Jeff Duquette

John: Speaking of optics I just found a snippet on the US ARMY indicating tank mounted stereoscopic range finders were widely adapted in the early 1950’s. Apparently a fairly rigid training routine was required for stereoscopes relative to coincidence type range finders. In addition, not all folks are capable of seeing in stereo (or so the report goes). Ratio was apparently about 70% of personal trained had acute enough stereoscopic vision to use these rangefinders. I reckon this adaptation of actual range finders probably accounts for the FM 100-5 quote: To Obtain 50-50 Probability Of Hit On Standing Tank At 1500 Meters: World War II Medium Tank - Had to fire 13 Rounds. Korean War Medium Tank - Had to fire 3 rounds. Mid-'70's Medium Tank - Needs to fire 1 Round. I found a couple more WWII German 3,000 meters engagement tales Seems like its not so much an outlier range as much it’s a standard deviation or two from the mean.

I thought this was kind of interesting. I have seen all the mechanical facts and figures so what do you suppose prompted the US ARMY's comments on slow turret traverse for the Panther? Of additional interest is the lack of TC turret override control. This had to have been a severe speed disadvantage when initially trying to acquire targets. From: Michael Green's, "Weapons of Patton's Armies" http://historicalgaming.freeservers.com/home.html Anyone have access to the full version of this report. Anyone have access to the full version of the 1947 French Report that keeps getting bated about...perhaps there is some context regarding target acquisition? [This message has been edited by Jeff Duquette (edited 11-29-2000).]

Machineman: Regarding the TZR1 (or perhaps TSR1 as it is refered to by Jentz) I have found reference to it in at least two sources. The significant info is below. It is interesting that it is not mentioned specifically in the “German Army Handbook”, but than the Sf14Z periscope is not mentioned in the handbook either. I think perhaps there is a difference between the TZR1 and the Sf14Z employed in STUGs…but I am not certain. The Sf14Z (ala our favorite STUG Commander photo) is a coincidence type range finder. Turn a base knob until the two images in each side of the scissors scopes overlap (or are coincident with each other). Using some simple trig relationships (i.e. distance between scope mirrors and angle at which coincidence occurs…with these as “knowns” the distance to image can be determined…sin(theta) = y/R). Of course this is simplified for a TC who would basically read the range off the focus knob once image coincidence is achieved in his scope. The TZR1 however may simply be a spotting periscope...but again there is some discrepancy on this point between sources. There is some implication that the scope ID for the TZR1 is perhaps a US ARMY Designation (see first quote from M. Green). I suppose that could potentially throw a monkey wrench into the works. TZR1 is not mentioned at all in Jentz’s “Tiger I&II Combat Tactics”…odd considering his usual attention to detail and his long description of the TZf9b. Yet Jentz mentions a TSR1 spotting periscope in “Panther Variants”. At the very least I suspect the TZR1 or TSR1 had reticule lines for range estimation via a mil scale (i.e. similar to the way a tiger gunner would estimate ranges with his TZf9b). <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR> From: Micheal Green’s “Tiger Tanks” MBI Publishing Co. Coincidence-type rangefinders work very well under conditions of clear visibility or when used on sharply defined objects. It is also relatively easy to train competent operators. Only a couple hours of instruction are usually required. On the minus side, they are ineffective at longer ranges or on targets having indistinct outlines. In wartime US Army documents, the German optical rangefinder device used by Tiger tank commanders is referred to as the TZR1. It was listed as having an overall length of fifty-five inches and a field of view of six degrees according to tests conducted by the First US Army and others in the United States. The TZR1 was typically used for observation by a German tank commander to see over the flash or muzzle obscuration (dust) from the firing of his tank's main gun. In many cases this would temporarily hide a tank gunner's view of a target. According to a US Army report: "When in use, the periscope is mounted on a bracket attached beneath the base of the cupola, so that it enables the tank commander) with his head below the top of the cupola, to see from a point approximately 39 in. above the cupola machine gun mounting ring. When not in use, it is stowed on the near side of the turret. The mounting bracket is adjustable and allows the periscope to be tilted approximately 5 degrees to either side of the vertical. Two clamping handles are provided for locking the periscope in position after adjustment." Early production Tiger I tanks with the drum pattern cupola did not have the bracket for mounting the TZR1. Instead, the crew used a hand-held optical rangefinder similar to those used by the crews of Flak guns.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR> From: Jentz, “Panther Variants 1942-1945” Osprey. Panzerbeobachtungswagen Panther Rheinmetall was assigned detailed design development of a turret for a Panzerbeobachtungswagen Panther (armoured artillery observation vehicle using a Panther chassis). Several variations were considered, including an altered Panther turret with a 5 cm Kw.K-39/1 gun and a coaxial machine gun in a Topfblende (pot mantlet) mounted in the centre of a flat plate covering the front of the turret. This version was identified as Entwurf 3 (third proposal) for an Artillerie-Panzer-Beobachtungswagen Fahrgestell Panther in drawings H-SkB 79557 dated 10/11 November 1942. The design already incorporated a built-in range finder, the TBF2 observation periscope mounted in the turret roof to the right of the commander's cupola, and a TSR1 spotting periscope mounted in the turret roof by the gunner. The commander's cupola shown in the drawing was an interim design with seven periscopes protected by cylindrical armour rings… The instruments in the Panzerbeobachtungswagen were designed to measure the initial range as well as switches and corrections based on observation of fall of shot for transmission to the ardllery. It was equipped with an EM 1.25 m (1.25 metre base) range finder, a TBF2 observation periscope (with a spare), a TSR1 spotting periscope (with a spare), an SF14Z scissors periscope, and a KZF2 telescopic gun sight (with a spare)… The TBF2 observation periscope was mounted in the center of the turret in a ball mounting in the roof plate. Counterbalanced by an elaborate rig of pulleys and counterweight, it could be raised and lowered through 37 centimetres, traversed through 360 degrees and tilled through 10 degrees. When it was in the lowered position, the opening in the roof above the periscope could be closed by a hinged cover plate. The TSR1 spotting periscope or the SF14Z scissors periscope was mounted on an adjustable bracket inside at the base of the commander's cupola…<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Thats the same stug commander picture I posted 3 or 4 pages ago

