Simon Fox

Slappy, Your innocuous barbs are just that. Why? Because whatever you say I know that you have admitted to a Tasmanian 'friend'.

Who said they threw them away? That was your assumption not mine. Best not to make giant leaps of extrapolation from one army to another, don't you think? Note to self: Slappy needs to be beaten unmercifully over the head with a swag of smileys before he 'gets it'.

Gee this tero bloke just doesn't have the knack of putting his historical case or he's not speaking to the right people. Obviously having an Aussie on the BTS payroll means things are more likely to get done properly. I've had some preliminary historical discussions with Steve and Dan regarding CM3. Which looks like being called CM :Dust, Sand and More Bloody Dust by the way. It looks like an extra troop rating category will have to be introduced for this one. Should go something like this: Conscript Green Regular Veteran Elite Crack ANZAC [ 06-28-2001: Message edited by: Simon Fox ]

Originally written by Agua <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>What were the odds at El Alemein, anyhow?<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>Numerically about 2:1

Slapdragon, I am not at all interested in how naughty US troops got slapped on the wrist for discarding their rifles. Your comments may be pertinent to the hidebound rule constricted US Army but have no bearing on the freewheeling, initiative at all levels Commonwealth forces. In all seriousness my comments in this matter relate to Commonwealth forces only, they were different armies with different weapons and practices and should be discussed seperately. My points were: A)Rifles may be dealt with a little severely by CMs firepower/ammo model. B)SMGs were freely available to Commonwealth forces who followed a 'horses for courses' model, that is for close stuff grab some SMGs off the 2nd echelon. C)British officers frequently used German or Italian SMGs. Seems like some sort of tradition almost. The issue of captured weapons is going to come up big time in the desert where it was habitual for both sides. On the issue of US SMGs the only one issued to the Brits in numbers was the Thompson which was not that popular for a number of reasons. How do US SMGs match up against the rest in terms of effective range, stopping power and general utility. For all it's faults the Sten was sorta handy. Of course the best SMG of WW2 was the Owen

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>The Allies have units with 1/10 SMG (standard), and with 1/3rd SMG (airborne only). I consider this rather silly, and also think the loadouts in the airborne squads are probably closer to ad hoc realities than the vanilla "TOE", pure rifle, types.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> I agree and for reasons distinct from any consideration of production figures. Anecdotal evidence certainly supports a greater than TOE number of SMGs in British platoons. Typically the Brits admired the "Schmeisser" and officers especially acquired them when they could, that and the Italian Beretta. Many 1st Airborne officers jumped into Holland with their trusty "Schmeissers". Having said that I have little doubt that the rifle was preffered in most situations. SMG use didn't ever seem to reach the levels of official German TOEs. This raises the question of why the superiority of SMG infantry in CM compared with reality? I wonder if the simplicity of the CM firepower model doesn't in some way detract from the effectiveness of the rifle. For Brit troops it seems that the SOP was to carry the rifle but the ready availability of SMGs meant that in situations where they were required, they were used. For example in night or urban type operations. In those cases I consider the airborne squad types in CM to be a perfectly reasonable simulation of historical practice (though I'd have a hard time documenting it ). Personally I think the British squad should have 1 extra SMG and the same for the PltHQ. That and the airborne squads being considered less gamey.

Sorry Dorosh at the moment I'm a little busy to type out a treatise. I'm just in here stirring up the Monty bashing Patton idolisers and the Monty bashing Rommel arsekissers who get their history from readers digest or somefink. Potts commanded the 25th? Brigade in Papua New Guinea. His Scipio-like fighting retreat across the Owen Stanleys set up the eventual allied victory. He correctly assessed the situation and fought the battle his own way while completely ignoring his orders (which were to attack). Other good Aussie commanders: Lavarack and Morshead, both of whom commanded Tobruk at one stage.

