cyrano01

Theres a hilarious example of this process in action towards the beginning of Death of Stalin
(Buscemi/Khrushchev and wife recalling and recording what was said at dascha by whom, as per their custom)

We kinda didn’t if we are honest with ourselves.  I think we talked ourselves into solutions but they were never tested.  Smoke, manoeuvre, APS, ERA.  I think we “umpired” a lot of these realities away in wargames and training, and then outright dismissed them as we fought in Iraq and Afghanistan.  I can’t imagine the difference in COIN if the Taliban had the levels of internet access we see today and drones, let alone a straight up conventional war.
Problem is that in the first real peer conventional war all of the things we tried to forget, plus new stuff all came home to roost.  Artillery is no longer dumb (as much as it pains to admit), ATGMs don’t give a fig about smoke or ERA, drones are flying directly at individual soldiers and following them into bunkers, and ISR is just crazy.
Finally on nets.  I actually think that combining a strong mesh (non-metallic would be best…carbon fibre?) with thermal camouflage might make for an effective UAS shield…but a static one.  For vehicles they are simply too hot and easily detected once they fire.  So definitely a good idea but they would have to be retractable and quickly so vehicles could move in seconds.  For troops they make for a solid defensive option to protect trenches but once again we see defensive primacy.  The second they get up to move they are not going to drag those nets with them.
Of course the second problem is that as soon as I lose a drone to a net, I am going to pound that spot with indirect fires.  But maybe trenches still work?
Either way this whole thing still points to a static defensive environment where attacking and/or moving is extremely difficult.  My best guess is that until someone can field an APS made of UAS/UGV (and then they will figure out we probably don’t need whatever they are protecting), we are kinda stuck.  Corrosive warfare did work but clearly it has a threshold and the Russians found enough friction to blunt it.  At a tactical and operational level the RA kinda won Summer ‘23 (until we understand the full impact of losses we cannot know strategic outcomes).  Maybe we got too used to them losing but the fact that your opponent is going to have good days is a reality in any war.
My hypothesis is not that the RA suddenly outfought the UA.  It is that they finally established conditions where defensive asymmetry succeeded.  Now whether the UA can overcome that may be a bigger issue than “more kit”.

Yes, you would have thought that the dangers of outsourcing strategic production would have been underlined both by the Ukraine war and before that Covid where getting hold of PPE (masks, overalls etc.) and vaccines on the international market suddenly got very difficult as national interest cut off free trade.
If you want to step up domestic shell production you have to be prepared to commit resources to doing so and there are limits to which Western governments will do that when they don't see an immediate existential threat.
Oddly enough I recently went to a local history talk (I'm in North West England) which touched on this very problem historically. The great munitions shortage of 1915 led to huge chunks of the local economy in this area, mostly textiles manufacture,  being re-purposed to make military supplies. Local cotton mills were converted to churn out components for 18 pdr shells and Stokes mortar bombs.
 
Short of that sort of national ecenomic mobilisation there are always going to be hard limits on the willingness to invest in munition production with theprospect of closing it down as soon as demand falls.
 
 

UKR troops activated on Hola Prystan' direction (SW from Kherson) - they set control over Bilohrudove village on Bilohrudnyi island. Likley this happened sevaral days or even week ago, and changes was spotted due to footage of Russian drones. No official information from UKR General Staff. About week ago they strictly rejected to comment any info about Dnipro-crossing operaton.

Russian milbloggers complain UKR troops on bridgeheads, especially in Krynky area have just "unlimited number" of FPV drones, which inflicted heavy losses for armor and logistic vehicles. Also they say UKR trops use multiple recon Mavics, so almost each squad can call artillery fire from right bank in short time.  UKR troops defended by probably new EW assets which Russian bloggers called "EW cupola" - by their words Russian have severe problems with own drones and communications, Russian troops suffered a lack of own EW assets, so UKR drones fly impudent and "khokhols became so insolent that use extreme low altitude helicopter strikes at our positions with S-8 rockets and even deploy SHORAD AD assets in 1-2 km from the river on right bank, shooting down most of our drones, which try to spot artillery". 
Our units also have huge support of "Magyar Birds" unit, which likely already became independent UCAV unit maybe regiment of higer subordination. Russians say "some very known personage (Magyar) set in Kherson on residental building powerful transmitter, which allows his unit reach too far and breakthrough our week EW defense". During last 10 days Russians launched two Kh-31P anti-radar missiles on Kherson, very likely against Madyar's radio equipment.
 
 

Some activity of Russian territory:
- diversion on railroad in Ryazan' oblast. 19 freight cars and locomotive were derailed. Loclas claim they heard explosions in time of crash. Locomotive's machinist was injured.