Conall: Regarding your previous post on comparisons between German, British and American tank gunsights: I came across the following information in “Tank Combat in North Africa”. Why do you reckon the Brits reduced the field of view in gunsights for the 6-pdr and 17-pdr relative to sights employed for the 2-pdr? Cruiser Tank Mark I Gunner had a No. 24 sighting telescope (1.9 x magnification and a 21 degree field of view) adjustable in 100-yard increments to a range of 1800 yards for the 2-pdr and 1500 yards for the machineguns. Mark IIA Infantry Tank (Matilda) Gunner had a No. 30 sighting telescope (1.9 x magnification and a 21 degree field of view) adjustable in 100-yard increments to a range of 1800 yards.

The Story of Cockoo More anecdotes. An example of British tankers impression of Panther optics…apparently based upon British combat testing of "Cuckoo". From: Mr. Churchill’s Tank, The British Infantry Tank Mark IV, By David Fletcher (Curator of the British Tank Museum at Bovington) <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>It was while they were in Overloon that the Coldstreams acquired their Panther tank. It was found, abandoned in a barn, nicknamed Cuckoo and taken into service. The crew appointed to the German tank clearly liked it but if one feature appealed to them more than any other it was the superb quality of the sights. Germany had always been noted as a source for high quality optics such as binocular and camera lens but it is clear that high standards were maintained right through to the end of the war. British manufacturers, by comparison, never seem to have achieved these standards at any time during the conflict.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Machineman: In the words of Homer Simpson "DOH"! This thing has been sitting on my bookshelf for many moons. I pulled it down the other day to look at some references, and low and behold. A German Panther TC in copula with the elusive TZR1. hmmm…

I received this relatively detailed cut away of the Tiger Ie from Machineman. I’m not sure what the original source was. This is the copula area clearly identifying mounting brackets for both the TC’s range finder and scissors observation periscope (TS1R). The entire image is quite large so I have not posted it here due to the chore of lateral scrolling across the remainder of the thread it would create. I posted the entire cut-away at: http://www.geocities.com/tigervib_2000/Crap/tiger_cut.jpg It’s a large image so give it a few seconds to load.

Another fine 17-pdr gunsight image courtesy of Conall. Apparently an armour exhibition of some sort. I reduced the original to 1/2 do to thread format. "GUNNER SABOT...MAN ON BIKE...12 O'CLOCK...100" "IDENTIFIED" "UP" "FIRE" "ON THE WAY" KA-BOOM "CEASE FIRE" click on the URL if you wish to see the full size version: http://www.geocities.com/tigervib_2000/Crap/17pdr.jpg [This message has been edited by Jeff Duquette (edited 11-22-2000).]

