New To Combat Mission. (Question)

[Merkin Muffley]

When

The German peak rate of AFV production was the same as that achieved by the USSR - it just hit that rate until 1944

becomes

As for peak AFV production, both German and Russia were putting out 1500-1600 medium AFVs per month in 1944.

the important difference is presumably the specific use of *medium* in the second quote.

For completeness and context (1944) there was the 400 per month Soviet heavy AFV production (and the German equivalent of say 90 per month), and the 600 per month Soviet SU76 production (and German light AFV of say 200 per month).

There might be an argument for excluding the light AFV production. It might even be convincing. Why one would want to arbitrarily exclude Soviet heavy AFV production of a third as much again as Soviet medium AFV production eludes me.

I think its just easier to say that German AFV production equalled Soviet AFV production in 1944 (as long as you arbitrarily exclude 20-40% of Soviet AFV production). Or, perhaps we are using different sources for AFV production, in which case I can't see that either position can be stated dogmatically.

[Vark]

Are we counting Panthers as medium tanks, ie using the German designation? I do think the numbers of afv's are a bit of a red herring, what we should be focusing on is industrial capacity, nor production figures. The Russians would cancel upgrades, new models etc if it increased the cost or production time, per unit, or the cardinal sin disrupted production of existing models. The Germans, the exact opposite, constant changes in specifications (some enforced most by choice) or producing ever more complex platforms. In crude terms the Russians got far more out of each Rouble invested in AFV production than the Germans did each Mark, not the Russians had more factories that could produce more tanks.

[Bigduke6]

True enough. But that also means, that when the Gemans were at the ends of their supply lines near Moscow and Stalingrad, and whining about the terrible road/rail system, the Soviets were concentrating force and supplying it from the Ural and Siberia - where the distances are even greater, and the transportation network even worse.

I just find it curious that the Germans almost constantly were whining about supply making their job just about impossible, and pretty much no matter where or when you look in the war, the Soviets weren't. And they were doing it with a bigger force. (Albeit one that, unit for unit, demanded less logistical support.)

Besides, there is potentially a diminishing point of return logisitically when you contract the front. More force in a given area places more, not less stress on a road/rail network. Sure, if there are more roads and track, maybe that will accomodate the increased force density. But maybe it won't.

BD6

Your logic is irrefutable : )

The point being is the Fronts get larger as you advance into Russia and compact as you travel West. Therefore the supply requirements are diffused one way and concentrated the other. And much assisted by improved communications net going West.

[Michael Emrys]

I just find it curious that the Germans almost constantly were whining about supply making their job just about impossible, and pretty much no matter where or when you look in the war, the Soviets weren't. And they were doing it with a bigger force. (Albeit one that, unit for unit, demanded less logistical support.)

Just speculating here, but maybe that difference arises from a German awareness that time was not on their side and they needed everything to go perfectly, whereas the Soviets just had to hang in there until everything came together in their favor. Not that the Soviets didn't feel any sense of urgency, it's just that it was a different matter for them.

Michael

[Kingfish]

Something else to consider is the Germans had to contend with X number of partisans on their side of the line.

[Vark]

German whining is par for the course, it is a natural reaction to losing, when you think you should have won. I'm sure you have colleagues who indulge in the same behaviour, over-estimation of capability coupled with a lack of real analysis of the situation leads to failure which can never be admitted. So excuses are created which act as comforters, the Germans lost because Nazi Germany was an inferior system to the Soviets at what the Germans regarded as their speciality, warfare. Some Germans and their supporters then spent considerable historical capital and resources covering up this most uncomfortable fact.

Bottom line, the Russian Operational art was better researched, analysed and conducted and some people find that hard to accept.

[Michael Emrys]

Something else to consider is the Germans had to contend with X number of partisans on their side of the line.

Which in this theater may have had even more impact than airstrikes against transportation lines.

Michael

[Erwin]

The German Blitzkrieg system still works and is practiced today by US forces pretty much the same in concept.

The problem is that the German's "system" requires air superiority and an enemy that hasn't got what it takes (equipment, C&C, training etc) to counter it. The Soviets learned to fight using their own strengths (just like Al Q and the Taliban are doing today).

The Germans were set up economically for very short swift wars and were unable to adapt or counter fast enough when the situation changed.

[Michael Emrys]

The Germans were set up economically for very short swift wars and were unable to adapt or counter fast enough when the situation changed.

