ASL Veteran

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by Mattias: ASL, Could you, please, try to actively prove that HC munitions was the main impetus behind the development of the skirts, instead of continually trying do disprove the ATR as the threat behind this development. Though your tactic is, to a point (that you have reached), perfectly valid in a court of law it is rather less productive in a forum that tries to establish a historical fact.<hr></blockquote> Up to this point, the argument supporting the skirts vs ATR has rested on the assumption that the ATR threat was the motivating factor. Therefore, I am simply making a direct response to that portion of your argument. Since I am only focusing on the timeline - I am simply reinforcing the fact that the timeline for the development of skirts favors the Bazookery argument over the ATR argument. <blockquote>quote:</font><hr>I don’t care what the original purpose of skirts was as long as I emerge knowing what it really was.<hr></blockquote> I'm not sure I follow you there <blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Yes, the ATR was a threat before the campaign in the East. But it was not a threat of such a nature that it required special attention. German tanks received progressively heavier armour in response to the increase in threats throughout the war (as we all know). However, the addition of skirts was a special answer to a specific threat, in a specific situation.<hr></blockquote> A specific threat that was diminishing as the war progressed. <blockquote>quote:</font><hr>To increase the armour thickness to at least 40mm in the areas eventually protected by the skirts would have been more expensive in terms of time, money, weight and production than the fitting of the simple skirts.<hr></blockquote> I'm not sure about this one ... the mounting of a skirt seems to be a great deal heavier than mounting smaller plates directly to the side of the vehicle since the area of the skirts will be much greater than the area of the added plates. The Pz IV was up armored in the front a few times during the war - why couldn't it be uparmored in the side in the same manner? <blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Which part in particular are you interested in? The deployment of ATRs or the development of the same?<hr></blockquote> Either or both - whatever you feel the most capable of commenting on.

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by Patgod: "hey fritz, congrats on that kick ass victory in france." "thanks hans, i had expected a much tougher fight out of the 'greatest army in zee world' heh" "yeah, damn frogs. well, i'm here on buisiness." "oh?" "yes, see the general staff wants to know what problems you faced, other then french whores and having to chase the retreating frogs." "humm, well ATRs took a heavy toll on my panzers, the frogs would wait in ambush to get side shots. we lost quite a few tanks that way" "ouch, that sucks. were you able to combat them though? i mean did you find a way to deal with them?" "yes, infact we did. often the[atr teams] hid in buildings near the roads, or in forests. after we started burning those buildings casualties went down considerably" "humm, ok i'll pass this onto the general staff. great talking to you bro" "yeah man, you should stop by my field office more often. and bring brewskies next time would ya? its hard getting good beer out here, damn french only drink girly 'wine'. loosers couldnt handle a real drink" "will do" and so, it was not till late 43 that schurtzen were commonplace. all because of 2 friends, and some brewskies.<hr></blockquote> Thanks for your insights. If you have anything relevant to add to the discussion then please don't hesitate.

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by Patrik: I don't know much of Schürtzen history so I wont argue on the reson why, to this I can only say just because it's a good and simple idea someone has to tink of it the first time and then convince someone that it's a good, simple and effective solution. The world is full of things that didn't exist before someone inveted them and got someone else to beleve in the idea. Patrik<hr></blockquote> An interesting response. Of course someone has to invent something the first time. However, you are more likely to spend resources on solving a problem that needs solving than a problem that doesn't need solving. Hanging skirts on tanks isn't a trivial matter. The extra weight of the skirts can make the vehicles difficult to steer or even effect the vehicles range. If the ATR threat is diminishing to the point of insignificance by 1943 (because tanks are more and more heavily armored) then why would you hang a bunch of heavy skirts on a vehicle for a threat that is diminishing? Doesn't make any sense to me.

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by Mattias: No problem ASL Veteran, opinions differ. But the next time, please extend me the courtesy of not distorting my words or belittle my opinion the last thing you do before leaving the discussion. M.<hr></blockquote> If you feel that I quoted you incorrectly then please post the specific reference and the exact distortion - along with any correction as necessary.

