Imperial Grunt

I wonder what Zarqawi and crew were thinking when they were hiding in their safe house and then they heard the two F-16s as the jets arrived on station. I am sure the final panic would have been priceless! Oh well, no more home movies of him shooting a SAW heroically in the desert with his white sneakers on.

The US Marines are the Nation's elite shock troops and the Marines have proven this over and over agian, especially from WW I and on. The US Army's Rangers and 82nd Airborne are also elite assault forces, but they are still different from the US Marines in not just in how they are equipped and operational capabilites, but also in doctrine and tactics and mentality. The Khafji battle exemplified USMC valor, but you still have to keep in mind the enemy, and good old lady luck. If the Iraqis were more competent and professional, then Khafji would have gone down differently, and each recon team would probably have been snuffed out, one by one, no matter how valorious of a fight the Marines put up. I do not think that the Marine TF that arrived relieve the teams and supported the Arab National force in the Khafji clearing operation, would have arrived in time to link up with all of teams before an aggressive Iraqi force could have compromised them all. While the Iraqi attack was a limited effort, had they attacked and siezed Khafji and dug in deep and if they held it like the NVA held Hue city, requiring the Marines to clear it street by street, fighting every step of the way, then a shift of US policy for the entire war might have occurred. Yes, those Iraqi forces holding Khafji would have been systematically destroyed, but it would have been at a price high enough for the American public and its government to think twice about liberating Kuwait. But all of this is Sunday morning quarterbacking. Also, if anyone here saw the movie Jarhead, you should know that it was all vile trash. The book was written by a self-admitted disgruntled Marine who was also a malingerer. A good book about the Marine Corps, written by an unbiased, non-military writer, is "Making the Corps" by Thomas Ricks. There is another one out just published called "American Spartans".

The MEUs, as part of the Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) are not really task organized mission specific, but task organized for the theatre to which they will spend the majority of their operational time afloat. East Coast MEUs usually operate in the Med and Atlantic, while West Coast MEUs (and the 31st MEU out of Okinawa) operate in the Pacific. Of course any MEU may be sent anywhere, depending on where the ARGs are when a particular crisis occurs. Once the MEU recieves a mission and launches forces, those forces would be tailored for the primary mission, such as an port or airfield siezures, embassy reinforcement or evacuation, maritime interdiction, etc.. The ARG does not maintain a CSAR capablity, but the MEU does. Whenever the MEU is conducting air operations, the BLT will stand up its TRAP (Tactical Recovery of Aircraft or Personnel) force, which is staged in the well-deck, ready to go up to the flight deck and launch as soon as they get their mission briefing. Such a TRAP force conducted the rescue of US Airforce Capt O'Grady during the conflict in Bosnia. The carrier battlegroup that is supporting the ARG (now the US Navy combines the battlegroups with the ARGs into Expeditionary Warfare Strike Groups) does maintain a CSAR capability with dedicated CSAR aircraft (Seahawks) and crews. Here are some answers to your questions: 1) The helo company practises what we call a "hard or soft hit". A hard hit is when the helo force actually lands on the objective, usually dropping Marines by fastrope. With practise, and entire company can be on the ground in a matter of minutes, with each stick from each helo taking down objectives quickly. This, of course would be done after recon elements are in place as well as fire support from Cobras. Defending against a hard hit at night is actually pretty hard. Low flying and fast moving helos do achieve a fair amount of surprize. Especially when snipers open fire when the aircraft are 30 seconds out. A soft hit is when the helo force lands off site and has to infiltrate to its target. That is usually done when the defenses, terrian, etc.. around the objective preclude a hard hit. The helo company also has access to the CH-53Es, which are faster and have longer legs (and can be refueled in flight) than the imperial battle frogs (the CH-46s), depending on the mission. Also the CH-53Es can bring in the BLTs fast attack vehicles (vehicles like jeeps with machineguns or TOWs on them) or sling-load HMMWVs and other stuff. So, with all that said, where and how far out the troops will land depends on the situation. 2) The ships of the ARG will close as far as they can with due regard to the antiship missile threat. If the target is in Somolia for example, the ships might be just a few miles off shore or less. Off the coast of Iran would be different. The ARG will usually be much closer to shore at night than during the day, unless the commander wants the ARGs presence to be known. The ships just showing up off the coast can be a pretty good political deterrent. 3) The on-station time for Harrier operating off of the flight deck would be fairly long. The Harriers can strike, return to the LHA to re-arm and refuel, and get back on station for another CAS mission fairly quickly. That is the reason the Marines have that otherwise not so great tactical aircraft. The Cobras are slower, of course. Obviously both the AV-8Bs and Cobras on station time would be closely synchronized with the needs of the mission commander. The MEU can also request air support from the carrier battle group in theater as well. So, again, it all depends on the situation. 4) Question is already answered. Apart from the MEUs Maritime Special Purpose Force, (MSPF) which is its direct action element consisting of mostly Force Recon Marines, the ARG usually has a SEAL platoon embarked for beach reconnaissance and other SEAL missions. Hope this helps.

