cyrano01

This is pretty much where I am at for this war at least - manoeuvre is essentially dead (or perhaps dormant).  We know western-style manoeuvre did not work last summer and likely will not under these conditions.  Even if the RA could manage a breakout, modern ISR would pin it pretty quickly and those deep battle forces would effectively be surrounded by a bunch of PGM armed resistance.  The UA is too connected and integrated in defence.  And here is the thing, I am not so sure the UA would not risk suffering the same fate at this point if they managed to achieve breakout.  The RA may have different emphasis but their ISR is still effective and they have PGM too.
So we are really back to WW1 games here - attrition/exhaustion. This is really engineering systemic collapses on an opponent through longer term front end attrition or corrosive warfare in depth.  Neither side is going to be able to pull off a "drive" anywhere until the other side suffers catastrophic internal failures.

Gawd, typical gunner.  Drone collects oranges, squeezes oranges, puts little umbrella in glass, delivers orange juice - “hey there is too much pulp…this whole drone thing is overblown hogwash!”
 
 

First of all there are no truly reliable methods of ensuring civilian safety in an active combat zone, there never have been. There are armies and nations that try to be discriminate, and armies and nations that don't bother. But perfection in a peer to peer shooting war where both sides are jamming and obscuring everything they possibly can, in any way they can think of is unattainable. The expression that there is no such thing as friendly artillery is about as old as anything that deserves to be called artillery.
The thing we aren't talking about enough is that there are degrees of jamming, and degrees of control. A live video going one way, and second by second flight commands going the other are by far the situation with the highest requirements for consistency and fidelity. As soon as anything less than that is required all sorts of intermittent communications options become viable. A the very simplest level you send out a first wave of drones to engage the very front line of enemy positions. You simply tell that first wave to self destruct or take whatever its current best target is, or simply hit a set of coordinates that was thought to be relevant at a specified time. So now, even in a 100% jamming environment your other forces are clear to proceed to their first phase line. At the next level up you have expendable transmitters that can broadcast a short but very high power signal to tell your drones to change kill boxes, and can even have a safety that any drone that doesn't receive a signal by the time specified crashes /self destructs. And the variations go on forever, but all of them are vastly more tolerant of reduced bandwidth than needing full time video one way, and full time control signals the other.

I am so tired of this entire line of thought.  Sure the UA has legacy Soviet doctrine but 1) what is wrong with Soviet doctrine - there is a huge assumption that Soviet doctrine was ineffective and somehow did not know how to manoeuvre, which is patently false, and 2) And ignores the other factors staring them in the face that are making large scale manoeuvre impossible.
This is straight up western arrogance built on a foundation of ignorance.  Until someone from the Pentagon can explain how we would successfully operate under the same conditions (no air superiority, ISR every where) using “mission command and manoeuvre” of course.  Did anyone ask the Ukrainians why they are using fires first?  Did anyone stop to wonder why manoeuvre has failed for the Russians as well?  Nope, too easy to blame it all on “Soviet-era” doctrine.  This “us-centric” analysis is frighteningly similar to what European observers of the US Civil War walked away with…and it cost them dearly.

Wellll, in reality, the myth that the Red Coats were “wiped by the militias on the march back to Boston is just that, a MYTH!  The Rebels lost about two to three times the number of casualties that the military lost. This was due to the Light Infantry flankers that the Red Coats sent out on both sides of the road to clear out the Rebel scum with one of the main weapons of the British Army, a thing called the bayonet.

