ASL Veteran

perhaps you can't follow my posts because you don't understand finance or accounting. That's okay, it isn't for everyone. Knowing that though, I'll try very hard to resist the temptation to rip your posts apart.

OMG, I am going to commit the cardinal sin of posting three times in a row!! I only add this because I wanted to make a quick adjustment to my numbers. Unfortunately my Minimum estimate is off because no additional Panzer units were deployed to the East Front in July so only the initial 200 can be counted and I can't add the individual replacements. This means that my raw minimum number will be off by 126 in each subsequent month because that's how many I added in July that didn't belong to units. So, the adjusted minimum for August would be 116 Available with 88 runners. For September it would be 144 available with 109 runners. For October it would be 160 available with 122 runners.

My other post accounts for both conditions Yes, I believe they can be used as a starting point because we have all the data to use it as such. Not really - I think I have narrowed most of it down, other than the 247 from the beginning. I attempted to get through the scattered information in your posts, but I never saw the May 31st figures posted there - just a lot of different unit strengths. However, even if you posted them already, I needed that information to make my post otherwise it wouldn't have made sense. Your posts also don't tie in the replacements with the inventory and the ready for issue figures and give a running total. If you did then I guess I missed it. By the way, I am not going to get into an argument about this, I am simply running some numbers from the same book you have and I am attempting to tie the numbers together into a sensible presentation. It is truly irrelevant to post the replacement units inventories without tying it into the whole or giving a running account. If you feel that I am just repeating in an inferior way what you have already spoken of, then I guess I'll just let you do your own thing. Incidentally, since I am not even addressing you or your posts I don't think it even matters if I read your posts. Perhaps if I was making a direct response to something you posted - then maybe you would want to ask if I read something you posted. Otherwise SOD OFF (to borrow a Cesspoolian term)

I’m not sure if I like punishment or what, but I was a little curious to see how accurately I could account for the Panthers during the period Steve asked about. All this comes from Panzertruppen Vol 2. BTW I neglected to include the rebuilt Panthers in the previous post for Ready for Issue figures. Okay, so on 1 July 1943, There are a total of 192 Panthers split between Pz Abt 52 and Pz Abt 51 along with 8 HQ Panthers for Pz Rgt 39 for a total of 200. Now, let’s check this against the inventory and production figures through July. Ready for issue figure for May 43 is 235, plus another 176 for the month of June. This gives us a total of 411 Panthers ready for issue (new) prior to Zitadelle – of which 200 are deployed. There were also a further 26 rebuilt making our total of 437 prior to Zitadelle. Inventory given for July 43 is 447 on the 1st of the month which is close to 437 but not exact. Okay, so losses for July are 84 with ready for issue being 180. This nets to +96 which would theoretically leave us with an August 1st figure of either 533 if we go by the ready for issue number or 543 if we use the inventory figure for July 1st and add 96. The figure given as inventory on Aug 1st is 553 (there seems to be an ‘off by ten’ theme here). IF 70% of the ready for issue was sent to the East Front this would give us 180 x .70 = 126 replacements for 84 losses netting out to 42 additional tanks added to the 200 previously deployed and a total tank strength of 242 for the month of August (not all of which would be operational). This does give us a theoretical max figure for the east of 242 and if we use the May 31 1944 figures for an operational ballpark percentage we would have a 76% operational readiness figure making 242 x 76% = 184 operational Panthers on August 1st all on the East Front. Okay, now we can calculate runners for September 1st. We can check the replacements sent to the East Front on Page 109 which shows 71 Panthers heading east in SS Pz Rgt 2 in August. The ready for issue figures for August are 153. Using our 70% assumption we would guess that 107 of these Panthers were sent east – of which 71 were all in SS Pz Rgt 2. The others would have either been sent east individually or would be added to the 247 that we already haven’t accounted for in the inventory. If we assume that the 107 were all sent east then we have 242 + 107 = 349. We then have to subtract losses of 43 giving us 306 x 76% readiness = 233 operational Panthers on September 1st. If we assume that the only Panthers sent east were the 71 of SS Rgt 2 we would have 242 + 71 = 313 subtracting losses of 43 we would then have 270 x 76% readiness = 205 runners. This should establish a min and a max for September 1st. Similarly let’s look at our total inventory figure as a check. The total inventory on September 1st is listed as 650. Our last given inventory figure was 553 so if we add 153 (RFI) – 43 (losses) = 110 (Net Gain) to 553 we get 663 total Panthers. Once again, not exact but pretty close. If we use the previously calculated 543 figure and add 110 we get 653 which is a lot closer, but still not exact. Anyway, the 233 operational figure seems fairly reasonable as a max. Looking at October 1st we can see that 96 Panthers arrived on the East Front in Pz Rgt 23. Ready for issue figures for September were 159 so if we use our 70% assumption we would have 111 sent east. Losses were 80 during that month so we would have 111 – 80 = +31. Add that to our previous total of 306 and we have 337 x 76% = 256 runners maximum. IF we assume that the only Panthers sent east were the 96 of Pz Rgt 23 then we would have 270 + 96 = 366 – 80 (losses) = 286. If we take the 286 and multiply it by the readiness factor of 76% we get 217 runners for October 1st. This gives us our min max as between 256 and 217. Checking against the given inventory we see that it is listed as 728 on Oct 1st with a note saying that the original document was adjusted. Our previous given inventory was 650 + 159 RFI = 809 for Oct 1st. Subtract losses of 80 and we get an inventory of 729. Okay using our calculated inventory figure from before we would have 653 inventory + 159 RFI = 812 – 80 (losses) and we have 732 total inventory. Taking our adjusted figure of a 663 base figure (calculated from the previous given inventory figure) we would have 663 + 159 RFI – 80 = 742 (which probably accounts for the note that it was adjusted). We have three different total inventories, two of which we calculated and one that’s given. Anyway, I guess that’s enough for now. I can continue for the rest of the months if this is of interest to Steve. Otherwise I think I’ll just go watch some NBA basketball!!