Sarcasm without a smiley...what is this forum coming too? Have fun on your Thanks Giving Vaca. I'm headed out of town myself…in laws

Conall: I am presently still at the gulag (work). If you emailed me an image to post I will do so when I get home.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Just want to make sure that you understand that it is irrelevant that the vehicle in question is Waffen SS. Elite is Elite, no matter what the branch of service is. The SS get no special übermensch bonus.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> You must be kidding? This is surely an oversight by BTS. Will there be a patch addressing this problem? <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Same as what you see here, plus math and physics (which is over my head, but not Charles').<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> I guess I missed any specific references that you may have mentioned other than a brief mention of D. Glantz. Glantz from my readings, tends to focus on operational and strategic level studies of the Russian Front. Surely there are several accuracy studies or books you relied on heavily for the foundation of the tank gunnery model employed in CM. How did you go about deriving hit to miss ratios, target acquisition functions and effects of bracketing? Surely whatever secret war time studies you relied on are public domain by now. Come-on Steve give us the straight poop…enquiring minds want to know. Regarding firing HE rounds in a direct fire mode from a tank…I think you missed my point. And at the risk of belaboring this there is no difference in engaging a target with direct fire…be the round: sabot, HE, or HEAT rounds. You determine range, you lay your gun on the center of mass of the target and you fire. The only difference is an adjustment in super-elevation to account for different trajectories of the different munitions. [This message has been edited by Jeff Duquette (edited 11-22-2000).]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>unless I miss my guess, the TC isn't supposed to be fixating on individual targets, acting as shot-tracker. He should be looking for next targets, fighting the tank, interfacing with his superiors, etc.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> The TC and gunner, as well as any other pair of eyes within a crew with access to a periscope or vision block should be intent on their vehicles fall of shot. Watching for either the tracer element or splash from impact. The whole concept of bracketing ones target is lost if you are not watching your fall of shot. Dust and flash generated during firing may obscure one individuals LOS on fall of shot but not necessarily another's. That is why multiple pairs of eyes need to be intent on this task. It is especially critical that the TC is observing fall of shot, as the gunner's field of vision is restricted. A Tank Comander should be nose defilade in his cupola with binos in hand maintaining situational awareness, watching the effect of his fire, and providing his gunner with range adjustment cues as required. If buttoned he should have his eyes glued to his periscope or range finder and adjusting his vehicles fire as required.

machineman: No I have not received your email with photo. Try sending it to: jeffduquette@home.com

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Firing HE at soft targets is a whole 'nother ballgame<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> Aside from an adjustment in super-elevation I am curious as to what you think is different from firing HE in a direct fire mode from a tank as oposed to firing AP? From where I sit there is no difference. The reference talks of a direct hit @ 4 klicks.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>And this is why I picked on that 3000m in one shot quote. This is the FIRST time I have ever read such a thing. Perhaps it happened once, that I don't doubt.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> I can dig up some statistically outlying Bobby Wohl 3,000 meter plus hits if you would like. 3000 meter hits are impossible in CM even with “bracketing”. This is a function of some flaw in the games LOS calcs. It is impossible for a tank to even spot another tank -- under absolutely ideal game visibility conditions -- at this range. Even 2500 meters is stretching the LOS abilities in Tank on Tank engagements. But don’t take my word for it. I would encourage anyone reading my post to test this for themselves. Put an Elite SS Tiger Ie on an embankment say 10 meters above all surrounding terrain. Make the rest of the map dead flat and featureless. Grab some Sextons (big silhouette vehicle…plus Sextons have no Smoke rounds) put the objective flag right next to the Tiger. Place the Sextons at 3,000 meters range from the Tiger. Start the game. You find that the unbuttoned Tiger will not spot moving Sextons in open flat terrain till they are within 2200 to 2300 meters. Once the shooting starts you will find that the Tiger will periodically lose sight of the Sextons (typically when it is hit or near miss HE detonation occurs and the TC buttons up). This will result in a condition in which the Sextons are hammering on the Tiger…yet the Tiger cannot spot the Sextons. You will also find that hit to miss ratio for the elite SS Tiger Crews will be in the range of 1 in 10 to 1 in 20 rounds fired per hit at approximately 2300 meters. This isn’t 1 in 2…this isn’t even 1 in 4. I am still curious as to what some of your references for WWII tank gunnery are?