I agree! A CM:Marines game should focus on MEU operations as well as standard MAGTF (Marine-Air-Ground-Task-Force)operations, such as I MEF in Iraq. A MEF or MEB is like a giant MEU, but without the special ops focus. I MEF in Iraq had the largest Marine air combat element ever assempled, under 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing (3rd MAW). The MEF's ground combat element consisted of 1st Marine Division (reinforced), organized into 3 RCTs, and TF Tawara, a Marine Brigade consisting of elements from 2nd Marine Division and II MEF. For combat support, I MEF had 1st FSSG (Force Service Support Group). The command element (CE) of I MEF, had a very large Force Recon TF for both direct action as well as reconnaisance, as well as all the necessary command and control and intelligence gathering assets that the MEF needed. It was a very powerful combined-arms force that also had a very different set of capabilites than the Army component, which was spearheaded by 3rd ID (Mech). I MEF and the Army forces in OIF1 really complemented each other with their warfighting capablities, making the total force heading north into Iraq very effective. Marine forces also operate as Marine Expeditionary Brigades (MEBs), which consist of a Marine air combat element, a brigade service support group, and a RCT or RLT, depending whether the MEB is task organized for amphibious operations or is a fly-in MEB that falls in on a Marine brigades worth of gear provided by Maritime Pre-positioned Force (MPF) ships. The MPF ships provide enough gear to create a mechanized RCT, support several squadrons of rotary-wing and fixed wing avaition, and enough CSS for 30 days of combat operations. The MPF ships do need a secure port (and a secure airfield for the troops to arrive) but they have a roll-on/roll-off capability and do not need intact port infrastructure to offload. That probably just confused everyone, and to top it off, the Marines are always task organizing its MEUs, MEBs, and MEFs for the mission at hand. No two will ever be exactly alike, other than that each Marine deployed force will always have a command element, a ground combat element, an air combat element, and a combat service support element, making up a MAGTF. That is the golden rule of the MAGTF concept.

