LongLeftFlank

https://www.nzz.ch/english/energy-guru-daniel-yergin-im-sick-of-the-discussion-about-energy-transition-ld.1821620
I asked Vladimir Putin a question at the economic forum in St. Petersburg in 2013, in which I mentioned shale oil and gas from the U.S. He literally shouted at me and said that shale gas was barbaric – because he knew that it would compete with Russian gas.... 
It was a very rational calculation on his part to speak of an oil and gas weapon – except that it failed. And it failed because of the shale revolution in the United States. If it hadn’t been for shale oil and gas, Putin would have prevailed. But there is a cost: European industry doesn’t have access to cheap Russian gas anymore.
But Putin’s problem is what to do with this gas. You can't just store natural gas. He has to look east, he has to integrate his economy more deeply with China and reduce the historical tensions between Beijing and Moscow. But there are contradictory messages coming from China.

https://www.nzz.ch/english/energy-guru-daniel-yergin-im-sick-of-the-discussion-about-energy-transition-ld.1821620
I asked Vladimir Putin a question at the economic forum in St. Petersburg in 2013, in which I mentioned shale oil and gas from the U.S. He literally shouted at me and said that shale gas was barbaric – because he knew that it would compete with Russian gas.... 
It was a very rational calculation on his part to speak of an oil and gas weapon – except that it failed. And it failed because of the shale revolution in the United States. If it hadn’t been for shale oil and gas, Putin would have prevailed. But there is a cost: European industry doesn’t have access to cheap Russian gas anymore.
But Putin’s problem is what to do with this gas. You can't just store natural gas. He has to look east, he has to integrate his economy more deeply with China and reduce the historical tensions between Beijing and Moscow. But there are contradictory messages coming from China.

🫣😵‍💫🫢
do not, under any circumstances go past the eagle cartoon. You have been warned. 

On the other hand, the Chinese have stuck their Very Long Strawwwww into Russia even more quickly than I expected....

Yes, I think he would.
Putin's regime crack on democracy, like Luka's, Kazakh etc. are products of progressive uncertainty on part of aparatus of power, which includes a lot of fears (real or token), irrational decisions, systemic inertia and lack of real data available to ruler. In some ways, this process it is like with decision of invading Ukraine- regime is drawn into certain types of behaviour the more it is in this mud. Except the process lasts much longer here. To organize these mock elections is simpler and cheaper solution for Putin, not necessarly a proof that he would loose the real ones. Much less it is the evidence that more Russians silently opppose his regime now than in the past (like significant part of emigre liberals like to explain it).
       Real democratic processess are a lot, like throwing a coin for Kremlin- even if they would secure the vote anyway, they instinctively push away this idea. Especially in times of war, globals struggles, villain NATO barking on the corner. Even meagre democracy also needs some debates, tiresome compaigns, talking to some peasants in villages lost in Syberia...a lot of hassle, costing tonns of money and effort that should be beyond Tsar dignity *. Strange, awkward and ulitimatelly hollow ritual, good for Western hypocrites, where financial oligarchy rules anyway (at least from Kremlin perspective). Add that Putin is genuinly convinced that Americans and CIA are puting their fingers into every election around him, so- like milions of citizens remembering USSR firmly believe- people can be simply communally programmed into being "nazis" and traitors just like that.
      We will never know, but personally I had little doubt that Putin would most probably win every major election in recent Russian history even without murders and authoritarian propaganda (he would have problems with changing constitution, though)- in some scenarios, he could even rule like Orban in Hungary, just by buying media by friendly oligarchs and controlling judiciary, if not for the militaristic needs of Russian state. But it would cost a lot of effort and always bring some risk, so why even bother? There was always little to no alternatives to Putin in minds of Russians in last 20 years anyway; probably even Navalny was just a phenomena, representing some resentments against corruption but not being taken seriously enough as statesman figure in muscovite sense. So, here we are.
*Probably clips of Buffallo Man on January 4th were like a cold shower for elites of many non-democratic states on this planet; a visible confirmation what can happen if you let the mob to stick their heads too high.