I'm not sure they even could have. Which is why—either barring a huge blunder on the part of their enemies, or the latter simply becoming tired of the war—I tend to think their failure was a foregone conclusion. They might could have avoided being totally conquered, but I seriously doubt that they had much chance of achieving Hitler's war aims.

Michael

[ArgusEye]

Placing an emphasis on AGN, on the other hand, would probably mean the early capture of Riga and possibly even Leningrad, along with several other minor Baltic ports. Then if—and admittedly it's a big if—those ports can be quickly brought into operation, supplies can be brought in through them and the logistical lines from Leningrad to Moscow are much shorter than from Warsaw. In the long run, I don't know how practical this strategy would have been either. It's still a long shot and I for one would not want to start a war counting on it.

In principle, that is a nice idea. But Narva fell in late 1941, with its harbour mostly intact. It wasn't used much. This peripheral supply route is shorter, as you say, but it first runs over contested waters, and then along a rail line which is the front line at the point of deepest German penetration. It is too vulnerable to use until the Germans have progressed beyond the line Petrograd-Stalingrad. As such, it is a very useful route once the German conquest of European Russia would have been complete. The idea is nice, but it brought the Germans very little. With hindsight, I think it is obvious it had better been left alone.

The problem with that is that if you liberate the Ukrainians instead of oppressing them, you have to feed them. You also have to find food for your army and its horses that now cannot live on the food you would have been stealing from the Ukrainians. The Nazis had practical as well as ideological reasons for starving the Ukrainians.

It's been tricky to get believable figures, so I have to rely on scholarship of a mr. Kamenetsky, who states that productivity under German rule increased due to decollectivisation, then sank back to Soviet levels when hundreds of thousands of men were deported for slave labour in Germany and the decollectivisation was stagnated by the Germans. The amount of food extracted is stated to be similar. The Germans did not starve the Ukrainians any more than the Soviets did.

The Germans themselves were aware of this. The German analysis bureau of their economic ministry appealed in quite strong terms to the Führer and Reichstag to reverse this ideological policy because of what they saw happening. It's not just monday morning quarterbacking.

I will stick my neck out and say that I don't believe Roosevelt and the US would have permitted that to happen. The US Navy would have entered the war at any point that it looked like the Germans were going to win that battle.

Roosevelt had been angling for a provocation for a long time, but the Germans had actually adhered pretty closely to international law at sea. Roosevelt already did some questionable things with his lend-lease deliveries, making himself de jure proper targets. Regardless, the closest the Kriegsmarine got to strangling the British was in 1943, when German tactics were getting more misguided and the Americans were already in open warfare against them.

Bigduke, I quite agree with your analysis of 25 december, but I think this quote:

Does this mean the Red Army somehow were actually better at logistics than the Wehrmacht?

might be a bit too easy. It is good to remember that the Red Army was about a million trucks ahead on the Germans (more than half from lend lease), and they had the rubber for tyres and the fuel to run them in a logistic role. This takes a lot of the burden that the Germans needed to put onto the railways. Also, the railways the Germans had improved could be used by the Soviets - and they were good rails...

As for the discussion about air harassment versus partisans, the Germans themselves express that only in France did the Jabo's get 'thick' enough to outweigh the problems generated by partisans. On the Eastern front, air power never came close to causing the same damage as partisans.

[undead reindeer cavalry]

Soviets suffered tank corps level attrition because of badly planned logistics well into the war. they most likely suffered more tanks to logistical screwups than to enemy action during the first half of their war. if you want true logistical gems, 1941 contains stuff like sending an entire tank division to stop German panzers... without being delivered a single AP shot.

[undead reindeer cavalry]

German whining is par for the course, it is a natural reaction to losing, when you think you should have won.

yeah it's quite special considering the whining begun already before the war had even started.

I'm sure you have colleagues who indulge in the same behaviour, over-estimation of capability coupled with a lack of real analysis of the situation leads to failure which can never be admitted.

so German analysis was incorrect when in july-august 1941 they considered they had just most likely lost the whole war?

So excuses are created which act as comforters, the Germans lost because Nazi Germany was an inferior system to the Soviets at what the Germans regarded as their speciality, warfare.

i agree, that's such a poor excuse.

Bottom line, the Russian Operational art was better researched, analysed and conducted and some people find that hard to accept.

yeah, most notably by STAVKA.

[undead reindeer cavalry]

the disparity in German vs Soviet tank production is not related to GDP, resources, management or anything like that. it's simply based on having "factories" that can produce tanks.

