Sgt Joch

I ran some more tests, there is a problem, but I am not sure what is going on. I took one of my own unfinished scenarios, created new Red objectives and got the same problem you had. Then I took a stock scenario, Tactical vignette 98-3 again, created a new objective and that one works perfectly. :confused: I will submit the issue to mr. Charles to see if he can figure out what is going on, although between Red Thunder and Black Sea, I don't know when he will be able to get to it.

Hi, so all post v. 1.32 patch? I have a few things I want to still check out.

I have only looked at Wadi so far. I checked a few more stock scenarios and they all work fine. Do you have a recent scenario you made in v 1.32 that works? That might give us a clue.

The best book on Vietnam is "Dispatches" by Michael Herr. Read that first before you read anything else. I started re-reading it again for the umpteenth time. It is easily in the top 10 of my favorite books on any subject, a great work of english literature. http://www.amazon.ca/Dispatches-Michael-Herr/dp/0307270807/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1392125052&sr=1-1&keywords=dispatches+herr After that, it is really a question of what you are looking for, a good book for a general overview is Neil Sheehan's "A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam" which, despite the title is actually objective and about the war. http://www.amazon.ca/Bright-Shining-Lie-America-Vietnam/dp/0679724141 Caputo's "A Rumor of War" is also good, although it did not have as much of an impact on me as the first two I listed. http://www.amazon.ca/Rumor-War-Philip-Caputo/dp/080504695X/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1392124881&sr=1-1&keywords=caputo+rumor+of+war If you are interested in the Air War, I can highly recommend " Clashes: Air combat over North Vietnam, 1965-72" by Marshal Michel. http://www.amazon.ca/Clashes-Combat-North-Vietnam-1965-1972/dp/1591145198/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1392125531&sr=1-1&keywords=clashes+michel ...and in case anyone is wondering, CM:Vietnam would be my dream game.

That is strange, the Red terrain objective in LOAM Wadi does not work, but I can't figure out why. I will raise it with the larger group.

I took a look at "Tactical Vignette 98-3" from the base game and the Red "Occupy" terrain objective is working fine whether playing from the Red or Blue side. I would have to take a look at the scenario where you are having problems to see what the problem might be.

Do you have a scenario I could look at that has this problem?

The Russians received Matildas and many Valentines, but by 44, most were used in training. Russians had a high regard for the long term reliability of British engines while Russian engines had a much shorter design life, so the Russians used their tanks at the front where they had an expected life span of less than 6 months and used the British tanks for training where long engine life was actually useful. Russian tankers also had a high regard for the Sherman 76 mm which was more reliable and had a better performing gun than the T34-85, but only around 2,000 were shipped to Russia and most only showed up in combat units in 1945.

yep, that was fun, I will have a lot more time for PBEM once RT is out the door.

we may have, BoB member? That is where I do most of my PBEMing.

Actually, since I have been playtesting this thing, controlling a Soviet Battalion is quite manageable, as long as you dont split the squads (which is the only proper way to play as Soviets anyway ). In 44-45, a typical Soviet Infantry Battalion would attack on a 300-700 meter front and would have 1-2 Assault Guns/Tank companies and an engineer company attached as well.

And so as not to confuse players, the penalty will not apply to any regular German/US/CW combat unit.

The rationale behind the morale penalty for splitting is more due to the fact that the Soviets had a persistent shortage of qualified, experienced NCOs, which are the backbone of squads/platoons, throughout the war. This is one area where the Germans held an advantage.

On replacements, by 1944, most were freshly drafted 18 year olds. Russia had a baby boom in the early 20s, 3-3.3 million men were turning 18 in each of 1942, 43, 44. 1 million were in territories occupied by the Germans leaving a pool of 2-2.3 million. The Soviets inducted 90% each year as they turned 17. Standard practice was to train them for up to 6 months, send them to their units after they turned 18, at which point they would receive another 1-2 months training. These 18 year olds probably made up 1/3 or more of a typical infantry unit. You also had a second group who were men from liberated territories, called "Booty Troops". Basically all the eligible men were drafted. Those that were 17 to early 20s and had no military training whatsoever followed basically the same training path as the 18 year olds decribed above. Those that were in their mid-20s or older, who had already done their prior military service, including former partisans, were sent directly to combat units after a short refresher course. There were probably at most only a few hundred thousand coming from this source. The Red Army took in 5 million recruits in 1943-45. Most would have come from the 18 year old draftee pool. By way of comparaison, Germany only had about 600,000 young men turning 18 each year.