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by Mattias: The threat developed throughout 1942 (Again, the 14.5 mm ATRs where not available at the start of the war in the East), it was not until early 1943 that it was addressed in a concerted manner. We are talking about a number of months here, even if there was a war on things still didn’t happen at the drop of a hat.<hr></blockquote> See my post above. Hopefully that should be sufficient to show that the ATR threat was real prior to 1943. The statement that the ATR threat didn't develop until 1942 is patently false. <blockquote>quote:</font><hr>This difference was not so great as to completely abolish the use of ATRs in the German army. They where used in the west and the desert and they certainly brought a few into Russia as well. In fact the development of new ATRs for German service continued into 1942 when they finally went out of fashion.<hr></blockquote> I'll give you an opportunity to either recant this assertion or to provide actual facts that back that assertion. <blockquote>quote:</font><hr>See above, all the Germans had to do was to ask their tank crews if they felt a bit of extra protection would be a good idea.<hr></blockquote> Indeed, I couldn't have said it better myself. I'm sure those tank crews were screaming for more protection in 1939 - which is backed up by the last report I quoted in the previous post.

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by Paul Lakowski: The answer to why the skirts weren't mounted until '43 is easy , they weren't need until then because the germans rolled over most of their infantry opponents until then...it took until mid to late 1942 for the russians to rebuild their infantry units and supply sufficent stocks again. Since until this point Hitler perceived most german attacks were successfull it wasn't until the Stalingrad debacle that he saw any need .<hr></blockquote> Not to pick on Paul, whose technical knowledge of armor is quite impressive, but I think that this ‘opinion’ is a gross over simplification of the event that we know as World War 2. This is also an opinion which has been repeated by others in this thread. What this assumes (or actually states in this case) is that German armor was not exposed to ATR fire in the early war period because the Germans were sweeping all before them. In Paul’s quote he actually says “rolled over” rather than sweeps, but the intent is the same. The Germans were simply too successful to bother with such things as protection against ATRs since they were a non factor. It also makes the assumption that it would require direct intervention from Hitler to get these skirts hung on the sides of the German vehicles. From Panzertruppen Volume 1 : <blockquote>quote:</font><hr> The commander of Panzer Abteilung zb V 40 wrote a detailed 13 page report dated 18 July 1940 on their experiences and lessons learned in Norway: As the experience in Denmark had already shown, one must continuously calculate on the enemy possessing anti tank weapons. The British anti-tank rifle and the French 25mm Hotchkiss anti-tank gun were used in Norway. The armor of all Panzers, (PzKpwI, PzKpw II, and Neubau – PzKpfw IV) was penetrated by both of these weapons. (snip) During battles in towns, settlements, and single farmsteads that had been occupied by the enemy, the opponent could be quickly convinced to clear out, especially when fired at by the 2 cm KwK tank gun. As a result, houses were set on fire, which couldn’t be prevented. The necessity to fire at houses that commanded the roads, even when the opponent hadn't already opened fire from them, came from the experience that occupants with anti tank weapons (British anti tank rifles and French 25mm anti tank guns) let the Panzers advance to close range before suddenly opening fire. In addition, the enemy occupying the houses with machine guns would let the Panzers pass and then open fire on the following infantry.<hr></blockquote> Here is a quote from a Leutnant Meyer from Panzer Regiment 4. <blockquote>quote:</font><hr> On 15 September 1939, I drove from Prczeworsk to Zamosc with a Pz Kpfw IV, Pz Kpfw III and two Pz Kpfw I Ausf A. About 1 kilometer west of Dachnow, I drove past the command post of Infanterie – Regiment 130 and was requested to support an infantry attack against Polish forces who had attacked the regiment from out of the woods northwest of Dachnow. I received orders from the regimental commander to leave both Pz KpfwI Ausf A at the command post and with both heavy Panzers to reconnoiter through Dachnow toward Oleszyce. Coming from there, a bicycle rider reported that Oleszyce was clear of enemy. The previous orders were dropped. With both heavy Panzer I then supported an attack of the 1 Kompanie/Infanterie Regiment 130 against the enemy occupied woods. After contact had been made with the company commander, I started to attack. But, after about 400 meters, I recognized that the infantry company wasn’t following. At the same time I cam under very strong Polish artillery fire. I decided not to advance closer to the woods but turned south and combed through the village for enemy infantry. Because of strong fire from anti tank rifles in houses and trees, I shot up the entire western part of the village, setting it on fire. <hr></blockquote> Here is part of another combat report from Panzer Regiment 4 <blockquote>quote:</font><hr> At 0110 hours on 19 September 1939, the lead platoon of the 5 Kompanie Panzer Regiment 4 with five PzKpfw II and a PzKpfw IV encountered the enemy at the entrance to the village of Narol and were shot at by machine guns, anti tank rifles, and anti tank guns. The lead Panzer, immobilized by hits in the idler wheel and track, had to be abandoned. This Panzer was rendered inoperable by a round fired from the PzKpfwIV. An attack against Narol by the 5 Kompanie was not possible at night. <hr></blockquote> After the Polish campaign, the Germans sent a questionnaire requesting specific information on tactical problems that had been encountered. Here is a very small slice of the experience report from Panzer Regiment 8: <blockquote>quote:</font><hr> II. Organization of the Panzer Abteilung: Panzer Abteilung 66 was only outfitted with PzKpfwI and PzKpfwII. These are not sufficiently armored. Their fire power is too low. The absence of any PzKpwIII and PzKpfw IV made itself very noticeable. If only a small number of PzKpfw IV had been assigned, it would have been possible to combat enemy anti tank nests that often caused heavy losses in men and vehicles. The PzKpfw IV could quickly deal with the anti tank guns at a range at which enemy anti tank rifles would be ineffective. <hr></blockquote> Hopefully this is sufficient to show that ATRs were indeed a recognized threat to German armor before 1943. In fact, as the report from Norway should demonstrate, ATRs were a larger threat early in the war since the armor of the German tanks was thinner back then and could be penetrated from all angles. So as German tanks became more heavily armored the ATR threat was, in fact, diminishing.

