Simon Fox

Having reviewed Mr Tork's history here and while being somewhat perplexed at the purpose of his post I think Mr Stuka'a response is unwarranted and indicates he needs to knock back a few tinnies. G'day Max ------------------ "Pink Floyd, a load of old twaddle"-John Lydon

How about Matt's email address while you're at it guachi? ------------------ "Pink Floyd, a load of old twaddle"-John Lydon

Hey guys, I hear someone just got their copy in Uzbekistan, or was that Mongolia? Probably both. hehe ------------------ "Pink Floyd, a load of old twaddle"-John Lydon

Pak40, I recommend you send an email to make your request. I am sure you will receive a relatively prompt and polite response. ------------------ "Pink Floyd, a load of old twaddle"-John Lydon

Great to see a non-whinging thread for once and it's not even the Poms doing it. Perth here. To answer Mr Demon's question on another thread, I'm in Karrinyup, though I'm at work at the moment. ------------------ "Even the Brady Bunch could beat a company of French"-Carentan (slightly paraphrased)

Ken Oath Steve, you Septics Onya Bumrush ------------------ "Even the Brady Bunch could beat a company of French"-Carentan (slightly paraphrased)

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>It has come to my attention<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> mmmm...that's a very interesting euphemism for "had sense beaten into me by a round of piscatorial combat" Mr Kraut. ------------------ "Even the Brady Bunch could beat a company of French"-Carentan (slightly paraphrased)

Jon, How can you question the Genius of Maximanus? ------------------ "Even the Brady Bunch could beat a company of French"-Carentan (slightly paraphrased)

Fionn, I am sure that most of us here are very aware of your attitude on this subject from previous posts. I must say that I am dismayed that what was a quite civil and interesting discussion has been undermined by your condescending comments about Andreas's views. Whatever your own views they are certainly open to discussion however "ludicrous" you may find those of others. However many people you have spoken too I do not see that translates to a broad generalisation of the views of a populace. I am in no position to discuss the current views of Germans but I do know from my reading that many Germans at the time including those in the armed forces were deeply troubled by their countries war of aggression eg Weider's (sp?) "Stalingrad: Memories and Reassessments". A number of them took a moral stand and refused to do their "duty", they paid with their lives. To my thinking they are the real heroes. Good post Goanna. Didn't think the old 'lizard' had it in him.

Your site looks very slick Mark. Just a bit of advice on presentation. A small dark font on a dark background is hard to read. A lighter shade of backgound like the BTS one is a bit easier on the eye.

IIRC krm is from SA. I can always tell when Mr Demon (formerly panzershrek I believe) gets home his posts start appearing around 3.30 local time, school's out! ------------------ "Even the Brady Bunch could beat a company of French"-Carentan (slightly paraphrased)

Just sit right back and you'll hear a tale, a tale of a FAQfull quest, That started in this serial port, and proved a thorny test. Jason was a mighty FAQin' man, Peternzeus brave and best. Five searchonauts set sail that day for a six month quest. A six month quest. The weather started getting rough, the golden FAQ was tossed. If not for the courage of the fearless crew, the Argo would be lost. The Argo would be lost. The ship set ground on the shore of Thrace, with Peternzeus, Jason too, the Millionaires: Steve, and Charles, the Costello and Madmatt, searching the Golden FAQ. There they met King Phionneus, assailed by winged newbies. they drove them off, so he joined the crew, to steer through the Seemgades: Klyntun and Lueis Now this is the tale of the Searchonauts, they've searched for a long, long time, they'd better get their act together, or there's gonna be a crime.... Note: in some versions of the 5th verse takes a slightly different form thus, King of Seemdessus was Pengius, cursed by winged smilies. driving them off they gained his aid to steer through the Seemgades: Klyntun and Lueis Apologies to Orpheus Thanks to Jon Additional verses welcome but try keep the theme of the original legend.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>punchline<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> LOL Don't worry Huang those americans don't understand subtlety. They need a joke that bashes them straight between the eyes. Your jokes probably went straight over their heads. Maybe one day they'll get them 'til then keep plugging away buddy.

