Blackhorse

Mr. Cawley, It's better than a boxing analysis which is one man vs one man. In football, the tactical level (i.e the execution of plays) calls for numerical superiority and overwhelming the enemy (it's called double and triple teaming). At the point of attack, football is indeed about outnumbering and clobbering an opponent to the ground. Furthermore, football is about scoring, not gaining territory. You might gain over a thousand yards a game and not score and you will still lose if your opponent gains just 1 yard and scores. The score is tantamount to achieving an operational objective. I was defining the characteristics of warfighting as outlined in current doctrine. It would be silly for doctrine to say that laziness, lack of vision, ineptitude, dimwittedness, etc were all desirable traits, wouldn't it? I simply stated, Your definition of an Attritionist is more likely in line with my definition of a Maneuverist. Bear in mind, that maneuver does not equal offense only. Maneuver is a team effort, requiring both offense and defense. It is characterized by innovation, creativity, agility, speed, initiative, adaptability, and every other desirable trait you can think of. So your definition of a maneuverist is what? Someone who is un-creative, slow, lazy? Your definition of an Attritionist is what? I say again, doctrine does not assign a label of Attritionist of Maneuverist upon anyone. We define those terms ourselves. They didn't learn after the first day did they? My point exactly. Rigid training and rigid doctrine led to an inability to foresee change and an inability for the French to fight well. Brave men yes, Smart men, no. It was even a common problem with the French Army in World War II. You have demonstrated my point exactly. Since when are desirable characteristics damning to doctrine. If my doctrine says that commanders should be agile, have initiative, and goes on to list several desirable charatersitics, is it flawed? Hardly. The Army that cultivates low standards and lacks creativity,initiative, or the ability to learn form mistakes is the one that is doomed. I cannot stress enough that doctrine does not label one a Maneuverist or an Attritionist. Those two terms and their definitions come from a few authors and our own personal definition of those terms as applied to warfighting. Question for you Mr. Cawley. What is your opinion of the war in the pacific as applied to 1. The Japanese? maneuver/attrition, why? 2. The Allied forces? maneuver/attrition, why? [This message has been edited by Blackhorse (edited 02-10-2001).]

Cawley, If we're going to use a sports analogy for analyzing the nature of military operations then it behooves us to use a sport that resembles military operations. Football is perfect for this. A team defends to stop the opponent and to regain control of the ball for the offense. Even while defending, the defense is constantly attacking. They blitz, stunt, vary their defensive schemes so as to throw off the opponent's offense and generally do whatever they can to cause the opponent's offense to react to them rather than them react to the opponent's offense. On offense, a team does not continuously run a fullback dive (this is akin to running straight up the middle). Instead, a team's offense is creative and throws in screen passes, long bombs, traps, and whatever else may result in a touchdown. The idea now is to force the defense to react to the offense. Even while attacking an offense defends (in the form of offensive linemen guarding the QB). In both offense and defense, the teams strive to retain the initiative and to set the tone of the game. It is their ultimate aim to force the other team to react to them rather than their reacting to the other team. Doctrine does not label one a Maneuverist or an Attritionist. In fact, in all the doctrine you read you will find no such characterization of one's warfighting technique. There is no single way to do fight battles, and doctrine recognizes this. In our discussion, we (all of us) have applied the terms of Attritionist and Maneuverist as we personally define it. Your definition and my definition are most likely miles apart. My definition of an Attritionist, using football as the backdrop, is one who runs a fullback dive over and over in the hopes of getting the lucky break to score a touchdown. On defense, my concept of an Attritionist is one who always blitzes straight up the middle. Your definition of an Attritionist is more likely in line with my definition of a Maneuverist. Bear in mind, that maneuver does not equal offense only. Maneuver is a team effort, requiring both offense and defense. It is characterized by innovation, creativity, agility, speed, initiative, adaptability, and every other desirable trait you can think of. An important part of my definition of an Attritionist is the inability to learn from setbacks. All military operations are prone to some form of setback. Failure to learn and repeating failure, is a striking characteristic of someone who fits my definition of an Attritionist.

