would be the accuracy of anti-tank guns. WWII Tank gunnery had to be less accurate than ATG fire Conall Received the additional optics images for British weapons. Thanks much. Sorry about the "e". Here is another of Conall’s finds: A great scan of a British 17-pounder gunsight. Yahoo is dragging its ass today so the image may load slowly or not at all...try back later if it doesnt load initially.

"on topic"...huh? I thought we were talking about splitting up infantry squads for scouting...and the difference between WWII ARMY doctrine and Present? Sorry there has been so many tangents to this topic I have obviously lost track of what the hell is being discussed. So now we're talking about modern air recon?

RMC: Balowski is really only giving us an insight into idealized squad performance. For squads to realistically be expected to perform in this manner a relatively high percentage of natural fighters – natural soldiers -- within every squad would have to be present; guys willing to lead and act on their own initiative. Individual initiative was hardly a common trait to the mostly green US ARMY going into France in 1944. Balowski’s detailing of a “three team” squad was a bit of a surprise to me as well…but there you have. A precursor to more formalized fire teams. However, from reading Gen. William DePuy one would get the impression that much of the green US Infantry going into ETO in 44 were incapable of functioning at a unit levels any smaller than squads and platoons. <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>From: “Changing An Army”, An Oral History of General William Depuy. INTERVIEWER: Was there anything in particular that you learned about our soldiers, other than what you've already mentioned, in terms of what you could or could not expect of them? GENERAL DEPUY: Well, I certainly came away with a feeling that only a small percentage of the soldiers did almost all of the fighting. If you just left them alone then some 10 percent of the soldiers were the ones who actually took the initiative, moved, fired their rifles, threw hand grenades, and so on. The other 90 percent would defend themselves if they had to, but would not do the other things unless an officer or a sergeant directly ordered them to do it, in which case they usually would do it. I learned that you couldn't depend on them doing things simply because there was a plan to do it, or because of some generalized order to do it, and this included the junior officers. You had to say, "do this," "do that," "now fire there," "now do this," and "now move there." You would always end up with a good sergeant or a good officer and three or four men doing all of the work Unfortunately, the rest of them contributed to the casualties. And, to this very day, I'd rather have a 40-man company than a 220-man company, if I could pick the 40 men. I’d pick sergeants and officers and a few natural fighters if I could. So, what I'm saying is that I came away absolutely impressed with the fact that the average man, like nine out of ten, or eight out of ten, does not have an instinct for the battlefield, doesn't relish it, and will not act independently except under direct orders. If they are in a crew they are better. If they are in a tank or with a machine gun, they are better because there is teamwork involved. If an officer orders them to do something eyeball-to-eyeball, most men, even the ones who don't want to do it, have no initiative, and are scared to death, normally will do exactly what he tells them to do. INTIERVIEWER: During this time did you start to develop the ideas that later became the "eleven men-one mind"' or "follow me and do as I do" concept, or did that come later? GEN DEPUY: "Eleven men-one mind" was the articulation of the overwatch concept. The idea was to provide a conceptual framework for the operation of a squad. Of course the goal was to get more soldiers involved in the fighting and to reduce the necessity of stopping to explain how the two fire teams were to provide "fire and movement." That came after the war, but the impetus came from the generally poor performance of wartime squads. Often a platoon leader would give up on squads and run a whole platoon as one mob or as a bunch of individuals. Of course that was an act of desperation. Once the idea of operating two mutually supporting teams has taken hold then the question of how to control a fire team arises. The answer is that the team leader leads. He is in front and his team follows on each side in a "V" formation. That is where the "follow me and do as I do" came from. By the way, Gideon said the same thing — "Observe me and do likewise."<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> [This message has been edited by Jeff Duquette (edited 11-11-2000).]

Very good Herr Oberst…you win a cookie. Calculate kinetic energy per unit area at impact: Tiger Pzgr39 Diameter = 88mm Panther Pzgr 39/42 Diameter = 75mm Cross sectional area of 88mm round = 6079 mm^2 Cross sectional area of 75mm round = 4415 mm^2 Kinetic Energy per unit area at the point of impact: Tiger Pzgr39 = 2,972,365/6079...or about 501 J/mm^2 Panther Pzgr39/42 = 3,047,398/4415...or about 673 J/mm^2 In other words the Panthers Pzgr39/42 has approximately 35% more kinetic energy per unit area over the Tiger I's Pzgr39. Fun with physics. In addition the 88mm's larger cross-sectional area presents a larger pig to move thorugh the air. As it speeds its way toward its intended victim it has to push a great deal more air out of its way than the more lithe 75mm Pzgr39/42. Increased air resistance...increased friction in the system...decrease in penetrator velocity at a faster rate. My wife always told me thicker was better as well. [This message has been edited by Jeff Duquette (edited 11-11-2000).]

sounds reasonable to me...I searched the net and saw something saying it had a crew of 5...but that may not be an accurate source.