yes, very good summary. The big difference between the Soviets and the US/CW, is that the Soviets did not care what casualties they suffered as long as they got the job done. As a German corporal captured in Normandy said: "Americans use infantry cautiously. If they used it the way Russians do, they would be in Paris now." In the attacks on june 22-23, the Russians massed as much as 10 regiments, plus armor support against 1 German regiment to achieve the breakthrough. Once the Breakthrough was achieved, Tank Forces pushed deep into the German rear. What was new in Bagration compared to previous attempts against Army Group Center, was that U.S. 4WD trucks allowed Mech infantry to keep up with the Tanks AND kept the supply lines open. Soviets only started running out of supplies when they were over 300 km from their depots, at which point, they were past Minsk and all this over secondary dirt roads. The Germans had assumed that if they could protect the main highways running through Vitebsk, Mogilev, Orsha and Brobuisk, that any Soviet force running around in their rear would run out of supply and eventually be mopped up. In hindsight, that turns out to have been a slight miscalculation.

yes, good point. The doors don't open either.

Truck at the bottom looks like a Gaz MM, those are in too.

+1. I just finished "Soviet Blitzkrieg", it is an excellent overview of Bagration. I am also reading "Hitler's Nemesis" also from Dunn which deals more generally with the Soviet Army in WW2. It is very interesting since Dunn is more interested in how the army was organised and functioned on the ground than the formal TO&E. An interesting point about the Soviets, especially once you get to 1944, is that the actual TO&E for many units differed as much from the formal TO&E as it did in the German Army. http://www.amazon.com/Hitlers-Nemesis-1930-45-Stackpole-Military/dp/0811735435/ref=sr_1_2?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1391116652&sr=1-2

Don't take it personally, I give everyone a hard time.

now you are just acting like a spoiled child.

expected fatigue life of 150 km means it is a fragile piece of equipment which could break if too much strain is put on it, i.e. moving uphill, downhill, turning. Moving offroad on uneven, muddy, soft sand just increases the strain and chances of a breakdown. To put the 150 km in perspective, the drivetrain of a new quality car is designed to last at least 100,000 km.

Well again, you are as you so eloquently put it, "beating a strawman", no one here is arguing that under ideal conditions a Panther was not theoretically more maneuverable than a Sherman, our point is that those ideal conditions did not exist. Panthers, Tigers, Tigers II all had weak drivetrains, the Germans knew it and because of that, they were careful in using them offroad except under "ideal" conditions. At Anzio, the entire Panther Battalion was kept in reserve because the ground conditions were "muddy". Now back to CM. The game does not model mechanical reliability so the German player does not have to worry about it, because of that, the offroad capability of Panthers, Tigers, Tigers II is already better than real life. Just because the game does not model reliability does not mean you should just ignore it and model the German tanks as if they were perfect and give them even better offroad capability than they already have. Now if there are any obvious bugs we will look at it, but I would not expect any major changes, unless BFC decides to model mechanical reliability. Now if you are still seriously arguing that the Panthers, Tigers and Tigers II were as mechanically reliable off road as the Sherman, I have yet to see any proof.

Agreed and I said as much in post#47 and #58, but Vanir is now arguing that the Panthers, Tigers, et. al, did not break down more often off road than the Shermans. That is what we are on about now. Keep track of what the game is if you are going to score, boys.

Its very easy to cherry pick quotes from secondary sources, but let's see what the people who actually operated Panthers thought. The French operated Panthers postwar and prepared a report in 1947: This is what Fritz Bayerlein, commander of Panzer Lehr thought of his Panthers: http://worldoftanks.com/en/news/21/chieftains-hatch-french-panthers/ You also have this which is apparently from contemporary German reports (ref: Spielberger. Panther & Its Variants page 160), but I have seen it: http://www.armchairgeneral.com/forums/showthread.php?t=110002

ok, this should be fun. http://mailer.fsu.edu/~akirk/tanks/UnitedStates/mediumtanks/M4/Introduction.html back to you.