Imperial Grunt

Speaking of firepower... Get Some!

Thought this was an interesting article to share: MARINE CORPS RECRUIT DEPOT SAN DIEGO (March 10, 2006) -- Giving up the fame of the football field at 29 years old, one B Company recruit looked for a glory that was more permanent than any trophy. At age 13, Pfc. Jeremy Staat was 75 inches tall and weighed 230 pounds. It seemed as if he was built for football, according to Staat. “I really didn’t have to work hard at it,” said Staat. Starting as an offensive lineman, Staat grew as a football player and saw his first glimpse of the Marine Corps not long after starting at Arizona State University as an offensive lineman. Fond memories traced back to his first encounter with the Marine Corps. “I had a buddy who was a combat photographer in the Marine Corps,” said Staat. “He came back from the desert with pictures of these big C-130s and I said, ‘I want to do what you are doing.’” Playing football began losing its appeal. Seeing other men and women around the world in their service uniforms kept Staat thinking about those “what-ifs.” Following his time at the university, Staat moved up to the National Football League, playing with the Pittsburgh Steelers, Oakland Raiders, Seattle Seahawks, St. Louis Rams and one year of arena football with the Los Angeles Avengers. Early thoughts of leaving the league were deflected after college teammate Pat Tillman influenced Staat to stay in until he could get a retirement plan. Staat and Tillman became good friends while sharing a room at ASU. Over time, Tillman decided to leave the NFL to serve in the U.S. Army before he was killed in action in 2004. “That was the turning point for Jeremy,” said Janet Goodheart, Jeremy Staat’s mother. “After Pat was killed, he began to dwell on things. He visited me at home and we had a real serious talk. He told me that he was through with football.” He decided to enlist in the military. Because of his larger-than-life exterior, Staat had to pass a few tests before he could enlist. His mother said he passed tests everyday. “He called me and said, ‘Mom, you can’t be any more than 78 inches, 29 years old and 261 pounds,’’’ said Goodheart. “He was all three.” There were certain reasons for joining that went beyond the passing of Pat Tillman, according to Staat. “The big reason was because I was just really disgusted with the amount of money entertainers get and what they pay troops overseas,” said Staat. “It didn’t seem right that we pay all those entertainers millions to catch a football and we pay our Marines pennies to a dollar to catch a bullet,” said Staat. Determined to leave, Staat spoke with a recruiter and left as soon as possible. “I came in two months early, like ‘Let’s get it on,’” said Staat. “I wanted to be a part of something that is going to live forever instead of getting trophies. What are trophies good for – collecting dust? Most trophies get thrown in the garage. Who knows where they go after that?” Arriving at the depot, Staat did what he could to keep his past under wraps, but within five hours of his landing, his secret was out. Staat said a drill instructor asked the 77-inch stack of muscle if he played football. “I played a little in college,” said Staat, who enlisted to become a machine gunner. The drill instructor kept digging and eventually the truth came out. “From what I knew of Marine Corps training, drill instructors are extremely professional,” said Staat. “With all the attention I’ve drawn to this platoon, they have done an awesome job being professional.” When he started training, Staat took a different outlook on his environment than most recruits do during the first phase of boot camp. To him, playing for a team was temporary; being part of a legend was something people wouldn’t forget. Since entering recruit training, Staat realized he wasn’t used to the strenuous environment. “I’ve run three miles four times in my life, once at (Military Entrance Processing Station), and three times here,” said Staat. Besides the physical training, boot camp is aimed to place stress on recruits to prepare them for stressful situations they may encounter on the battlefield. Stepping away from the life of an entertainer to enjoy the priceless experience of Marine Corps boot camp, Staat said he couldn’t feel more at home. “I would wake up every day and smile,” said Staat. “Recruits look at me like I am crazy, but I am just happy to be here; to be on a practice field as big as Camp Pendleton is crazy.” According to Goodheart, the letters Staat sent home during training let her know that her son was doing fine in his training. “He was very happy,” she said. The only thing that Staat couldn’t grasp about training was the other recruits. He couldn’t understand why 60 recruits would rather to do push-ups in the dirt than sound off when told to by their drill instructors, but Staat never lost his motivation, according to Goodheart. “If there was something that gave Jeremy any kind of doubt, he would pursue it until he was convinced,” said Goodheart. “If you change the mindset of what you are doing, you can turn it into a whole new experience,” said Staat. “I looked at field training like I was going camping. They are going to pay me to learn how to train and survive in the field.” Staat said he found it amusing that people pay for the training that Marines are paid to complete. “They train you to keep in shape. They put you on a diet,” said Staat. “People pay to do that.” Staat recalled a day during training when his company ran the obstacle course. There are a number of high walls, logs and bars to get over throughout the course including the rope, which is strung from a high beam of wood to the ground. Staat attempted to climb the rope but failed. He was trained on the proper techniques, he got a second chance. Staat’s senior drill instructor told him to climb the rope again. One of the many things that are stressed during training is bearing, but when Staat climbed to the top of the rope, he broke his bearing and smiled. “I asked him what happened the first time and he smiled and said, ‘This recruit didn’t have the technique down, sir,’” said Staff Sgt. Miguel R. Saenz, senior drill instructor, Platoon 1065. “I was just happy,” said Staat. “I had never climbed a rope before.” Beyond the training, there were adjustments Staat had to make. “It was fast,” said Staat. “The sounding off was difficult because I am not used to yelling and screaming.” Even the combat utility uniforms took some getting used to, according Staat. “I looked at them as a new uniform,” said Staat. “Instead of having a football helmet, I had a Kevlar. Instead of wearing shoulder pads, I wore a flak jacket.” Departing the depot as a squad leader, and one of many new Marines graduating from Co. B, Staat plans on leaving a lasting impression in the Marine Corps and maybe watch a few football games on his days off.