Has to be Monty, after all he never lost a battle, hehe Rommel was a propaganda product. Kesserling was much better except Rommel never listened to him. Best commander of WW2: Brigadier Arnold Potts <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Stalin's Organ: Who was the original commander of hte British Desert forces who got captured or killed??<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>O'Connor

I go with Jason's choice Graziani was a real dunderhead . Mind you one always has to consider that the quality of the opposition and incompetence by ones subordinates can make even competent generals look silly. Macarthur's generalship in the Phillippines and later in the South West Pacific was less than stellar but not quite at the "worst" level. Characterising a burning obsession with "returning" and doing so by trampling over inumerable corpses of ones own men as "island hopping" is hubris indeed especially when one manages to pull the wool over so many eyes. Personally I'd have to go for Paulus and his military and moral failure at Stalingrad. <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Herr Oberst: What, no mention thus far of that certain general who only won in Afrika because he waited until the numerical superiority tilted the battlefield such that my own grandmother could have led those forces to victory? The one who blew every timetable prediction he made about advancing in the weeks following the Normandy invasion, then had the gall to note that the master strategy of landings and breakout was the toughest he ever commanded? And who the hell devises a plan where your advance relies on a single elevated road? The planned axis of advance that every military man from Holland knew was insane. The route that Holland armed forces had wargamed in the past and discounted as ridiculous. The one that the government in exile told them wouldn't work. But would Monty listen? Noooooooooooo. "They're not professional soldiers, so I must know more than them." Monty gets my vote, maybe not up there at the very top, but definitely in the running. An arrogant, pompous ass. Yeah, Patton was arrogant and pompous ass too, but at least he knew it, and had good cause to be arrogant and pompous.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> Congratulations! You have managed to bring to this thread all the historical scholarship and insightful analysis which you display in your posts in the Peng thread.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Babra: Like Stuart 'roos and Sherman IICs? <HR></BLOCKQUOTE> Oooh Babs, you are such a bitch!

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>The tank destroyer units in all divisions (armoured and infantry) were manned by the Royal Artillery. Armoured divisions had M-10 Wolverine and Achilles (once these became available), while the infantry had towed 17pdrs and later Archers.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> Are you absolutely certain of this organisation Andreas? Cos I'm not. I am not sure that the RA made a distinction between the AT regiments attached to armoured or infantry divisions. My understanding was that by June 1944 they were all half towed and half SP (please don't call them tank destroyers, that's a dumb US term which confuses one no end since they used it interchangeably for SP and towed guns). Maybe later they phased in fully SP for the armoured divisions but the infantry divisions still had some SP not all towed. I should add that each British Corps had an AT regt attached as well. One such was the 91st AT regt attached to VIII Corps which had 2 towed batteries (12 guns each) and 2 SP batteries (12 M10s each). <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>And has anyone ever heard of 27th Armoured Brigade? Never heard of them anywhere.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> The 27th Armoured Brigade consisted of: 13th/18th Royal Hussars 1st East Riding Yeomanry The Staffordshire Yeomanry The Brigade supported the D-day assault of the 3rd Brit div. The 13th/18th Royal Hussars was a specialised unit which manned Sherman DDs on D-day and and subsequently supported the 6th airborne and the 51st Highland in the fighting east of the Orne. The SY participated in the repulse of the 21st Pz Div attack late on D-day. The 1st ERY and the SY continued to support the 3rd Inf Div in the bitter Normandy fighting. Thus we see tanks of the 1st ERY in Moon's "First clash at Cambes" scenario. Units of the brigade are also credited with a number of tactical innovations (well innovations for the British at least) in tank-infantry cooperation in the close bocage country. The Brigade was disbanded on the 29th of July 1944 to provide reinforcments. The 13th/18th Royal Hussars went to the 8th Armoured Brigade. The 1st East Riding Yeomanry went to the 33rd armoured regiment. Not sure what happened to the Staffordshire Yeomanry, they were a veteran unit which had fought in the desert with the 8th Armoured Bde. I think they may have been attached to the 79th Armoured but I do know the continued to man DD Shermans in river assaults (eg Rhine and Elbe) [ 06-25-2001: Message edited by: Simon Fox ]

David Aitken wrote: <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>It's a bunker-buster. I imagine that an HE round, however big, would not be as effective against pillboxes in CM as a hollow charge, and therefore BTS were compelled to model it this way.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>I disagree, it's not a very good bunker buster at all, it's simply not big enough for most reinforced concrete bunkers. If it wobbled end over end in flight (I have read that as well) it is hard to see it working too well as something directionl as hollow charge is it? ARVE crews would typically manually place beehive or wade charges for busting bunkers or concrete walls. British SOP for bunkers was tank main gun fire at the slit or crocodiles not using the petard. You are correct to point out that it was not strictly an assault vehicle but a multipurpose engineering vehicle. I would have to say that it's main contribution would be laying bridges and fascines.