I'm not going to argue with you Mattias. I have the opinion that you are from Russia and you feel very strongly about the ATR and its effectiveness. Doubtless it was also known as the "Great Eastern Terror" to the German tank crews who feared this horrible weapon so much that they thought it would be to their advantage to put several hundred extra pounds of weight on their vehicles. We will just have to disagree on this one I guess.

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by Mattias: So, what are you saying? That it is a coincident that schürtzen where fitted to surfaces vulnerable to ATR rounds at a time when these weapons finally available in great number and the men and leaders began to be able to use them with sufficient skill and determination. A time when the fighting was going into overdrive on the eastern front and the Germans where really beginning to feel hurt being brought upon them, when every man an tank counted? I don’t think I will ever understand why the HEAT holds such appeal There are no contemporary sources supporting this point of view, are there? And by contemporary I mean early 1943… All that speaks in favour of it is, firstly, the fact that the skirts may have a useful secondary effect against HEAT rounds, something that came to be the primary function after the final demise of the ATR. Secondly, the existence of a weapons employing HEAT (or rather HC) warheads at the time Schürtzen began fitting to production vehicles. And, finally, that several writers have written that this latter function was the one originally envisaged, but without substantiating that opinion further. That, against the stacking of facts in the shape of historical documents such as battlefield reports, biographies, manuals, live fire tests and the correlation of time and place, threat and remedy. Facts thank you M. Oh, P.S. Tiger quoted "Red Army Handbook 1939-1945" by S. J. Zaloga and L. S. Ness in another of these lovely threads. "The lack of a modern infantry anti-tank weapon was one of the singular failures of the wartime Soviet weapons industry. The Red Army was slow in adopting an anti-tank rifle but changed its mind in 1939-40 after having encountering Polish and Finnish anti-tank rifles. After several designs were tested and failed, in August 1941 the Red Army finally settled on the single-shot Degtaryev PTRD 14.5mm anti-tank rifles and the magazine-fed Simonov PTRS rifle. Of the two types, the simpler and cheaper PTRD was more common with 202,488 built through 1942, compared to 63,385 of the more sophisticated PTRS. They were both very large and cumbersom weapons, the PTRS weighing 44.7lb, and the PTRD some 35.2lb, requiring two soldiers to carry them. Their ammunition could penetrate 35mm of armor at 100 m, which made them a viable weapon for the first year of fighting. By the middle of 1942, German tanks were uparmoured to the point where the anti-tank rifles were useless in frontal engagements; however, they could still penetrate from the sides and rear, especially when used from close range. The anti-tank rifles remained the principle anti-tank weapon of the Soviet infantry through to the end of the war due to the lack of a more modern replacement; their main advantage was the sheer number available. Although not powerful enough to destroy a tank, thay were such a painful nuisance that in 1943 the Germans began to place armour skirts around the sides of the turrent and hull of their tanks and assault guns to protect against this nuisance."<hr></blockquote> Your quote isn't a fact - merely an opinion put forward by a published author. Facts please. Once again, why were the skirts not placed on German tanks in 1942 or even earlier? ATRs were around since 1918 - all the great powers knew about them and had plenty of time to find counter measures between the wars. Answer that question and you might be able to collapse the Bazookery argument. If that question is not addressed, then the Bazookery argument will stand.