We actually have no idea what Putin’s real base of genuine support is or is not.  First off he controls any and all “polls” either directly or indirectly so trying to gauge who really supports him, who is pretending simply to avoid trouble and who opposes but is afraid to say anything, in real terms is basically impossible to do inside Russia, let alone outside looking in.  “Look a bunch of people lined up to support him” is not a viable basis for deductions.
Second problem is that support, in a functioning democracy, is founded on a basis of “informed decision”.  This means that all sides can spin, argue and slant but in the end the news media and objective journalism is supposed to provide a voter with a range of diverging viewpoints and facts.  Voters can then decide who to support, or not support based on their own personal perception and understanding.  This is damned hard to do in a functioning liberal democracy; however, in Russia it is likely impossible.  Putin controls the mainstream media - we have heard endless stories of dissenters being arrested or charged, hell he passed laws making criticism of this war illegal.  He also has a lot of control within social media, suppressing sites and flooding the RUSNet with stooges.  We have seen enough outright lies and insane claims out of Russian media in the last two years to know that the average Russian simply is not able to access much beyond what Putin wants them to see and hear.  Under these conditions “real support” is nearly impossible because no alternative facts, ideas or even options are ever presented.
Finally, as our Ukrainian friends like to point out continually, the average Russian is poorly educated, poor wealth and largely ignorant…this is why they keep signing up for this war.  To now accuse these people of “knowingly supporting Putin” as if they have access to alternatives is short-sighted at best.  Further, Kraze’s continued insistence to call every living Russian on the planet as vicious war loving murders is not only disingenuous, it treads dangerously close to genocidal narratives that have no place on what is supposed to be a rational objective forum.  We know Russians opposed this war, a few hundred thousand ran away.  Others are resisting passively.  We also know that many really do not even understand what this war is or is not because Putin is preventing them from seeing any truth but his own.  We also know some Russians also buy into this war and Putin fully even knowing the reality.  In the end we are going to have to deal with all of them in some form or another because as much as some people are acting out emotionally here, we are not going to wipe Russia off the face of the earth and salt the ground on their mass graves.
So be pissed off, but do not come here and promote outright disinformation in some sort of weird attempt to get us to all buy into some “every Russian is evil and must die” nonsense.  There are all sorts of sites on the internet where people on both sides can engage in that emotional orgy, but it should not be here.  The second this forum becomes one of those places, I for one, am out.
 

Well kudos for trying to wrestle with it.  There is a lot in the wind with respect to warfare right now. All of my theories could easily collapse tomorrow.  I spent the first year of this war, mouth agape, trying to figure out what was going on.  The second year, things started to form, but they are nothing more than shadows we can see from the outside.
Now into the third year, I am convinced of some things, which if wargaming has taught me anything, is about the time Bil H drops the bomb and blows up my entire plan.

https://nationalsecuritynews.com/2024/03/exclusive-satellite-images-reveal-the-expansion-of-russian-war-cemeteries-following-huge-troops-losses-in-ukraine/
Especially VDV division home cities.

Lies, damn lies, statistics, and economic statistics. Reminds me of the old joke!
Two economists are walking in the park. As they're walking, they come across a pile of dog ****.
One economist says to the other, "If you eat that dog ****, I'll give you $50". The second economist thinks for a minute, then reaches down, picks up the ****, and eats it. The first economist gives him a $50 bill and they keep going on their walk.
A few minutes later, they come across another pile of dog ****. This time, the second economist says to the first, "Hey, if you eat that, I'll give you $50." So, of course, the first economist picks up the ****, eats it, and gets $50.  
Walking a little while farther, the first economist looks at the second and says, "You know, I gave you $50 to eat dog ****, then you gave me back the same $50 to eat dog ****. I can't help but feel like we both just ate dog **** for nothing."
"That's not true", responded the second economist. "We increased the GDP by $100

Teplinsky is apparently alive, and the Thirteen guy was killed by Kadyrovites after starting beef with them.
No idea what was on that ship.
 