"Modern" attack helicopters are completely obsolete. People have just spent so much money on them over the years that don't want to admit it just yet. Between cheap, expendable, and VERY soon autonomous drones, and things like the later models the Israeli spike missile that have a ~40km range, it makes zero sense to invest in expensive helicopters. At least the U.S. canceled the program for a next generation model.
The Russians got good use out the Ka-52s last year because of all the things NATO would bring to this fight that Ukraine didn't have. Good airborne radar at the right range is just one of MANY of those capabilities. They were also using the helicopters because they were they only thing in inventory that could fire their very best long range ATGM. I don't think anyone else is going to make that mistake again for a while. Whatever you want to say about the helicopter it is a very good missile. Ukarine is lucky tey don't more of them on more platforms.
These are smart motivated people, but at the same time this third year engineering student stuff. They are throwing large amounts of semiskilled labor at the problem to get thee production they need. For Ukraine, at this moment, this necessary and appropriate.
So a lot of discussion about drone costs. A new Iphone costs less than $2000, by even the most pessimistic assumptions. It has an approximate infinity of processing power, and three great cameras. There is just no reason for the brains of a drone to ever cost more than that. so even if all the other bits, including a nice tandem/EFP warhead come out to $5000, you still have a DELUXE FPV drone for $7000. Except it won't be FPV, all the operator will have to do is confirm the coordinates of the kill box, and pull the safety on the warhead. 
The Pentagon needs to invest in the drone equivalent of a Gigafactory to make them by the tens and tens of thousands. And  they need to have a come to Jesus conversation with the defense industry about the way they get paid. We can afford to overpay somewhat for hardware engineering and development that works. Getting overcharged on a per piece basis is just not viable anymore.

I think whoever is going to figure out long range cheap and precise weapons is going to rule the world, basically. Imagine Ukraine had few thousand Storm Shadows instead of like 50. The war would be probably over by now.
Shaheds meanwhile deliver on the cheap and long range but not on the precise. Russia had a lot of missiles of various types, but they don't seem to deliver on the precise or cheap either. FPVs are cheap and precise but not long range.
The only case where we have seen all three is with the Ukrainian naval drones - and the effect has been devastating. I don't know if the Ukrainian plane drones used for refinery hunting count as cheap and precise, but they seem to be having effect as well.
But delivering on something cheap is kind of hard because the MIC wants its cut. So who knows where we'll end up.

Consider the information shown in: https://www.cfr.org/article/how-much-us-aid-going-ukraine
Now, someone correct me if I’m misreading or mistaken. 69 billion is a big number except, as far as I can tell, most of the money is directly earmarked for U.S manufacturers or NATO related to Ukraine. The only portion that Ukraine can use to purchase elsewhere is the FMF or foreign military financing, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF12040, and that says it’s around 6 billion. 6 billion for Ukraine to purchase ammo from 3rd parties. Most of the money is tied up in Western manufacturers and their production lines or from NATO country stockpiles or earmarked money for replacing said stockpiles.
no idea about the EU money except I certainly recall periods where Ukraine had to beg the EU to release portions of already pledged money to support the economy but again, uncertain the forms of funding.

Yeah, the US in particular is incapable of doing anything for a reasonable price, be it infrastructure, weapons, transit etc.
I stand by my claim if the US withdraws from this, Europe will give up in short order.

Well we can agree or at least agree to disagree in some places.  I am still not sure how you can get this new tank platoon down in costs so that it matches what we can do with light wheeled armor.  Tracks to give better cross country mobility but they always come at a significant maint and vulnerability costs of their own.  [Aside the quad tracks are a proven technology but they simply look and feel too fussy and too many points of failure for modern warfare to my eyes].
I did highlight that last para of yours.  I cannot stress how this is not all about drones or a drone basket.  Anymore than your proposal is "all about tanks."  It is about a land warfare tactical and operational systems.  And what we put at the core of that system.  I am arguing that it is tactically - light infantry, indirect fires, PGMs of all shapes and sizes and unmanned systems (surface and above surface). Operationally it is all about C4ISR and Air Denial.  Drones are a main component but cannot be the only component.  This is a new all arms team that has already demonstrated utility in this war.  The question is, can it carry it the rest of the way?
I think the need for armored vehicles is the anomaly, not a sign of a continuing trend.  Infantry need transport and protected transport, this much is true.  And we still see instances of direct fire support.  But looking forward, how fire support is provided is likely to change. PGM means infantry can clear a bunker without a tank gun. They can suppress with combination from the new arms team. 
This is an evolution toward something and we will see c-measures and c-c-measures introduced, but the fundamental truth is that miniaturization, processing power-to-weight, materials and data networking are all reshaping the battlefield. We will not go backwards from here. Large, heavy and expensive are endangered species in this war, they may very well be extinct for the next one - the Age of Needles has already begun.
I honestly think we need to start thinking about ground warfare in terms of naval warfare evolution.  And here is the thing, it looks like naval warfare needs to evolve too.  So maybe it is new naval warfare thinking.  Regardless, we shall just have to wait and see where this all lands in the end.  I have zero doubts that the military industrial complex will try and sell exactly what you are proposing, and western militaries will likely convince governments to pay for it.  But it won't work and eventually we will see the tank take its ranks in the museum - it is just the nature of things in warfare.