Panzertruppen volume 2 has a nice chart on page 205 listing the tank strengths of all units on the Eastern front for 31 May. There are 9 units listed in Heeregruppe Suedukraine with a total of 107 available, of which 56 were operational and which includes 59 replacement tanks that came to the front by June 31 (If I'm reading that right). Of the nine units, the Panthers are all concentrated in only two divisions (23 Pz Division and Gross Deutchland) There are 13 units listed in Heeresgruppe Nordukraine with a total of 194 available of which 177 operational and which includes a further 206 replacement tanks that arrived between 31 May and 30 June. The operational tanks are concentrated in 4 divisions - really only two divisions (Wiking and 8th Panzer) with the other two having around 30 between the two of them. The replacement tanks mostly went into two divisions (79 each for 4th and 5th Panzer) with the two others that only had 30 between them getting the rest. There are 4 units listed for Heeresgruppe Mitte of which none have any Panthers. There are 3 units listed for Heeresgruppe Nord, of which one (11th SS Pz Grenadier) has 12 Panthers - only 5 operational. While this is only a quick snapshot at the end of the period Steve is asking about, I find it notable that nearly all the Panthers were to be found in Army Group South (yeah, so it was broken into two parts). So, if we were having regional distinctions, a QB set in the south would have a much better chance of getting a Panther than someone in the north or center. Anyway, the totals given for 31 May are: Pz IV: 603 Available, 484 Operational, and 123 replacements arriving between 31 May to 30 June. Pz V: 313 Available, 238 Operational, 265 replacements arriving between 31 May and 30 June. Pz VI: 298 Available, 233 Operational, 32 replacements arriving between 31 May and 30 June. Examining the production figures for the month of June 44 we find that 370 were produced during the month and that 338 were ready to issue during the month. From our chart we show that 265 replacements arrived during June so that is 71% of the production run heading east and a whopping 78% of the ready to issue heading east. We see the total inventory is listed as 2038 for the month of June. If we take our available and add that to our replacements we get 578 Panthers accounted for on the east. This leaves a further 1460 in the inventory unaccounted for. I can check the tank totals on the eve of D-Day in the west on page 177. It shows that in the west there were 655 Panthers on 10 June 1944 in the West. That of course leaves 805 unaccounted for (1460 - 655). Probably in depots or in various stages of refitting or somefink. Okay, IF we assume that the 78% figure (of the ready for issue numbers) holds true for the entire time period, you would see the following number of Panthers sent east as replacements during the appropriate months (from page 284): Sep 43: 121 Oct 43: 182 Nov 43: 173 Dec 43: 241 Jan 44: 221 Feb 44: 191 Mar 44: 227 Apr 44: 215 May 44: 288 The raw total of ready for issue between that time period is 2,163. 2163 x .12 = 260 tanks theoretically sent to the west, but if you have 655 deployed in the west, then I guess that would make the 78% figure incorrect as a blanket assumption. Taking 655 divided by 2163 we get a 70% figure for Panthers sent East so the numbers above would have to be adjusted down to: Sep 43: 109 Oct 43: 164 Nov 43: 155 Dec 43: 216 Jan 44: 198 Feb 44: 172 Mar 44: 204 Apr 44: 193 May 44: 259 There were also around 200 Panthers already in the east at the beginning of this time period (August). You will note, of course, that the number theoretically sent east in May is an all time high and is almost equivalent to the total of operational Panthers on May 31 (which may indicate a high attrition rate). From this, I would hazard a guess that your operational Panther strength for the period would probably be somewhere between 100 and 300 Panthers a month (or less) during this time frame and that they would almost all be located in Army Group South. My goodness, that post was almost Jason like! :eek: Perhaps I should go and seek help. edited because equalivent is not a word (Doh) [ February 26, 2002, 07:30 PM: Message edited by: ASL Veteran ]