I don't see a reason to kill Teplinsky. Isn't he the idiot who only ordered meat assaults and wasted Russian material by sending them into narrow approaches at Krynky?
Ukraine should aim to keep as many of the old guard in Russia alive during the war. Their corruption and incompetence is 30% of Ukrainian war power (the rest is half Western tech, half massive titanium balls and grit).
Why risk a motivated up-and-coming nationalist to take his spot? Someone who has the kind of brains Putin would normally keep out of the higher ranks?
 

Habemus Suecia
 

And immediately there fell from his eyes as it had been scales: and he received sight forthwith, and arose, and was baptized.  Acts 9:18
Let your sins of woeful ignorance be washed away!

I've been thinking about this post most of the day, and keep coming back to "Neat. Now what?"
Which got me thinking about how other step changes in military capability were handled. The two obvious ones that come to mind are tanks in WWII, and airpower during the Cold War. Now, clearly, in both cases they existed early, but they only really became effective/worrisome/"game-changing" some decades after their entree to the battlefield.
For the infantry, in both cases, the response became basically the same: very small infantry units became fully capable of anti-ing the other thing, either anti-tank or anti-air.
During WWII anti-tank rifles, bazookas, fausts, shrecks, Piats and hearty grenades gave platoons and sections an ability to defend against or attack against tanks, pretty explicitly at the detriment to the nominal role of the infantry, which was to oppose and defeat enemy infantry. That trend was significantly enhanced during second half of last century with things like RPGs and M-72s. This is at the point now where with weapons like Javelin tanks perhaps have more to fear from infantry than the vice versa, even though lugging Javelin around is a royal PITA especially for light infantry.
The introduction of air power, and especially effective CAS, started us on the road to the fully illuminated battlefield, where nowhere is safe and to be seen is to die. During WWII the only real counter that the infantry had was to dig on, or hide, or both. But during the Cold War a lot of effort went into MANPADS, resulting in the Stinger in the 1980s and with other systems following soon after. Just like their anti tank weapons, lugging around anti-aircraft missiles is a PITA which detracts from the nominal role of engaging enemy infantry, not to mention the drain on budgets and training schedules. But on the other hand now every platoon and section is capable of destroying any tank or aircraft that wanders into it's little tactical AO. And once the air and armour battle is won - either locally or globally - then the rest is just mopping up. The degradation of the infantry platoon and section's ability in the infantry-battle doesn't really matter, since while that bit remains hard and unpleasant, it is incredibly harder and more unpleasant in the absence of either air or armoured support.
So you can probably see where this is going.
Assuming UAS remains in play (and why wouldn't it?), then the role of infantry platoons and sections will change again. Instead of being little nodes of anti-tank and anti-air goodness,with some residual anti-infantry capability, they will become little anti-UAS nodes, with the weapons, training, mindset and purpose to defeat enemy UAS in their local area, and also protect or project friendly UAS capability around themselves. If an enemy tank or aircraft turns up then the section or platoon mightn't be able to deal with it themselves, but they will be networked to someone who can - guns, missiles, friendly armour or air, or friendly UAS. And they'll still, you know, carry rifles. Mainly out of habit and tradition, as well as giving the NCOs something to inspect every day. But most of their weaponry, and sensors, and just the general claggage they're carting about will be geared towards winning the UAS fight, because winning that will mean that the rest is just mopping up.
In other words, the infantry will be able to concentrate physically and cognitively on the UAS battle because it won't be their role any more to win the tank, infantry, or local airspace battle.