Here is some generic info about Marine Expeditionary Units. Marine Expeditionary Unit The Marine Corps operational doctrine emphasizes the air-ground team integrated at relatively low command levels. The Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU -- pronounced M-YOO) is the smallest type of MAGTF. The Marine Expeditionary Unit was formerly referred to as Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU). The change in name reflects capabilities beyond amphibious operations. With a strength of about 2,200 personnel, the MEU is normally built around a reinforced infantry battalion, a composite aircraft squadron, and a MEU service support group. It is commanded by a colonel and is routinely deployed with an Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) to form a forward deployed, sea-based, naval expeditionary force. A deployed MEU is vital element of the National Military Strategy requirement to maintain a capable forward presence. It is capable of conducting amphibious operations of limited duration, acting as an advance force for a larger follow-on MAGTF and providing an immediate response capability to a wide spectrum of crises/contingencies by conducting maritime-oriented missions. A MEU is capable of rapid deployment and employment via amphibious shipping, strategic airlift, marrying with MPF assets or any combination thereof. Capabilities of the MEU in intelligence, command and control, communications, and combat power are enhanced by significant augmentation of FMF assets. The MEU is unique in that its air and ground combat elements are combined with combat service support under one commander. The air/ground task force concept is designed to thoroughly exploit the combat power inherent in air and ground assets by closely integrating them into a single force. The MEU brings all the supplies it needs to sustain itself for quick mission accomplishment or to pave the way for any follow-on forces. The MEU is an expeditionary intervention force with the ability to rapidly organize for combat operations in virtually any environment. A primary goal for all forward deploying MEU's is to be trained, evaluated, and certified to conduct selected maritime special operations. Following the certification, the MEU will be designated as Special Operations Capable (SOC). To receive the certification, the MEU undergoes an intensive 26-week, standardized predeployment training program that includes an exercise and a final evaluation. The MEU must demonstrate competence across the entire spectrum of required capabilities, be able to plan and execute any assigned mission within six hours of notification, and conduct multiple missions simultaneously. These MEUs are augmented with selected personnel and equipment to provide enhanced conventional and selected maritime special operations capabilities. The designation "Special Operations Capable" is never granted until a unit successfully completed a special training syllabus, had been rigorously tested, and was certified to perform 18 special missions: amphibious raids, limited objective attacks, non-combatant evacuations, show of force, reinforcement operations, security operations, training foreign military, civil action, deception operations, fire support coordination, counter-intelligence, initial terminal guidance, signal intelligence-electronic warfare, tactical recovery of personnel and aircraft (TRAP), clandestine reconnaissance, military Operations in urban terrain (MOUT), special demolitions operations, and in-extremis hostage rescues. Marine Corps Forces Atlantic and Pacific maintain forward-deployed MEUs (SOC) in the Mediterranean Sea, the western Pacific, and the Indian Ocean or Arabian Gulf region. The MEU (SOC) can be thought of both as a self-contained operating force capable of missions of limited scope and duration and as a forward-deployed extension of the Marine expeditionary force. The forward-deployed MEU(SOC) is uniquely organized, trained and equipped to provide the naval or joint force commander with an expeditionary force that is inherently balanced, sustainable, flexible, responsive, expandable, and credible. Normally embarked aboard three to four ships of an Amphibious Ready Group (ARG), it is task-organized to accomplish a broad range of mission requirements. When embarked aboard amphibious shipping the MEU deploys with 15 days of accompanying supplies in classes I, II, VIII, and IX. The ARG deploys with 15 days of class III(, IV, and V embarked as Landing Force Operational Readiness Material (LFORM) to support the embarked MEU. The MEU is comprised of a command element (CE); a reinforced infantry battalion as the ground combat element (GCE); a reinforced helicopter squadron as the aviation combat element (ACE); and a combat service support element (CSSE) designated the MEU Service Support Group (MSSG). The Command Element (CE) provides command and control of the three Major Subordinate Elements (MSEs). In addition to the MEU commander and his supporting staff, the CE includes specialized detachments providing a direct action capability, naval gunfire liaison capability, reconnaissance and surveillance, and specialized communications and electronics warfare capabilities. When the MEU is in CONUS and not embarked aboard ship, the Marine Expeditionary Force Commander exercises operational control (OPCON) of the MEU. When embarked aboard ARG ships, the Fleet Commander in whose area of operation the ARG is operating normally exercises OPCON of the MEU during routine activities. During contingencies, command relationships are prescribed in the alert, warning, and/or execute order. The MEU may be designated a separate component within a Joint Force or designated as the landing force of an Amphibious Task Force. It is considered unacceptable for the MEU Commander to be designated as a functional warfare commander within the Navy Composite Warfare Commander construct; nor is it acceptable for the MEU to be embedded in a command relationship that fails to provide the Commander, Landing Force the decision-making authority and span of control prescribed in Joint doctrine for landing force operations. The Ground Combat Element (GCE) of a MEU is a Battalion Landing Team (BLT), is a reinforced infantry battalion of approximately 1,200 Marines, including three Rifle Companies. These attachments normally include artillery, engineers, light armored infantry (LAI), antiarmor, assault amphibian, and division reconnaissance units. Artillery battery configured with six 155mm howitzers. The artillery