Kurt Knipsel "cool gunner" <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Panzer Aces II by Kurowskipg 207 Once he and his tank were sitting in a ditch when someone called out: "Tanks from the left!" About 3000 meters away two tanks had rolled out of a wood. They were Churchill III’s. The armor on the front of these tanks was 100 mm thick. Before anyone else could react, Knispel opened fire and after the second shot the first Churchill went up in flames. During this engagement, which lasted only a few seconds, the second tank was able to drive back in the forest.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Panzer Aces II by Kurowskipg 220 At the end of October the battalion assembled in Cegled. Beginning on I November it- saw action between Cegled and KeKskemet. The fighting on this day saw the first appearance of the new Josef Stalin tank armed with a 122-mm gun; tnese, too, were destroyed by the King Tigers. During the days and weeks that followed Fw. Knispel scored further successes against Russian tanks. In some cases his kills were made from maximum range, up to 3000 meters. His kill list grew longer and longer and everyone agreed that Knispel would soon reach the offically-recognized figure of 200 enemy tanks destroyed.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Panzer Aces II by Kurowskipg 198 Knipsel on the Tiger I The penetrative power of the new gun and its fantastic aiming system caused the crews to have high expectations. The results of live firing trials convinced them that they had in their hands a weapon which was superior to any tank they knew of. The crews had to learn and practice new tactics. The first was engaging enemy tanks from long range. Then there was the fast dash from benind the front and the subsequent attack. The crews practiced attacks over and over again. It was the role of the Tigers driving on both flanks of an armored wedge formation to make quick firing halts and engage the enemy from distances of 2000 meters and more, inflicting the initial losses on him, thus diverting his attention from the center of the attack and giving the main attacking wedge the opportunity to halt and fire en masse.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

machineman...its in the mail for me. I think its like 30 bucks. some more anecdotes <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR> Jentz: Tiger I & II Combat Tactics Pg. 69 On 15 March 1943, schwere Panzer-Abteilung 503 reported on their experience in tank-versus-tank combat as follows: The Abteilung has experience with the 7.5 cm kurz Granat-patrone 38 HL (hollow charge) and the 8.8 cm Panzergranate (APCBC/HE). Using the 7.5 cm Gr.38 HL and limiting expenditure to only a few rounds, successes against enemy tanks could be achieved only at ranges up to 1000 meters. At longer ranges, succe"" could be achieved only through a large expenditure of ammunition. Because of the short gun tube, during attempts to hit point targets the atmospheric influences strongly affected the flight path. Using the 8.8 cm Panzergranate, successes against enemy tanks were achieved at short as well as long ranges. The most favorable range is 1200 to 2000 meters. At ranges up to 2000 meters, a direct hit is reckoned on with the first or at the latest by the second shot. Additionally, small errors in range estimates at these ranges are almost insignificant. However, with good visibility success is even possible at ranges over 3000 meters. As an example, at ranges from 2500 to 3000 meters, one Pz.Kpfw. VI fired 18 rounds to destroy five T-34 tanks (of which three were moving across its front).<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR> Jentz: Tiger I & II Combat Tactics Pg 77 Armament 8.8 cm Kw.K. gun proved to be a depend-able and effective weapon. No problems or breakdowns occurred in the electrical firing circuit. Sprenggranaten were fired at a moving artillery column at a range of 5000 meters. A direct hit was achieved with the third round. Horses and men immediately lay in the snow.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR> Jentz: Tiger I & II Combat Tactics Pg 89 Dissatisfied with how the Tigers had been tactically employed by the units to which they were attached, General der Panzertruppe Breith, commander of the III.Panzer-Korps, issued the following directive on 21 July 1943: Based on experience in the recent battles, I issue the following instructions for the cooperation of Tigers with other weapons: 1. As a result of its high performance weapon and strong armor, the Tiger should be used primarily against enemy tanks and anti-tank weapons and secondarily - and then only as a complete exception - against infantry targets. As experience has shown, its weapons allow the Tiger to fight enemy tanks at ranges of 2000 meters and longer, which has especially worked on the morale of the opponent. As a result of the strong armor, it is possible to close to short range with the enemy tanks without being seriously damaged from hits. Still, the Tiger should attempt to start engaging enemy tanks at ranges over 1000 meters.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Part of my point was that 1 tale does not a correlation make. 10 tales however may be significant. If you can see it you can hit it...if you can hit it you can kill it (unless of course its the glacis of a Tiger II). Postulate: If you cant see it you cant it hit it. Boys will be boys and play with toys. I suspect every GI who had the chance crawled around the interiors of German tanks and tried out all the "gee-wizz" new gizmos. Belton Copper in "Death Traps" relays a tale of finding several Panzerfaust 100's and testing them out on a Tiger II's frontal armour. A panzerfaust 100 will apparently punch a hole through the front of a Tiger II. Unless of course Cooper was fabricating the whole tale.