"Drones Today
The ongoing war in Ukraine showcases small drones as key tools for ground combat in the modern era. The technology behind them will continue to improve, as machine guns did, by becoming more reliable, portable, and tactically useful. Ukraine and Russia are desperate for better and more drones to equip their forces. This year, the Ukrainian government aims to produce one million small drones for military use, and its partners are focusing on supplying thousands more. As much as 50 percent of Russia’s modern T-90 tank combat losses are attributed to small first-person-view drones. Over 3,000 verified drone strikes occurred along the front line in January 2024. At the same time, Russian forces are building and using drones with equal zeal. In at least one case, a bakery was converted to 3D printing drones, and public schools are teaching classes on drone flying along with other martial topics. Small drones are becoming the defining technology of the conflict."
That is just nuts.  Excellent article.
As to western military integration, let's just say it has been "spotty".  We are all watching this war, but just like on this forum at times, we are all seeing what we want to see and not necessarily what is actually happening.  Before this war in the Canadian military UAS programs were a hot mess.  The RCAF still does not have an unmanned platform within its fleets.  They are getting one, but in typical fashion it will be some large Strategic/operational beast.  This is not all bad as we need these too, but the smaller stuff, Class 2 and below, are all being handled internally by each service.  This has led to the capability spinning off in a bunch of directions.  So as to training and force development, it is kinda all over the map right now and changing daily.  No one expected to see naval drones swarming a patrol ship that looks a lot like our AOPS. No one could have imagined "1 million" FPVs who appear to be doing most of the tank killing back in March of '22 - hell my money was on ATGMs, like Javelin, which definitely worked but were not even close to becoming the major shocker.
We have major issues with deconfliction, training standards, training clearances, frequency management - ranges and training areas are not set up for FPV gunnery - I am not even sure what that looks like.  Simulators are our best bet, but we will spend 5-10 years buying some massively bloated system or some app-garbage built by some "diversity group" (see: ArriveCAN app).  All this is of course also held up by procurement friction.  Some organizations are out in front - but they shall remain unnamed - however even they are struggling at times.  We definitely do not have doctrine or established tactics.  Frankly I do not even know where to start on Unmanned Battlefield Management, I mean what do the supply lines even look like?  Training, C2 and effective employment are all behind the curve. 
Our reactions and culture are not competitive either.  With few exceptions, I have largely heard of the "drone problem" as just that, a problem to be managed so we can get our current "stuff" to work like it used to.  Few are pointing at the competitive opportunities here.
And all the while the Chinese are pushing ahead:   https://odin.tradoc.army.mil/WEG/List/ORIGIN_china--people-s-republic-of-d6ee02&DOM_air-e61af2&DOM_aircraft-42b8bd&DOM_unmanned-aerial-vehicles--uavs--bc8e46
 https://odin.tradoc.army.mil/WEG/List/ORIGIN_china--people-s-republic-of-d6ee02&DOM_land-f5e1db&DOM_infantry-vehicles-0a6516&DOM_unmanned-ground-vehicles--ugv--453001
It is one of my final departing shots - we have seen this coming for years and largely ignored it.  We either get with the program or we risk losing the few military options we have left.
 

Havent seen the news here yet but russia officially ended Armata development, citing its high cost as  mine clearing vehicle

With all considerations regarding potentiall cease of hostilities, I'd start with a fact that according to Chingisid Kremlin logic, Ukraine currently "occupies" not that small parts of Russia in Kherson oblast including its biggest city. Tsar can naturally unf**k this legal Quasimodo born out of desparation if he wish to, but it would cost him some imperial mojo and may actually be problematic internally, given how mechanics of this system works. This is still very much procedural regime, and stamps, maps, new schoolbooks et allia already show this as part of Great Proud Motherland occupied by Nazi. And that is despite that even some domestic Russian nationalists started to figure it out they were never welcomed there as much as they thought, after clips with vivating crowds we saw at the end of 2022. He is pragmatist, but it doesn't sound like he could let it go easily during potentiall negotiations. A major obstacle.
... too much Hemingway, sire.