Actually Dorosh you are incorrect, partially anyway The British were reluctant to take the 76mm sherman for the supply related reasons you cite but also because they preferred the 75mm vs infantry and they had the firefly for the other stuff. But they had to take some because that is what the yanks were supplying so they put them all in the Polish armoured division to simplify the supply problem.

Don't worry about it Viceroy, Dorosh is a pathological sermoniser and a horrible little uniform grog to boot. There is no such thing as a UK tank destroyer regiment/battalion. There is an organic anti-tank regiment in the UK divisional structure (armoured and infantry) which is manned by members of the royal artillery. Around June 1944 these would have 1/2 towed and 1/2 sp guns (the UK term for tank destroyer). They were organised as troops/batteries of 4 guns (all sp or all towed). The sp guns would be achilles, M10 or archer. CM has the dates of introduction for the achilles wrong, they were phased in earlier from June 44 onwards in an accelerated conversion program from the M10 because the conversion was found to be a huge success. Even so in June 44 most of the UK M10s still had the 3in gun. By all accounts the achilles was a much better gun vehicle combination to fight in than the M10. Therefore a UK sp gun should be equally as common as the towed 17pdr.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by JasonC: I recommend 25 turns for medium sized battles, in the 1000-1500 point range, and 20 turns for small ones, under 1000 points. I also recommend random weather and random time of day, with the former the more important of the two. 30 turns is a very long time in smaller fights, and defenders essentially cannot delay that long against odds. They either stop the attackers by winning the firefights or they run out of men. 25 turns or less makes delay issues more important. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE> "Don't worry Hans, we only have to hold off the Tommies for 20min today" Feh! I fink deadmarsh was asking about attack/defend scenarios Jason, not delay scenarios. For myself I refuse to play under 30 turns for anything over 1000pts. Otherwise it just favours those gamey stinking SMG infantry. If the terrain is heavy or bocage then make it 40turns. Sheesh I'm playing Kwazydog in the bocage at the moment and it's turn 20 something and we've only had a few skirmishes. It's still fun though, if somewhat nerve racking.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by redwolf: one of the things that annoys me in current CM games is that the attacker can place guns in setup, often in LOS of the defenders lines or the victory flags. That means the attacker can get the guns into firing position without the problem of moving them into position and getting them spotted by the defender (who is usually in excellent observation of places that are in LOS of his lines). That is unrealistic (IMHO), and also a gameplay problem, as the attacker gets one of the benefits the defender should have exclusivly, placed and camouflaged guns. I would appreciate it if you could find a way that - either the attacker must move the guns into position - or attacker guns are subject to observation even when not moving Fixes could include that the guns must be embarked to a vehicle and that disembarking gets the same spottability as movement. Or attacker guns can only fire when they moved 20 meters or so from their original setup place. Or as a brutal fix, during the first turn, attackers guns are as spottable as if they were moving, even when they don't move. Maybe CM has a camouflage benefit for units that did not move since setup, and you could reduce that benefit drastically. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>So I guess that it hadn't occurred to you that they may have positioned those guns the previous night?

Babs wrote: <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Other, far less rare, far less questionable and far more useful units will not be making it into the game. I have nothing at all against even the rarest of vehicles, but when they take precedence for inclusion over more common items then I have to get concerned.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>I absolutely agree with this, which goes to that IS3 thread too. A number of vehicles which were quite common did not make it into CMBO at the expense of stuff that was hardly used like Pershings and Super Pershings, that US Sherman crocodile etc etc. For example the 6pdr armed Churchills, the quad .50 1/2track (M16?), the Crusader AA, porte mounted bofors etc etc. It would be dissappointing if vehicles which were in combat and in a number of documented instances made a significant difference lose out to fairytale vehicles because of a "cool" factor (this is a general comment and not directed specifically at the sturmtiger). I see the usual ARVE misconceptions have popped up in this thread. The ARVE was a brilliant vehicle which did a fantastic job of saving British lives on D-day but it was not intended for bunker busting as such (though eventually it was used for that). The spigot mortar was for the demolition of beach obstacle from an armoured vehicle. On the US beaches the same job was done by combat engineers with explosives at huge cost in casualties (unsung heroes in my opinion). I am convinced, since I have pictures of houses hit by ARVE fire, that the blast is undermodelled in CM. I am also very unconvinced that the round was hollow charge, I wish I could find the reference BTS used for that bit of information. Take a look at one of those Belgian gate beach obstacles which were the main target of the 'flying dustbin'. It seems to me that a HE round would be a lot more effective in reducing it than a hollow charge round. The armour of the ARVE is undermodelled in CM. Older model Churchills were converted to ARVE and additional armouring was done at the same time. BTS have used the base armour of the older Churchill models for the ARVE which is incorrect but an understandable oversight. Of course they still wouldn't have the Churchill VIII armour thickness but they are an entirely different purpose vehicle than the sturmtiger. The later model Churchills were either being used as is or converted to crocs at the time, a much more effective assault vehicle IMO.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Thanks Simon - I hadn't thought to check the blast factors!! doh! <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>Yes, it took a supreme effort of will to restrain the sarcasm there, you being a kiwi and all