sorry double post [This message has been edited by Jeff Duquette (edited 11-21-2000).]

From: Michael Green’s “Tiger Tanks” <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR> Gun Optics One of the major contributing factors leading to the successful use of the 88 as an antitank weapon during World War II was the gun's outstanding optics (sights). The effective use of any gun in the direct-fire mode depends on the weapon's crew being able to spot a target, engage it, and then destroy it in the shortest amount of time possible. Because the German optics industry was the best in the world prior to World War II, German weapons had the ability to see and engage opponents at ranges far in excess of what their Allied counterparts were capable of. Herr Franz Kurtz, a veteran of the Eastern Front, trained for two month's on the 8.8cm Flak. He vividly recalls looking through the 88's sight's and in his own words: "You could clearly see a blade of grass over a mile away with the sights on this weapon." Almost always outnumbered, German tankers exploited the advantage of the Tiger's long-range firepower to reduce the number of enemy tanks getting too close. A good example of this approach is described in a wartime report by Captain Charles L. Davis where he recounts details of an attack on German positions in North Africa by units of the 1st AD in late April 1943: "As the platoon moved back up the ridge to cover the left flank, the Germans responded with high explosives and armor piercing shells. A look through the glasses showed at least one Mark VI tank firing at approximately 3,000 yards (maximum range for the American tank direct fire because of inadequate sights). One round landed about three quarters of the distance to the enemy target. The Platoon Leader put his trust in mobility. He kept moving, issuing similar instructions to his platoon. The Company Commander urged the Platoon Leader, via radio) to move higher on the hill. The Platoon Leader asked who was going to take care of the Mark VI on the right flank. "What Mark VI?" asked the CO. A moment later the Platoon Leader and his crew were hitchhiking. A near miss had struck near the right rear of the tank, breaking rhe track and immobilizing the vehicle. Recognizing the futility of using the 75mm gun to compete with high velocity weapons equipped with superior fire control instruments in that situation, the Platoon Leader ordered the crew to abandon the tank."<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> More From the Eisenhower Report: Major General I.D. White, “A Report on the United States vs German Equipment, T83-3-5. <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Lt. Col. Wilson M. Hawkins (US Army), commanding the 3rd Batallion, 67th Armored Regiment wrote in a wartime report about his opinion of German tank sights: "The matter of tank gun sights has caused us much concern. I have looked through and worked with sights in German Mark V (Panther) and Mark VI (Tiger) tanks as well as our own. I find that the German sight has more magnifying power and clearness than our own, which is a big advantage to a gunner." ---------------------------- Sgt. Lewis A. Taylor (US Army), of the 2nd Armored Division, stated in a wartime report: "The German telescopic sights mounted in their tanks are far superior to ours, in particular it is more powerful. In fact all their optical equipment is superior to ours." ----------------------- Sgt. George A. Barden (US Army), also of the 2nd Armored Division,, confirms this fact in a wartime report: "I took from a German officer a pair of field glasses 10x50, the best glasses that I've ever seen. On two occasions, I was able to pick up an antitank position and a mortar position at a range of about one mile, when these same two targets could not be seen using a pair of G.I. glasses, 7x50."<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> From: Seek, Strike, and Destroy, U.S. Army Tank Destroyer Doctrine in WWII. <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>A World War II US Army report dated March 1943 and titled Training Notes from Recent Fighting in Tunisia comes this description of German tank tactics from an American tank officer: "When the German tanks come out, they stay out of range and sit and watch. Then they move a little, stop, and watch some more. They have excellent glasses [binoculars] and they use them carefully."<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Steve: At the heart of the thread should be the search for truth. Lay the cards out and lets have a look. Personally I’m less interested in whether I’m right or wrong as much as I’m interested in gathering information. And again this goes beyond my interest in CM. Wargames will come and wargames will go. I was around when James Dunigan first started crankin out S&T Magazine. <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR> quote: Greater mobility. This is directly contrary to the popular opinion that the heavy tank is slow and cumbersome. Overall, this is not supported by the facts. Or is it? Certain Sherman models were NOT good in snow, but others were better. So it depends on WHICH US model tank you are talking about vs which German one. But