battery includes its own truck platoon with a mix of 1-ton and 5-ton trucks for carrying ammunition and other supplies, and for towing artillery pieces. Light Armored Reconnaissance (LAR) detachment configured with seven to sixteen Light Armored Vehicles (LAV) provides mobile reconnaissance screening and strike capability with its LAVs and organic infantry/scouts. Assault Amphibian Vehicle (AAV) platoon configured with fifteen AAV's: provides amphibious-assault, ship-to-shore movement and ground mobility. TOW platoon: provides a heavy anti-armor capability with 8 TOW anti-armor missile launchers. Tank platoon (when required for a specific operation) configured with four M1A1 main battle tanks. The Aviation Combat Element (ACE) of a MEU is a reinforced medium helicopter squadron. This squadron is normally reinforced with a mix of transport helicopters, attack helicopters, a detachment from the Marine Air Control Group (MACG), a Low Altitude Air Defense (LAAD) section, and a detachment from the Marine Wing Support Group (MWSG). VSTOL attack aircraft and aerial refueler/transport aircraft, if not embarked, may be provided as reinforcements if required. Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron (HMM), configured with twelve CH-46E helicopters, provides medium-lift assault support and is the core of the ACE. Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron (HMH) detachment, configured with four CH-53E helicopters: provides extended-range, heavy-lift assault support. Marine Light Attack Squadron (HMLA) detachment, configured with four AH-1W attack helicopters, and three UH-1N utility helicopters: provides close air support, airborne command and control, and escort. Marine Attack Squadron (VMA) detachment, configured with six AV-8B Harrier aircraft provides organic close air support (when required for a specific operation -- not all MEU deployments include the Harrier). The AV-8B Harrier VSTOL jet may be substituted for the attack helicopters. When appropriate shipping (i.e., LHA, LHD) is not available, the detachment trains with the MEU throughout the Predeployment Training Program (PTP), and then is placed on CONUS standby and prepared to deploy within 96 hours. Marine Aerial Refueler/Transport Squadron (VMGR) detachment, configured with two KC-130 aircraft: provides refueling services for embarked helicopters and AV-8B aircraft, and performs other support tasks (e.g., parachute operations, flare drops, cargo transportation, etc.) as required. Maximum flexibility is maintained with an airborne C3 capability. The detachment trains with the MEU throughout the PTP, and then is on CONUS standby and prepared to deploy within 96 hours. Marine Air Control Group (MACG) detachment that encompasses the Low Altitude Air Defense (LAAD) Battery detachment: provides low level, close-in air defense. The Combat Service Support Element (CSSE) of a MEU is a MSSG formed from the FSSG. Relatively small in numbers, usually with less than 300 Marines and Sailors, a MEU Service Support Group provides combat support, specifically: supply; maintenance; transportation; explosive ordnance disposal; military police; disbursing (pay services); water production and distribution; engineering; medical and dental services; fuel storage and distribution; and other services to the deployed MEU. The MSSG normally consists of an executive staff, two support platoons, and six service support platoons. The two support platoons are the Headquarters Platoon and the Communications Platoon. The six service support platoons are the Engineer Support Platoon, the Maintenance Support Platoon, the Motor Transport Platoon, the Landing Support Platoon, the Supply Platoon, and the Medical Platoon. Within its organic assets, the MSSG is capable of providing limited line haul transportation, limited third echelon repairs, and Arrival Airfield Control Group (AACG) or Departure Airfield Control Group (DACG) functions. In 1991 there were six permanent MEUs, three on the US east coast and three on the west coast. At any given time, two MEUs were forward deployed, two others were in training, and the remaining two were either standing up, standing down, or in transit. While MEU headquarters were permanent organizations, the units assigned to them rotated on a 15-month cycle (nine months stateside and six months deployed). A normal deployment included the "work up," a six-month training and familiarization program that welded separate MAGTF units into a unified combat-ready force; a six-month deployment, known as a "pump"; and the return trip which included the turnover, wash down, and homebound transit. All elements come together for six months of training then deploy for six months as a forward-deployed, self-sustaining Marine Air-Ground Task Force. There are seven MEU's in the Corps, three on each coast of the United States and one in Okinawa, Japan [the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit was activated on 09 September 1992]. The East Coast MEUs maintain a near-constant presence in the Mediterranean, while the West Coast MEUs deploy to the Western Pacific, to include the Persian Gulf. Each MEU follows a similar work-up/deployment cycle. A MEU's BLT is task organized for three methods of insertion. One rifle company is trained on small boats, one rifle company is meched up with AAVs (and the BLT's LAVs and tanks-the BLT may be LAV heavy and sans tanks, or a mix of a reinforced LAV platoon and a tank platoon) as the primary maneuver element, and one rifle company is the helo company. Additionally the BLT's heavy machinegun platoon and antiarmor platoon (found the the BLT's Weapons Company) are tasked organized into combined anti-armor teams or CAATs. This usually consits of two section sized elements with hardback HMMWVs mounted with TOWs, Javelins, .50 cals, and Mk-19s. The CAAT sections usually work in general support of the BLT, but may also be part of the mech company, depending on the mission. The BLT's artillery battery usually ends up performing a provisional infantry role since most of the fire support comes from the MEUs air assets or the carrier battle group that is usually nearby. Marine units organized for land combat, such as a RCT are more traditional in organization, however all Marine combat forces are organized with ground, air, and logistics all combined. MEUs are tailored packages and when committed to sieze and airfield and/or port, are meant to be reinforced with Marine or Army units flown in and/or arriving on ships, such as the Marine's MPF assets. 24th MEU