The US and UK 4.2in mortars do not use the same ammunition, in fact they are quite different weapons. If you bought the US mortars you would find a considerable difference in the blast. The US ones are much nastier and therefore cost more. As for the 3in and 81mm FOOs I guess it is ammunition quantity which makes the difference. IIRC there is no "availability" factor in CMBO pricing.

Good post Dan, nofink like a bit of real life evidence. Medinine showed that by that time the 8th Army completely had the wood on the Afrika Corps. In fact even with 6pdrs they seemed to do Ok vs Tigers. In CM you seldom see AT guns in the numbers they were employed by the British. Some brit inf Bn had up to 12 AT guns in the desert, add to that the AT regiments at divisional level and you have a fair bit of AT defence. In CM it may be gun vs tank but in reality it was guns. Comparing the Firefly and the Tiger is apples and oranges. Anyway why would a Firefly be pinging away at a MkIV you only need a Stuart or Daimler for that

No doubt you are right Moon, if you'd had the same source I have (RUR regimental history) then the scenario may have been different. My main point was that you can't rely on one side to estimate the strength of the other since obviously your German history may be super accurate on their side but seems to have mixed up the British forces from the 7th and 9th. It is hardly unexpected that they overestimated the forces they bumped into if they decided to withdraw. The advantage of regimental diaries is that they don't tend to give exact details of the enemy strength but will give precise details of the friendly forces committed as well whatever support they get. I did play the scenario against Bastables as Germans but we canned it half way through because I thought the original CM brit inf Bn OOB upon which you obviously based the brit forces was hamstringing me in a big way. Thankfully that has been fixed now. I still think the battle could have played out like the scenario if the brit Bn commander had persisted and followed up D Co on the 7th. But I think the Brit OOB would be quite different. I might edit the Brit side and dispositions and send you the result to see what you think?