overall, the US equipment was far better in adverse conditions because it was less likely to break down, or if broken down fixed in a timely manner. An example of contradiction is seen in this post as well. Reread the above quote and then read this one: quote: Although we cannot turn on a dime, we are satisfied with our maneuverability which is as good or slightly superior. OK, which is it? One says mobility is inferior to the Germans and the other says is possibly superior. It can't be both, can it? Sure it can. If the first tanker was in an earlier model Sherman, with narrow tracks, and the second vet was in a later model with HVSS and wide tracks both could be correct. But do we know these critical facts? Nope. And when I see something like this next quote, I just write it off to "urban legends" (i.e. his buddy's buddy's buddy told him a story once that was heard from some other guy in another outfit). It is amazing how often these things are repeated as fact when they have little to no basis in truth, or at best were not representative of the general trend.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> I think the intent of these quotes was to bring to light the Panther and Tiger’s superior flotation characteristics relative to Sherman’s equipped with narrow tracks. This superior flotation characteristic is in spite of both of these German vehicles having huge weight differentials over the Sherman. In addition the Sherman did not have a neutral steer capability. Panthers and Tigers could lock one track and turn in place…thus the “ability to turn on a dime” comments. <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR> Heck, Jeff... how easy was this to do in your tank on a firing range with all the post war improvements?<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> This would simply be another “incomplete, vague, or even contradictory first hand report” sorry I couldn’t resist. <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>First of all, how many King Tigers do you suppose this guy's unit ran up against? Statistically the chances are NONE. Regardless, I think it is clear from this thread that King Tigers did not REGULLARLY hit targets at 3000m on their first shot. Heck, Jeff... how easy was this to do in your tank on a firing range with all the post war improvements?<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> When I see one vet account relaying a tale of what seems to be a fantastic tale…I chalk it up to folk lore. When I see two vets telling similar tales…hmmm…still kind of vague. But when 10 men tell me I’m drunk, well I figure maybe I should get someone to drive me home. A 2000 meter shot should not be unrealistic proposition. Considering the CM gunnery model testing I have conducted under idealistic conditions...2000 meter shots are very low probability affairs. The tests I have run typically render results in the range of 1 shot in 10 hit to miss ratio. Unbuttoned...clear visibility...flat terrain. Bracketing effect appears to be minimal. I dont know nuthin from nuthin...this is just my uniformed opinion on the matter. Perhaps you can suggest some additional references I should be devoting some attention to. The essence of what is being relayed is multiple independent sources arriving at the same conclusion. This by all rights goes along toward establishing a trend or correlation. In addition, the above info on veterans talking about German optics were originally gathered by Eisenhower because he too could not bring himself to believe the reports coming from the front regarding the quality of the German equipment. These are more than just accounts from GI Average Tanker from Hoboken. There are several high-ranking, professional, gray haired, armour officers providing the above assessments regarding German tank optics. Men making life and death decisions for their tankers. Men with careers and reputations. These are men that would logically be somewhat reluctant to scream fire in a crowded theater unless there was really a fire. <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>And are these guys even qualified to draw such conclusions? Sure, they probably have the qualifications to talk about their own equipment, but why is that? Because they fired dozens or hundreds of rounds in combat against a real live target. But did they do the same in a German tank vs. Shermans?<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> I drive a Ford Truck. I drive it everyday. It works just fine for me. It’s a good truck. Occasionally I ride in my bosses Mercedes. It’s not to hard for me to come to the conclusion that that Mercedes is a cut above my Ford. Now if I rode a bike everyday I wouldn’t really have a common frame of reference by which to compare riding a Mercedes with. [This message has been edited by Jeff Duquette (edited 11-21-2000).]

I beleive 21st Army Group conducted a fairly in depth study on the subject...ETO 44 - 45. The results indicated an average of 1.4 casulties amongst tank crews from knocked out tanks.

Great stuff...Thanks Tiger.

Great news Tiger. I saw your halftrack mods. Great work. When will they be available for DL? Are they going to be posted at CMHQ or Kumps site?