- UKR UAV attacked Machinebuilding Design Bureau in Kolomna, Moscow oblast. This institution has been participating in developing of many different missile systems - ATGMs, SAMs, Iskander ballistic missiles etc.
Result of attack in unknown, the local on video says about large "mashroom", which he hadn't time to film, but now a fire in the building, though nothing visible on the video. Also reportedly explosions were heard in Krasnogorsk and Strogino cities of Moscow oblast. 

- one of workshops of gunpowder factory in Kotovsk, Tambov oblast was exploded this night by unknown reason
 

I wonder if they could get MORE bunched up along the road? They might try but I don't think so. What discipline. 🤦‍♂️ You'd think that if you were going to stop for some period of time - even 20 minutes - you'd disperse all the vehicles. It's not like UKR has never used drones for artillery spotting before. At this point it should be SOP anytime there is a halt.
Hell, we did that when there were no drones and we had air superiority!
Dave

As you know, during a week UKR forces have been striking some important targets in Russian rear:
1. UAV operators school of DNR forces in Donetsk. Russian milbloggers tell valuable equipment was lost, also losses among personnel (unknown how much, likely about dozen). One of most painful losses for DNRs - old very experienced sapper, veteran of Afganistan, who fought since 2014, separs called him "sapper genuius"
2. Strike on Russian HQ in Strilkove on Arabatska spit in Kherson oblast. By contraversal information VDV general Teplinskiy  either was wounded or still intact.
Now appeared first news about losses - UKR really hit HQ of "Dnepr" groupmemt, when lilely their operative planning department had a meeting
From left to right:
Colonel Vadim Dobriakov, operative duty - deputy of the chief of VDV Command control center
Colonel Aleksei Kiblov - chief of department of fire missions planning of VDV HQ
Colonel Aleksandr Galkin - operative duty - deputy of the chief of VDV Command control center   
 
Obviously killing of high-ranked palnning department officers and wounding of unknown number will affect control capabilities of Russian troops in Dnipro area.
3. Strike of 9th of November on Skadovsk, sea-town of Kherson oblast. A building was hit, where 126th military investigation department of Investigation Committee of Russian Federation and Rosgvardiya station was deployed. Russian TGs claimed 8-10-11 servicemen were killed (different sources), 10 wounded. In present time five bodies are recognized, three of five more still on recognizing.
Among killed - acting chief of 126th miliatry investigation department Dmitriy Katsuba, two officers-interrogators, forwarder and driver. Among wounded also Dagestanian servicemen of Rosgvardiya and Miliatry Police 
 

4. Except today's maritime drone attack on Chornomorske in Crimea, reportedly barracks of border guards and naval forces in this town were hit with missiles. No information about losses yet.

Training of Russian MiG-31K, Kinzhal carriers, with inflight refueling, caused probably longest air raid alarm in Ukraine, lasted 3,5 hours. 
During this time in one scholl bomb shelter in Kyiv %)
 

UKR artillery or HIMARS has struck Russian supply convoy in Hladkivka village, 25 km south from Kherson, this is Hola Prystan' direction - relatively calm area, distant from Krynky. Russians got too much relax and...
Claimed losses 8 trucks destroyed and damaged, up to 25 killed and up to 30 wounded.
Judging on angry posts among Russian milbloggers, these losses can be close to the true.
 
 

The situation on the left bank of the Dnieper from Konstantin Mashovets:
You can treat the active actions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces on the left bank of the Dnieper in any way you like. Consider this a “PR gamble with blood”, a pointless waste of resources, or seriously consider the possibility of a “breakthrough to Crimea” in this direction.
But so far, real events indicate that the Russian command in the Crimean-Tavrian direction, at least, received a significant “headache” that was clearly not planned by them. This is already a fact, no matter how you evaluate and interpret it.
As far as I understand, everything there is going exactly “according to plan”, however, obviously not to the Russian one:
- At least 2 tactical bridgeheads of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the area of the road and railway Antonov bridges have already turned into 1, but more than the previous two. Moreover, apparently, the Ukrainian Armed Forces are holding him quite tightly.
- In the area of the village of Krynki, units of the enemy’s 26th motorized rifle regiment apparently still hold part of the forest south of the village and the north-eastern part of the village itself, but the situation there for the Russians is clearly developing, somehow “in the wrong direction.” Moreover, even the Storm-Z, driven from the direction of Korsunok, does not help. In turn, several units of the 144th separate motorized rifle brigade of the Russians tried to “probe the Ukrainian bridgehead” in this area, as they say, head-on, impudently, but it turned out unsuccessfully for them.
- In at least 2 places, the advanced units of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the section between Oleshki and Novaya Kakhovka managed to cut the coastal road that goes from Novaya Kakhovka to Oleshki, which, in itself, is a little strange. But it will be even stranger if Ukrainian units go to the next road E-58. And they have such an opportunity, in which case the situation will change completely, radically.
– Along the Podstepnoe – Peschanivka line there is also some “vanity and disorder”. In the area of Chaika Island, the enemy (probably units of the 177th separate marine regiment and the 171st separate airborne assault battalion from the 7th airborne assault division) are trying to hold the first position of the main line of defense. It is quite possible that separate units of the enemy’s 205th Infantry Motorized Rifle Brigade are also involved there. But, despite this, even judging by open sources, the situation there is also heating up for the enemy, especially north of the village of Podstepnoe.
In short, the enemy somehow did not have an effective line of defense from the Dnieper flood plains. How does Teplinsky and Company react to all these events? Of course, in the typical Russian style:
 