Well therein lies a problem Moon. Because if indeed we are talking of the first clash at Cambes then assuming your German OOB is good then your British OOB is wide of the mark. Since in fact only D Co. 2nd RUR participated in that engagement supported by one squadron of the ERY. If that is indeed the fact then historically they did pretty well if they were fighting most of a German Bn. Mind you it would be difficult to repeat that result in CM "On the 7th June, the Battalion was ordered to move in a South Westerly direction to capture Cambes. a small village thickly wooded, and approximately six miles inland from the coast. The Battalion moved via Le Mesnil with D Company, commanded by Captain J. R. StL. Aldworth as vanguard. it, was believed that Cambes was lightly held, but as the two woods surrounding it were themselves surrounded by walls some ten feet high, it was not possible to observe the enemys actual dispositions. D Company was therefore ordered to proceed forward and capture Cambes with the rest of the Battalion closely following in reserve.About 1700 hours on the 7th June, D Company moved forward supported by one squadron of tank (East Riding Yeomanry); the rest of the Battalion remained halted at the side of the wood. A short diversion was provided here as four enemy fighters suddenly appeared and machine gunned the rear companies, causing no casualties. Here too, the first French people were met, who outwardly showed many signs of goodwill. On reaching the wood — the approach having been somewhat costly due to enemy snipers on the forward edge of the wood, and accurate mortar fire dropping onto the approach — the company split into half, two platoons under the Company Commander attacking the village through the left side of the wood, and the other platoon and Company Headquarters, commanded by the companys second in command, Captain J. Montgomery, attacking through the right edge of the wood. Immediately the company had broken through into the wood, cross fire from machine guns opened up, resulting in many men becoming casualties. The Company Commander was killed on the left, and one Platoon Commander on the right, Lt H. Greene, was wounded and unable to carry on. Captain Montgomery, deciding that the opposition was too heavy for his depleted company to overcome, ordered a withdrawal from the wood. Owing to the high wall and the thickness of the wood, the supporting tanks had not been able to give any effective close support during the attack. The Company then withdrew to the Battalion. and the Commanding Officer on the information received decided that a Battalion attack would be far too costly without much greater artillery support. During D Companys attack, the reserve companies had suffered a few casualties from mortar fire, amongst whom were Captain H. M. Gaffikin, the Carrier Platoon Commander, who was wounded but not evacuated. The Battalion withdrew to Le Mesnil where it took up a defensive position. The attack had cost D Company its Commander and fourteen Other Ranks killed, one Officer and eleven Other Ranks wounded and four Other Ranks missing, with two Stretcher Bearers from the Medical Section killed whilst tending the wounded. The loss of Captain Aldworth was a particularly heavy blow. He had commanded D Company for close on two years and had become almost an institution both for D Company and indeed the Battalion. Of the many regulars of the Battalion that we were so soon to lose he was the first, and with his passing it seemed as though the Battalion had lost part of its identity and character.On the 8th June, the Commanding Officer made a reconnaissance for a Battalion attack on Cambes, this time attacking from the village of Afisy, some 1200 yards to the west of Le Mesnil, and 1500 yards north of Cambes. This reconnaissance was carried out with Lt-Colonel Hussey, commanding 33 Field Artillery who was killed later in his tank, and Lieut. Colonel Williamson, commanding East Riding Yeomanry, protected by the Battalion Snipers under command of Sjt F. Pancott. As a result, Company Commanders were given the plan in outline at Anisy at 1630 hours 8 June, after which they made their reconnaissance."

tero, It was the invasion of Sicily and it was probably not calculated since the timing of Kursk was up to the Germans and the timing of Husky was up to the allies. Unless they were in collusion of course I am confused as to your justification for discounting POW as a combat statistic. Exactly what do you think they are? Certainly not irrelevant I would think. Whether you deny the enemy the use of his manpower through death, wounding or capture the effect upon his capabilities is similar. Excepting of course you have to look after the POW. Perhaps you are suggesting that by executing POW one could improve the combat efficiency of your units?