I think a Korean scenario would be a really good game as well. Lots of units, MOUT, difficult terrain and weather, etc... Very much like a Taiwan scenario, but even more intense. And the brain-washed N Koreans definetly have the capability and will to fight at the tactical level. Their gear might suck, (like the Syrians), but given the close terrain and their will to fight, they are a very challenging opponent.

Getting back to the issue of the thread, here is an interesting article about China. US more cautious than wary as China's reach grows By Robert Marquand | Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor ANDERSEN AIR BASE, GUAM - This 30-mile-long volcanic island appears on a map like stray bit of tropical spackling flung out in the Pacific. Honolulu is eight hours east, Tokyo four hours north, Hong Kong and Jakarta four hours west and south. The rest is ocean. Guam has been a sleepy supply depot for decades. But it is now becoming known as the "tip of the spear" of US Pacific forces. This US territorial outpost no longer means just "fuel and ammo" but "subs and bombers" as well. Some officers say Guam's new priority is a result of diverse missions in the Pacific, like tsunami relief. But most agree it has its source in the "unknowns" in East Asia - code language for Pentagon concerns about the rise of China - with its claims on Taiwan and rivalry with Japan - and a region with friction over oil rights, North Korea. "[Guam] hasn't had a continuous bomber presence since Vietnam," says Lt. Col. Hans Lageschulte, a flight operations officer here. "But things changed two years ago." At that time, about 12,000 military aircraft were landing on the longest runway in the Pacific. Last year, that figure was 26,000. Bulldozers are flattening earth for a second parallel runway. Parked wing to wing on Andersen's tarmac are seven B-1B Lancer bombers with names like "Night Hawk" and "Live Free or Die." Their gray swept-back forms now carry JDAMs, or guided munitions. Each plane carries the payload of three B-52 bombers. [Editor's note: The original version mischaracterized the B-52 bomber.] "We [uS forces] are developing an ops [operations] mentality in the Pacific," says David Crockett, as he stands inside a B1 cockpit loaded with upgrades. A B1 squad leader who wears titanium Armani glasses, Colonel Crockett is a veteran of Kosovo and Afghanistan. "We are training more and staying out longer." China's military is beginning to show signs of serious capability, as it rises and spends in tandem with its new-wealth economy (see Part 1, Nov. 17). As China's submarines and destroyers begin to navigate the Pacific Ocean currents, US forces in Asia are becoming more robust and watchful - even as the Pentagon seeks better ties with the PLA. The PLA has reformed 15 percent of itself into a core modern force capable of giving the US trouble around Taiwan. It has newly effective cruise missiles, three new classes of submarines, and a significant new defense industrial base from which to develop advanced weapons. China lags behind the US in areas like stealth technology and the ability to project power But this does not mean China now has a state-of-the-art Army, nor that China is on the verge of Pacific military parity with the US. To take one example, the PLA currently can "lift" or move only one division, about 15,000 personnel. It has no carrier force. In fact, there are so many wide gaps between China and the US - from stealth technology to "battlefield vision" - that some experts say China lags 20 years behind in the area of purely military matchups. In the past year, however, a dawning realization of new Chinese military capability has been so surprising that many analysts warn of overcompensating, and of attributing to China far more threat than there is. They point to fearful commentary about Chinese ambitions and warmaking ability that is largely based on lists of Chinese hardware - planes, missiles, tanks, subs. Yet few serious military planners feel such lists are a genuine method of assessing military prowess. As one Pentagon source noted, quoting an old CIA joke, "no one ever lost their job here by analyzing a threat." "To predict anything with certainty about the PLA or its intent is really irresponsible," says a senior US expert on China's military. "I don't think the PLA knows which way it is headed. I think there are just too many question marks." "I view China as a challenge, I would like to put it that way," says Guam's air commander, Col. Michael Boera. "I don't yet know if they are a problem." Problems for China: sustaining an attack on Taiwan and a US 'revolution in military force' In interviews in Hawaii, Guam, Taiwan, and Tokyo, generals and pilots, analysts and experts offered two fundamental points about China and the US in Asia. First, while China has turned its 1970s-era military technology into late 1980s-era technology, it is still 1980s-early-90s technology, and remains