Soviets had all that done in 1930s, just like the plans to evacuate facilities located close to the borders. their mid 1930s tank production capability is in that sense equal to that of mid 1940s. none of their "factories" pumping out T-34s at the first half of the war are new. their tank fleet size is equal as well. Germans on the other than are still building the new mass production facilities as the war is already being waged. they start with, in comparison, pathetic small workshops with maximum output at hundreds. when the new facilities, one by one, open up they start reaching the Soviet numbers.

of course Germans did make great errors what comes to strategic production. e.g. most naval projects were futile.

[ArgusEye]

An anecdote from the memoirs of a German hauptmann:

'I knew we had lost the war when the intelligence officer inspected [the first T34 they had killed] with awe and curiosity, and wanted to know all about it.'

[undead reindeer cavalry]

I just find it curious that the Germans almost constantly were whining about supply making their job just about impossible, and pretty much no matter where or when you look in the war, the Soviets weren't

after the first week of the infamous logistical catastrophe knows as Operation Barbarossa the German spearheads have advanced around 500 km. the nazi weaklings start to whine at somewhere around 700-800 km. when the cowardly fascist advance is finally stopped by the heroic and patriotic defenders of the worker's paradise the German supply line distance is 1600 km.

if we look at the latter half of the war, the greatest advance the Red Army achieved was around 650 km, during Vistula-Oder in 1945. in contrast in summer 1944 the brilliant Operation Bagration had to stop after around 300 km because of running out of logistical capacity. in 1943 the advancing Soviet tank corps typically run out of "logistical reach" after around 100 km, or about a week of activity (does not equal combat), when tank losses have mounted to 40-60% due to "logistical factors" alone.

since Soviet science of war, including logistics, was perfect only a Trotskyite or a Nazi would find any reason to whine.

[undead reindeer cavalry]

the Soviets were concentrating force and supplying it from the Ural and Siberia - where the distances are even greater, and the transportation network even worse.

typically Soviet railheads were 50-150 km from the front. there's quite an amount of bitching in between the lines in staff AARs for example for Kursk when they have to supply by trucks some 70 km. oh the horror of muddy roads. the worst i remember reading is around 300 km between railhead and the front.

And they were doing it with a bigger force. (Albeit one that, unit for unit, demanded less logistical support.)

more bang for buck? compare something like AG Centre in August 1941 vs Bagration in 1944. Centre receives about 12 000 tons/day. Bagration has 3 000 000 tons (yeah six zeros) in depots at front to start with and receives additional 45 000 tons/day. still it stalls after 300 km.

[Joachim]

I just find it curious that the Germans almost constantly were whining about supply making their job just about impossible, and pretty much no matter where or when you look in the war, the Soviets weren't. And they were doing it with a bigger force. (Albeit one that, unit for unit, demanded less logistical support.)

Somebody whining about the status quo might result from

a) a real lack of things

striving for perfectionism

c) a national tendency to whine anyway.

Some model:

Which side complained at your Lauban campaign?

Which side performed better?

Which nationality were those whiners?

BTW: IIRC the US Army was great at whining, too.

[Ziploc]

Is it ultimately possible to determine the exact reasons for the German defeat in Russia? With such a magnitude of factors, frequently displaying unexpected results, can we ever hope to thoroughly appreciate their interactions?

[Michael Emrys]

Is it ultimately possible to determine the exact reasons for the German defeat in Russia? With such a magnitude of factors, frequently displaying unexpected results, can we ever hope to thoroughly appreciate their interactions?

No. But it is interesting and occasionally illuminating to try.

Michael

[costard]

According to Tooze, the German plan was to occupy enough territory so that it could be self sufficient in agriculture and industrial supply (oil, iron, bauxite, etc.). The German higher command were aware by 1942 that this would mean, on the agriculture front alone, taking an area in Russia from Leningrad, east to moscow and south to the Ukraine, holding the Caucasus to anchor the south. Oh, and eradicating 21 million people - this according to their own economic data. The size of this work when the entire populace is (understandably) fighting against you is well beyond the capabilities of Hitler's Germany. I hazard that it would be impossible for the US to do it now - especially given the quality of success they have enjoyed in other theatres recently.

[Ziploc]

Costard, is the conclusion that it was beyond the capabilities of Hitler's Germany your own or Tooze's?

[Bigduke6]

Somebody whining about the status quo might result from

a) a real lack of things

striving for perfectionism

c) a national tendency to whine anyway.