Well that damned search function has stymied me once again. Anyway I had that account still on file so I will post it again. ?was believed that Cambes was lightly held, but as the two woods surrounding it were themselves surrounded by walls some ten feet high, it was not possible to observe the enemies actual dispositions.? On the afternoon of 7th June 1944, D company The 2nd Bn. The Royal Ulster Rifles with support of one Sqn East Riding Yeomanry attacked Cambes and the woods, although gaining entry into the woods strong enfilading MG and mortar fire made the position untenable and they withdrew to attack 2 days later with better support. The picture was as follows: Cambes and Galmanche (another small village some 800 yards south of Cambes), thought to be lightly held by the enemy, were defended strongly as outposts. Buron and St Contest, two villages a further 1000 yards or so south and south west of Galmanche were strongly held. On the east side, La Bijude, some 800 yards south east of Cambes, and Epron, some 500 yards south of La Bijude were held by the enemy with unknown strength. For the attack on Cambes Wood 9th June, 1944 The 2nd Bn. The Royal Ulster Rifles had additional troops as follows: Under Command: one section Field Ambulance. In support, one 6? Cruiser, Royal Navy, the whole of the Divisional Artillery, two troops Anti-Tank (RA) ? one ordinary and one self propelled. One company 4.2? mortars, one company Medium Machine Guns; one regiment of Sherman tanks (East Riding Yeomanry) Royal Engineers in the shape of assault demolition and mine clearance teams, with five Armoured Vehicles Royal Engineers in support. ?It will be recalled that the ground from Anisy to Cambes is open, its distance being approximately 1500 yards, and its width approximately 800 yards. A dusty track with no bordering or fence of any description runs straight from Anisy to Cambes. The intention of the Commanding Officer was simple and direct; ?2nd Bn. The Royal Ulster Rifles will capture and consolidate Cambes?. The plan was as follows: The advance from Anisy to Cambes over the open ground was to be carried out with B Company on the right, A Company on the left with their left on the track, D Company supporting B Company, and C Company supporting A Company, the advance to be carried out under cover of an artillery barrage. The advance was to be in open order, with A and B Companies clearing the front edge of the village and guarding the flanks, and with C and D Companies passing through and capturing the far edges of the village, the whole operation requiring both wood and street fighting. Prior to Zero Hour, the Naval Cruiser gave a five minute concentration onto the village, followed by the Fd Arty giving a series of concentration, behind which the Battalion were to advance. The anti-tank gunners were to protect the flanks, and the East Riding Yeomanry tanks were also to assist. The assault companies, A and B, were each given a demolition and mine clearance team for use until their final objectives, when they were to pass these on to the supporting companies, C and D. The Armoured Vehicles Royal Engineers were to move forward with the Battalion ready to deal with any strongpoints. The 4.2? mortars were given two tasks of crumping onto A Companys first objective, and then to transfer to C Companys final objective. The Medium Machine Gun Company were (1) To cover the left flank, and (2) To consolidate on the final objectives in order to deal with counter attacks. The Battalions own 3? Mortar Platoon were to be prepared to fire on call from the Assault Companies, and then from the two Supporting Companies. The Carrier Platoon under command of 5 Company Commander, Major C. R. P. Sweeny, MC, were to remain at Anisy and be prepared to ferry up ammunition or any other requirements to the objectives. The anti-tank platoon were given protective tasks once the objective had been gained. and the Pioneer Platoon, whose Commander, Lt D. Greer, had left the Battalion on the 7th June to collect some stores from a dump and had not since returned, were to be ready should the Royal Engineers not be in a position to fulfil their commitments. At 1515 hours 9th June, A and B Companies crossed the start line followed by the Battalion O Group behind A Company. The men were well spaced out and advanced in good order, direction being steadied by the Commanding Officer from the left. As the Companies reached the ridge some 1100 yards from the objective, whence they could be permanently observed by the enemy they came under a heavy barrage of mortar and shell fire accompanied by machine gun fire. The Commanding Officer of the East Riding Yeomanry, who had fought with the Guards, observing the advance from the start line, said to himself ?This is where they get to ground, and the attack is held up?. To his astonishment however, the Battalion continued to advance in open order keeping perfect distance. Certainly there is no doubt that the Companies advanced through what appeared to be an impassable barrage with the same unconcern as that shown on a company field firing exercise. Men were dropping all round, but still the advance continued. A Company under Major W. D. Tighe-Wood were particularly unfortunate, losing all three of their Platoon Commanders, Lt R. S. Hall being killed, and the other two, Lt D. Walsh and Lt J. St. J. Cooper being wounded in such a way that they could not carry on. Further, one Platoon Serjeant was also knocked out. But Major Tighe-Wood, despite these difficulties, succeeded in establishing his Company upon the objective and inspired all ranks by his example of cool and determined leadership. Cpl OReilly finding himself the senior person left in his platoon, took command and did very good work during the difficult period of consolidation which followed. In the same Company, Rfn Miller