I was not actually being serious about the whole war against robots thing...

I do not see the meaning in comparing Germany to the United States, their geo-political-strategic situations are vastly different. And the various Services do focus on thier "finest hour" for a reason, because that is what they do best. There are pros and cons, but when a unified commander needs a tool for a job, he wants the best tool for the job at hand, not a jack-of-all trades, master-of-nothing tool. It is not efficient and it can be expensive. But it makes for a good military and it allows for those intangibles such as espirit de corps, service traditions, etc... And those factors can be very important. And the carrier battle groups have proven their worth during many crisis since WWII. The US still has them because they are out there, all of time, to respond somewhere. While US Airforce aircraft can also be sent in many cases, they do not have the loiter or turn-around time that a carrier offers. And there is no presence in a theater of operations with just airforce planes. Its the same reason why the US military continues to bankroll both Marines and Airborne forces. They are both capable of forced entry operations and rapid responce. Both are elite formations with a tradition of winning, no matter what the odds. But they operate very differently and have offer different operational options to a theater commander. So as long as the US and UK can afford them, my bet is that they will keep them. And while the Cold War is over and the War on Terrorism has just begun, as you have said, there is potential confict with China, there is always North Korea, and probably some other place that will require the US to project power and then fight a sustained war of some type. Before the Gulf War, people said that the US military will never need tanks anymore. Well, those M-1s have proven to be priceless in Iraq, both for OIF 1 and now. So if China went for Taiwan, or if North Korea imploded, the Canadians attack, or whatever...those carrier battle groups, F-22s, Marines, paratroopers, etc...are very valuable, especially when compared with the option of having no option. When it comes down to it, the average American taxpayer wants the US to have a big stick that can be used when it is necessary. We argue whenever it is used, unless the Nation is physically attacked first. But they want a big stick that can whack anyone in the world. It is not always efficient and of course there is waste. Democracy is inefficient in itself and the their military's are a reflection of that. No Service can just buy something it wants. There is a bureucratic process. Bids, contracts, etc...But, overall the system works out. As a Marine, I definetly wish Congress did not elect to put a squadron of F-22s in service and used that money to speed up the EFV or V-22 program, or fund more training ammo, new weapons and body armor, better armored HMMWVs, etc... But I understand that that single squadron of F-22s can have strategic impact in a crisis. Air superiority is critical in US warfighting doctrine. The F-22s virtually guarantee that, unless aliens invade. And of course you are are entitled to your opinion and obviously we would never agree on some issues, so lets both just have a beer and be happy we live in places where we can argue over the internet about crap like this!

Actually, all this speculation is worthless. The next big war will be against robots. And man will eventually lose. They are already among us! Robot Grunts

Things like this, just alot more advanced... Unmanned Ground Vehicle

The game looks cool and challenging. The vehicles looks great, but I was wondering how they stay so clean after running around the battlefield. Must be that futuristic paint. I like SciFi so I am hoping this turns out well. And I am really interested in seeing how infantry is going to be simulated in the follow-on module. Other than vehicles and radar, are there any other recon assets such as UAVs and UGVs?

The US used to have a part of the State Department that specifically delt with the US's world public image. But it was done away with. Since then, there has been almost no effort in even telling America's side of the story. In my opinion, that alone has caused enormous damage to the US. As far as the emerging government in Iraq, I agree it will more than likely be a compromise between what the US wants and the what the Iraqis want. I do not agree that it will be an Islamic state or another dictatorship. But when it starts to thrive and exist on its own, it will continue to shape the course of history in the Middle East in a different direction than how things were going before Saddam was removed from power. Same for Afghanistan.

Well I guess you got the UK's and US's nation defense budget and policy all figured out! You should submit your resume ASAP.