Here are some research links so you can read the current Army doctrine. You can decide for yourselves where the Army stands in regards to this topic. FM 100-5 OPERATIONS http://155.217.58.58/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/fm/100-5/100-5toc.htm FM 71-100 DIVISION OPERATIONS http://155.217.58.58/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/fm/71-100/toc.htm FM 71-3 ARMORED AND MECHANIZED BRIGADE OPERATIONS http://155.217.58.58/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/fm/71-3/f377toc.htm Additionally, here is a brief exceprt from FM 100-5 for you to digest. OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS The offensive is the decisive form of war--the commanders' ultimate means of imposing their will upon the enemy. While strategic, operational, or tactical considerations may require defending, the defeat of an enemy force at any level may require shifting to the offensive. Even in the defense itself, seizure and retention of the initiative requires offensive activities. The more fluid the battle, the truer this will be. Offensive campaigns and major operations are designed to achieve operational and strategic objectives quickly and decisively at least cost. Operations Just Cause and Desert Storm are good examples. Army forces must also be adept and have the will to fight in more protracted conflicts if necessary. Several dynamic characteristics apply to offensive operations: initiative on the part of subordinate commanders, rapid shifts in the main effort to take advantage of opportunities, momentum and tempo, and the deepest, most rapid and simultaneous destruction of enemy defenses possible. The ideal attack might resemble a torrent of water rushing forward and expanding its channels around major resistance. It should move fast, follow reconnaissance units or successful probes through gaps in enemy defenses, and shift its strength quickly to widen penetrations and reinforce its successes, thereby carrying the battle deep into the enemy's rear. JFCs orient offensive campaigns and major operations on decisive objectives. Their plans identify the center of gravity and decisive points and establish objectives that lead to the enemy's defeat. Although a campaign should attempt to defeat the enemy in a single major operation, an elusive enemy may cause commanders to structure the campaign to defeat the enemy in a series of major operations. Within a given theater, a number of ground, air, and naval operations occur simultaneously in support of the campaign plan. Even during a major operation, one large joint force might be attacking, another defending, and still another protecting LOCs, while others arrive in theater. Additionally, commanders may find themselves fighting offensive campaigns against either concentrated or dispersed enemy forces. Facing a concentrated enemy, operational commanders maneuver to force the enemy to abandon his position or fight at a disadvantage. In practice, this means directing operations against an enemy's flanks or rear or penetrating his defenses through weak areas. Facing a dispersed enemy, attacking commanders can isolate and defeat separated enemy forces in turn before they can join to organize a stronger defense. However, in any offensive operation, ground commanders try to collapse enemy defenses as rapidly as possible with the smallest expenditure of resources. They do this by massing fires, concentrating units only when necessary. They also do this by retaining the initiative, striking enemy weaknesses, attacking the enemy in depth, and creating conditions that prevent the enemy from organizing a coherent defense. Occasionally, attacking commanders maneuver to avoid battles that would slow or weaken the offensive. The initiative is critical to successful offensive operations. Whatever its purpose, campaign plans must be flexible enough to accommodate change so commanders can shift their main effort in response to either setback or opportunity without losing the initiative. Accordingly, commanders anticipate likely enemy actions and prepare contingencies for them and train their units to do likewise. Successful commanders do not run out of options and are always looking for ways to hurt the enemy. Anticipation and continuous formulation of attack options are key. Security of the force is crucial. Successful reconnaissance is vital to success. The high-speed mobility of modern forces can create exposed LOCs and gaps between large, friendly formations. Commanders should anticipate this and take precautions to keep it from happening. Moreover, covering forces operate well forward, providing early warning. In each phase of a campaign, operational commanders deploy their units using whatever form of maneuver best fits the conditions of METT-T. They move the force as a whole, orienting on enemy forces or major geographical terrain features, keeping some forces in depth as reserves. The employment of the reserve may be the most crucial decision commanders make. As the battle is joined, operational-level commanders adjust the final maneuver of their forces and look for opportunities to defeat the enemy's defense in depth. In particular, they seek ways to employ their operational reserves decisively. In any battle, commanders position operational reserves where they can best exploit tactical success. As tactical success is achieved, the choices for employing reserves become more certain, whether to destroy the enemy in the battle area, to secure deep objectives, or whatever else commanders desire. So it is important that commanders plan for the commitment of the reserve and, once committed, anticipate its reconstitution. Finally, in an offensive campaign, commanders try to preserve the fighting integrity of the force. However, if their force becomes dispersed or overextended, they may have to resort to the defense, planning for such a contingency as either a branch or sequel to their offensive operations.