finding his section leader-less, took over command and led his section with great initiative. L/Sjt McCann, A Company, was badly wounded in the face, but refused to drop out of the fight until his Platoons objective had been obtained. B Company on the right, under the command of Major J. W. Hyde, came under heavy mortar and machine gun fire from the flank about 400 yards from the near edge of their first objective. With great presence of mind Sjt Kavanagh of 11 Platoon engaged the machine guns with his Bren groups and also directed the attention of a tank on to the trouble. Subsequent patrolling located several enemy dead in the target area. The first objective was quickly taken, 10 Platoon passing with great speed through the village to the church. their final objective. One German, an SS sniper was wounded and taken prisoner. A and B Companies reached their first objective by 1630 hours. In passing through A Company, C Company, who by this time had the Armoured Vehicle Royal Engineers tanks under command, lost these to German 88 mm guns firing from La Bijude. These tanks manned by Royal Engineers had done great work, their crews having shown a strong desire to get to grips with the enemy, carrying out tasks which strictly they were not intended to do. the history of the 79th Armd Div has something uncomplementary to say about this misuse of ARVEs around Cambes However. C Company Commander, Major J. C. S. G. de Longueuil, could not communicate with them during the battle, and they fought until their tanks were knocked out underneath them. When C Company with great vigour and dash, had fought their way through the wood to their final objective, they were unfortunate in losing one of their Platoon Commanders, Lt R. C. Diserens, who regardless of his own safety, was running about in the open under fire, putting his platoon into position. This very enthusiastic young officer was severely wounded and died later from the effects, a great loss to his Company and to the Battalion. D Company, which it will be remembered was sadly depleted, went through B Company, and almost immediately, two of its remaining three officers were wounded, Captain J. Montgomery the acting Company Commander, though wounded twice in the leg, carried on throughout the battle, and Lt Lennox, after leading his Platoon with great determination was severely wounded and could not carry on. Had D Company not secured its objective, it is possible that the enemy could have used this portion of the village and wood to make a very vigorous counter attack. In this battle D Company lost a further two killed, fifteen wounded, and one missing. Immediately the leading companies had reached their first objectives, the Anti-Tank Platoon under command of Captain C. R. Gray was ordered to move forward to assist in consolidation. All gun detachments moved forward in the face of an accurate 88 mm and mortar fire, and succeeded in being manhandled into position with the exception of one detachment. This was commanded by Cpl Boyd and received a direct hit from an 88 mm shell which besides knocking out the carrier, wounded Cpl Boyd and Rfn Heald and killed Rfn Bingham. Rfn Walton the remaining member of the crew escaped without injury. The gun itself was later recovered and manhandled into position. Whilst consolidating against a probable counter attack, the enemy subjected the position to a vicious attack of mortar and shell fire which lasted for five hours, so that the digging in was carried out under the greatest difficulties. During the consolidation, Captain M. D. G. C. Ryan, Headquarter Company Commander, was severely burnt in the hands by the explosion of a Phosphorous Smoke Bomb, and evacuated, and Major Brooks, MC, the very popular commander of the RA Battery which had supported the Battalion since 1939, was killed. At the end of the day, the Battalions total casualties were three Officers and forty one Other Ranks killed, seven Officers and one hundred and thirty one Other Ranks wounded and evacuated, three Officers and three Other Ranks wounded but not evacuated, one Officer and ten Other Ranks missing, making a total away from the Battalion of eleven Officers and one hundred and eighty two Other Ranks. Many of the wounded had been amazingly cheerful, joking in the face of the most frightful wounds. The Medical Officer, Captain C. R. Wright, RAMC, and his staff of medical orderlies and stretcher bearers had been a pillar of strength, dealing with patients with the same calmness and a good deal more humour than was normally shown on the non operational sick parade. Mention has already been made of Captain Aldworth and Lt Diserens. Lt Hall had not been with the Battalion for as long as them, having joined in January from the Coast Artillery, but he was already marked out for promotion by his ability and excellence as an officer, while to his many friends, his death meant the loss of one for whom loyalty and reliability were always paramount virtues and for whom gaiety and good humour were as essential as the breath of life. Morale in the Battalion never faltered from the beginning. The Battalion took its victory and its wounds as if they were normal everyday occurrences. After consolidation, the Officers and Men soon learnt the advisability of digging deep, and the Germans regular strafing was soon the cause of much laughter and singing of such songs as ?Run Rabbit Run?. Cambes was not liked, but it was looked upon as a stepping stone to bigger things, and in order that the Germans could know this too, strong fighting patrols soon took up the offensive. When the 2nd Battalion was ordered to move forward again, it was not weaker owing to Cambes but stronger, and the Germans soon learnt to recognise the strong fighting spirit of the Royal Ulster Rifles. It was learnt later that as a result of this operation, Major