All you have to do is go to your nearest book store and browse the military history section. Thumb through whatever catches your fancy. Buy whatever you can afford. Eventually you will build up a library on a subject you enjoy. I buy a new book just about every weekend. Just got a good one on the Crimean War the other day. If you can't find something at the book store, you can always browse Amazon.com or Borders books online.

Winner of most knowledgable grog category: [x] Rexford - grog among grogs. Hell, he even wrote a book about armor penetration. :eek: runner up - [x] LOS - been quiet recently, but he deserves a vote too. [x] Michael Dorosh - well, I suppose he wrote a book too. That makes him a runner up at a minimum. Winner of visual aides category: [x] Jeff Duquette - always good with a diagram. Winner of most long winded category: [x] Jason C - his posts are so long I seldom make it entirely through one.

Well, you know that the Iron Chef always likes to jump in and add an insightful comment or two to most threads on the forum. His mastery of WW2 minutae is rather impressive - even Groglike on occasion.

Anyone who has lived in California during a drought will tell you that fire and trees don't mix and only a complete moron would deliberately set a forest on fire to deny a few meters of ground to an enemy advance. Before long several hundred square MILES of forest would be burning out of control and I doubt there would be too many volunteer fire fighters running around trying to put it out. Sparks and little burning specks would also be blowing around setting buildings and other things on fire several meters from the genesis of the fire - even jumping fire breaks. Putting out forest fires takes a LOT of manpower and a LOT of hard work. Rather than lighting fires, my guess is that most troops probably feared fire because of it's unpredictable nature. In CMBO fire is very predictable and contained, thus its exploitation in the game is gamey. If someone wants to use that "tactic" then go ahead and "fire away" if your opponent doesn't mind, but to try to justify it as a historically accurate tactic just seems a little shallow to me. If someone feels strongly enough that it was a valid and common tactic, then I would just suggest that you go out to a forest and light some trees on fire. Dig a foxhole ten meters from where you started the fire and then tell us how normal and common this behavior would be as you gawk at a thirty foot tall flaming torch that's close enough to roast marshmallows over. That's my 2 cents anyway

I seem to recall, in the distant reaches of my brain, that the Israelis complained about the M-60 tank burning easily during the 73 war and that it had something to do with the hydraulic fluid that was used. I think it was some kind of cherry colored fluid or somefink - although I'm kinda thinking right now that hydraulic fluid is normally red. Well, I did say it was from the distant reaches of my brain now didn't I?