- Transferring additional forces and assets to the “dangerous area”;
- Organizing and conducting numerous series of attacks in 24/7 mode.
Moreover, the introduction of formations, units and subunits into battle occurs in the same way as always, “as they concentrate and deploy.”
 
We are talking, first of all, about two main formations that the enemy obviously intends to use to “liquidate the Dnieper crisis” - the 70th motorized rifle division from the 18th combined arms army, as well as the 7th airborne assault division

If no one can attack the result is... peace?

I mean, caveats ahoy and not necessarily a warm, fun peace that everyone enjoys... maybe more like the 90s where it's 'peace' if you live in the right places and people living everywhere else double down on that asymmetry thing.

This is really just an academic cop-out -“F#ck knows, so let’s call it ‘intermediate’ and dump the solution forward”
Some fundamentals of warfare have shifted.  Mass manoeuvre on offence is clearly broken as we knew it.  Establishing conditions to re-start it remain out of reach.  Neither side has been able to project and sustain mass precision, or at least the levels required to break deadlock.  I am not convinced that there will be a technological or doctrinal solution by 2025.
I think we are going to start seeing difficult conversations.  Ukraine will likely need to dig in and adopt small power strategies of continuing to bleed the RA.  At some point Russia will realize this is a waste of time and effort, probably need a few more disasters to drive that point home.
Defensive primacy might be back (for now).  Denial primacy definitely is happening.  Themes of Denial, Corrosion, projected friction, precision, smart mass, Illumination, Hyper-connectivity, dispersion, deception and attrition seem to really dominate.  A battlefield of negative decisions - I can’t have positive decisions but neither can you.
The military problem may be unsolvable.  Over to the political side.

Still far from the level of famous clip of German mercenary doctors removing organs from wounded AFU patients.
https://voxukraine.org/en/public-health-fakes-ukrainian-military-man-witnessed-the-work-of-black-transplant-specialists-at-the-front-issue-33
Also some month age there was one great in-depth interview with DPR soldiers by one of Russian "journos", who described in detail how they killed so many american mercs, that BlackHawks hoovered constantly at night, crossed the frontline and managed to take their bodies back to "giant, secret freezer  in Poland". Further they even claimed they shot down one helicopter, but remains where immediatelly bombed by Ukrainian artillery, so unfirtunatelly no wrecks to show.
As you see, in Russia Americans are in the same time extremelly dumb and ungodly clever. Very difficult enemy for Ivan.
Perhaps action was planned by Boris "Tactical" Johnson himself.

Yes, you would have thought that the dangers of outsourcing strategic production would have been underlined both by the Ukraine war and before that Covid where getting hold of PPE (masks, overalls etc.) and vaccines on the international market suddenly got very difficult as national interest cut off free trade.
If you want to step up domestic shell production you have to be prepared to commit resources to doing so and there are limits to which Western governments will do that when they don't see an immediate existential threat.
Oddly enough I recently went to a local history talk (I'm in North West England) which touched on this very problem historically. The great munitions shortage of 1915 led to huge chunks of the local economy in this area, mostly textiles manufacture,  being re-purposed to make military supplies. Local cotton mills were converted to churn out components for 18 pdr shells and Stokes mortar bombs.
 
Short of that sort of national ecenomic mobilisation there are always going to be hard limits on the willingness to invest in munition production with theprospect of closing it down as soon as demand falls.
 