Having read Lind, I can tell you most, if not everything covered in his Maneuver Warfare Handbook is being applied in today’s Army. Lind himself admits the following in regards to the US Army in Desert Storm: William S. Lind in Maneuver Warfare, an Anthology 1993 Presidio Press. In Desert Storm, the American ground forces, Army and Marine Corps, on the whole practiced maneuver warfare. There were certainly exceptions: for example, we had in effect the 1st German Marine Division and the 2nd French Marine Division, in terms of the styles each employed. But the overall picture suggests the ship has come onto the new course, even if it has a long journey ahead of it before it is safe in a maneuver warfare harbor. This is an interesting statement coming from the contemporary author who is the basis for much of the discussion we’re having on maneuver warfare. It certainly seems contradictory to some of Leonhard’s assertions. [This message has been edited by Blackhorse (edited 02-07-2001).]

Interest

Maneuver warfare implies accepting risk. Commanders willing to accept high risk will be more inclined to adopt forms of maneuver warfare. Conservative commanders will be less likely to. You are right that it is indeed a mindset not just some scientific formula. In fact, I’d say it is almost 100% command philosophy driven. Take as an example a division operations officer schooled and trained in maneuver warfare. His plans will reflect that philosophy. If his division commander is conservative in his approach, then no matter what brilliant plans the G3 comes up with, they will most likely not be accepted by his more conservative commander. Ultimately, the G3’s plans will most likely be a blending of the two approaches. In this case, the division commander is not willing to assume the risk and the G3 consequently adopts a more conservative approach. This does not mean the division commander’s philosophy is the wrong one, just that it is the more conservative and less risky of the two. Flip-flop the two and we find the division commander unhappy with the conservative minded approach of his operation’s officer. In the end the division G3 will try to make his plans more in line with the philosophy of his commander. Like most things in the military, it does in fact “start at the top”. Having said that, I can tell you the Army is striving to inculcate in its leaders the foundations upon which maneuver warfare are based. Mission based orders, flexibility, audacity, innovation, and getting inside the enemy’s decision cycle are all taught and trained in various classroom and field environments. The Army has gone to great pains to create free-flowing tactical exercises and situations to reinforce this mindset throughout the course of one’s career. However, with career and job progression as it is in the Army, the lessons may be quickly forgotten as the commander, freshly trained in maneuver warfare, is assigned to a desk job somewhere after command. Ultimately, it all falls back on the philosophy or style of the individual. Like the old boxer who starts boxing at the sound of a bell, so too maneuver minded commanders easily slip into the maneuver mindset when called upon. The conservative minded will be slower to do so, if at all. Which brings up another point. I believe length of conflict plays a very significant role in maneuver warfare theory. In a short duration conflict, maneuver warfare has the potential to reign supreme. More likely than not, that conflict is shortened by the implementation of maneuver warfare by the victorious side. If however, the conflict becomes protracted, the novelty of maneuver warfare wears off and the more conservative approach once again takes hold. This is evident in the case of Germany in WWII. We have all used them as shining examples of maneuver warfare. I think we all agree that they simply did not forget what maneuver warfare was. Yet, from about 1942 onward on the Eastern Front, they did not use it. The question here has to be “why not?” The answer most likely can be found in the lack of willingness of the German commanders to accept risk when faced by an opponent possessing superior numbers. The German commanders were not willing to accept the risks associated with maneuver warfare. The same cannot be said for Rommel in the desert. He accepted risk initially and was very bold in his early Afrika campaign. His was a personality driven approach. Interestingly enough, much of the discussion has been about personlities. I’ve seen Grant, Lee, Jackson, Rommel, Von Manstein, and others mentioned when discussing maneuver warfare. Henri has mentioned the current USMC and this is the only military entity per se that has been mentioned as adopting maneuver warfare. I would venture to say that while the USMC does in fact train the spirit of MW, it has yet to demonstrate it in action. Having seen USMC training exercises, I believe the same personality driven approach ultimately decides what form of warfare the unit uses. Conservative commanders fight conservative battles, audacious commanders fight bold battles. Perhaps the best ways to describe the two forms of warfare we’re discussing is not attrition or maneuver but rather conservative and audacious.