It's not. Modelled that is. It was one of the favorite topics for ... his name escapes me now - the dude who said he was going to make his own version of CM. One of Steve's best buds .... peacetime army. Claimed to be an engineer of some sort. Anyway, none of that really matters to the question does it? A search could reveal much on this topic though I think.

I would like to see a guard rail or a wall of some kind along the top of the bridge. Not only would it keep trucks from falling off, but infantry could hide from fire while advancing across.

Sometimes you just gotta go with what's available!! . Obviously I didn't dig very far . That's also why I encouraged someone to post some data in order to take at least a slightly rational look at the two vehicles. Chest thumping patriotic discussions don't get ya very far if we want to actually learn something.

Okay, I did a little digging and it would appear that the penetration ratings for the various 76mm guns on the T-34 (and other Soviet vehicles) are comparable to the US 75mm - the 76mm has a marginally higher MV, but the penetration is almost identical to the penetration ratings listed in CM for the Sherman 75. The T-34/85 main gun has penetration stats that are similar to the US 76 used by the "Easy Eight" - nearly identical at 0 degrees at 500 meters and 1,000 meters as far as I can tell. Armor protection between the Sherman and T-34 is also similar in terms of thickness. I am not sure about the slope comparison of the front plates - but the Sherman in CM is something like 60 mm 47 degrees IIRC. So taking a look at things a little less "patriotically" it would seem that the Sherman 75 is the rough equivalent of the T-34/76 and the Sherman 76 is the rough equivalent of the T-34/85 in terms of firepower and protection. This only leads to a comparison of reliability and crew placement / space. On that I will leave you all to judge for yourselves . Naturally if someone would like to post some comprehensive statistics for penetration and armor protection I think it would possibly bring a little less - 'opinionated' discussion on the topic and a little more 'direct comparison'. Everybody knows the T-34 is an uber tank therefore it must be superb. Everybody knows how much the Sherman sucks, so it must be a lame tank that explodes on sight. Well, the Germans didn't think the Sherman was a suck tank at El Alamein. I think people will find the Sherman to be quite effective in Tunisia and Italy when CM 3 comes out. Try tangling with a Sherman in a Pz III armed with the same gun as those 50mm AT guns in CMBO. Yeah, I think some German players might have a tough time of it. A Pz IIIJ would have just as much trouble with a Sherman as it would have with a T-34 - and that's really where the T-34 got its reputation. Fighting against Pz IIIs.

30 + scenarios on the way.

I think you have to be within 10 meters to attack an enemy vehicle in CMBO with the Gammon bomb. I don't know how many are assigned per platoon in CMBO - I think there is some random factor involved.

Well, my reaction would be to stand around if I heard gunshots in my hometown - mostly because I wouldn't be expecting to be shot at. I actually might not even identify the sound as gunshot sounds for a few seconds - and even then I might wonder about it. As a civilian I just wouldn't expect gunfire to be going off in my direction so my reaction would be more of "what the hell?" I think most soldiers realize that they may be the target of hostile fire and would doubtless react more quickly than a civilian would. [ February 06, 2002, 11:32 PM: Message edited by: ASL Veteran ]