I wish I could say that love of a platform or system is only an amateur wargamers disease.  I have already seen the reflexive signs of the upcoming arguments.  We will dress them up but in reality we have built identities around these platforms/systems.  Asking someone to change a strong identity, one designed to weather war, is a tall order.  We have generations of senior officers who grew up with the tank as the core of the land warfare tactical system.  Hell, we were still counting them as a metric of combat power in the lead up to this thing.  Even now, I think they are still a threat, but more like nukes...if conditions get to the point that they can be employed, this war is already over.  If the UA collapse and we see a ring of steel outside Kharikiv, or if the UA drives tank columns into Crimea, these are not a sign that "tanks work!" They are a symptom of a much larger collapse. A collapse that had little to do with the tank, or even mech itself. 

I think this is the crux of the issue right here.  If you do not believe ISR is so ubiquitous that tanks still have space on the modern battlefield then any revisioning starts to make sense.  To my mind the evidence is too large to ignore that this is not the case.  Beyond RUSI and other academic assessments there is the simple fact that we are seeing essentially a deadlock on a frontage over 800km long.  Both sides are employing force-to-space levels unheard of...and yet nothing is able to move.  We should be seeing moves/c-moves and all sorts of manoeuvre given the levels of breathing room...but we are not.  Why?  Well military conservatives tend to fall back on "well Russian and Ukraine simply do not know how" which gets weaker and weaker everyday.
How?  ISR.  I have no idea how much processing power is required but both sides clearly have it, why else would they be unable to concentrate to manoeuvre? They forgot how? Same goes for airpower.  The RuAF is massively overmatching the UAAF yet cannot do much more than lob glide bombs 50+ kms back.  This is modern AD but it has to be plugged into something.
Finally, even if it isn't on the battlefield in this war...what about the next one?  What possible indication do we have that this trend has culminated and we are going to see less ISR on the battlefield of tomorrow?  It is not the steady stream of social media, it is the fact that neither side can move when according to all modern doctrine they should be able to.  While people are arguing over the tank I see the horrible reality that ground warfare (and air to an extent) is broken.
I am saying you cannot mask military traffic by using civilian shields.  And yes, we might have to clear civilian traffic 100kms back because that is what the enemy can see and hit.
We seem to be agreeing on swarm, but you want to swarm with a multi-million dollar set of platforms.  How long can we sustain a swarm centered on a tank platoon that costs as much as a flight of F35s?  This is basically trying to stuff the tank into a swarming concept because we want tanks, not because we need them.
Again, I am not seeing what these new tanks are adding for the cost. I can get direct and indirect fires via other lighter faster platforms, indirect fires and unmanned already?
So you have a new tank that has "more amor" in different locations and now hybrid electric cold engines pushing a 30ton (how "more armor" and "less weight" works will be interesting).  You have thrown in a statement like "more resistant to indirect fires and drones while maintaining mobility" like it is simply a matter of design.  You are arguing with physics and on the losing end.  A small cheap drone can carry more chemical kinetic power the tank can handle everywhere. But the drone can strike anywhere and apply it to just about any location on the tank, including mines in front of the tank. You are trying to have massive survivability, mobility and low visibility here, and years of tank design have proven one cannot have all these factors maximized at the same time.
Finally, there is firepower.  If I need 105mm worth of HE - that is about 2kgs of HE wrapped in a shell to throw it out 2-3kms (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/105×617mmR) - then why don't I simply stick 2kgs of HE (or shaped HEAT) onto an FPV for a fraction of a fraction of the cost of a quad tracked, transparent hulled, hybrid electric, multi-spectral invisible 30 ton tank with some new amor that can be 50% lighter?  "But a tank gun can throw it at 700 m/s"  Well sure, but for the cost of this next gen F35 tank I can buy and employ a few hundred thousand drones.
Hey man, you said "sanitize".  And the threat from ATGM teams is against heavy vehicles, not other ATGM teams and drone swarms.  The easiest way to avoid getting ones tanks hit and "ruining an attack" is to not have tanks as the core of your tactical system. 
Well you clearly think pretty highly of your own idea if I am reading this right, there is that.  I think you have proven that we still need vehicles to carry C2 and support forward as a bubble pushes out.  Where we disagree is that it need to be this "radical reinvention" of what is going to be 1) extremely expensive, 2) a Rube Goldberg level of complexity to maintain (quad tracks...really?") and is 3) likely to be just as slow and visible as any tanks we have right now.  Why can I not put all of what you are proposing on light armor that is much faster and cheaper?  We already saw this in the Kharkiv break out. It was not tanks, it was infantry/SOF in MRAPs.  I want more of that and enough of them that I can sustain losses over time.