untested in combat conditions. China's high-tech training of officers and enlisted personnel is still considered very modest. Moreover, while China is creating the kind of high-tech battle force that will allow its ships, planes, missiles, and operations centers to coordinate with precision and speed, it does not yet have this hard-earned capability. Nor does it have advanced satellites and AWACS-enhanced battlefield vision (though China is purchasing up to four AWACS-type Russian A-50 planes.) In the short term, China faces two real problems. One, in the most serious and potentially catastrophic scenario - a PLA attack on Taiwan - it is far from clear that China can sustain an attack, once it meets advanced resistance. Second, US Pacific forces are not sitting dormant. China, for example, may be reforming, but it has not undergone the kind of "revolution in military affairs" that US forces have in the past decade. Moreover, should it come to a serious dustup in the Pacific, China might be required to face both US and Japanese forces. Japan has state-of-the-art systems that are mostly compatible with US systems. From atop the slender control tower here at Anderson, with its "Prepared to Prevail" inscription, officers are busy managing a live example of how US forces are adapting. Aircraft from three military branches work together: Ke-135 bomber refuelers, B-52s, Navy P-3s, and Navy H860 helicopters. A set of stealthy B2 bombers was here last week, and Marine F-18 jets arrive next week. Lumbering C-17s buzz around like oversize bumblebees. This is a composite picture of Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld's idea of "interoperability" - where military branches act in concert. The concept will be further enhanced this month when a new "Kenney War Fighting Center" starts up in Honolulu. The center will oversee a rapid-response Air Force team throughout the Pacific. Here in Guam, the Kenney center will deploy three sophisticated "Global Hawk" unmanned reconnaissance planes. Global Hawk replaces the U-2 spy plane, and will fly reconnaissance missions of 24 hours or more at 54,000 feet above the 100 million square miles and along the 43 countries that make up the Pacific command region. "Flexibility, speed, quick response ... is what we seek," says Lt. Col. Jason Salata of Pacific Command. Last summer, US and Japanese planes conducted joint bombing runs off Guam - the first time Japanese planes dropped munitions here since WW II. Guam's downside is vulnerability to what is called a "single point failure." That is, many assets could be wiped out in a single event, like an earthquake or a hostile submarine with tactical nuclear weapons. Pearl Harbor on Dec. 7, 1941, was nearly a "single point failure." One gap between China's military aims and its actual ability is the officer corps. China is developing a high-tech army. Yet it is unclear whether enough high-tech officers are available. A colonel in the PLA makes about $500 a month, less than the salary of many office clerks in Beijing's joint-venture firms. One Western expert who has spent time at PLA schools says that while China may be purchasing a modern army, it is not clear that enough officers are "modern in their heads ... a lot of them are still fairly local. They like hanging out in karaoke bars and don't want a lot of trouble." Andrew Yang, one of Taiwan's foremost military experts, says that on a trip to Beijing this summer, he felt the PLA "officers are not at a high level, and they are still losing talent to the private sector." One sharp critic of a "Chicken Little attitude" about China is analyst Richard Bitzinger, now at the Asia-Pacific Center for Strategic Studies. Mr. Bitzinger argues that precise appraisals of the PLA are nearly impossible, since the Chinese do not share much information. He argues that many China hawks substitute their own fears for what they don't know about China's capability. Yet he says it is possible to use common sense in taking some basic appraisals of the PLA. To quickly become the dominant power in Asia, China would have to sharply increase its military budget For example, he says, for China to develop quickly into the dominant military power in Asia would require PLA commanders to focus on every area at the same time - research, training, weapons manufacture, deployment, and the creation of high-tech communications that even US forces find daunting. Such a full-out buildup would require China to even more sharply increase its already whopping budget. "The problem for the PLA goes to the old saying, 'You can't make everything a priority,' " Bitzinger says. "They can't upgrade at all the levels needed and still spend only 3 percent at most of GDP." Moreover, for PLA generals to simply go on a shopping spree and obtain cutting-edge aerospace, boats, and missiles, doesn't necessarily mean much, Bitzinger argues. Modern militaries require "sweating the details" to make very unusual and