Actually Michael, I was not trying to say that you were biased about the British, and I am not trying to bait you into a flame war. I am simply pointing out that the examples you are using to prove your point - whatever that may be right now - can easily be turned around to show that what they are doing was not considered normal by the participants themselves. If the participants are stating that the behavior is not normal, how can you use that to prove that something is normal behavior? No, it must be extraordinary behavior. If the behavior is extraordinary, then why is it extraordinary? The reason it was extraordinary is that the British didn't seek cover, but just walked along. If your point is that all WW1 infantry were trained to walk into MG fire and did so willingly because they had never seen a MG before - then that statement would clearly be false because the Germans thought the British actions to be extraordinary. Clearly if the Germans thought it extraordinary they certainly wouldn't be doing things like that themselves. If you wanted to say that British Infantry in specific walked into MG fire willingly - then that might be true. However, since that was extraordinary behavior - as amazed Germans said - then I'm not sure it proves anything other than the British soldiers were brave and trained poorly at that specific point in time. Or possibly that they weren't smart enough to seek cover. (although I hate to put it that way). Obviously even the British themselves must not have attacked in that manner prior to the Somme if the Germans were saying that they had never seen something like that before. If the whole purpose of your series of posts is to show that a human being can willingly walk around under heavy fire - okay, I can accept that. But that proves what exactly? It doesn't prove that Infantry of all nations in WW1 walked around like they were on a Sunday stroll through no man's land. No, you might be able to make that case for the British infantry in certain specific instances, but to draw from your examples that whole armies of human beings will ignore the chance of being visited by death and just loll about in front of MGs - well that's a bit of a stretch I should think. Most normal human beings will think of self preservation - don't you agree? So what you are actually proving is that, under extraordinary circumstances , men can walk around while under heavy fire like a Sunday stroll. There was even an Italian Company during WW1 where the company commander kept his troops standing at attention while being blasted by artillery. Very impressive. But what does it prove? Does it prove that troops will ignore heavy artillery bombardments on a regular basis? No, it just shows that some men do some brave and foolish things sometimes. So, getting back to your MGs. If your point is that infantry can regularly ignore MG fire and walk around no mans land like a Sunday stroll - False. If you want to say: Under extraordinary circumstances infantry can do some brave and stupid things - sure, I can buy that. That's how heroes are made. I believe that I am right on point in your discussion - if not, then I really haven't got the foggiest idea of what you are trying to prove - if anything.

Wow, it is Michael hour tonight! I just want to draw your attention to this portion of your own quote - especially the part where they say "we had never seen that before". Now I know how ... how shall I say ... proud you are of the army of the commonwealth. However, there was another army attacking on the Somme. The French army. Their attack looked nothing like the British attack - and faired much better. You see, the French and Germans were using fire and movement long before the British figured it out. Another interesting quote for what it says about the English types. You will note that the Germans thought the British were daft. Wow, this really is a ... rather revealing remark wouldn't you say? Apparently the British saw how the French and Germans were fighting and decided that it was too complicated for their troops (I would be feeling rather insulted by that if I was British). I guess one could draw the inference that the British, far from being an army of tactical innovators, were really behind the curve - and by 1917 they were probably on the level of the Germans and French in 1915. Far from proving your point, that infantry in WW1 advanced by walking and ignoring cover, it only serves to highlight the incompetence of the British Army during WW1. :eek:

I read your post and fully understood its content. If CM can't model MG grazing fire, then that is the cause. The effect is that you can't use MGs effectively in enfilade - and there is no way to 'play around it' and get any results that are similar to properly modelled grazing fire in CMBO as it currently is. Now, the reason I say that you can't play around it is because you can't. If you set up an MG in an enfilade position it is no different than setting it up to fire directly at the target - and in most cases less effective than firing directly at the target. Now you can use your MGs that way in CM, but make no mistake in thinking that it is an adequate work around. It isn't. It is like fighting a boxing match with one hand tied behind your back and it limits the way you employ MGs tactically. So, the context within which I am referring to 'play around' is that you aren't playing around a weakness in MGs - you are simply not playing with that feature at all by using MGs exclusively as Point Fire weapons. 'Playing around' to me means that you can tweak your deployments and alter your unit composition etc. to obtain a result that is similar to the desired effect. As it stands there is no way to acheive an effect similar to fully modelled grazing fire in CMBO. Yes, ASL did a tremendous job with grazing fire. I was known as 'Firelane Master' for my preference of the use of grazing fire and became expert at sighting MGs for maximum effect in the game. That is admittedly why I miss grazing fire so much - because I relied on it so heavily in ASL. Obviously game conditions don't always mirror reality (which is why I never refer to ASL in these debates, but rely on FMs and historical sources), but you can bet that if grazing fire were modelled in CM I would be an expert in its employment in CM too. Not to be totally negative though - as a Point Fire weapon MGs seem to be modelled just fine in CM. The firepower ratings 'feel' about right, although I think the suppression model could be tweaked up a little, and the troops running around pell mell in the open needs to be addressed. I'm sure that is what will be looked at in CMBB - although it still isn't the same thing as fully modelled grazing fire.