Minefields.  Yes, they will be a problem for Year 1, day 1 of the next war.  If Ukraine had several hundred thousand drones that could carry and drop mines on 22 Feb, do you honestly think they would not have used them?  In fact mines are likely to make a major comeback because when plugged into a C4ISR architecture and supported by....everyone say it together...indirect fires, PGMS, infantry and unmanned systems, they work so well that modern breaching doctrine fails and doctrinal force multiplication stops making any sense at all.
You asked for critiques and hole poking, you are getting it.  Your proposed system is really has the appearance of a hammer looking for a nail.  The core assumption that we even need a tank is already been established within your proposal, yet what you are proposing does not address the fundamental issues with that assumption that we are seeing everyday on the battlefield in Ukraine, and every indication we have points to accelerating trends in these directions (ISR, precision, lethality and reach). 
To summarize, your proposal, my critiques are:
- Does not demonstrably show how these new tanks/tank platoon will perform any better than what we already have.  You are far too vague on how mobility-survivability-visibility will be optimized for the future battlefield. It appears you are advocating a "free lunch" concept.  I am not seeing net competitive advantage here against an opponent that can deny terrain with todays technology let alone tomorrows.
- I see some very significant engineering challenges in: armor, engine/power pack and drive trains.  You also are proposing some very complex and advanced ISR and targeting equipment, but I think these are well developed elsewhere so porting them over is likely a lesser concern.
- Tactically, this system does not solve for the Denial Asymmetry we are seeing.  It is waiting for another system to solve that problem so it can then do what it is designed for. Problem is that whatever system can solve for Denial Asymmetry will also likely be able to do what these tanks can, so there is real risk of redundancy.
- It is a very expensive redundancy risk.  An F35 comes in at roughly $83 million per platform.  A modern M1A2 Sep 3 comes in at around $24 million.  What you are proposing will likely be in this league of costs.  And for this we get a 105mm HE gun, a 40mm gun, a drone platform and C-UAS platform that needs a significant C-ISR and C-UAS enterprise to survive, let alone thrive.  To my mind if we can build that C-ISR/C-UAS enterprise we can put this firepower and mobility on much cheaper extant platforms.
- Operational costs will also be very significant.  Maintenance of complex systems such as these will drive a much higher logistics load, at best it will likely be the same as the one we currently have, which we know is too heavy.  Your hybrid electric idea is actually being fielded (https://www.army.mil/article/254124/army_advancing_first_hybrid_electric_bradley) and on a 30 ton chassis.  This will reduce fuel requirements (by 20%) but these are still combustion engines with the heat and sound vulnerabilities.   I would shoot to get logistical burden down to that of an MRAP, at which point this tank platoon becomes competitive. Again though, I am not sure why I need a tank here when this engine on a high mobility light armor vehicle is already in reach.
- Offsets/Risk. An opponent could neutralize this entire system with existing cheap and readily available systems.  ATGMs, indirect fires, UAS/UGV and mines, carrying loads of stand-off EFP and/or smart submunitions are likely going to counter this proposed system at a small fraction of comparative costs. Given the low density of production of this new tank platoon, driven by costs, means an opponent can be wrong many times but our forces can only be wrong a few times, perhaps once. This system would likely be niche and used rarely, much like low density specialized engineering vehicles.  We could find ourselves in a scenario where they are on a critical path but this would not be the norm, nor should it be.
More bluntly put - too expensive, too visible, not enough benefit compared to other systems.  And too reliant on another system (C-ISR/C-UAS complex) to be able to do its job, to the point that the enabling system can likely do its job for it.
Finally, there is one wildcard out there, cyber.  Cyber has been tepid in this war, we know it is happening but neither side has been able to weaponize the domain to the point where enemy ISR is shut down, for example.  If cyber were able to re-set a battlefield by eliminating or highly degrading an opponents C4ISR then traditional manoeuvre could be back on the table.   Of course if we have complete C4ISR superiority, I still do not see why we cannot simply push our own bubbles with impunity but fast manoeuvre with a level of armor could make a re-emergence.  But we would have to see cyber actually perform as advertised - an operational/tactical tool as opposed to strategic shaping tool within conventional warfare.      