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by Jeff Duquette: Although this is a valid point, I would like to point out that the numbers of ATR’s the Germans were facing prior to entering Russia were somewhat miniscule. The Soviets manufactured some ½ million PTRD’s and PTRS rifles during the war. Perhaps this nusacnce really only manifested itself after Barbarossa. But than why wouldn’t schurzen start showing up in early 1942. Regarding Bazookas in Tunisia in Dec 42, is this the time period which the first German Panzer may have been KO’d by American “bazookery”? What was the exact date of the engagement or formations involved?<hr></blockquote> Well, the first encounter between American and German tanks was supposedly on November 26th a few miles from Djedeida in Tunisia between a few Pz IVs and some Stuarts. One can extrapolate that where Stuarts are, American infantry can't be far behind. One can also assume that at some point a German tank may have encountered some form of Bazookery shortly thereafter. The Germans, being duly impressed by American bazookery promptly went out and copied it (creating the Shrek in 43). I would guess that they also would have recognized the threat to their armored fighting vehicles that these new fangled weapons presented and promptly found a remedy (skirts - coincidentally also in 1943). Perhaps the reason ATRs were tested against the skirts was that the Germans didn't have any Bazookas to fire at it? Your second point is exactly what I was thinking of too - if ATRs were the threat, then why not have the skirts in 1941, or 1942? Why February 1943 - a mere three months after presumably encountering American Bazookery? By taking the February 1943 date and comparing it to the threat, you can either assume that the Germans were dense and couldn't come up with a way to stop ATRs until 1943 (after knowing about them since 1918), or you can assume that the Germans were quite clever and came up with a defense against Bazookery a mere three months after first encountering them. A quick note to Jason's history lesson: Uparmoring of tanks throughout the war was primarily a response to the upgunning of tanks - not a response to the threat of ATRs. On a general note - I find the argument that the skirts were only added because ATRs weren't a big enough threat prior to 1943 to be lacking. Actually, if you turn the argument on its head, then you could just as easily argue that the Germans themselves didn't see the ATR as a threat since they stopped using them prior to 1940. They also never started using them again - in spite of encountering billions of them in so called close hard fighting for an extended period of time on the Eastern Front. If the Germans never started using them again, could we not presume that they didn't see them as either useful or threatening? If the Germans didn't see them as useful or threatening then why would they create a counter measure designed specifically to counter them? The Germans don't show a history of creating a defense against a weapon they themselves don't find useful to use. Take Zimmerit coating for example. The Germans used magnetic mines and created a countermeasure (even though the Allies didn't even use any magnetic mines). Magnetic mines were found to be useful, therefore a counter measure was created. Perhaps the answer is that skirts were originally designed as a countermeasure against Bazookery, and subsequently it was found that they were rather handy at protecting against ATRs too. A sort of unexpected bonus :cool:

ATRs had been around before the war started (in fact, the Germans had one in 1918). If the Germans had intended to protect their vehicles against ATRs then why didn't they start hanging these skirts in 1940? It would seem that the ATR threat would have well known prior to 1943? The Germans would have encountered the American Bazookas in Tunisia around Dec 1942. This does seem to coincide with the timeline for when the testing on the skirts began. Coincidence or Alien intervention? Just some thoughts .....