What, like in Total Annihilation, where you could win a battle by sending a fleet of transport aircraft to pick up the (irreplacable) Commander and then self destruct, resulting in either a crippled enemy or an instant win, depending on the victory conditions? Cool. Let's put that in CMSF </font>

I agree with that. They want to wait us out and just move in when the global political situation appears best. That was exactly Saddam's plan in 1990. He bet that the US would not oppose his annexation of Kuwait. And if the US did not, then he would have kept Kuwait and who knows how world history would have turned out then. I think the Chinese are spending more money to get a real amphibious capability in the near future to project power to Taiwan. It is not just a political stick. But, in my opinion, they will not make their military move until they feel the politics completey isolates a US military response. They are quite prepared to absorb the angry letters from the UN and France. I also believe that China needs to take back Taiwan at some point because the government has been pushing that idea for so long to its people. Eventually that political momentum will start to culminate and people will no longer believe the past propaganda and or the threat of inaction. Oppressive governments need not only enemy's of the state to survive but the need to motivate its people to want to go forward and fight the imperialists, etc..and not think about how working 10-12 hours a day in a crammed factory for a few dollars a day is really not the good life. I do believe that right now, China is prepared to suffer more pain that the US. But the US can dish out alot more pain on China that China can against the US. So it is not even. Taking back Taiwan would be a difficult challenge for US forces, but since it is waterlocked, and the US is a maritime power, I believe that barring a political resolution, it would only be a matter of time and hard effort to take back Taiwan. It would make for a tremendous CM:SF game. I would use most of Peter's scenario and pit US, UK, Aussie. South Korean, and loyal Taiwanese forces against Chinese and communist Taiwanese forces. Taiwan would make for a varied battlefield as well.

The US Army's helicopters are not made to operate from ships or tolerate constant exposure to salt air and water. They have operated Army special ops helos from carriers, but that is a special mission and it takes a carrier out of the fight. And it takes alot of training to operate from ships routinely. If the Marine Corps had the V-22 for Afghanistan, the build up of combat power at Rhino would have been alot faster. The CH-53Es could then have transported more fuel, ammo, supplies, water, etc..which is their primary mission. C-130s do not replace the V-22 because they can only land in airstrips that have to be secured ahead of time. The C-130s are not assault aircraft. O'Grady could have been rescued by Army or Airforce CSAR teams, but the ships were in the best position and the Marines could there the fastest. That is why they got the mission. If there was no Marine Corps, then the US Army would have to create special amphibious troops for the missions the Marine Corps now fulfills. More importantly, the Marine Corps has an expeditionary heritage that has developed over the years, something that the US Army traditionaly does not have alot of experience at. It is not about one service being better than another. It is about the roles of the service and capabilities and mutual support. I assume that the Royal Marines are still in existence because Britian needs an amphibious capability and doing away with them and simply replacing them with paras will not work. The V-22 is expensive, like all US aircraft, the the Nation can afford it and it will give the Marines and the Nation a tremedous leap forward in crisis response time and reach. The aircraft will not make a huge impact in Iraq but it will in all of the future ops the Marine Corps traditionally conducts. Especially for launching forces from beyond the horizon to go and get somebody, be it a friend in need or a foe that needs to be delt with.

Actually there are numerous times the Marines used helos to project power ashore quickly at a distance. -The establishment of Camp Rhino in Afghanistan was initially done by a Marines flying in on CH-53s from ships. After the airstrip was secured, Marine C-130s then flew in LAVs and more Marines. -There have been numerous embassy extractions or reinforcement, some performed with very little notice, by Marines and their helos operating from ships. -The rescue of Capt O'Grady in Bosnia was executed by a MEU using helicopters from ships. -Many humanitarian missions have been conducted by Marines using their helos from ships. The V-22, along with the EFV, will definetley earn their pricetags when deployed with Marine units. Like many other aircraft programs, the V-22 does have a bad history and it went overbudget. Hopefully all the really bad bugs have been worked out. Even the M-1 Garand rifle was critized when it first was produced, and it was the best infantry rifle in WWII. Time will tell, but I think the V-22 will work out just fine and it will definetly allow the MEUs to perform the mission with a longer reach, faster, and more efficiently. If I had my way though, the Marine Corps would not just invest in the V-22 exclusively as its mediem assault lift aircraft, but went for a mixed fleet of V-22s and another helicopter. But it all comes down to money and operational capabilities.

Unless you have gone over there to take a poll, I do not think all of your answers are correct. A great video to watch is called "Voices of Iraq". It was aired on PBS awhile back and it is very telling of the true realitiy. It is not necessarily pro-US, but it is not anti-US, with the exception of the part of the documentary that were filmed in the Sunni triangle. More than anything it is very human and it shows families just trying to survive the situation. Voices of Iraq The insurgents and the terrorists are very different groups of people. And the Iraqis are killing terrorist as well, because they do not want them in their country. But the terrorists use terror tactics (go figure) to imtimidate and coerce the populations of villages and communities because they can due to the painfully slow development of the overall level of security. The Sunni tacit support of AQ is seriously undermining their own cause. Especially with the attack on the mosque and the sectarian violence that it spurned. While it is not very PC, I would just sit back and let the Shia's wipe out the Sunnis insurgents, it would probably take just 45 days, (even less if the Kurds came down for some payback) and just ensure the government survives the ordeal. Iranian influence in Iraq is definetly present, but it is not nearly as strong as is commonly illustrated in the media. And a far majority in Iraq do not want a religious state. They want a vibrant and strong and rich Iraq. To send their kids to college in Europe and the US, etc... Maybe we can find a Brit who has served in Basra to weigh in on that. By experience only goes down to Al-Hillah, a major city south of Baghdad.