This is kind of an interesting exercise. Calculate the kinetic energy of the respective munitions of the Panther and Tiger I. K.E. = ½ x M x V^2 K.E.= Kinetic Energy of penetrator M= projectile mass in kilograms V^2= muzzle velocity squared Here are the vital stats: Panther 75mmL70 Pzgr 39/42 935 m/s 6.8kg Pzgr 40/42 1,120 m/s 4.75kg Tiger 88mmL56 Pzgr 39 773 m/s 10.2kg Pzgr 40 930 m/s 7.3kg Apparently Pzgr39 was the most commonly available munitions for both AFV’s. Kinetic Energy for the Panther’s 75mmL70: Pzgr 39/42 KE = 2,972,365 Pzgr 40/42 KE = 2,979,200 Kinetic Energy for the Tiger 88mmL56 Pzgr 39 KE = 3,047,398 Pzgr 40 KE = 3,156,885 In both cases the Kinetic Energy of the Tigers 88mm is higher than that of the Panthers 75 lang. Hmmmm…

Speaking of 4 man crews, isn’t the Firefly supposed to have a 5 man crew? I’m playing the Villiers Boccage Scenario of CM and all three of my Fireflys show up with 4 crew members??

heh heh...I was the "auto loader" in my 4 man crew. M60A1's and M48A5's. A thankless job being an "auto-loader"...but somebody had to do it I think the crew position you are searching for is the assistant driver. Most 5-man crews had an extra fellow in the hull that would operate the hull MG. Many modern MBT's have eliminated the hull MG and thus removed the necessity of the assistant driver position.

I know this is sacrilege to utter these words John…but I don’t own Jentz’s work on the Panther. Anyway here are two of the Tz9 versions. Tz9b Tz9b/1 Blow up of the "triangles" the big one is 4 x 4 mils...the little uns' are 2 x 2 mils. If I read Mike McConnels right up correctly a target that fills up the big triangle at 1000meters is approximately 4 meters in height. An image from PE showing Ziess sight "This sight picture is from a M38A2 telescope. The M38A2 was used with both the M3 (75mm) and the M1 (76mm) guns. The cross at the top of the range tree is for targets under 500 yards away. The 8, 16, 24, 36, and 42 marks on the range tree indicates the needed elevation to hit targets at 800, 1600, 2400, 3600, and 4200 yards, respectively." (from Mike McConell)

At the risk of diverging from the present thread course and diving back into the discussion at hand, I thought this was kind of interesting. I’m sure it will be misinterpreted as I think the intent of Scout’s tactical guide was aimed at a reinforced rifle company deliberate attack on a know enemy position, and the following is really talking about squad tactical doctrine…but what the hell. From: Joseph Balkoski’s “Beyond the Beachead, The 29th Infantry Division in Normandy” <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>The US Army's solution was "fire superiority." The manual stated that "Fire superiority is gained by subjecting the enemy to fire of such accuracy and intensity that his fire becomes so inaccurate or so reduced in volume as to be ineffective." Then the troops could rush forward to dispatch the enemy with grenades and bayonets. "Fire and maneuver" was what the tacticians called this procedure. An American squad…was trained to overcome an enemy position by breaking into separate parts. According to the manuals (Presumably “The manuals” refers to the 1940’s versions: FM 7-8 & FM 7-10) two riflemen designated as scouts, and known as "Team Able," would locate the enemy position. Then the squad leader would direct his BAR man and three other riflemen, together designated "Team Baker," to lay down fire on the target. The five remaining riflemen and the squad leader himself—"Team Charlie"—assaulted the enemy position. The concentrated, rapid fire of the BAR and M1s was deemed sufficient to maintain fire superiority. If a squad ran into a strong enemy position, it could maintain fire superiority by calling upon neighboring squads for help.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I got these from Thomas R. aka “Conell” with the accompanying note: <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>“Here are the scans of the 75mm & 76mm WWII US gunsights that I promised. As I have no idea how to post an image on the message board I'll leave it to one of you guys. Great discussion thread by the way, I've really enjoyed reading it.”<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> Great stuff Conell. Thanks for your digging. What by the way is your source?