Well, looking at a slightly more zoomed out map, right now at least they're apparently on the wrong side of the river for Kharkiv. Doesn't exactly look like that axis is a defensive priority.

Ok.  I guess my first question is “what does this really give us?”  I like the idea of mixed potent light tanks but these are still 1) highly visible, 2) will have long logistics tails and 3) very expensive - you specifically are porting tech from F-35s (eg transparent hulls).  So for all that money we get:
- a 105 direct fire gun
- a 40mm gun
- ATGMs 
- and a drone control platform
The problem immediately is that I can get all that effects-wise with distributed light infantry, PGMs and drone swarms at much less cost and far harder to see and hit.  We just had a video of the drone control platform being four guys in a basement.  The direct fires support is already being replaced by PGM artillery and FPVs…and ATGMs are..well already man-portable.  Why stick them on a heavy vehicle when I can simply put them on fast dismounts all over the place?  I can put them on a quad bike for mobility. Or better yet a UGV.
To my mind this is a novel re-think of the system that assumes we still need the overall system to deliver effects when it is becoming clear we really don’t.  I do not see how this new tank platoon is going to fare much better in say 10 years. Drones will be fully autonomous by then with new forms of stand-off attack. ISR will be even more ubiquitous. PGMs will be everywhere. These are lighter than current MBTs but still are 30t hot steel that rely on ground movement and direct fire. This kind of looks like trying to invent a better horse in 1918.

Lifting of these restrictions, while in themselves eggregious examples of political stupidity and well deserving to be scrapped ASAP, is not going to help much. The Ukraine is now waging a very conventional war (possibly paradigm-shattering drones excepted, but we are not there yet) with a very big country capable of sustaining a big army. It will not create a strategic bombing campaign via drones and ATACMS able to destroy Russian warmaking capability. This is an expensive way to wage war, and UKR will not get the funding for this. 
What they need is very simple, but they need a lot of it with guaranteed delivery without limitation in time. Artillery munitions (they cannot manufacture locally); SAM munitions;  funding for drone production, better still outsourcing the production itself to  the sanctuary countries (PL, Romania; in the future maybe Slovakia again); SPGs; HIMARS or equivalents; long- and mid-range SAM's; ECM/ECCM land-based equipment; ATACMS; some tanks, in numbers to replace losses; IFVs, in higher numbers than tanks; APCs more than tanks and IFVs; some ATGMs; small arms munitions; trucks and logistic vehicles; finally (and I have been convinced of this by the recent Russian successes with glide bombs) some fighter aircraft, with the understanding that they will all be shot down at some point. Also, the UKR need to have their stuff in order and find a way of mobilising soldiers for war, Zelenski's chances for reelection be damned.
The only theory of victory in this war that I can see is exactly the same as could be formulated in every conventional war  with a very big country capable of sustaining a big army, provided that the war has not been resolved via a France 1940 type offensive or a Nomonhan 1939 type counteroffensive in the first months: invest all resources you can and try to hang on in the war longer than the other guy, while always keeping an eye out for a potential technical paradigm shattering solution (Project Manhattan) or a potential opportunity to asymmetrically hamstring his economy (ref. bombing of ball bearing and synthetic fuel factories 1944).
Or, as the Duke of Wellington put it: "Hard pounding this, gentlemen. Let's see who pounds the longest"