hard-to-duplicate military systems and subsystems work. This takes years. "You can't just go out, buy stuff, and expect to plug and play [sophisticated hardware]," Bitzinger says. "I blame Star Trek for these assumptions," he adds, "where Captain Kirk and Spock can build anything out of nothing. You may want an Aegis system, but you can't buy it off the shelf. "We see a smooth plating on China's new 053 destroyer that looks like our Aegis system," Bitzinger says, "and some military analysts decide China does have an Aegis. But that assumes too much, in my view." Many PLA watchers say that despite China's modernization, many critical details are not addressed. For example, relations between the Chinese Army and Navy have long been so bitter that they sometimes don't speak to each other. While Chinese pilots now get a standard 200 hours training, that training is not advanced. In a Taiwan scenario, too, the battle China has been planning for, there are many unsolved problems. Military commanders who have "war gamed" Taiwan point out that an invasion force of at least 250,000 to 300,000 is required. Yet China can't deliver that many men to Taiwan's shores in a first assault. While China may be able to bloody the US Navy if it comes close to China's shores, the US Navy no longer employs this tactic in a Taiwan scenario, analysts say. One active Japanese army general who has war-gamed Taiwan many times says that China has only bad outcomes at present. If China tries to sink US ships with waves of aircraft, it will probably lose much of its Air Force, he states: "As a military planner you have to live to fight another day.... I have done the gaming many times from the Chinese side, and I've never won. My worst nightmare job is to be the Chinese operational planner for a Taiwan invasion. I have questioned whether China would sink a single US ship." Beijing can now potentially sink an aircraft carrier that gets too close to the Taiwan strait. But so far its cruise missiles, which are similar to the US Harpoon or French Exocet, are still 1970s vintage. These missiles can hit a ship. But more than 40 navies in the world use this type of weapon, and US ships are practiced in countermeasures. "People talk about Chinese cruise missiles as if one missile could stop the US Navy," says Bitzinger. "I really question that. For starters there are countermeasures. In a real scenario, the Navy isn't sitting on its hands." Missiles aimed at Taiwan are not a decisive military threat Then there are those 600-800 Chinese missiles aimed at Taiwan from Fujian province in China. US commanders, Taiwanese politicians, and journalists often describe these missiles as if they are a decisive military threat. In fact, they are more likely symbolic. As a munitions expert told the Monitor, 700 missiles is "nothing. For a military attack that is supposed to incapacitate and paralyze a country, it is not impressive." Each missile carries about a half-ton of explosive. Some 1,000 of them represent 500 tons. That amount is smaller than US forces dropped on Tokyo in two days, March 9-10, 1945, in an early futile effort to get Japan to surrender. In an eerily prescient PLA book that came out before Sept. 11, 2001, two PLA officers argue that many future conflicts would be organized around "asymmetric warfare," also called "assassin's mace." The tactic itself sounds unsettling, based on deception and trickery. Yet some US strategists point out that military tactics from the Trojan Horse to Pearl Harbor have relied on surprise and hitting the enemy in vulnerable places. One said, "I think maybe only the British in the 19th century deigned not to attack in a vulnerable or dishonorable place. Everyone else has and does, and plans for it. I don't think China has a corner on that market. Unfortunately, many assessments about China's military can only be proven in war. Such an event would probably be catastrophic. Many sources for this report, including some that confess they simply "don't trust China," nonetheless abhor the assumption that conflict is inevitable in the Pacific. Future relations envision everything from a US and allies "containing" China to a future where both the US and China find a way realistically to share the security of the Pacific. Admiral William Fallon, head of the Pacific Command, pointed out in Beijing in September that the stakes are too great for US and Chinese military relations to remain chilly, and cloudy. "If I were to encounter an issue with most of the countries in the Asia Pacific right now," he told reporters. "I would merely have to pick up the telephone and call someone I already know, I've already met, had a dialogue with...." Fallon continued that he felt it, "important for more than just the US-Chinese relationship" to develop a new and serious rapport. It is important for the entire region of Asia, he stated. I have to agree with Peter on this one, a Taiwan scenario would be a great CM:SF game.