W. D. Tighe-Wood, Captain J. Montgomery and Lt S. M. Lennox had been awarded the Military Cross, Cpl OReilly the Distinguished Conduct Medal, L/Sjt McCann, Rfn Long (who as a Signaller with C Company had attended a wounded man under severe shell fire with complete disregard for his own safety) and Rfn McGlennon (who as D Companys runner had maintained personal communication throughout the worst phase of the battle) the Military Medal. By July 3rd the geography of Cambes and its surroundings were firmly imprinted on our minds. The village itself must have held a population of some 300 before the war, but now, of course, there was none, the last civilians ? four old ladies ? being evacuated by ourselves on June 12th. The main road ran from North to South through the village from Villon Les Buissons on its way to Malon, and ultimately Caen, having Galmanche and St Contest on its right, and La Bijude and Epron on its left. North East and North of the village lay the wood, and through it into the village ran a track from Anisy, which was our main channel of supply and communication. This track was generously bordered with trenches and ditches, and many a visitor, trapped in a spell of Boche harassing fire, abandoned his vehicle for one of these. Within the framework of these roads stood the Chateau, a large white impressive structure set in what a few years before must have been beautiful surroundings. The back windows looked down an avenue which connected La Bijude with Cambes, and the front looked across the Northern stretches of the wood which contained our own Mortar platoon and half the other Battalion that was holding this area with ourselves. Some 200 yards to the West of the Chateau stood the Church, the meeting point of all roads and tracks leading into and out of the village. It was a fine old Norman church and once it had dominated the village architecturally just as its preachers and doctrines influenced the lives of all that dwelt there. Now, penetrated again and again by shells and shrapnel, its grandeur was a mere shadow of its former self. The railway followed along the Southern edge of the wood, crossed the Avenue at a level crossing and then swung South to follow a tortuous path towards Caen. Just East of the level crossing was Cambes station or halt ? a building which we would have described as a signal box. June 9th, 1944, 2nd Battalion, Middlesex regiment, MG Regiment (Vickers and 4.2? mortars) During the afternoon the Royal Ulster Rifles, of 9th Infantry Brigade, made an attack on Cambes Wood, supported by "B" Company and Nos. 10 and 11 Mortar Platoons. The opening barrage included both mortar and machine-gun fire, the mortars firing on the wood from Cazelle and Nos. 4 and 6 Machine-Gun Platoons of "B" Company raking the wood from the left flank with fire at a range of no more than 400 yards. As soon as they opened up they were heavily engaged by enemy artillery, losing three men wounded. The R.U.R. advanced frontally on the wood from Anisy, down a long, open, forward slope and under very heavy fire from enemy tanks at La Bijude. As the infantry reached the edge of the wood, the remaining platoon (No. 5) of "B" Com-pany raced down the road from Anisy on a consolidation task, but at the last minute their carriers were held up by the infantry. For a few moments they were brought to a standstill, giving the enemy tank gunners a stationary target. The leading carrier was hit, fortunately without causing any casualties to the crew, but the others managed to get into the corner of the wood at Cambes, where the guns were quickly mounted to form a defensive screen. The Commanding Officer, coming up on the pillion of a motor-cycle to the wood for a conference with the brigadier, had his cycle hit by anti-tank fire and had to crawl and run the last hundred yards, he and his driver, Sergeant Davis, both running the gauntlet of a very persistent sniper on the exposed flank. Cambes Wood was not a healthy place for the issue of further orders, for the enemy, having themselves withdrawn, directed a heavy mortar fire on the whole area. One bomb landed on Major Passy?s carrier, killing him, Corporal Green, his driver operator, Lance-Corporal Rees, and Private Baker. C.S.M. Bell, who had accompanied Major Passy, was mortally wounded a few minutes later by another. Nor was that the full tale of the losses at Cambes, for Captain McDowell, second-in-command of "B" Company. came up to the wood as soon as he heard that Major Pause had been killed and was himself killed imme-diately on arrival. The enemy fire directed on to the wood at Cambers became fiercer as the evening wore on. Movement became almost impossible and the Commanding Officer was pinned down near No. 5 Platoon. Lance-Sergeant Davis, his dispatch rider, distinguished himself during the evening by the complete dis-regard of danger with which he ran messages up and down the wood and tended the wounded under heavy fire. The bar to the M.M., which he won that day, was richly deserved. Captain H. B. Neve, the mortar O.P. officer, also won the M.C. for his gallantry on this occasion. While directing the fire of two mortar platoons, he had to sit out in the open as his wireless remote control gear had been hit by shrapnel, and the coolness and efficiency with which he directed the fire with shells and bombs exploding all round him was beyond praises At last light, the K.O.S.B. reached Cambes to reinforce the Royal Ulster Rifles. With their arrival the German fire gradually died down and the area was finally consolidated and firmly held.

There was another thread on this one a while back in which I posted a British account of the battle, I will try to dig it out. I have a few issues with it being historical spot on. For one it should be "2nd clash at Cambes". The town was flatened by British naval cruiser fire IIRC.