 

Because that is not how it works. Suppliers want contracts before they set up a production line. It takes at least a year (if you rush it) and 50 mil (a guess) per line. No one is going to invest that if they are not sure if they can sell their product.
Such a production line is not really dual use. No civilian use without mayor retooling. You could mothball it, but then you still have sunk the investment costs for a war that never came. Scalability costs money.
If the crisis comes, and you want to outsource, you need to find someone with free capacities. Difficult and costly in a crisis. And if there is no free capacity, 'they' also need time to build that. Outsourcing is not a magic wand. Well, maybe a cursed one...
 

Yes, you would have thought that the dangers of outsourcing strategic production would have been underlined both by the Ukraine war and before that Covid where getting hold of PPE (masks, overalls etc.) and vaccines on the international market suddenly got very difficult as national interest cut off free trade.
If you want to step up domestic shell production you have to be prepared to commit resources to doing so and there are limits to which Western governments will do that when they don't see an immediate existential threat.
Oddly enough I recently went to a local history talk (I'm in North West England) which touched on this very problem historically. The great munitions shortage of 1915 led to huge chunks of the local economy in this area, mostly textiles manufacture,  being re-purposed to make military supplies. Local cotton mills were converted to churn out components for 18 pdr shells and Stokes mortar bombs.
 
Short of that sort of national ecenomic mobilisation there are always going to be hard limits on the willingness to invest in munition production with theprospect of closing it down as soon as demand falls.
 
 

Yes, you would have thought that the dangers of outsourcing strategic production would have been underlined both by the Ukraine war and before that Covid where getting hold of PPE (masks, overalls etc.) and vaccines on the international market suddenly got very difficult as national interest cut off free trade.
If you want to step up domestic shell production you have to be prepared to commit resources to doing so and there are limits to which Western governments will do that when they don't see an immediate existential threat.
Oddly enough I recently went to a local history talk (I'm in North West England) which touched on this very problem historically. The great munitions shortage of 1915 led to huge chunks of the local economy in this area, mostly textiles manufacture,  being re-purposed to make military supplies. Local cotton mills were converted to churn out components for 18 pdr shells and Stokes mortar bombs.
 
Short of that sort of national ecenomic mobilisation there are always going to be hard limits on the willingness to invest in munition production with theprospect of closing it down as soon as demand falls.
 
 

This, absolutely in spades. Historians hat on...<hyperbole> responding to the demands of the Ukraine war by stepping up tank production would be akin to responding to the British 1915 shell shortages by increasing production of cavalry sabres and lances. </hyperbole>

Some more videos of firework in Sedovo.

Russian TG also claimed except ammo dump, repair base, were helicopters also stood was hit.
 

This, absolutely in spades. Historians hat on...<hyperbole> responding to the demands of the Ukraine war by stepping up tank production would be akin to responding to the British 1915 shell shortages by increasing production of cavalry sabres and lances. </hyperbole>

Yes, you would have thought that the dangers of outsourcing strategic production would have been underlined both by the Ukraine war and before that Covid where getting hold of PPE (masks, overalls etc.) and vaccines on the international market suddenly got very difficult as national interest cut off free trade.
If you want to step up domestic shell production you have to be prepared to commit resources to doing so and there are limits to which Western governments will do that when they don't see an immediate existential threat.
Oddly enough I recently went to a local history talk (I'm in North West England) which touched on this very problem historically. The great munitions shortage of 1915 led to huge chunks of the local economy in this area, mostly textiles manufacture,  being re-purposed to make military supplies. Local cotton mills were converted to churn out components for 18 pdr shells and Stokes mortar bombs.
 
Short of that sort of national ecenomic mobilisation there are always going to be hard limits on the willingness to invest in munition production with theprospect of closing it down as soon as demand falls.
 
 

I agree with him on the need of standardization. I guess it is not the lack of standards, but that there are too many of them. Probably national lobbying at its best.
Where I don't agree is the outsourcing part.
Firstly, manufacturing simple artillery shells is a simple manufacturing task. Any industrialized country can do that AND do a million other things. It is not clogging up any unreplaceable resources. If you calculate opportunity costs, it may not best the best choice, but you are still making money.
Secondly, if you strictly look for the market solution, our future shells will all come from south-east Asia. I don't need to spell it out why this will be an undesirable outcome.
Standardize the stuff and build it locally.

They are two sides of the same coin, cheap precision that breaks all the assumptions that legacy systems are built around.
I keep coming back to the U.S. apparently going ahead with a new manned scout helicopter. That is serious head in the sand denial.

This, absolutely in spades. Historians hat on...<hyperbole> responding to the demands of the Ukraine war by stepping up tank production would be akin to responding to the British 1915 shell shortages by increasing production of cavalry sabres and lances. </hyperbole>