That's it you miserable Kiwi loafer stop dumping on poor Manieri. I can't believe you didn't take him seriously. Just think it will be weeks before you get yours and here's this poor guy who will get his in a couple days at the most. Take pity on him. I believe there is a special package for you Capt. wrapped inside a 500lb bomb. BTS's shipping instructions were: "Deliver this to Manieri ASAP"

Since Manieri uses the rest of the Forum for his bitching and moaning it would certainly be a novelty if he confined it to one thread. I see he's true to form with his scintillating wit here too. As for Phoenix, this is the bitching and moaning thread so if he wants to bitch and moan about Manieri this is the place for it. Quite frankly I feel like bitching and moaning about people who bitch and moan about people who bitch and moan about Manieri's bitching and moaning I can honestly say that I am as desperate for Manieri to get his copy of CM as he is.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>As I understood it, a german flight got screwed up in it's navigation during a night raid and dropped it's bombs on the first sign of lights that they saw. That happened to be London. That incident prompted the raid on Berlin, that led to Hitler's obsession with leveling London.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> Though the above quote is from Capt Ayers it seems to be the consensus on this thread and actually you are all incorrect. While this easy explanation happily rationalises the actions of each side as "mistakes" or responses to them, few modern historians would agree with this view of events themselves or the connection and rationale behind them. Firstly, it is clear that both Hitler and Goring had ordered that London was not to be bombed and everything suggests that the Luftwaffe raid on London on the night of 24-25 August was some sort of bungle. Which is hardly suprising given it's organisational incompetence at the time. Goring was furious when he heard of it, but since the eastern front didn't exist for some time to come no-one was actually transferred there. In fact the threat was transfer to the infantry, which as far as I know wasn't carried out as a large amount of paperwork went "missing". However it is unlikely that this bombing was a result of a navigational error, an isolated incident or a single plane. Bombs fell on widely different parts of the capital at times ranging from 11pm to 3:40am the following morning. As for the British retaliation, as early as the 19th July Churchill asked the RAF about mounting a raid on Berlin on short notice and plans were in place for this by the 2nd August. Though the RAF raid on Berlin on the night of 25-26 August was in response the the previous nights raid on London it was by no means spur of the moment and was widely approved. This RAF raid played no part whatsoever in the Luftwaffe Air Fleet commanders' decision to switch attacks to London The RAF raid on Berlin was made through cloud, most of the bombs fell on open countryside south of the city, the only casualties were two slightly injured in a northern suburb. Consequently so slight were it's effects that there was considerable doubt amongst the German leadership as to whether it was actually a raid of an accident of navigation and a few jettisoned bomb loads. It was only subsequently after a number of RAF Berlin raids that Hitler was convinced that the RAF were deliberately attacking the capital. The German decision to switch it's attack to London was an operational one based on erroneous intelligence regarding the RAF losses and based on well documented discussions within OKW not a thoughtless whim of Hitler. While Sperrle wished to continue the airfield attacks Kesserling did not, since he considered the RAF could always withdraw out of range. On 30 August the Germans beleived that the RAF was down to 420 fighters with 100 reserve when actual numbers were 750 with 200 reserves. They also grossly underestimated British production figures. Lured by these optimistic figures into beleiving they were on the cusp of success and that the only way to lure what they beleived to be the weakened British fighters remaining into battle was by attacking a target which they could not refuse to defend- London. Thus on 31st August OKL issued the order which was for effect on 7th Sept. This was a thoroughly discussed decision with considerable support within the Luftwaffe not a knee-jerk reaction of Hitler's. An important factor was the sense of urgency to finish the RAF off in time for Sealion to be launched in 1940. In retrospect of course it was a mistake but not one which was catastrophic to their chances of winning the BoB. It might be nice for the British to beleive it was backs to the wall and down to the last few fighters or the Germans to think that they were dudded again by that idiot Hitler but the evidence supports neither of these. The facts are that the Luftwaffe had bungled any chance they had long before the switch to bombing London and that the slim chance they had was largely due to the British Air Ministries' inefficient management of it's manpower resources in 1939 and 1940.

