Blackhorse

Double post [This message has been edited by Blackhorse (edited 06-08-2000).]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by thomasj: First before the question I would like to say (HI!) to everyone, being new on the Forums, and give a HUGE thanks for BTS for their time and effort.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> Tom, Welcome aboard. What do you do in USAREUR? As for the mousewheel support...Sorry, I have no idea.

Very impressive.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Toad: I am in disbelief over what I have just seen, and I must share it. I almost can't believe what *actually* happened. I am baffled at the behaviour of my smoke-laying STuG through this whole episode. If I didn't witness the Sherman ramming into it, and pushing it aside - while it continued it's smoke orders - I wouldn't have believed it.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> Pretty neat. I think a combination of heavy smoke immediately in front of the Stug, coupled with it being buttoned up and arty and suppressive fires falling all around led to that ugly knife fight close encounter. The last shot of smoke was proabaly right after the TC said, "Huh? What was that bump? Driver, you hit something?" I'd hate to be in that Stug Zug's shoes right about now. I must commend your opponent on a pretty ballsy move as well. Looks like you two have a good fight going.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Zulu1: After zis fifz yer, ve vil hav a reli sensible riten styl. Zer vil be no mor trubls or difikultis and evrivun vil find it ezi tu understand ech ozer. ZE DREM VIL FINALI KUM TRU <HR></BLOCKQUOTE> Mein Fuhrer, I can Valk! Good one Zulu. That is hilarious

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by billcarey: This is fun(ny) to watch! Willhelm Carius, "Handbook of Knowledge I Pulled out My Butt", 1944. It is a really great resource! <HR></BLOCKQUOTE> LOL! I get the very distinct and unequivocal feeling we're arguing with a 10 year old. Time to pull pitch and climb to a higher altitude in this thread. C-ya!

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by MG Mannschft: There are 20 Authors listed in his Bibliography all in German whom he used as scorces for his book. If you want me to list them, I will. If you know German, then you can aquire them. contains everything that you would want to know or in your case not want to know about the German Army. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE> Heh heh, a coupla things in regards to this MG. First of all, I'm fluent in German so fire away. Second, both my uncles fought in the Wermacht in WWII. They have seen the elephant. Third, When you give me the bibliography, go ahead and give me the publishing date as well. Fourth, who is feeding you this crap?

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by MG Mannschft: Instead of my quoting you long Versus go get the book. The other books, not just one, that I Have been using are Von Mellenthin's "Panzer Battles" and if you dont know who Von Mellenthin is, You dont know the german Army. MG<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> MG, How hard can it be to read and quote just a few sentences dealing with tactical employment of HMGs and LMGs? I don't want all pages, just a relevant few lines, much like the ones I gave you from several reliable sources. The same goes for TO&E. As for Von Mellenthin's book, I have the fourth Edition. Here's an interesting quote, In the Crisis in the West section, pg 319 in my book: "On 24 September two regiments of the 559th Volks Grenadier Division suported by the 106th panzer brigade, put in an attack west of Chateau-Salins." The map on my page 315 entitled "Army Group G, 15 September 1944" Shows the following Divisions on the Front Line. 19 (VGD) Volksgrenadier Division 559th VGD 462 VGD 17 SS 3 PGD 553 VGD 15 PGD 16 INF DIV Out of curiosity, how old are you?

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by CEO: Uhhh. Check back a few posts. The info you posted, I already let 'im have it with it!<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> Gotcha CEO. I didn't realize at the time that your book was Nafziger. He (Nafziger) pretty much does TO&E research for a living. So, I just reinforced what you had already stated