About developing of warfare by spiral again %)
Since Russia unable to use A-50 AWACS close to our borders, it flooded our space by long-range recon drones Orlan, Zala, SuperCam, which with rotations are may to observe large squares of frontline and in the deep rear. Reportedly only for one day up to 200 UAVs can be spotted behind out lines. UKR side just hasn't enough radars, EW assets and SAMs, SHORADs etc to cover all frontline to prevent penetration of such number of drones in the rear. Except all of this we have large lack of anti-aircraft missiles of all types, including SHORADs and even MANPADs 
Yesterday likley as experimental act of desperation training Yak-52 was use to shoot down two Russian drones over Odesa oblast. Like in WWI times second crewman takes LMG in the cabine to fire at the drones. BTW this flight was successfull - two enemy drones were downed. And this is obviously more cheap method, than waste missiles. There is a one problem - risk of friendly fire, because small aircraft can be similar on radar to the drone

Videos of "dogfihgt" with Orlan-10
So, if some have operational P-51, Spitfires, Bf-109 , it will be useful

 

I don't think so until counter drone is solved for. The defender would still be able to send their drones to bust up the offensive operations, ISR for arty, etc. Until one side can deny drones I don't think there will be much movement. 
 

they didn't have a receipt so had to make a direct visit to the store.... too bad they didn't order through Amazon 🤪

US design for maintainability is generally pretty excellent. It makes for expensive procurement and high maintenance budgets (ie, swap the entire Abrams power pack rather than fix the fault lòcally) but it does that in order to increase availability rates at the pointy end.
Given that general approach, I'd be surprised if the Patriot was an exception. Given *that* I'd assume there is more internal damage that both can't be seen in a photo and can't be fixed in Ukraine.
Or, alternately, the priority to date has been on pushing end-user equipment into Ukraine, and not on the support systems that keep them operational and in users hands. Edit: So what would be a simple field repair for a US unit has to go back to the States when its operated by Ukraine.
But weighing against that second conclusion is the existence of USAREUR; if it was conceivably fixable forward at Grafenwohr or Kaiserlauten (or by any of the European operators of Patriot) then they would. That it wasn't suggests significant but non-obvious damage.
I think.

Russians gradually have been learing of Ukrainian experience of artillery fire control. If in 2022  - mid 23 we have seen typical Soviet style of whole batteries and even battalions of side-by-side standing guns simultainous work, that now Russians are more and more shifting to dispersing of artillery and work by single guns of a battery with individaual targeting for each.
Here is google-translated post about changes since 2022. "The work was carried out in areas with a low coeeficient of UAV use" - means "ineffective area fire with low UAV usage", though for summer 2022 it's not always could be true, or soldiers then reported about dozen Orlans and Zala, ajusting fire. Probably ajusting was inefefctive or come on too long command chain, which made it ineffective.

 
And addition to this post by other Russian artillerist with my translation:
I'l throw my 5 cents:
Regimental artillery tied on artillery chief (of regiment). He, sitting on command post (let's call it in such way) together with chief of recon, watch streams from UAVs (and intercepted streams of the enemy). Spotting the target chief of artillery transmits it to battery commander or senior battery officer  [he is commander of 1st artillery platoon also] and they transmit this data to the gun. 2-7 minutes for targeting of the gun, the bird [drone] in the sky. First shoot - the fire ajustment from artilelry chief directly to the gun. Or artillery chief opens the map, come into communication with gun commandr through the radio and gives the targeting (angle, azimuth, lines). The gun crew lives on position 2-5 days, further a rotation is coming. Nobody drink on position, it's taboo, else they go to "zakrep" [probably those who have to hold the ground after assault] - and this is more scary than to stormers. 
We don't work with mortars since new year. This is no longer relevant becaus of crews life preservation purposes. Drones already fly on 10 km in the rear, so they clicks them at once  

And here Russian feedback about CAESERs

Plus ca change...