Lindan, Your attitude is disgraceful already you are filling this forum with a rubbish thread. What? What do you mean hypocrite? Sulkingly Yours Simon

Stuka, Component prices especially are likely to go down after June 30th due to the new tax system here in Oz so I would hold off on your upgrade 'til then- I know I am. Maybe some of our east coast Aussie members could suggest some good sources. I for one would be a bit reluctant to order from an online US store, to many hassles.

Madmatt contrite and apologetic? It's an imposter! ------------------ "Nah, I'm totally straight-laced. I just play a pervert on the net." - Fionn

http://www.battlefront.com/discuss/Forum1/HTML/002335.html http://www.battlefront.com/discuss/Forum1/HTML/003381.html http://www.battlefront.com/discuss/Forum1/HTML/001859.html http://www.battlefront.com/discuss/Forum1/HTML/000516.html http://www.battlefront.com/discuss/Forum1/HTML/001652.html http://www.battlefront.com/discuss/Forum1/HTML/000909.html

Aacooper: I would agree with your final points regarding the inflexibility of British doctrine. My main concern was with your use of the word "lack" in your earlier post which implied an absence of such cooperation. I am sure there are plenty of occasions when the coordination of infantry and armour were poor. But I think Hastings overemphasises the significance of this in the context of the Normandy battle. Unfortunately like many popular histories Hastings' book (and to a lesser extent Reynolds') has a tendency to take particular instances and broadly brush entire organisations with the conclusions without particular reference to supporting evidence for that extension. Quite what the personal antipathy between two brigadiers in a particular division has to do with overall British practice I do not know. Just an another example of Hastings' shoring up his basic premise of hidebound Brits versus stupendously professional Germans, both of which are equally incorrect characterisations. I am sure that there were plenty of occasions when cooperation was good. The basic point is that Normandy is very poor country for maintaining close coordination between armour and infantry even for experienced units which most British formations were not. German counterattacks in this terrain fared no better than their opponents. Babra, The point of your quote seems to be largely an operational one I would be interested in knowing your view of it's relevance. On the subject of British weaponry and CM, the British equivalent of the bazooka and schrek, the PIAT, operated on an entirely different principle being spring operated. Although the warhead was considerably less effective than the zook or schrek the absence of a backblast made it excellent for firing from concealment and harder to spot. Though IIRC the range was also less.