It's almost as fun discussing a game as it is playing it. The game (and it's a good one) is merely a means of bringing a bunch of folks with similar interests into a forum to yak about WWII. I like to bitch with the best of um…but ultimately my only desire for change at this point is having TCP capability. And hay BTS is working on it and keeping its fans (clients) well informed as to the status of TCP. What more can you ask for? Well CM2…I could ask for that. OK two things…the ambush reticule showing up to your opponent in pbem play.

Interesting...so the ARMY went back to employing black powder in the 40's?

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>That's pretty hillarious Jeff since it is the Russian Military Zone that actually chronicles these weaknesses better than any other site. Maybe it's your bubble that's getting busted. I don't suppose you've actually ever gone there? <HR></BLOCKQUOTE> huh? I think if you read my previous posts I have been quoting the RMZ for T34 weaknesses. A little equal time toward the strengths of the T34 are perhaps in order at this point. [This message has been edited by Jeff Duquette (edited 11-09-2000).]

Greg: Well for being such a worthless piece of S*%#, the T34 sure managed to scare the bah-jezus out of the Germans. Enough to prompt them into cranking out the Tiger I and Panther. Early designs iterations of both MkVI and MkV -- at least there outward appearance -- was certainly heavily influenced by the T34-76's design. It's the cult of the Panzer at work here. Perhaps if we carry on with this discussion long enough we can eventually come to a state where we remove our rose colored glasses. We are so inundated with information on the Tiger and Panther the vehicles begin to take on mythical status. You can hardly get onto the internet without finding some web site on "I Love the Tiger Tank". Try to find a decent web site on the Sherman Tank Thank goodness for "The Russian Military Zone" which - IMO -gives us a relatively unbiased look at Soviet Military Equipment in WWII. Now hurry up and send me the pbem move you owe and quite wastin time here [This message has been edited by Jeff Duquette (edited 11-09-2000).]

The United States Army had been employing a smokeless cartridge since the adoption of the United States Rifle, Caliber .30, M1892 (Krag-Jorgenson or ".30-40 Krag") in 1892. Most other major European Armies had also adapted smokeless powder rifles and artillery in the late 1880's and early 1890's (1888 the British army adopted the 0.303 caliber Lee-Metford… The Italian Army adopted the Mannlicher-Carcano, the first Italian smokeless powder rifle). Smokeless gunpowder gave weapons designers of the late Nineteenth century the ability to create more powerful rifles which didn't require as much maintenance or care as the previous generation of rifles using black powder to propel a projectile. It also allowed the diameter of both the bullet and the cartridge case to be reduced and the muzzle velocity of the round to be increased. This change would allow more rounds to be carried by an infantryman, giving him greater level of firepower to throw against the enemy. The United States Rifle, Caliber .30, Model 1903 (Springfield .03) as well as the United States Rifle Caliber .30 M1 (Garand)also employed cordite propellents. Smokeless Artillery muntions were also being employed the US ARMY since the turn of the century. <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR> From: Revolutionary War in the Ilocos (Philippine Insurrection during in 1900) URL: http://www.bibingka.com/phg/ilocos/ On Jan. 14, 1900, the only artillery duel of the war was fought in Mount Bimmuaya, a summit 1,000 meters above the Cabugao River northeast of Lapog (now San Juan, Ilocos Sur). It is a place with an unobstructed view of the coastal plain from Vigan to Laoag. The American won mainly because their locations were concealed by their use of smokeless gunpowder so that Filipino aim was wide off the mark. Many believe that Tinio, Reyes, and Celedonio were present at this encounter but got away unscathed.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> [This message has been edited by Jeff Duquette (edited 11-09-2000).]

Excellent work Mr. Justice! Now how about a treatise employing a tank heavy company task force So presumably you feel there is some value to employing a game like CM as a training tool?

Great! Thanks for the info guys.

Are there any available? If so where?

Very well done. Thanks. Has any one done hi-resolution Cromwell and Churchill?

Doug: I think your forgetting that the majority of Soviet AFV's didnt have radios in WWII.