I really don’t see that stopping an FPV with an RPG round strapped to it coming in at 80kph.  And it definitely won’t do a damned thing against this little monster:
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2214914714000348
 

Here are the key parts.  Basically Scholz may come across as waffling on materiel support to Ukraine, Germany is the second largest supplier after the US and Macron doesn't want to be shown up.  I think this gets Germany a handful of get-out-of-bashing-day cards.
 

Even slow boats have fast screws - little propellors don't move much water per turn, so they need more turns, and you have to stay ahead of the currents and wind.  If they want slow drive noise they'd have to go with big paddlewheels, or robotic rowboats that have big flat surfaces that move a lot of water per stroke or per paddle board in the water and probably have a big reflective radar signature.  You can do steam or compressed gas powered for the final couple miles, but those will also have an acoustic signature.

I've been trying to keep up with the thread the past couple weeks and haven't really had time to respond to things, but a few things went by without generating very many additional comments:
The first is the number of FPV drones that Ukraine is producing: 100K/month.  The second is the number of drones it takes to get a hit.  I've seen various numbers in the past 30 pages and also in some searching, and they're all consistently less than 10 drones per hit, 1/3, 1/5, and 1/7 all showing up.  That's a major step towards massed precision.
If you multiply it out and take the conservative 1/7, that's about 475 hits/day of something, and over 14,000 hits/month.  Those are all either damaged/destroyed vehicles of casualties, or some combination.  If each hit on average damages two people/things (not a big stretch, since most successful FPV attacks we see are on a vehicle or small group), that's 28K casualties or vehicles/month that have to be replaced, and 170K/year.  Just to break even.  And it doesn't depend on tubes that wear out or a heavy logistics tail moving a bunch of 152/155 HE around.
The third is the 350K artillery shells per month that RU is producing/procuring/refurbing.  If we assume that RU has fired 10K shells/day through the war to get 31,000 Ukrainian KIAs, and assume 3 WIA/KIA, those shells are producing about 170 Ukrainian casualties/day and it's taking ~275 shells to produce a single casualty. 
These are all approximate, and I'm not really comparing apples to apples (the drones are counting hits that can include both vehicles and troops, or one or the other, and I'm only counting troop casualties for impact of RU arty on Ukraine), but it's showing a picture of a transition - Ukraine is substituting drones for artillery and doing so very effectively.  And steadily improving. Russian artillery effectiveness is roughly constant, if not decreasing as quality of tubes and shells decreases, and not all that different from WWII era artillery effectiveness numbers I've seen.  If the Ukrainian FPV effectiveness is closer to 1/5 or 1/3, that starts to get into the "1 munition per opposing troop" kind of massed precision.  And many of the FPV drones don't cost much more than a single artillery shell.
The effectiveness could also drop as they have to have more troops with less training flying the FPVs, but it will also come back up as those "pilots" get practice.  And using FPVs instead of "meat in the seat" pilots means that the pilots just continue to gain experience, even if their missions fail, because they're not put directly into harms way during their sorties.
One of the biggest limitations of drones vs. artillery is range - drones are still mostly 10 km or less, and often limited to aerial LOS. They need bigger batteries or an artillery boost to get to longer range, and a relay drone (or multiple relays) to be controllable  farther out.
The other thing that's not making a lot of sense are the various claims that Russia can make or buy even more FPV drones than Ukraine.  We're not seeing the same kind of effectiveness - if they were just as numerous and effective as Ukr drones we'd be seeing 4 or 5x higher Ukr casualties than we are.  And I don't think we have reason to think that they are that effective and it's just good Ukr OpSec keeping us from hearing about it.