In one of his posts Andreas mentions the "Battle Schools". These were the principle training schools of the British army at the time and they perpetuated a fairly formulaic approach to tactics. Often they were staffed by officers with little practical experience themselves. There is some merit to the idea that training for so long with a rigid set of standard tactical solutions British infantry formations became locked into a way of thinking which took some time to break out of when they eventually encountered battle and of course with considerable cost. I have quoted some pertinent points from Jary's book below: "I now have little doubt that, for the first two months in Normandy, we lacked two things: comprehensive and imaginative training and personal experience of battle. We were also seriously handicapped by our casual attitude. Too many junior officers did not think for themselves and persistently relied on the narrow teaching of the Battle Schools, whose dogma had assumed the proportion of holy writ......" "Mesmerised by the performance of the German panzer divisions in their blitzkrieg campaign in France in 1940, co-operation between arms became the gospel. Infantry had to fit into the big picture, rarely operating without artillery and armoured support. The most successful actions by 18 Platoon were fought without the support of either. We had learned in a hard school how to skirmish, infiltrate and edge our way forward. The left or right flanking platoon attack, so beloved of the Battle School staff, would rarely succeed in the Normandy bocage. I remember with horror being locked into the timetables of meticulously planned large battles. These invariably left the junior infantry commander with no scope for exploitation. If you found a gap in the enemy defences, adherence to the artillery program, which rarely could be altered, effectively stopped any personal initiative. To me, the preparation for these battles assumed the demented proportion of a Kafka-like nightmare ballet, in which the anonymous 'they' ordained that 'we' must perform a choreographed ritual danse macabre. I felt trapped and helpless. No solo parts were written into the score, nor was there scope for small groups of performers in this mammoth ballet of machines. Undoubtedly, far shadows from the Somme clouded my emotions, but instinct told me that this kind of show would be unlikely to succeed. The irony was that this support was planned and given to the infantry with the best of intentions. The Somme had also cast its shadows on our artillery and armoured commanders. Both genuinely believed that in their hands they had the panacea which would protect us, the infantry, from the terrible slaughter of 1916. Instead they put us in a straightjacket. Some battalion and brigade commanders had, with the most humane intentions, been seduced by this doctrine. Their soldiers expected and relied upon artillery and armoured support and this tended to rob them of the self-reliance essential to well trained infantry. As a twenty year old subaltern, I felt strongly about over-reliance on other arms. Now in my sixties, I do not under-estimate the influence that the Somme had on the British military psyche. Far too much time had been spent fitting the infantry and armoured junior leaders into the "big picture" and too little had been spent training them and stimulating their imagination, initiative and individual resourcefulness to probe, draw conclusions, infiltrate and exploit weaknesses in the enemy's dispositions. Providing the junior leader survived and adopted a professional attitude to the business in hand, time corrected the disadvantage of inexperience. However, the damnably casual attitude we British, including many regular soldiers, brought to most of our enterprises was unforgivable. I was too young at the time to appreciate this factor thoroughly and, without doubt, I was imbued with it myself. Three weeks commanding 18 Platoon eradicated this attitude for ever."

Some useful recent texts on this subject: Arnhem Martin Middlebrook 1995 A fine night for Tanks Ken Tout 1999 Also 3 other books by Tout: Tanks!, To hell with Tanks!, Tanks, Advance! from Normandy to the Netherlands Monty's Marauders Patrick Delaforce 1998 (bit of a naff title but good) 18 Platoon Sydney Jary Thank God and the Infantry John Lincoln 1999 A view from the turret Bill Close Now to respond to a few points: <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>The British lack of armor-infantry cooperation hurt them throughout desert and Normandy battles,<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>aacooper This is not strictly correct though it would be certainly accurate for many of the desert battles. Unfortunately it is one promulgated by widely read books like Max Hastings Overlord which is somewhat unbalanced on this issue and which totally fails to consider exactly what the British doctrine and training were at the time. Following from my previous post it is without doubt that by 1944, and well before, British training and doctrine overemphasised cooperation between arms with the specific objective in mind of sparing the infantry the appalling casualties of WW1 and as a result of the German success in 1940. To view British failings in Normandy as being in part a result of poor armour-infantry cooperation is simplistic since it totally ignores the nature of the terrain which was absolutely unsuitable for armour. In fact I would suggest that it was the combination of rigid adherence to armour-infantry dogma and inflexibility of thought engendered by overtraining and inexperience which meant that British infantry formations took some time to break free of their over-reliance upon armoured support (or expectation of it at least). As for Marty's points regarding the relative firepower of US and German squads I beleive there has been plenty of discussion on this subject on previous threads. I think it is pertinent to note that in this context that the firepower of the German squad was best employed on the defensive, residing as it did primarily in the MG42 (ignoring later squad OOBs), which was after all the principle posture of the Germans at this time.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>PFs are fired totally indepently of other small arms.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> This might explain an interesting situation I had in a game once, I had a vet german squad with 1 guy left in the same turn take out a sherman with a faust and hose down a US squad with his MP40 in opposite directions. Could this be a possible bug? It was the beta so it might be fixed. The faust independence is OK when your squad has multiple members but isn't so realistic when there is only one guy left.

First the kitchen sink now the toilet bowl. Jerry doesn't stand a chance....