Juan, you are confusing the Islamic terrorits types with the insurgents in all of the countries you have mentioned. Hearts and minds is absolutely vital in fighting the insurgencies, (which we are not losing, but things are difficult in key areas of the country). And you cannot engage an insurgent without thinking about the repercussions of the collateral damage. You dont want to kill one insurgent and make his family into 10 more. At the same time, doing nothing has a similar price, as it emboldens insurgents. By the way, dont think of the insurgents as Washington's or Lee's army. Most are really just fighting gang style for their piece of stakes. They are not fighting for a free Iraq. Even the Sunni insurgents are very divided amongst themselves into their various tribes. But none of that works with AQ types. And you are right, changing the Middle East so people are free to pursue happiness and a better way of life is the long term solution. Making democratic governments in the Arabic culture is difficult, but making pro-US, benign governments that promote free enterprise is much more doable. And, in my humble opinion, that economic equation will finally snuff out Islamic extremists (there will always be some, just like the David Koresh types in the US), and more importantly, the mainstream Muslims in those countries will completely reject them. A thriving Iraq will economically crush Iran and Syria and it would spread a dominoe effect. It would still take time, but the entire world is moving towards globilization, like it or not. Maybe true democracy will follow, but the economics will flourish the fastest as soon as it can start. But the core terrorists, the ones killing more Iraqis than US military personnel, the ones that will do anything to hurt the US and any other non-believer, the ones who use kids as suicide bombers, those are the ones that we need to continually hunt. Day and night, for as long as it takes.

Peter, I do not have the exact award citation or the summary of action that justified it. Lets just say that his commander at least saw that he was performing meritoriously and therefore put him in for the award. But I am willing to say that he did many things heroically as well. As far as the Pacific and Korea goes, you are probably right. Especially during WWII, very few awards were given out. Staying alive was pretty much an award in itself. As far as the UK military goes, whatever.

Ummm, that is what I said. Time is on their side.

As China expands it economy and dabbles with free enterprise and technology, the country, in my opinion, will face another revolution as the powers that be will be questioned by the powers that start to make money. And those huge numbers of cheap labor will start to question more and more until something breaks. N. Korea is even more fragile. And a war between the US and China would not just hurt the US economically. It would crush China and they would be the ones to suffer more infrastructure damage. All of their exports would stop. The inflow of oil would stop. There is alot of risk for China to take Taiwan or challenge the US. Otherwise, it would have already been done. The card they want to play is a weak US government that would balk at the thought of going to war. They will wait for a US President who is afraid to thumb his or her nose to the UN, world opinion, etc... Time is on China's side. But they will never move against Taiwan until they feel that the US will do nothing. If it went nuclear, then both sides would lose, but the US would loose a few cities, while China would be completely devestated. They know that. As much as they threaten, I highly doubt the Chinese would risk nuclear destruction. Just been rambling tonight...

The author was not addressing the Iraqi insurgency and Iraq only, but the War on Terror as a whole. The ones that the US is locked into a war of attrition with are the radical Islamic terrorists, aka Al Qeda, Jamal Islamyyiah, etc.. And I complety agree that past US inaction only encouraged the likes of Bin Laden. And I completely agree that the best defense against radical radical terrorits is to annhililate them through offensive actions. But that is just me. Iraq and Afghanistan might not last a long time, but the War on Terror will. It has just started really. And in 1950, no one had any idea how economics would make Germany and Japan prosper to become incredible countries. No one could imagine that the Soviet Union would fall apart and its citizens would stop believing in communism. Today, no one can predict how things will turn out, but I am optimistic and I see a parallel.

The Osprey is replaceing the old CH-46 to be the USMC's new Imperial battlefrog. It is not replacing the CH-53, which is primarily a heavy cargo helo and not a troop tranport. The Osprey is expensive but it has a ton of operational abilities that a MEU or other Marine unit can exploit. And it is very modern. The Marine Corps vertical assault doctrine is to not fly into hot LZs. Those are to be avoided. If it is suspected to be hot, then a firesupport plan is put in place to pound all suspected enemy positions. Plus the engress will be escorted by Cobras. Also, helo ops are best done at night. And low-flying helos are hard to hit until they flare to land in the LZ. So unless the Marines are unlucky and pick the wrong LZ or the enemy guess the right one and avoids the prep fires, then helo inserts are usually a good bet overall. Vehicles and other sling-loaded stuff would only go into secure LZ's.

Peter, with all due respect you have no idea what you are talking about. During his tours in Iraq, he and his team were involved in many firefights. He was killed in the opening moments of a large firefight that lasted the entire afternoon and into the night. He was meeting with a village shiek when the attack occured and he quickly went forward to see what the situation was. Then the rocket hit him. A Marine tactical civil affairs team actually gets into more action than an infantry platoon over the course of an average tour, simply because the team has to be out in the villages and streets virtually everyday to do its mission of interfacing with the local civil population to support the military mission. He was very successful as his mission, both working with the local Iraqi leadership and dealing with insurgents when they found them. He definetly rated the bronzestar medal and would have probably been awarded it upon completion of his tour had he not been KIA. The above article was about the Red Cross award he recieved so it did not detail his military actions. The Marine Corps does not hand out medals and if you compare the number of bronze star medals and other awards to those issued by the other US services you would see that.

I liked this article too... In Praise of Attrition RALPH PETERS © 2004 Ralph Peters From Parameters, Summer 2004, pp. 24-32. “Who dares to call the child by its true name?” — Goethe, Faust In our military, the danger of accepting the traditional wisdom has become part of the traditional wisdom. Despite our lip service to creativity and innovation, we rarely pause to question fundamentals. Partly, of course, this is because officers in today’s Army or Marine Corps operate at a wartime tempo, with little leisure for reflection. Yet, even more fundamentally, deep prejudices have crept into our military—as well as into the civilian world— that obscure elementary truths. There is no better example of our unthinking embrace of an error than our rejection of the term “war of attrition.” The belief that attrition, as an objective or a result, is inherently negative is simply wrong. A soldier’s job is to kill the enemy. All else, however important it may appear at the moment, is secondary. And to kill the enemy is to attrit the enemy. All wars in which bullets—or arrows—fly are wars of attrition. Of course, the term “war of attrition” conjures the unimaginative slaughter of the Western Front, with massive casualties on both sides. Last year, when journalists wanted to denigrate our military’s occupation efforts in Iraq, the term bubbled up again and again. The notion that killing even the enemy is a bad thing in war has been exacerbated by the defense industry’s claims, seconded by glib military careerists, that precision weapons and technology in general had irrevocably changed the nature of warfare. But the nature of warfare never changes—only its superficial manifestations. The US Army also did great harm to its own intellectual and practical grasp of war by trolling for theories, especially in the 1980s. Theories don’t win wars. Well-trained, well-led soldiers in well-equipped armies do. And they do so by killing effectively. Yet we heard a great deal of nonsense about “maneuver warfare” as the solution to all our woes, from our numerical 24/25 disadvantage vis-à-vis the Warsaw Pact to our knowledge that the “active defense” on the old inner-German border was political tomfoolery and a military sham—and, frankly, the best an Army gutted by Vietnam and its long hangover could hope to do. Maneuver is not a solution unto itself, any more than technology is. It exists in an ever-readjusting balance with fires. Neither fires nor maneuver can be dispensed with. This sounds obvious, but that which is obvious is not always that which is valued or pursued. Those who would be theorists always prefer the arcane to the actual. Precious few military campaigns have been won by maneuver alone— at least not since the Renaissance and the days of chessboard battles between corporate condottieri. Napoleon’s Ulm campaign, the Japanese march on Singapore, and a few others make up the short list of “bloodless” victories. Even campaigns that appear to be triumphs of maneuver prove, on closer inspection, to have been successful because of a dynamic combination of fire and maneuver. The opening, conventional phase of the Franco-Prussian War, culminating in the grand envelopment at Sedan, is often cited as an example of brilliant maneuver at the operational level—yet the road to Paris was paved with more German than French corpses. It was a bloody war that happened to be fought on the move. Other campaigns whose success was built on audacious maneuvers nonetheless required attrition battles along the way or at their climax, from Moltke’s brilliant concentration on multiple axes at Koenigsgraetz (urgent marches to a gory day), to the German blitzkrieg efforts against the Poles, French, and Russians, and on to Operation Desert Storm, in which daring operational maneuvers positioned tactical firepower for a series of short, convincingly sharp engagements. Even the Inchon landing, one of the two or three most daring operations led by an American field commander, failed to bring the Korean War to a conclusion. More often than not, an overreliance on bold operational maneuvers to win a swift campaign led to disappointment, even disaster. One may argue for centuries about the diversion of a half dozen German divisions from the right flank of the Schlieffen Plan in 1914, but the attempt to win the war in one swift sweep led to more than four years of stalemate on the Western Front. In the same campaign season, Russian attempts at grand maneuver in the vicinity of the Masurian lakes collapsed in the face of counter-maneuvers and sharp encounter battles—a German active defense that drew on Napoleon’s 25/26 “strategy of the central position”—while, in Galicia, aggressive maneuvering proved to be exactly the wrong approach for the Austro-Hungarian military—which was ill-prepared for encounter battles. There is no substitute for shedding the enemy’s blood. Despite initial maneuver victories against Russia and in the Western Desert, a German overreliance on maneuver as a substitute for adequate firepower ultimately led to the destruction of Nazi armies. Time and again, from Lee’s disastrous Gettysburg campaign to the race to the Yalu in Korea, overconfidence in an army’s capabilities to continue to assert its power during grand maneuvers led to stunning reverses. The results were not merely a matter of Clausewitzian culminating points, but of fundamentally flawed strategies. Operation Iraqi Freedom, one of the most successful military campaigns in history, was intended to be a new kind of war of maneuver, in which aerial weapons would “shock and awe” a humbled opponent into surrender while ground forces did a little light dusting in the house of war. But instead of being decided by maneuvered technologies, the three-week war was fought and won—triumphantly—by soldiers and marines employing both aggressive operational maneuvers and devastating tactical firepower. The point is not that maneuver is the stepbrother of firepower, but that there is no single answer to the battlefield, no formula. The commander’s age-old need to balance incisive movements with the application of weaponry is unlikely to change even well beyond our lifetimes. It’s not an either-or matter, but about getting the integration right in each specific case. Although no two campaigns are identical, the closest we can come to an American superpower model of war would be this: strategic maneuver, then operational maneuver to deliver fires, then tactical fires to enable further maneuver. Increasingly, strategic fires play a role—although they do not win wars or decide them. Of course, no battlefield is ever quite so simple as this proposition, but any force that loses its elementary focus on killing the enemy swiftly and relentlessly until that enemy surrenders unconditionally cripples itself. Far from entering an age of maneuver, we have entered a new age of attrition warfare in two kinds: First, the war against religious terrorism is unquestionably a war of attrition—if one of your enemies is left alive or unimprisoned, he will continue trying to kill you and destroy your civilization. Second, Operation Iraqi Freedom, for all its dashing maneuvers, provided a new example of a postmodern war of attrition—one in which the casualties are overwhelmingly on one side. Nothing says that wars of attrition have to be fair. It’s essential to purge our minds of the clichéd images the term “war of attrition” evokes. Certainly, we do not and will not seek wars in which vast 26/27 casualties are equally distributed between our own forces and the enemy’s. But a one-sided war of attrition, enabled by our broad range of superior capabilities, is a strong model for a 21st-century American way of war. No model is consistently applicable. That is—or should be—a given. Wars create exceptions, to the eternal chagrin of military commanders and the consistent embarrassment of theorists. One of our greatest national and military strengths is our adaptability. Unlike many other cultures, we have an almost-primal aversion to wearing the straitjacket of theory, and our independence of mind serves us very well, indeed. But the theorists are always there, like devils whispering in our ears, telling us that airpower will win this war, or that satellite “intelligence” obviates the need for human effort, or that a mortal enemy will be persuaded to surrender by a sound-and-light show. Precision weapons unquestionably have value, but they are expensive and do not cause adequate destruction to impress a hardened enemy. The first time a guided bomb hits the deputy’s desk, it will get his chief’s attention, but if precision weaponry fails both to annihilate the enemy’s leadership and to somehow convince the army and population it has been defeated, it leaves the job to the soldier once again. Those who live in the technological clouds simply do not grasp the importance of graphic, extensive destruction in convincing an opponent of his defeat. Focus on killing the enemy. With fires. With maneuver. With sticks and stones and polyunsaturated fats. In a disciplined military, aggressive leaders and troops can always be restrained. But it’s difficult to persuade leaders schooled in caution that their mission is not to keep an entire corps’ tanks on line, but to rip the enemy’s heart out. We have made great progress from the ballet of Desert Storm—“spoiled” only by then-Major General Barry McCaffrey’s insistence on breaking out of the chorus line and kicking the enemy instead of thin air—to the close-with-the-enemy spirit of last year’s race to Baghdad. In the bitter years after Vietnam, when our national leaders succumbed to the myth that the American people would not tolerate casualties, elements within our military—although certainly not everyone—grew morally and practically timid. By the mid-1990s, the US Army’s informal motto appeared to be “We won’t fight, and you can’t make us.” There were obvious reasons for this. Our military—especially the Army and Marine Corps—felt betrayed by our national leadership over Vietnam. Then President Reagan evacuated Beirut shortly after the bombing of our Marine barracks on the city’s outskirts—beginning a long series of bipartisan retreats in the face of terror that ultimately led to 9/11. We hit a low point in Mogadishu, when Army Rangers, Special Operations elements, and line troops delivered a devastating blow against General Aideed’s irregulars— 27/28 only to have President Clinton declare defeat by pulling out. One may argue about the rationale for our presence in Somalia and about the dangers of mission creep, but once we’re in a fight, we need to win it—and remain on the battlefield long enough to convince our enemies they’ve lost on every count. Things began to change less than two weeks into our campaign in Afghanistan. At first, there was caution—would the new President run as soon as we suffered casualties? Then, as it dawned on our commanders that the Administration would stand behind our forces, we saw one of the most innovative campaigns in military history unfold with stunning speed. Our military, and especially our Army, has come a long way. But we’re still in recovery—almost through our Cold War hangover, but still too vulnerable to the nonsense concocted by desk-bound theoreticians. Evaluating lessons learned in Iraq, a recent draft study for a major joint command spoke of the need for “discourses” between commanders at various levels and their staffs. Trust me. We don’t need discourses. We need plain talk, honest answers, and the will to close with the enemy and kill him. And to keep on killing him until it is unmistakably clear to the entire world who won. When military officers start speaking in academic gobbledygook, it means they have nothing to contribute to the effectiveness of our forces. They badly need an assignment to Fallujah. Consider our enemies in the War on Terror. Men who believe, literally, that they are on a mission from God to destroy your civilization and who regard death as a promotion are not impressed by elegant maneuvers. You must find them, no matter how long it takes, then kill them. If they surrender, you must accord them their rights under the laws of war and international conventions. But, as we have learned so painfully from all the mindless, left-wing nonsense spouted about the prisoners at Guantanamo, you are much better off killing them before they have a chance to surrender. We have heard no end of blather about network-centric warfare, to the great profit of defense contractors. If you want to see a superb—and cheap—example of “net-war,” look at al Qaeda. The mere possession of technology does not ensure that it will be used effectively. And effectiveness is what matters. It isn’t a question of whether or not we want to fight a war of attrition against religion-fueled terrorists. We’re in a war of attrition with them. We have no realistic choice. Indeed, our enemies are, in some respects, better suited to both global and local wars of maneuver than we are. They have a world in which to hide, and the world is full of targets for them. They do not heed laws or boundaries. They make and observe no treaties. They do not ex- 28/29 pect the approval of the United Nations Security Council. They do not face election cycles. And their weapons are largely provided by our own societies. We have the technical capabilities to deploy globally, but, for now, we are forced to watch as Pakistani forces fumble efforts to surround and destroy concentrations of terrorists; we cannot enter any country (except, temporarily, Iraq) without the permission of its government. We have many tools—military, diplomatic, economic, cultural, law enforcement, and so on—but we have less freedom of maneuver than our enemies. But we do have superior killing power, once our enemies have been located. Ultimately, the key advantage of a superpower is super power. Faced with implacable enemies who would kill every man, woman, and child in our country and call the killing good (the ultimate war of attrition), we must be willing to use that power wisely, but remorselessly. We are, militarily and nationally, in a transition phase. Even after 9/11, we do not fully appreciate the cruelty and determination of our enemies. We will learn our lesson, painfully, because the terrorists will not quit. The only solution is to kill them and keep on killing them: a war of attrition. But a war of attrition fought on our terms, not theirs. Of course, we shall hear no end of fatuous arguments to the effect that we can’t kill our way out of the problem. Well, until a better methodology is discovered, killing every terrorist we can find is a good interim solution. The truth is that even if you can’t kill yourself out of the problem, you can make the problem a great deal smaller by effective targeting. And we shall hear that killing terrorists only creates more terrorists. This is sophomoric nonsense. The surest way to swell the ranks of terror is to follow the approach we did in the decade before 9/11 and do nothing of substance. Success breeds success. Everybody loves a winner. The clichés exist because they’re true. Al Qaeda and related terrorist groups metastasized because they were viewed in the Muslim world as standing up to the West successfully and handing the Great Satan America embarrassing defeats with impunity. Some fanatics will flock to the standard of terror, no matter what we do. But it’s far easier for Islamic societies to purge themselves of terrorists if the terrorists are on the losing end of the global struggle than if they’re al- 29/30 lowed to become triumphant heroes to every jobless, unstable teenager in the Middle East and beyond. Far worse than fighting such a war of attrition aggressively is to pretend you’re not in one while your enemy keeps on killing you. Even the occupation of Iraq is a war of attrition. We’re doing remarkably well, given the restrictions under which our forces operate. But no grand maneuvers, no gestures of humanity, no offers of conciliation, and no compromises will persuade the terrorists to halt their efforts to disrupt the development of a democratic, rule-of-law Iraq. On the contrary, anything less than relentless pursuit, with both preemptive and retaliatory action, only encourages the terrorists and remaining Baathist gangsters. With hardcore terrorists, it’s not about PSYOP or jobs or deploying dental teams. It’s about killing them. Even regarding the general population, which benefits from our reconstruction and development efforts, the best thing we can do for them is to kill terrorists and insurgents. Until the people of Iraq are secure, they are not truly free. The terrorists know that. We pretend otherwise. This will be a long war, stretching beyond many of our lifetimes. And it will be a long war of attrition. We must ensure that the casualties are always disproportionately on the other side. Curiously, while our military avoids a “body count” in Iraq—body counts have at least as bad a name as wars of attrition—the media insist on one. Sad to say, the body count cherished by the media is the number of our own troops dead and wounded. With our over-caution, we have allowed the media to create a perception that the losses are consistently on our side. By avoiding an enemy body count, we create an impression of our own defeat. In a war of attrition, numbers matter. Regarding the other postmodern form of wars of attrition—the high-velocity conventional operations in which maneuver and firepower, speed and violent systemic shock, combine to devastate an opposing force—the Army and Marine Corps need to embrace it, instead of allowing the technical services, the Air Force and Navy, to define the future of war (which the Air Force, especially, is defining wrongly). We will not live to see a magical suite of technologies achieve meaningful victories at no cost in human life. We need to oppose that massive lie at every opportunity. The 21st century’s opening decades, at least, will be dominated by the up-gunned Cain-and-Abel warfare we have seen from Manhattan to Bali, from Afghanistan’s Shamali Plain to Nasiriyeh, from Fallujah to Madrid. The problem is that the Department of Defense combines two fundamentally different breeds of military services. In the Air Force and the Navy, 30/31 people support machines. In the Army and Marine Corps, machines support people. While expensive technologies can have great utility—and Air Force and Navy assets made notable contributions to the Army-Marine victory in Operation Iraqi Freedom—the technical services have a profoundly diminished utility in the extended range of operations we are required to perform, from urban raids to extended occupations, from foot patrols in remote environments to peacemaking. The Navy is struggling hard with these issues, but the Air Force is the strongest opponent of admitting that we face wars of attrition, since it has invested overwhelmingly in precision weapons designed to win a war by “deconstructing” the enemy’s command networks. But the only way you can decisively cripple the command networks of terrorist organizations is by killing terrorists. Even in Operation Iraqi Freedom, airpower made an invaluable contribution, but attacking military and governmental infrastructure targets proved no substitute for destroying enemy forces. When, in mid-war, the focus of the air effort shifted from trying to persuade Saddam Hussein to wave a white handkerchief (which he had no incentive to do) to destroying Iraqi military equipment and killing enemy troops, the utility of airpower soared. It cannot be repeated often enough: Whatever else you aim to do in wartime, never lose your focus on killing the enemy. A number of the problems we have faced in the aftermath of Operation Iraqi Freedom arose because we tried to moderate the amount of destruction we inflicted on the Iraqi military. The only result was the rise of an Iraqi Dolchstosslegende, the notion that they weren’t really defeated, but betrayed. Combined with insufficient numbers of Coalition troops to blanket the country—especially the Sunni triangle—in the weeks immediately following the toppling of the regime, crucial portions of the population never really felt America’s power. It is not enough to materially defeat your enemy. You must convince your enemy that he has been defeated. You cannot do that by bombing empty buildings. You must be willing to kill in the short term to save lives and foster peace in the long term. This essay does not suppose that warfare is simple: “Just go out and kill ’em.” Of course, incisive attacks on command networks and control capabilities, well-considered psychological operations, and humane treatment of civilians and prisoners matter profoundly, along with many other complex factors. But at a time when huckster contractors and “experts” who never served in uniform prophesize bloodless wars and sterile victories through technology, it’s essential that those who actually must fight our nation’s wars 31/32 not succumb to the facile theories or shimmering vocabulary of those who wish to explain war to our soldiers from comfortable offices. It is not a matter of whether attrition is good or bad. It’s necessary. Only the shedding of their blood defeats resolute enemies. Especially in our struggle with God-obsessed terrorists—the most implacable enemies our nation has ever faced—there is no economical solution. Unquestionably, our long-term strategy must include a wide range of efforts to do what we, as outsiders, can to address the environmental conditions in which terrorism arises and thrives (often disappointingly little—it’s a self-help world). But, for now, all we can do is to impress our enemies, our allies, and all the populations in between that we are winning and will continue to win. The only way to do that is through killing. The fifth edition of the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary defines to “attrit” as to “wear down in quality or quantity by military attrition.” That sounds like the next several years, at least, of the War on Terror. The same dictionary defines “attrition” as “the gradual wearing down of an enemy’s forces in sustained warfare.” Indeed, that is exactly what we shall have to do against religious terrorists. There is no magic maneuver waiting to be plotted on a map. While sharp tactical movements that bring firepower to bear will bring us important successes along the way, this war is going to be a long, hard slog. The new trenches are ideological and civilizational, involving the most fundamental differences human beings can have—those over the intentions of God and the roles of men and women. In the short term, we shall have to wear down the enemy’s forces; in the longer term, we shall have to wear down the appeal of his ideas. Our military wars of attrition in the 21st century will be only one aspect of a vast metaphysical war of attrition, in which the differences between the sides are so profound they prohibit compromise. As a result of our recent wars and lesser operations, we have the best-trained, best-led, best-equipped, and most experienced ground forces in the world in our Army and Marine Corps. Potential competitors and even most of our traditional allies have only the knowledge of the classroom and the training range, while we have experience of war and related operations unparalleled in our time. We have the most impressive military establishment, overall, in military history. Now, if only we could steel ourselves to think clearly and speak plainly: There is no shame in calling reality by its proper name. We are fighting, and will fight, wars of attrition. And we are going to win them. Ralph Peters is a retired Army officer and the author of 19 books, as well as of hundreds of essays and articles, written both under his own name and as Owen Parry. He has experience, military or civilian, in 60 countries, and is a frequent contributor to Parameters.

Here is an article about the US Army's transformation and the mediem brigades... Ralph Peters

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Another thing to consider regarding concealment is that most the thermal sights used by US forces will ID concealed targets anyways. Hopefully the Syrian forces will be able to employ some unconventional types of concealment, such as putting a tank inside a house or mosque and fixing up the house so it does not damaged. Same for IEDs and mines. The Serbs made good use of abandoned vehicles and dummy vehicles to draw US firepower away from their actual ground forces. The US air campaign in the Balkans was not as effective as once thought since it was a war conducted entirely from the air and many targets were not validated by forces on the ground. If the Syrian player uses his tanks and forces in a defense in depth, with an ambush mentality, then he has a good chance of causing some serious damage to US forces, especially to a Stryker formation. I am also hoping for tunnels and "spider holes", basically ultra-camoflauged fighting holes. The VC and NVA made very good use of these to hide from US firepower. A Syrian version of the tunnels of Cu Chi.