Some model:

Which side complained at your Lauban campaign?

Which side performed better?

Which nationality were those whiners?

BTW: IIRC the US Army was great at whining, too.

I don't recall any one using logistics difficulties to justify operational errors, if that's what you mean.

Indeed, I might well make the arguement that the whiners prevailed, in spite of their whining.

[undead reindeer cavalry]

The size of this work when the entire populace is (understandably) fighting against you is well beyond the capabilities of Hitler's Germany.

the whole idea was deeply ideological and while many nazi actions and policies were direct results of their ideological views, many of their actions were directly opposed to their ideology. the whole agricultural field (and directly related to it the labour/manpower questions) was one of the most glaring examples of such policies. they were supposed to create a racially pure Germany and bring forth utopistic romantic agrarian lifestyle. what they did was bring millions of foreigners into holy German soil, most of whom were of racially undesirable stock, and modernize agriculture (or outright destroy it by massing resources into industrialization). in that light i think the most questionable aspect of the plan was where to get the millions of extra Germans to do the farming after the 20 million Slavs were dead.

there's of course a whole political aspect of it. Nazis weren't that popular and IMO it wouldn't have taken much to change history so that we would be playing historical Heer vs Waffen SS Combat Mission scenarios as the highlight of WW2.

[Joachim]

I don't recall any one using logistics difficulties to justify operational errors, if that's what you mean.

Woot?... We missed an opportunity to whine? Gotta whine about that!

I did not mean any special reason or occasion to whine. Just a tendency to whine about anything.

[Joachim]

the whole idea was deeply ideological and while many nazi actions and policies were direct results of their ideological views, many of their actions were directly opposed to their ideology. the whole agricultural field (and directly related to it the labour/manpower questions) was one of the most glaring examples of such policies. they were supposed to create a racially pure Germany and bring forth utopistic romantic agrarian lifestyle. what they did was bring millions of foreigners into holy German soil, most of whom were of racially undesirable stock, and modernize agriculture (or outright destroy it by massing resources into industrialization). in that light i think the most questionable aspect of the plan was where to get the millions of extra Germans to do the farming after the 20 million Slavs were dead.

there's of course a whole political aspect of it. Nazis weren't that popular and IMO it wouldn't have taken much to change history so that we would be playing historical Heer vs Waffen SS Combat Mission scenarios as the highlight of WW2.

Nazi ideology was not coherent.

For Poland there were two models:

a) Baldur von Schirach (IIRC Reichsjugendführer (Nazi Youth leader)) intended to build German "Wehrdörfer" (fortified villages) occupied by German farmers, used to subjugate the surrounding Polish villages. German farmers would actually do some farming.

Himmler (Reichsleiter SS) advocated just killing the Polish elite. It would be enough for Poles to be able to read&write their name and learn that it is their highest pleasure and duty to serve their German masters. Germans would probalby not work on their own in this model.

Both models competed. Himmler slowly won.

Both had direct access to Hitler. Both presented their models to him. Still there was no clear decision. Both had to constantly lobby Hitler for his support for their model.

A more well known competition is Himmler vs Göring. Himmler wanted more men. But Hitler did not trust a single sub-leader. Himmler wanted more men. The Wehrmacht didn't want to give them away and Hitler needed the Wehrmacht to control the Waffen-SS... and vice versa. 5th Viking might be "nordic" and thus fits racial doctrine. But Himmler ignored the racial principles when it came to manpower for the Waffen-SS and thus his personal power. Göring had his LW divisions, his rivalry with the navy and his own airborne PzDiv to compete vs Himmler. Pure inefficiency. Why not a single plan, with decisions from a strong leader? Because that leader feared rivals from the lower ranks.

Which leads to a decent management problem in the Nazi structures. There were many organizations with overlapping and/or competing tasks. While the Wehrmacht (and Waffen SS) usually gave their sub-leaders free reign to accomplish the objective as they would see fit ("managament by objectives") the party organization relied on weak sub-leaders ensuring the power of their leader.

1 We are the "Herrenrasse" (market leader)

2 Our Rasse (products) is superior

3 Our leader (CEO) is superior

4 We will win once and for all (we will remain market leader forever)

5 Anybody not believing in 1 to 4 is an enemy (will get fired)

Imagine a company with the principles in brackets. How long will it remain market leader? Which type of managers will you see? Strong, charismatic persons in the middle management? Or one half disillusioned old hands bypassed by the other half of bootlickers?

How long will that company remain market leader?