It is a significant defect. No, it can't be played around. You haven't thought out of the box and grasped the true nature of the problem - which is that the danger space (extending from the MGs barrel all the way out to the beaten zone) is not, and can not, be modeled with the current game engine. I would explain the 'box' as "I shoot at a target, and the target is hit - so what's the problem?" which completely ignores the fact that the bullets are 'travelling' to the target and influencing everything in between. However, if grazing fire is not in your bag of tactical 'tricks' you won't notice that it's missing - therefore you won't be able to identify what the problem is. The problem is pretty straightforward, and it has nothing to do with WW1 mythology. The significance of the problem is that you can't use an MG effectively in some ways that they were commonly employed. I think anyone who has been in the service and gone through that exercise in Basic where you are crawling under some barbed wire while an M60 MG is firing tracers overhead will understand the situation. Even though the bullets from the MG were passing, like 50 feet overhead, they felt like they were right on top of you and you hugged the dirt trying to get as low as possible. You can't really tell how low the tracers are as they pass overhead. I know I was pinned down though . Wow, does that bring back some memories out of the attic!

Steve said that motorcycles were out. They tried to include them, but it was impossible to have the 'riders' 'abandon' the motorcycles and then remount them later within the limitations of the current engine.

I tried to resist the bait - I truly tried . When it comes to ASL though I am a "Defender of the Faith". I understand your main point is not directed specifically at ASL, but one unfamiliar with the game might get a few misconceptions about what ASL is all about by reading that post. Maybe you have just been away from SL too long - or never truly played ASL. The Germans have a whole laundry list of squads from which to choose: 4-6-8, 4-6-7, 5-4-8, 4-4-7 (yes, a German 447), 8-3-8, 6-5-8, 4-3-6 - each one representing a different type and experience level - and usable by a designer in any way he sees fit. The Soviets have a large variety of squads to choose from too: 4-4-7, 4-5-8, 6-2-8, 5-2-7, 4-3-6. Note that veteran Soviet squads have a range of 5 - equivalent to British, French, and minor nations range for their base units. There are also ELR levels, ratio of leaders to squads, Human Wave assaults, Commissars, and a whole host of other items included. ASL tried to highlight different national characteristics to add flavor to the game. It was a design choice and it worked. When you are dealing with cardboard pieces and mapboards you aren't going to have precision. Some fudging has to be done to maintain playability - and if you have ever truly played ASL you will know that they were certainly testing the limits of playability in the latest rules versions. Soviet MGs are also just as powerful as Britain's, France's, or the US. In fact, I think the only nation with a LMG rated at a 3, an MMG rated at a 5, or an HMG rated at a 7 is Germany and the MG34 / 42. Every other nation in ASL has LMG 2, MMG 4, HMG 6. Doesn't seem out of line to me. I think this pretty much tells us your point of view and what it is based upon. Oh, and I can honestly say that I never lost a scenario as the Soviets in ASL because of the lack of two hexes of range in my base Soviet squads . My dice and leaders usually played a much larger role. :eek: I could actually go on and on, but I know that you are a swell guy Kip and I don't want to belabor the point. ASL is the best tactical wargame ever made with cardboard, and I think it has a lot to offer the CM series in terms of ideas (not in terms of direct translation). I think any game designer could pick up a thing or two from a game as long lived and successful as SL / ASL. A game that has been evolving for some 30 years and is still going must be doing something right. Okay, now I'm finally finished!!

I think the main reason there will be no telephone pole doodads is that Moon, in his new capacity as President, decided they should not be included. Steve & Charles would love to include them, but under the circumstances it is now impossible. All complaints should naturally be directed toward Moon.

You can never have too many doodads. :cool: