Imperial Grunt

The Black Watch,that is right. I remember now. Thanks.

And some basic Marine ground combat ops stuff... Ground Combat Element

Marine Rifle Squad USMC MOUT Here are some USMC doctrine on a rifle squad and MOUT.

Near the end of my second tour in Iraq, I was serving with BLT 1/2 and they were reinforced with a British company from Basra (I think they were some kind of Highlander or Scottish unit but the names of the British regiments are beyond me. US Marines keep it simple- the 1st Marine regiment, the 2nd Marine regiment, etc..) The Brits initally thought that the Marine patrols were being too offensively minded and disregarded some of the advice that the BLT staff and company commanders offered. Their very first week on deck a Brit patrol was ambushed and they took 4-5 WIA and they subsequently adjusted their tactics to mirror the BLT's. Things were different in the I MEF AO as compared to Basra. There are lessons to be learned by all. The Brits were outstanding soldiers.

I'm no expert on the USMC but I liked Evan Wright's Generation Kill - a portrayal by an embedded journalist who rode with Force Recon during the war in Iraq. A warts'n'all type of book. I especially liked how he wasn't politically correct - if a marine officer was a WOFTAM he didn't mind mind labelling him so. If that's not your cup of tea, then there is always Phil Caputo's A Rumor of War... </font>

Never heard of "teeth" troops, but the experience of bootcamp and OCS does "change" most Marines for life. When I left active-duty in 1995 after 5 years and several months of service, I was looking forward to civilian life. Less than 6 months later, I volunteered for the Marine reserves. And I have few civilian close friends that are not ex-military and/or law enforcement. Thomas Ricks talks alot about this in his book. Marine bootcamp is one of the few public institutions in the US that still hammers home standards as simple as "honor, courage, committment". Of course not all Marines keep that standard or meet it very well, but they are taught it and the standard is very much there. Now that I have experienced the war-time Marine Corps, I would say that I am even more addicted to it.

Very interesting article. I once read a book about Grenada that was written by a Brit Army officer and I thought his perspective was very accurate and refreshing. Forgot what it was titled. There are some points I would like to comment on: "Yet it would be simplistic and misleading to suggest that U.S. senior commanders simply did not understand the importance of popular support. At least 2 evidently did. Major General (MG) David Petraeus, as Commanding General (CG) of the 101st Division and responsible for Northern Iraq in the period after the fall of Saddam, swung his troops routinely between offensive operations and an equally vigorous domestic construction and restoration programme.14 He is widely accredited with maintaining relative peace and normal functionality in Mosul, a city with an ethnic mix easily liable to ignite into civil conflict. Likewise, MG Pete Chiarelli, CG of 1st Cav Div, responsible for the demanding and volatile Baghdad area of operations in 2004, referred in briefings to his Division’s SWETI ops: Sewage, Water, Electricity, Trash, Information. He considered his role to be as much city chief executive as soldier." []Marine Generals Conway (I MEF CG) and Mattis (1st MarDiv CG) were very focused on "winning hearts and minds". Also, back during Vietnam War, there was alot of senior level conflict between the Army and Marines. Gen Westmorland wanted set piece battles against the NVA and VC and to engage them in a war of attrition with US firepower. The Marines only wanted to fight when challenged and focus on an "ink-blot" strategy that pacified towns and villages, one at a time. The combined action program (CAP) was created early to do this, but without strategic support, the Marines could only make some operational level success. "‘they live in fortified camps away from the population and most face-to-face contact . . . is during cordon and search or vehicle checkpoint operations’.18 Routine foot patrolling, a key means of interacting and thus gathering HUMINT, was the exception." [] The Marines and Army have differed alot about this "fortress" mentality. When the Marines pulled out of Somalia, there was an immediate feeling among the populace that the street cop just left. While of course the Marines use FOB's, many company level firm bases and smaller patrol bases are also in use in order to have better influence and presence. Of course, this exposes the Marines to more IED attacks and other threats. "when insurgents captured and mutilated 4 U.S. contractors in Fallujah. In classic insurgency doctrine, this act was almost certainly a come-on, designed to invoke a disproportionate response, thereby further polarising the situation and driving a wedge between the domestic population and the Coalition forces. It succeeded." [] This event occurred right after 1st MarDiv completed its reflief in place (RIP) of the 82nd Airborne, which had responsiblity for Fallujah. The 82nd did maintain a continual presence, following pretty much the FOB example. They did conduct mounted patrols and other operations, especially raids against insurgent/jihadist leadership. And they had to deal with a very unfortunate shooting incident when some paratroopers fired into a crowd when defending themselves. Marine Generals Conway and Mattis did not want to attack the city until it had been properly prepared...ie the event "set up" so that the Arab world saw Fallujans as the bad seeds they were. But the Marines were ordered to attack. General Conway also said that if the attack is started, the worst thing that could happen would be to stop the attack. But this is what exactly happened due to political pressure from Bahgdad and the international community. So the offensive stopped. This created a huge pyschological victory for the insurgents and jihadists and made Fallujah a safe haven. Thus by November, it had to be cleared. The Phase IV part of the operation was completely planned out. But it was a tactical and operational success and did not have the overall impact at the strategic level in Iraq in the long term. "Each commander had his own style, but if there was a common trend it was for micro-management, with many hours devoted to daily briefings and updates. Planning tended to be staff driven and focused on process rather than end effect. The net effect was highly centralised decision-making, which worked when serving a commander with a gift for retaining detail and concurrently managing a plethora of issues, but all too readily developed undue inertia." [] This is one of the major differences that I have experienced as a Marine officer who has worked with the US Army. Very different command and staff styles. US Army Col Daniel Bolger wrote about that in his book "Death Ground, American Infantry in Battle" (another excellent book that I highly recommend). When describing the Marines he describes plans as being brief, sometimes overly so. While Marines are guilty of micro-management just like the Army and other services, US Army staffs are especially prone to alot of briefs by powerpoint. US Army battalions attached to 1st MarDiv for OIF2 would often create briefs of 20-50 slides for Gen Mattis. He wanted 5 and an overall assessment from the commander, face to face. This is one of the problems that I see with a completly digitized force. It allows, even invites, a commander to micromanage each squad and vehicle (just like in CM) which squelches inititive and judgement. And things are always different on the ground than they are on map symbology, no matter how digital. "• Improve skills and tactical repertoire for IW across the wider force—broaden the knowledge base outside Special Operations Forces and Marines." [] The Marines have been a "small wars" force since its inception and US SOF were originally designed as counter guerrilla forces. The book by Col Bolger mentioned above as well as "Making the Corps" by Thomas Ricks document this well. But while the Marine Corps thrives in expeditionary operations, most of the Army does not (and, overall, should not in my opinion). The Army is the Nation's slegehammer to win a war at the strategic level. Many Army units are trained and equipped for "small wars", like the 10th Mountian for example, but as an institution the US Army does not have the institutionalized experience and mentality that the Marines and SOF have acquired. At the same time, Marines struggle with planning and corps and above sized operations, something that the Army has mastered better than anyone else in the world. The article is correct in many ways and I am glad it was written by a Brit and not a Marine. But in the US Army's defense, being the most potent land force in the world in sustained land combat is its primary mission. The Marines can contribute to this effort, especially for amphibious assaults and other limited operations in support of the land campaign. But to retrain the entire Army to think like Marines and SOF would lessen its ability to wage a sustained land war. And while many may say that such a war will never happen again, all I can say is that all those who predicted that before were wrong.

That is just like Fallujah in alot of ways, no pattern of building or streets and alleys or building construction, and mosques everywhere. Fallujah has been called the "city of mosques". I would imagine that Syria would have alot of the same. Western style construction need not apply.

OK, that was one pic.

Here are some pics of some LAV's with 2nd Light Armored Reconnaisance Battalion (2nd LAR) in Iraq. 2nd LAR

Did not see the movie, but judging from the trailers, I would like to see Jamie Fox's portrayal of a Marine Staff Sergeant. Read the book when I was in Iraq for the second time and hated it. Basically its the story of a disgruntled Marine who was also a malingerer. A LCpl on my team also read it and thought it was completely bogus. I refused to go see the movie in the theater but will probably rent it to satisfy my own curiosity. So I wrote it off as a book by a guy who had an a n axe to grind and then some and sought to portray the Marines as he saw it. I do not read alot of books written by Marines about the Marine Corps. They tend to be too far pro usually, and Jarhead is a book that is con. One of the best books about the USMC is "Making the Corps" by Thomas Ricks, a journalist with the Washington Post (pretty sure).

Here are some good pics of Marine infantry in battle. Fallujah photo essay Fallujah fallujah fallujah 1 fallujah 1

Just found this. Pretty accurate and fair info about the USMC. I would like to point out that the LAV-25 is not used as an APC. Its a reconnaisance vehicle and it only carries its crew and a 4 Marine scout team. USMC-From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia.

I cant believe that the damn thing floats, but then again, I cant believe that the old AAV's float.

Here is a good shot of a SMAW team.

Here are some more pics...

The EFV will be the Corp's new track for amphibious and mech ops. When the USMC module is made, I hope it is part of the game. USMC EFV Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV) Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle The Marine Corps plans to replace the amphibious assault vehicle with 1,013 advanced amphibious assault vehicles for $6.7 billion, including a $456-million increase due to a 2-year procurement delay. With a water speed of 23 to 29 miles per hour, the new vehicle could be launched from amphibious ships 25 miles or more offshore and reach shore far more quickly than the current vehicle. This improved mobility would reduce the risk to Navy ships from missiles, aircraft, boats, and mines. Until the new vehicle is fielded, beginning in 2008, the Marine Corps anticipates spending more to maintain the current vehicle. The Marine Corps is developing the AAAV to replace the AAV as its primary combat vehicle for transporting troops on land and from ship to shore. The AAAV must satisfy many operational requirements, which will provide increased capabilities compared to the AAV and improve the ship-to-shore movement, thus allowing the Marine Corps and the Navy to more effectively implement OMFTS. The AAAV will be capable of transporting 18 Marines and a crew of three over water at speeds of 29 miles an hour; the design uses a planing hull propelled by two water jets. On land, AAAV will achieve speeds of 45 miles an hour, with cross-country mobility equal to an M1 Abrams tank. In addition to its high land speed, the EFV has sufficient ballistic protection to defeat rounds up to 14.5mm or fragments from 155mm artillery shells. It also has improved mine-blast protection and a nuclear, chemical and biological defense system. This combination of features alone will provide enhanced survivability. A smooth transition from water to cross-country movement has always been a difficult and dangerous task for amphibious vehicles. The General Dynamics AAAV design solves this problem by the automatic transfer of power from the high-speed water jets to the vehicle tracks. Using the same vehicle design, General Dynamics will also deliver a command and control AAAV variant to the Marines. This mobile command post will provide access to information from satellite and computer-based intelligence sources, as well as from ships, aircraft and other vehicles, while controlling operations at sea or on land. The AAAV is the U.S. Marine Corps only acquisition category (ACAT) I acquisition program. The Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAAV) represents the signature mission of the USMC. A truly amphibious vehicle that will replace the USMC's aging current system and provide the capability to maneuver, combat loaded with a Marine rifle squad, at 20-25 knots in the water and maneuver cross country with agility and mobility equal or greater than that of the M1 Main Battle Tank (MBT). The AAAV will virtually revolutionize every facet of USMC combat operations. It is one of the most capable all-around weapon systems in the world. The technology to meet these requirements has been demonstrated, and the plan to procure this system represents the most operationally effective solution for meeting USMC requirements. In 1997, nearly the entire Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAAV) team, over one hundred and fifty members, including the prime contractor staff and critical subcontractor personnel, Government and contractor secretaries, engineers, logisticians, computer programmers, and financial managers were given an unprecedented fleet and field exposure to the amphibious operational environment for the sole purpose of improving system design for support, readiness, and durability. Everyone was taken by bus to Norfolk, Virginia and taken on a two day amphibious exercise specifically designed to expose him or her to the systems' operating environment. Everyone rode and most drove amphibious vehicles on land and in the water side-by-side with the Marines of Delta Company, 2nd Amphibious Assault Battalion. The entire group of Government and private industry team members were housed aboard the Amphibious Assault Ships USS Tortuga and USS Oak Hill in troop living spaces for the exercise. The experience resulted in a significant improvement of the team's understanding of operational suitability, support and readiness that is now reflected in improvements in the AAAV design. The AAAV will allow the Navy and Marine Corps to seamlessly link maneuver in ships and maneuver ashore enabling Operational Maneuver From The Sea (OMFTS). The AAAV will be the principal means of armored protected land and water mobility and direct fire support for Marine infantry during combat operations. Based on this unique mission profile, the AAAV must leverage state of the art advances in water propulsion, land mobility, lethality and survivability. Lightweight components and structures that are cost and operationally effective and supportable together with a significantly more powerful engine are the primary technical challenges for the AAAV. There are currently 1,322 USMC Assault Amphibious Vehicles (AAV7A1 ) which will be replaced by 1,013 AAAVs beginning late in the first decade of the next century. The Marine Corps has a requirement to procure 1,013 AAAVs. Prior to December 1994, the cost to develop and procure AAAVs was estimated at $7.2 billion (then-year dollars). Due to budget constraints, DOD reduced AAAV funding in the FYDP by $189 million in December 1994. As a result, the Marine Corps extended the demonstration and validation phase 22 months and delayed procurement by 2 years, which increased the program's cost by $456 million, to $7.6 billion. As a result, low-rate initial production has been delayed from fiscal year 2003 to 2005; initial operational capability from fiscal year 2006 to 2008; and full operational capability--fielding all required AAAVs to the active assault amphibian battalions and the maritime prepositioning squadrons--from fiscal year 2012 to 2014. In July 2001 the US Marine Corps awarded General Dynamics Land Systems, a wholly owned subsidiary of General Dynamics, a $712 million contract for the Systems Development and Demonstration phase of the Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAAV) program. Under the cost-reimbursable contract General Dynamics will provide all required material, services, personnel and facilities to complete the design and development of the AAAV, manufacture and test nine new prototypes, refurbish three early development prototypes, support the Marine Corps initial operational test and evaluation, and prepare for the production phase of the program. The contract begins the next phase in the development of the world’s most advanced amphibious assault vehicle, which started with award of a $200 million-plus demonstration/validation contract to General Dynamics Land Systems in June 1996. More than 500 General Dynamics employees and contractors, Marines and naval personnel in Woodbridge, Virginia, will do engineering and assembly of the nine new prototype vehicles. The Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAAV) was officially renamed the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV) sometime in late 2003. Two platform variants are under development: the personnel variant (EFV(P)), which will be armed with a 30 mm cannon and a 7.62 mm machinegun and is intended to transport 17 combat-equipped Marines and a three-man crew; and a command and control variant (EFV©) which will transport a commander and staff. Testing is ongoing, and according to the DOT&E there have been concerns with regards to system reliability.

For anyone interested in what a Marine Expeditionary Force looks like, here is a press release showing the task organization for I MEF going back to Iraq, real soon. United States Marine Corps Press Release Public Affairs Office 1st Marine Expeditionary Force; U. S. MARINE CORPS FORCES, PACIFICUIC 42540FPO AP 96426-2540; 1st Marine Expeditionary Force, U. S. MARINE CORPS FORCES, PACIFICUIC 42540FPO AP 96426-2540; 1st Marine Expeditionary Force; U. S. MARINE CORPS FORCES, PACIFICUIC 42540FPO AP 96426-2540, 1st Marine Expeditionary Force, U. S. MARINE CORPS FORCES, PACIFIC UIC 42540 FPO AP 96426-2540 Capt. Megan McClung Megan.McClung@usmc.mil or 760-763-4682 Contact: Release # 1223-05-1049 I MEF units deploying to Iraq Dec. 23, 2005 CAMP PENDLETON, Calif. -- There are some corrections to a previous announcement of Marine units deploying to Iraq. Corrections are in red. Marines and sailors from the I Marine Expeditionary Force, headquartered here, have begun deploying to Iraq in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom 05-07 to relieve the II Marine Expeditionary Force, from Camp Lejeune, NC, in the Al Anbar Province in western Iraq. This rotation of forces includes approximately 25,000 Marines and sailors, built around a division-sized Marine Air Ground Task Force. The I Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward) will include units from the 1st Marine Division, the 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing and the 1st Marine Logistics Group and will be augmented by units from the II Marine Expeditionary Force, headquartered at Camp Lejeune, N.C., III Marine Expeditionary Force, headquartered at Okinawa, Japan, and Marine Forces Reserve, headquartered at New Orleans, La. Marine forces will primarily deploy to Iraq in two, seven-month rotations, with the first rotation transitioning into Iraq beginning in January 2006. Major Marine units to deploy under the command of I MEF (Fwd) for the first rotation are as follows: I MEF (Fwd) Command Element I MEF Headquarters Group elements of the 9th Communication Battalion elements of the 1st Radio Battalion elements of the 1st Intelligence Battalion elements of the 1st Force Reconnaissance Company elements of the 2nd Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison Company 3rd Civil Affairs Group 1st Provisional Military Police Battalion, 14th Regiment Ground Combat Element elements of the 2nd Tank Battalion elements of the 3rd Assault Amphibian Battalion elements of the 2nd Assault Amphibian Battalion elements of the 1st Tank Battalion Regimental Combat Team 5 Regimental Combat Team 7 elements of the 11th Marine Regiment elements of the 10th Marine Regiment 3rd Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment 3rd Battalion, 8th Marine Regiment 1st Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marine Regiment 1st Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment 1st Battalion, 25th Marine Regiment elements of the 3rd Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion elements of the 2nd Reconnaissance Battalion elements of 1st Combat Engineer Battalion Air Combat Element (proper abbreviations provided for clarity) elements of the Marine Wing Headquarters Squadron 3 (MWHS-3) elements of the Marine Aircraft Group 16 (MAG-16) elements of the Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 16 (MALS-16) Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 268 (HMM-268) Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 463 (HMH-463) Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 361 (HMH-361) Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 169 (HMLA-169) elements of Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 269 (HMLA-269) Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron 252 (VMGR-252) Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron 352 (VMGR-352) elements of the Marine Attack Squadron 513 (VMA-513) elements of the Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 533 (VMFA(AW)-533) Marine Tactical Air Command Squadron 38 (MTACS-38) Marine Air Support Squadron 3 (MASS-3) elements of the Marine Wing Support Group 37 (MWSG-37) elements of the Marine Air Control Squadron 1 (MACS-1) Marine Wing Support Squadron 274 (MWSS-274) Marine Wing Support Squadron 374 (MWSS-374) elements of the Marine Wing Communications Squadron (MWCS-38) elements of the Marine Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Squadron 2 (VMU-2) Combat Service Support Element (proper abbreviations provided for clarity) elements of the Brigade Service Support Group 1 (BSSG-1) elements of the Communications Company elements of Service Company 1st MLG elements of the 9th Engineer Support Battalion, 3rd MLG elements of the 7th Engineer Support Battalion 1st MLG elements of the Combat Logistics Regiment 11 (CLB-11) elements of the Combat Logistics Battalion 5 (CLB-5) elements of the Combat Logistics Battalion 7 (CLB-7) elements of the Combat Logistics Regiment 15 (CLR-15) elements of the 1st Maintenance Battalion elements of the 1st Supply Battalion elements of the 1st Medical Battalion elements of the 3rd Materiel Readiness Battalion elements of the 3rd Transportation Support Battalion

If you mean Sunni Iraqis, then that is a probably true. But outside of Al-Anbar, the insurgency is not some raging monster as it portrayed in the media sometimes. The Sunnis want nothing but regime change themselves..another Baathist/Sunni dictatorship. They are a very historical case, the ones who had power and lost it. Nothing but getting that power back will suffice. What is amazing to me though is that the Sunnis, being a much smaller minority in Iraq, are resisting so much against the US. If we left tommorrow, it would not be long before the Shia empowered government, backed by the Kurds, got tired of their B.S. and decided to do what the US would never do. But the middle east is ruled by a thought process and mentality that has been unchanged for centuries. Western thinking, especially liberal thinking, does not apply there very well.

That is like saying that when the WWII casualty count surpassed the numbers of those killed during Pearl Harbor, there were people who wanted to end the war. (And there were people back then who wanted to end the war, but never a majority). In WWII, the media was controlled by a censorship office. Nowadays, there is no censorship and even classifed stuff is routinely leaked. The war in Iraq is a bitch politically, since the media is always broadcasting the casualites and the combat, with a few elections thrown in. The 21st century age of instant media means that the US military will always have to take the media in mind in all that is does. The entire "embedded" media idea was purely so that those reporters could get first hand info which would hopefully be positive, rather than reporters waiting in the rear for military reports which they would naturally try to debunk. Many cops die in the line of duty every year in the US, but no one says that cops on the streets are the cause of crime or that they need to stop policing the streets. Iraq would be a much more popular war if the Administration sold it from the very beginning for what is was...an invasion into the very heart of the middle east to set up a democracy and change the political/social dynamics that feed Islamic radicalism. It really did not have much to do with WMD and it has not much to do with oil, though it both of those are part of the equation. I respect the President alot for his beliefs and his standing by his decisions. Few politicians these days actually do what they say. But he has failed as a salesman and being a...politician.

I'll go beyond disagreeing with the article and call it offensive, anti-democratic, politically motivated, and dishonest. The problem with the war in Iraq, of course, is that many people don't support it - and of those who do support it, their support is not deep. It's not because of casualties that they don't support it, but because the war was sold as: (1) a war to stop Saddam's production of WMDs; (2) secondarily, as a war to stop Saddam; and (3) a war that not only would be over quickly, but a war that was over 18 mos. ago. Against this backdrop - yeah, the US population is sensitive to casualties...there is little to no support for having the troops stay for the long term, and while most people probably do not support precipitously pulling out, they do want the troops home as soon as possible. So in this particular situation involving a war that, had the true facts been known would have had little support, yeah, the US public is sensitive to casualties. If troops were finding crude nuclear labs and sarin factories, people would be much more supportive of the war and much less sensitive to casualties. Blaming journalists for the lack of support of the war is basically intellectually dishonest scapegoating...although if the writer wanted to blame the journalists for insufficiently investigating the administrations claims that led us into this war. Well, he would have a point. </font>

Oh, and one thing. It was kinda funny, but the Saddam Fedeyeen would set up fighting positions with white sandbags. Never figured that one out.

The Saddam Fedayeen did not wear uniforms, nor did the other Baathist loyalists that fought against US forces. Most Iraqi conventional units that fought were annihilated right off. The Saddam Fedayeen were semi-organized and made thier first appearance in An-Nasiriyah. They were then encountered all the way up to Baghdad. Baghdad itself was also defended by the Special Republican Guard. Basically a Pretaorian Guard for the regime. They would fight and had alot more capability than the Saddam Fedayeen. But no Iraqi that fought the US had any idea what US forces could bring to the table.

There are a lot of things I'd take over a Javelin in that scenario, but then you might be wishing you had 1 Javelin over your 10 RPGs when you take fire from a building over 300m away. Javelins are just neat anyways. Here's an interesting bit of market analysis: http://www.forecastinternational.com/press/release.cfm?article=83 </font>

And Semper Fi to you as well, Devil Dog.