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by MG Mannschft: According to the German Infantry Handbook, (Again By Alex Buchner) from the Origanel German, States that there was a machine Gun Squad that advanced infront of the Rifle Squad which covered the Machine Gun. Remember the Volksgrendiers where a Strickly a Home defence Force, Their Actions proved it during the Very short Time from Sept. 1944 to April of 1945. Another Thing On Volksgrenadiers, Apart of what you might think they where equiped with, There Training was non-Exsitant Remember these where not formed from regular army Troops. They where Elderly and The young. There was no Time for Training. (Note: Read "Panzer Battles" By Von Mellenthin to get some Idea of what I are talking about) Two: Heavy Machine gun Teams... ...Ammunition and two Extra Men. Three: Volksgrenadier SMG Units. Since your Game does not Hinge on the Realistic use of Volksgrenadier Sub-Machine Gun Units, and you have only one scorce of information on them, I'll be glad to overlook this one. MG<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> MG, You are starting to look foolish (I'm being lenient). First of all, I showed you a second source explaining Volksgrenadier composition. The source was George Nafzifger. Ever heard of him? Any response? A few questions for you. 1. Who the hell is this guy Alex Buchner you keep popping off about? What are his credentials? 2. I want direct quotes from his book showing the use of the HMG, the LMG, and any other MG. If you want to maintain any legitimacy in this arguemnt, you better get reading and writing fella. 3.I, no scratch that, We want you to go ahead and quote Herr Buchner on the TO&E of the Volksgrenadier while you're at it. Oh, and a few more things. 1.Volksgrenadier ARE NOT VOLKSSTURM 2.You seem incapable of understanding that the HMG moves as fast as any squa in CM. Oh hey, did you miss that? The only thing they can't do is run. How long does it take to break down a HMG from the Lafette Mount? How long does it take to set up? What magnification are the optics? 3. Your website has two ranks that are utter rubbish. SS Oberpanzergrenadier and SS Panzergrenadier. Where the heck did you dig those up... ALex Buchner? Now, go do your research and get back when you've compiled the quotes from the book. Allons

I have definitive proof The German Order of Battle, Infantry in World War II by George F. Nafziger pg 33-34 Volksgrenadier Division "Late 1944 saw a new formation in the German infantry. The Volksgrenadier Division. When divisions were destroyed and reconstituted from the various replacement divisions they were redesignated "Volksgrenadier" or People's Grenadier" division in an effort to regenerate some enthusiasm for them... Their heavy equipment was less substantial than that of a regular infantry division... However, the infantry was equipped with large numbers of sub machineguns and anti-tank weapons Fusilier Company: Company Staff 1 Sub Machinegun Platoon 2nd sub machinegun platoon Reconnaissance platoon Heavy Weapon Platoon. There you have it. It's so nice to be at Fort Knox, with all these reference materials close at hand. Thank You Patton Museum library and Armor Center Book Store. Allons. [This message has been edited by Blackhorse (edited 06-05-2000).]