Which way to that guy with the knife?

I guess that I am just a believer in overkill. Like why take a knife to a knife fight? Bring a gun. And not any gun, like a .38 snub-nose revolver. Bring something that is alot more expensive than your average knife made in China, like this problem solver and almost certian knife-fight winner:

Here is a SAW in action!

Yep, I think that is the preview I caught a little bit of. Thanks for heads up, I'll have to remember to set my DVR for this series. </font>

Hmmm...you know, all the fans of the M-1903 Springfield service rifle said all that about the experimental M-1 Garand rifle before WWII. Same logic of cost and not much perceived gain. Sure the cost ratio is alot more for a F-16A than for JSF, but once the JSF is online, it will be a good thing. A military that chooses to remain stagnant and not invest in the latest cutting edge tech will be overtaken. There is no reason for the US to deploy a force somewhere in the world and then fight at near-equal odds. The odds need to be stacked in the US's favor as much as possible. Especially for that war with China over Taiwan. War and the security of a nation is not all about bean-counting costs. Its about being able to project power and winning and not paying too high of a price to win. And the US does not have the luxury of simply configuring its entire military to fight the War on Terror. It has to be prepared for anything that may affect the Nation's strategic interests. I am sure the planners looking at Iran are wishing for a few squadrons of JSFs on all of the carrier battle groups, F-22s, as well as the latest and greatest TLAMs loaded on board more SeaWolf subs. Having a few of the DDX ships would be nice as well. As far as the cost ratio of an RPG-7 or an M-1 tank goes, which weapon system would you feel more comfortable with if you went to battle tomorrow? I do not think you would worry much about the cost of the tank, the fuel, ammo, etc...or the industrial military complex that invented the M-1 tank in the first place.

In my opinion, the SAW is an excellent weapon, but it does require care, like most US weapons. Compared to a RPK-type weapon, it is a maintanance nightmare but it is more effective in terms of accuracy, range, and sustained rate of fire. The SAW can put down a very effective amount of fire that no rifle can, and the short stock version is great for room clearing the old-fashion style. Not so good for hostage-rescue I imagine. Well, maybe for Russian HRTs. The 200 round drums can be noisy and they can fall off, destroying any kind of noise discipline you might have had on a patrol. The 100 round drum is alot better, except for static or defensive positions. Using a magazine is usually very problematic, but that is really an emergency option and not a primary method of employment. The USMC has debated back and forth for awhile on replacing the SAW. Get an bunch of Marine Gunners togther and they will debate whether its suppossed to be an automatic rifle or a light machinegun or what its role in the squad should be for days and never agree. Another problem with the SAW is during movement. When a fireteam is bounding, the SAW gunner has alot to do compared to everyone else when it comes to moving and shooting. But as soon as the team stops to set up a base of fire, then the SAW gunner is the man for the job. I think the USMC does want a lighter, more effective weapon, but right now nothing else is out there that rates the cost of switching from SAW. If you task organize a squad for a mission like MOUT, then you can put three SAWs in one fireteam and have the other two teams armed with just rifles as assault/clearing teams. That is alot of firepower and if you use talking guns, then that team can keep up a steady amount of automatic suppressive fire for a good amount of time. So, with all that said, the SAW is not a piece of crap.

That is a Javelin.

You forgot about dangling small treble fishhooks at eye level as well.

To go along with the M-32 GL, here is another weapon that the US Army is experimenting with. I like it. Door Breacher

OK, this has nothing to do with the game, but... I want some robot-infantry like this! (In addition to space Marines of course). Tetra Vaal And I am not sure if the game wants to go there, but the giving the background and circumstances of the various planets being fought over, should'nt the battlefields be "darker"? I am not talking necessary about fields of skulls being crushed under the treads of tanks (ala Terminator), but the current maps are pretty much fights on a golf course (one being frozen) Just an idea to throw out.

How much does it cost to insure that there's an M1A2 everywhere one could be needed to burst a bunker, as opposed to making sure there's a TOW launcher everywhere one could be needed to burst a bunker? </font>

He is probably one of those freaks of nature who is left-eye dominant.

Here is a pic of a US Marine rifleman. He is wearing the new side SAPI plate. Each plate is 5 pounds and most guys do not wear them due to the wieght. Side SAPI

That is good to go. I knew about the TOW 2, but not about the bunker buster varient. A normal TOWs warhead works pretty good as a bunker buster anyway though.

This is what they say... "Trophy was designed to effectively operate in a dense urban environment, where armored vehicles operate closely with integrated infantry forces. Therefore, direction, formation and energy of the fragments areMerkava 3 with prototype Trophy APS Ssytem demonstrated at LIC 2005 designed to ensure effective target kill with low collateral damage, and low risk to nearby troops" I am not sure what they mean by "low risk" but an RPG detonating on the side of a vehicle cannot be good for nearby troops either. I have not seen the system so I am not sure how safe or unsafe it is. Neat idea though.

Since there has been so much flak about ATGMs, how about a countermeasure like this? Trophy Anti RPG system

Speaking of RPGs, check this out: Trophy Anti-RPG system

Ahh, so that is what that vehicle does. Unfortunately, my current computer cant hack the game in order for me to explore it fully, so I guess I was just firing from the hip. Harv's Golden Rule is a very good one.