Allow me to murky the waters a little. So far, we have been discussing the doer or maneuverer/attritter.What about the doee? You know, the guy being attacked/maneuvered/attritted upon. In your examples, Falkenhayn is the principle and primary focus. What options did the French have, if any? One point about maneuver warfare is that it almost exclusively focuses on the offensive minded army. It rarely, if ever, is discussed in terms of the defense. Food for thought. Allons.

Frank, just want to publicly acknowledge the excellence of all your scenarios. Keep up the great work. I hope BTS answers your questions to help you continue making the best scenarios possible.

I think the picture is backwards. If you reverse it, it might make it easier to ID the bubbas. Unless a bunch of lefties were put into the "Left Handed" division and issued lefty Garands.

Bump. I am in the exact same boat.

I liked the new CM camera angles they implemented. I kept wanting them to hit shift-a though

Why on earth do you represent yourself as BTS on that discussion board???You are NOT BTS and you should NOT represent yourself as such.

http://www.alltel.net/~shawkids/wwii/

being an open topped vehicle, perhaps grenades did the 'lil ole greyhound in. I've been in one and can tell you my SUV is bigger and probably more heavily armored. I have a healthy respect for the greyhound crews of WWII.

We should do lunch some time. Are you in the Captains Career Course?

Hmm, not sure. On my system, the music plays at the same time as the sounds from CM. Perhaps it's a matter of the capabilities of the card being the determining factor in playback of both sound inputs.

http://horrido.org/radio.php3 The old time radio braodcasts from that site are a perfect fit for CM.

Wrong... Strategic, Operational, Tactical

The detail is incredible. To me though, the color seems off. It looks almost purple. Compare the tank to the brown tank trail beside it. That tank trail is brown, the tank is purple. Brown that tank up and you've got damn near the perfect Panther mod.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by ED: Great! How did the maps print out for you? Ed Kroening<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> I haven't printed any out yet. There's a definite need for on-line maps like the ones you provide, especially for scenario designers. Speaking of which, I'm looking forward to the scenarios and operations you have coming. Regards, Chris

Hi Frank When do you think you'll do "We Fight and Die Here"? BTW, all your scenarios are great. I just finished a massive PBEM against Tankdawg using "August Bank Holiday". It was simply superb.

ED, Your site looks great. Keep up the good work. I've bookmarked it.

I had no problems with previous PBEM games I upgraded. Just be sure to go through the correct process to upgrade the old games. LOAD---SAVE---EXIT CM---UPGRADE---START CM---PLAY GAME---SELECT YOUR SAVED GAME---SELECT PBEM. Voila Bear in mind, that if all you do is watch a replay, then your opponent will have to do the upgrading.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by TankDawg: Hey Blackhorse, This kind of study sounds right up your alley! I bet you could TDY it for a long time. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE> Let's see...I'll need to go to Waterloo, then scurry off to La Gleize, Cheneux, Long Champs, Bastogne, Elsenborn, Dom Butgenbach, Normandy, Carentan, and wherever the scenario "August Bank Holiday" occured. Yup, I think I'll take that Officer Professional Development trip. You need to go too right? As an aside, one of the best OPD sessions I ever participated in was studying the initial stages of WWI when the Germans stormed through Belgium into France and encountered the BEF. Our Squadron officers studied this and each officer had to brief a portion of the battle. We started at Mons, and over the course of a week made our way From Mons to Cambrai, to Le Cateau to St. Quentin. It was the OPD to end all OPDs

It reminds me of a Leader's Reaction Course, except it's for mechanically inclined civilians (Unless we want to count the three heavy, doughnut eating, tea drinking Brit Officer brothers)