http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usamhi/DL/AtoZ.htm Folks, This has a significant amount of pertinent and not so pertinent documents. Of particular interest is the Handbook on German Forces, dated May '45 Enjoy.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Wesreidau: Great post! Good example of a historic battle suitable for a scenario. Now you gotta create it, shoulda kept quiet Ermm..I`ll be the Russians ok LOL<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I posted this in another thread, but felt it worthwhile for all to read and enjoy.The following is taken from "Small Unit Actions During the German Campaign in Russia". It is part of the Historical Series from the CMH, USA. It was originally published in 1953. It is the result of interviewing the German officers, non-commissioned officers, and soldiers who served on the Eastern Front. "Chapter 1. Section VIII. Company G Recaptures Hill 726 (October 1942) During the spring and summer of 1942 the Germans strengthened the Rzhev salient and eliminated Russian forces that had gained a foothold west of the Vyazma-Rzhev rail line. The salient gradually became one of the strongest defense lines the Germans had built in Russia. In the early autumn Marshal Zhukov launched an offensive against the Rzhev salient to divert German forces from the Stalingrad front and to eliminate this potential threat to the Russian capital. In this action, which is the last one in the series concerning the fighting west of Moscow, Company G resisted the onslaught of fresh Russian troops who had recently arrived from training centers in Siberia. In mid-September Russian infantry supported by tanks seized Hill 726, some 10 miles north of Olenino. Once the Russians had wrested it from the Germans, they withdrew their tanks and left an infantry company of about 75 men to defend the newly won position. This hill now constituted a dent in the German MLR and afforded a sweeping view of the German rear area, thus hampering movements. Its rapid recapture was of vital importance to the Germans. The Russian defense system on the hill was not organized in a continuous line, but rather in the form of strong points. The positions were quite deep, afforded overhead cover, and were so well camouflaged that they could only be detected at very close range. The communication trenches leading to the rear were deep enough only for crawling. All machineguns were emplaced so as to deliver only frontal fire. Mortars were emplace on the reverse slope of the hill, and large quantities of ammunition and handgrenades had been stored in the strongpoints. A belt of wooden mines-to which German detectors did not respond-extended almost completely around the hill. Gaps had been left in the mine belt to permit passage of friendly patrols. Before the attack, German reconnaissance patrols were able to identify these lanes. Company G made five or six attempts to retake Hill 726, but failed; in each case the attack was halted at the very beginning because of heavy casualties incurred from mines and massed mortar fire. The Russians defended the hill with extreme tenacity. The company commander, CPT Veihmann, observed that the Russians confined their activity to the hours of darkness. During the day, their positions appeared deserted. Russian reconnaissance patrols were very active, but only between midnight and dawn. Viehmann decided to launch a surprise attack at dusk on 2 October. He selected 30 men who, together with two flame thrower teams, were to make up the assault detachments. Six machinegun teams were to follow directly behind. After seizure of the hill, an intrenching team was to move in with previously prepared barbed wire obstacles, set them up on the reverse side of the hill, and establish defensive positions. All men in the assault detachments were equipped with sub-machineguns and issued an ample supply of handgrenades. They were familiar with the terrain, including Hill 726 itself and the Russian MLR. Under cover of darkness and unnoticed by the Russian, the assault troops moved from their assembly area into the jumpoff positions. At the scheduled time the two companies along the flanks of the German MLR facing the right and left sides of the hill as well as the machineguns located on the southern slope poured fire into the Russian positions. While the german troops in the MLR diverted the enemy's attention by sudden shouting, the assault elements attacked and penetrated the Russian mine belt through two previously identified gaps. The defending Russians were taken completely by surprise. The fire and shouting from all sides confused them as to the true direction of the attack. They were further thrown off balance by the German flame throwers, despite the fact that the latter failed to function after only a few bursts. Nevertheless, the Russians did not give away to panic or abandon their positions, but struggled to the bitter end. After about an hour of hand-tohand- fighting the entire hill was in German hands, as were 20 Russian prisoners. The initial German objective, to cut Russian communicatiosn to the rear, had been achieved early in the attack. The Russian MLR was thereby out of contact with the defenders on the hill, who apparently were not alert enough to summon assistance from the rear before being cut off. Once the hill was taken, The Germans immediately dispatched two listening sentries to points about 30 yards in front of their lines, set up barbed wire obstacles, and otherwise prepared their defensive positions. Within 2 hours a continuous line of barbed wire entanglemts stretched across the crest of the hill. About an hour after the completion of these defenses one of the sentries reported the approach of about 40 Russians. All entrenching work was immediately suspended and the defense positions were quickly manned. Soon thereafter the second sentry confirmed the report of the first. The gap in the wire obstacle line which had until then been left open for the men at the listening post was closed. At a given signal the Germans opened fire just as the screaming Russians began their counterattack. Rushing headlong into the wire entaglements, which they had failed to spot in advance, The Russians were cut down by the German defensive fire concentrated on that zone. Only three of the attackers were able to regain the safety of their jumpoff positions. The next day the Russians directed heavy harrassing fire against Hill 726, but made no further attempts to conduct a concerted infantry attack." A very cursory analysis shows: 1. MGs were used in support of the assault, not in the direct assault. 2. Assault teams were equipped exclusively with SMGs 3. FTs were not nearly as effective as hoped (**** happens example) 4. A solid plan and good leadership were key to victory that day. [This message has been edited by Blackhorse (edited 06-04-2000).] [This message has been edited by Blackhorse (edited 06-04-2000).]

The following is taken from "Small Unit Actions During the German Campaign in Russia". It is part of the Historical Series from the CMH, USA. It was originally published in 1953. It is the result of interviewing the German officers, non-commissioned officers, and soldiers who served on the Eastern Front. "Chapter 1. Section VIII. Company G Recaptures Hill 726 (October 1942) During the spring and summer of 1942 the Germans strengthened the Rzhev salient and eliminated Russian forces that had gained a foothold west of the Vyazma-Rzhev rail line. The salient gradually became one of the strongest defense lines the Germans had built in Russia. In the early autumn Marshal Zhukov launched an offensive against the Rzhev salient to divert German forces from the Stalingrad front and to eliminate this potential threat to the Russian capital. In this action, which is the last one in the series concerning the fighting west of Moscow, Company G resisted the onslaught of fresh Russian troops who had recently arrived from training centers in Siberia. In mid-September Russian infantry supported by tanks seized Hill 726, some 10 miles north of Olenino. Once the Russians had wrested it from the Germans, they withdrew their tanks and left an infantry company of about 75 men to defend the newly won position. This hill now constituted a dent in the German MLR and afforded a sweeping view of the German rear area, thus hampering movements. Its rapid recapture was of vital importance to the Germans. The Russian defense system on the hill was not organized in a continuous line, but rather in the form of strong points. The positions were quite deep, afforded overhead cover, and were so well camouflaged that they could only be detected at very close range. The communication trenches leading to the rear were deep enough only for crawling. All machineguns were emplaced so as to deliver only frontal fire. Mortars were emplace on the reverse slope of the hill, and large quantities of ammunition and handgrenades had been stored in the strongpoints. A belt of wooden mines-to which German detectors did not respond-extended almost completely around the hill. Gaps had been left in the mine belt to permit passage of friendly patrols. Before the attack, German reconnaissance patrols were able to identify these lanes. Company G made five or six attempts to retake Hill 726, but failed; in each case the attack was halted at the very beginning because of heavy casualties incurred from mines and massed mortar fire. The Russians defended the hill with extreme tenacity. The company commander, CPT Veihmann, observed that the Russians confined their activity to the hours of darkness. During the day, their positions appeared deserted. Russian reconnaissance patrols were very active, but only between midnight and dawn. Viehmann decided to launch a surprise attack at dusk on 2 October. He selected 30 men who, together with two flame thrower teams, were to make up the assault detachments. Six machinegun teams were to follow directly behind. After seizure of the hill, an intrenching team was to move in with previously prepared barbed wire obstacles, set them up on the reverse side of the hill, and establish defensive positions. All men in the assault detachments were equipped with sub-machineguns and issued an ample supply of handgrenades. They were familiar with the terrain, including Hill 726 itself and the Russian MLR. Under cover of darkness and unnoticed by the Russian, the assault troops moved from their assembly area into the jumpoff positions. At the scheduled time the two companies along the flanks of the German MLR facing the right and left sides of the hill as well as the machineguns located on the southern slope poured fire into the Russian positions. While the german troops in the MLR diverted the enemy's attention by sudden shouting, the assault elements attacked and penetrated the Russian mine belt through two previously identified gaps. The defending Russians were taken completely by surprise. The fire and shouting from all sides confused them as to the true direction of the attack. They were further thrown off balance by the German flame throwers, despite the fact that the latter failed to function after only a few bursts. Nevertheless, the Russians did not give away to panic or abandon their positions, but struggled to the bitter end. After about an hour of hand-to-hand fighting the entire hill was in German hands, as were 20 Russian prisoners. The initial German objective, to cut Russian communicatiosn to the rear, had been achieved early in the attack. The Russian MLR was thereby out of contact with the defenders on the hill, who apparently were not alert enough to summon assistance from the rear before being cut off. Once the hill was taken, The Germans immediately dispatched two listening sentries to points about 30 yards in front of their lines, set up barbed wire obstacles, and otherwise prepared their defensive positions. Within 2 hours a continuous line of barbed wire entanglemts stretched across the crest of the hill. About an hour after the completion of these defenses one of the sentries reported the approach of about 40 Russians. All entrenching work was immediately suspended and the defense positions were quickly manned. Soon thereafter the second sentry confirmed the report of the first. The gap in the wire obstacle line which had until then been left open for the men at the listening post was closed. At a given signal the Germans opened fire just as the screaming Russians began their counterattack. Rushing headlong into the wire entaglements, which they had failed to spot in advance, The Russians were cut down by the German defensive fire concentrated on that zone. Only three of the attackers were able to regain the safety of their jumpoff positions. The next day the Russians directed heavy harrassing fire against Hill 726, but made no further attempts to conduct a concerted infantry attack." A very cursory analysis shows: 1. MGs were used in support of the assault, not in the direct assault. 2. Assault teams were equipped exclusively with SMGs 3. FTs were not nearly as effective as hoped (**** happens example) 4. A solid plan and good leadership were key to victory that day. [This message has been edited by Blackhorse (edited 06-04-2000).] [This message has been edited by Blackhorse (edited 06-04-2000).]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Seanachai: benzedrined bunnies Tinker's caravan running the Preakness, 6 guys who could machine gun for Germany in the Olympics <HR></BLOCKQUOTE> I'd like to see all of these modeled in Cm. As for historical accuracy and such. I've been to MG Team's webpage. It is pretty cool, and looks fun. My question to him is. What sort of ranks are SS Oberpanzergrenadier and SS Panzergrenadier? I don't recall seeing those in any reference I've ever read. I also think you (MG Team) should research this bit about supporting with rifles and attacking with the HMG a bit more. I think you may, just may be a bit off. [This message has been edited by Blackhorse (edited 06-04-2000).] [This message has been edited by Blackhorse (edited 06-04-2000).]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by V B: Belgrade at the time during WW2 was under attack by rebel soldiers (IRA equivaliant) and Germany did infact have communication with these soldiers but Belgrade was never taken by any German soldiers. Just thought I would include some of my past education with some of these prop. myths. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE> Hmmm. This is interesting. The whole basis for Fritz Klingenberg winning his Knight's Cross was his capturing Belgrade with just a handful of men from his motorcycle troop. Actually, it was more like convincing the mayor to turn over the town peacefully. Keys here being handful of men, and peacefully. Sure, no combat may have occured, but at some point, Belgrade submitted to the Axis. This is where Klingenberg comes in. He got the town without any combat between German or Yugoslavian forces. It was a very audacious move on his part and is still regarded as one of the better cavalry actions of the war.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by tss: - a KV tank brewed up with 3rd shot (range 150m) - two T-34/85s brewed up. First with 6 shots and second with 5 shots (150-200 m) - One T-34-85 and 3 KV-1s. First and second with 2nd shot and third with 1st shot. (100-300 meters) - one KV-1 with first shot (250m) - one KV-1 brewed up with 3rd shot (40 m) - three KV-1s. No ammo expenditure known - one KV-1 and 1 T-34/85, both with first shot (200m and 74m) <HR></BLOCKQUOTE> Good god man, they must have been ******* bricks !! You really can't help but admire those Finnish gunners after reading that one. That is some very close combat.

Hit it dead on JD. Thanks for the nice post.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by TeAcH: I dunno. Graphics kinda look bad especially the terrain.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> ACK! It looks hideous

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Formerly Babra: The Haunted tank strikes again.... <HR></BLOCKQUOTE> Ahhh. What fond memories that brings back. the Haunted Tank!

Pritzl, Nice catch!

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by von Lucke: The producers would like to announce that the former producers have been sacked.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> Those that sacked the producers have been sacked. Time for the Llamas

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Walter: It's also worth noting that CC5 will *not* be D-Day and Normandy. Rather, it will be an extremely narrow view of D-Day and Normandy... specifically Utah beach. That's right 1 beach - 2 armies. Whoohoo, yeah cause no other countries participated in the invasion. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE> is it just me or does the CC series really seem to be regressing?

Right, I've got those Gerries right where I want them!! Ahhh I love that Stuart.