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by Triumvir: Obviously not all professional armies follow that route; look at the British during the Napoleonic Wars, whose conscription was mostly limited to the Navy, not the Army (but that navy was the finest in the world; _Shannon_ smashed _Chesapeake_ in fifteen minutes with a pressed crew.)[/QB]<hr></blockquote> Opening up a wonderful opportunity for patriotic Americans to discuss their early naval exploits. Looking at that particular battle does prove to be interesting though since the crew of the Chesapeake was unmotivated (not having been paid in a while) and hadn't been to sea in a long time. Even though the crew of the Chesapeake was crewed with volunteers - they weren't exactly in tip top shape either. How did those British fare against the USS Constitution BTW ? I don't think that the status of being either a volunteer or a conscript in and of itself is going to be a deciding factor. In WW1 in East Africa many British settlers formed up into volunteer units to fight the "Jerries", but one time into combat and their enthusiasm cooled considerably. Their training wasn't up to snuff either - they were more like a social gathering than an actual military unit.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Michael Dorosh: Exactly. Canadians used storm troop tactics at Vimy Ridge also, so the Allies were learning these lessons as early as 1917 - even, dare I say, earlier than the Germans? I have no doubt the Aussies were doing similar things also. Blitzkrieg was a term coined by a western Allied reporter; the Germans never used it. They simply applied the tools at hand (tanks) to the concept of schwerpunkt.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> As much as I know you Canadians enjoy beating your chests and singing your praises , (my goodness, it is almost as bad as those darn Aussies and Finns) I think it is safe to assume that the Germans first developed the so called Stormtrupper tactics. The first recognized experimentation was on 30 December 1914 by the elite "Garde - Schutzen" battalion in the Vosges. The Garde Schutzen was the premier Jager battalion in the German army and the Fifth Army authorized this battalion to develop new offensive tactics. Colonel Bauer, the German General Staff's siege warfare expert, wanted to give the battalion a 37mm light gun to play with, but Major Calsow was never able to use it to advantage, so he was sacked. A Captain Rohr was then placed in command and the battalion was turned into a hybrid Jager/Pioniere battalion equipped with a machine gun platoon, a mortar platoon (which the Germans invented BTW), and a flamethrower platoon (which the Germans invented), along with a bunch of infantry who viewed the new grenade (which the Germans also used first) as the primary offensive weapon rather than the rifle. This unit was then titled "Sturmbattalion Rohr" and was the official German test bed for new and innovative infantry tactics. :cool:

German infantry tactics in WW2 were a direct descendant of the "Stosstruppen" tactics practiced in 1918 - and developed in 1915 - 1918. Obviously German armor tactics were developed between the wars as the Germans only had about 7 tanks in WW1 (plus a bunch of captured ones). I am pretty confident that the term "Blitzkrieg" was applied by non Germans, but the "revolution" was not in the infantry tactics, but in the integration of armor, the coordination between all arms (armor, infantry, artillery, air force), along with the adjustment in operational thinking that allowed the Germans to combine all the elements successfully.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Michael Dorosh: My references also indicate the Soviets did not have ATMMs. ASL got a lot of things wrong - so did Up Front. Let's be careful what we use for sources, shall we?<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> I think what ASL had was called ATM or Anti Tank Mine as opposed to the ATMM or Anti Tank Magnetic Mine. The Soviets did have an Anti Tank grenade ... the RPG 43.

How about this for a nitpick. Infantry in CMBO can run through a Ford - thus making their crossing much more quick. I suppose it would depend on the depth of the Ford, but I would think that if the depth was waist deep or greater it would prove difficult, if not impossible, to run through a Ford.

Ya know, there is this one little annoying thing in CMBO that really just frustrates me to no end. For anyone who reads this and assumes that I am referring to the "abstract representation" of the little pixelated soldiers, let me disabuse you of that notion in advance. Situation: My troops are hiding in ambush, waiting for the enemy to get within striking distance. Enemy gets within sight, but does not detect my boys yet. I decide to sneak or crawl a meter or five to adjust my position or get a better angle without opening up the engagement. What happens? The troops stand up and blaze away - then get down and crawl or sneak to their new position!! :mad: It seems that there is no possible way to move without firing if the enemy is within range. Situation: my boys are hiding behind a wall after encountering the enemy (which prevents them from getting shot at 0% exposure). I want to move them from behind the wall to a nearby building so I would like them to crawl from their position behind the wall to the building (thus preventing the enemy from firing at them while they crawl behind the wall). What happens? They stand up and blaze away!! :mad: It is impossible to go from the hide position to crawling without standing up and taking fire first!! I just felt like getting that off my chest Somebody fix or do somefink!!! [ 09-09-2001: Message edited by: ASL Veteran ]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Brian: I'd have thought the idea was that all vehicles (within reason) should be able to utilise a ford - that was why the existed to offer an alternative to bridges. I can think of several battles where fords were significant because they did allow the attackers to cross rivers where no bridge was available.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> CMBB will feature fords that will be usable by vehicles. Alas, CMBO does not. Just one of those things we have to live with

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by JasonC: Personally I have nothing much against the CM system. It is extremely simply to use and clean. My only qualms about it have to do with responsiveness, speed, accuracy, certainty - all being somewhat too high. But I don't quite see the point in playing "artillery, the atari version", to walk in each shell. It is more work, and its produces much the same result once perfectionist players have tweaked every knob - a little fiddling delay, then a barrage where you want it.[/QB]<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> It is simple to use. However, I do think that there would be advantages in forcing a player to play with the spotting rounds. First, it would give the opponent a heads up that someone is trying to drop artillery on them. It could give a player a chance to react to the impending barrage. Second, it would increase the frustration level of the requesting player as the centerpoint of your FFE would almost never be exactly where you want it to be. Eventually, you may just have to say "Heck with it, that location is close enough!". I would also like to have the ability to have an FFE ... continuation feature that would stay for a few minutes after you stop a barrage and would allow the FO to re start a barrage from the same location within a fairly short notice. Naturally this would only hold for a few minutes after the initial barrage. Anyway, this is just my opinion of how I would like to play "Artillery Atari" and I do see some benefits to it. Disagree if you like - that is of no concern to me Incidentally, playing with the spotting round would directly speak to all of your issues of responsiveness, speed, accuracy, certainty which you listed above so I have to admit that I'm a little puzzled by your lack of enthusiasm for such a request.

I would have to agree that there are a lot of abstractions in CMBO for artillery. One thing that I would like to see implemented would be to have a little more interaction with the Spotting Round. Maybe I should place the desired location for the FFE, then when the spotting round comes down - that would then become the center of the FFE. I would then evaluate where the Spotting Round landed and decide if that is where I want the FFE to land - otherwise I should adjust the Spotting Round again. Seemed to work well for that "other" game about WW2 tactical combat . I wonder what kind of drift you could expect with an initial spotting round?

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Slapdragon: AVT -- I think it is fanciful, and stupid in fact, but so is putting the Bren into the class of the MG-42.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> I can't say I disagree with a single part of what you just said there.

The reason there is a class of weapons referred to as 'LMG' is that it is too difficult for an average rifleman to control a weapon that fires a full sized rifle round in a fully automatic mode without support from a bipod. This is the entire reason for the creation of the class of weapon known as the LMG. Give the squad a weapon that fires a full sized rifle round in full automatic mode accurately and reliably. There is no specification of an LMG being belt fed. There is no magical cut off point where 47 round drums become LMGs while 30 round magazines are not. This is also why the creation of the assault rifle was so revolutionary (and why it created a new class of weapon) - it used the short rifle round instead of the full sized rifle round and allowed the rifleman to have a full automatic capability in a weapon that can be managed. This is also why no weapon firing a full sized rifle round without a bipod could be reliably used in any but a semi automatic way. edited out comparison of Garand as Slapdragon recanted on that point [ 08-30-2001: Message edited by: ASL Veteran ]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Slapdragon: So -- you want the Bren an LMG -- lets throw the BAR and SVT in as LMGs also since they are close in firepower to the Bren.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> This is preposterous. The SVT is a semi automatic weapon and the Bren is a fully automatic weapon. You say they are close in firepower? The BAR - sure - it can be classed as a weak LMG without a quick change barrel. That wouldn't be a stretch. But to put the SVT in the same class as the Bren is fanciful.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Slapdragon: Now we attempt to promote the MG42 to a functional class of weapon that did not exist in the 1940s, the GPMG, thus freeing up the Bren to become the LMG.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> This is a real reach. Now you are saying that the MG42 is not a GPMG? The MG42 was the first GPMG - it defined the class. Just like the Dreadnought defined the battleship, the MG42 defined the GPMG. You can't really be serious here can you? <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Here I would have to say OK -- lets just call the BAR and LMG, and any other autoloading rifle with automatic capability .. snip<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> There are no autoloading rifles with automatic capabilities. The automatic rifle is also known as the self loading rifle. The automatic rifle does not mean that the weapon can fire full automatic. It means that the new round is loaded automatically - without the soldier manually turning the bolt. This is also why they are referred to as 'Self Loading Rifles'. Even a smart guy like you should know that Slappy. The weapons in this class would be the Garand, SVT 38 and 40, AVS 36, GEW 43, and weapons of their ilk. I'm curious - do you feel that the Garand is in the same class as the Bren? If so, can you justify it in some way? If the Garand is in a different class than the Bren - what class would that be? I begin to weary of this nonsense. Slappy, you are amazing. BTW, I couldn't give a rat's butt about having separate Bren teams or not. My only concern is the wild propaganda being spouted about making the Bren into an automatic rifle in order to fight against separate Bren teams in CMBO. Why concern for such a thing? I haven't got a clue. To me, calling a Bren an automatic rifle is like calling an apple an orange.

I'm not sure that anyone is trying to put the Bren in the same weapon 'class' as the MG42. The Bren is an LMG. The MG42 is a GPMG. Two different class of weapon. I see now that Slapdragon is essentially saying that the MG42 is an LMG and the Bren is not because it is not like the MG42. This would obviously make someone conclude that the LMG in WW2 was a class of two - the only weapons being an LMG would be the MG42 and the MG34. No other weapon could be classed as an LMG because no other squad automatic weapon is like the MG42 therefore they are all Automatic Rifles. This ignores the fact that the MG42 is classed as a GPMG because it can fulfill the roles of both LMG and MMG / HMG. I feel that this is poor 'taxonomy'. To class an MG42 as an LMG completely ignores it's role and use as an MMG. I think it is fairly widely acknowledged that the MG42 is a GPMG and is a class above LMG only type weapons. Slapdragon is comparing a GPMG to an LMG and concluding that the LMG is an AR because the GPMG fits the role of LMG better. It may fit 'modern' classifications, but it doesn't fit WW2 classifications. I think the regular use of the modern GPMG in the role of LMG has colored Slapdragon's opinion of the characteristics of WW2 LMGs. Of course, this ignores the fact that the GPMG role of the MG42 was revolutionary at the time. Incidentally, the higher rate of fire of the MG42 requires a heavier barrel than lower rate of fire weapons since the MG42 would heat up faster.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by tero: I count only 5 men in the HMG team. IIRC there are 6 men in the HMG team in CM. Which is the historically correct number, 5 by your source or 6 by CM modelling ?<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> Unless the author's background on the jackets of all his books is a fabrication, then Alex Buchner was a company commander in a German Mountain Division during WW2. I think he would be a trustworthy source for the size of an MG42 crew. You may have noticed that all independent MG crews in CMBO have 6 men for all nations. I'm sure the crew size is an abstraction/convenience. The actual size of a German Infantry Company Command Group would be 10 men not 6 as another example (and yes, I can list them all and their duties as well) - yet all company command groups for all nations in CMBO are 6. No big deal really. I would just hesitate to compare CMBO crew sizes to a published author's listed crew size. <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR> I make a German HMG section consisted of 2 guns + 12 men (section leader, horse cart driver, 2 gun leaders and 8 gunners). Divide that by two you get 6 men per gun. Approximation based on an abstraction ? Should the MG42 HMG sold only in pairs (as would be the appropriate OOB) or separate ? <HR></BLOCKQUOTE> I believe the sixth man in the German HMG crew in CMBO is representative of the crowd noise generated from all the spectators to my PBEM matches. Either that, or the sixth man is in reality one of the horses from the cart. This would then explain the ammo carried by the team, as a horse could carry a great deal of ammo in packs.