Ok, well let’s start there then.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/George_Washington's_crossing_of_the_Delaware_River
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Plunder
And of course the big one: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Overlord
And let’s pull some doctrine in: https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/3-90-12/fm3-90-12.pdf
So adding this all up, essentially it has and can be done but there are a lot of caveats.  Ultimately it is a question of weight.  How much weight is being projected across the river as combat power?  How much weight is needed under combat conditions to sustain the weight of the combat power on the other side?  There are multiple ways to get that weight across a river other than a fixed bridge.  Fixed ferry, unfixed ferry, tac aviation and now, UAS.  Forward foraging and cannibalization etc.  
Now doctrine agrees with you, the best is solid fixed LOC bridging but any crossing operations, even conventional ones come in phases.  The opening phase is very often lighter more mobile resupply methods until the bridgehead force can push the enemy back far enough that it is safe to build a series of fixed bridges.  Essentially almost every opposed military river crossing in history began with what we are describing south of Kherson - light forces establishing a bridgehead, sustained and then heavy force link up once conditions are established.  D Day being an exception as were other amphib operations which all had to be sustained by air and sea.
So “sustaining a scale of operation” without a bridge is not only possible, it is really the only way to get many water crossing started in the first place.  Now as to “how long and how far?”  Well that depends on a lot of factors.  If the UA stays light it keeps the logistics bill low.  They might not need a fixed pontoon bridge if they can advance - as you say - “10-30kms”.  Pontoon ferry’s might be able to sustain them as they did for the RA for quite some time before the RA withdrew.
So basically as an engineering and logistics problem what we are looking at south of Kherson is not new or novel.  In the current environment it is going to be challenging and dangerous but it is not the thing being invented from zero in all this. 
 
Ok, so this one opens up the question of how well prepared are the RA forces on the other side?  Light forces have proven pretty important in this war.  They were critical in the first month pretty much everywhere and at Kharkiv constituted the breakout force.  If the RA has built a heavy line of defence as you seem to indicate then you may be correct.  But have they?  We really do not know, but the fact that a small bridgehead at Krynky for months - no massive RA armoured c-attack, and a few maps of force lay down estimates may help:
https://features.csis.org/ukraine-war-map/
https://militaryland.net/maps/deployment-map/
These seem to suggest that the RA have accepted risk in this sector exactly because there is a river there.  So how dense are those RA fortifications?  That map appears to show roughly a single Division covering off 100 kms of frontage.  That is - and let’s be really generous and say that RA division is at full strength - approx 10,000 troops, or 100 troops per km..which is extremely thin.  Estimates of the rest of the RA line are around 300 troops per km.  100 RA troops per km means that there are massive holes in that defensive line.  Light troops can not only cross, they can infiltrate between forces and get into rear areas, which will force the RA to react.  So we are not talking the Atlantic Wall here, we likely have RA hard points on obvious crossing sights, small c-moves forces and a bunch of RA ISR.
So indications are that RA force density is quite low, which makes the light dispersed option a good fit.  Now the UA has much better intel and will have to plan according to that but based on what we can see, the employment of light forces over that river in strength is not only possible, it is viable.
An and now we get to the crux…but you kinda answer your own question here.  “What can these light forces actually do?”  Well at Kyiv they stopped the RA cold.  Elsewhere they have been instrumental in causing the RA to collapse - please find me one major tank battle in this war?  Hell it is hard enough to find a decent mech battle.  This is a war dominated by fires, not manoeuvres.
So the answer to your question is right in your post:
”RUS regroup, reassign reserves to the zone, pile on the drone/artillery/aviation support”.  
That is exactly the objective of a bunch of light forces running rampant in the backfield.  Why?  Because the RA will have to pull these (shrinking) assets from somewhere else.  This is the minimum objective by the way.  If the RA cannot or does not have “reserves” then an opportunity to redraw the lines south of Kherson presents itself.  If those light forces can actually establish a bridge head then options open up for heavier forces and other crossing options.  By that point the entire left end of the RA line is in trouble. But let’s leave that all as a branch plan and stretch goal.
So the real question is not in your response or reasoning.  They are not “can it be done” or “will it do anything?”  The real question is: does the UA have the forces and capabilities to do it at scale?  This we do not know and will have to simply wait and see.

There is no political reason in Krynki. There was a huge political reason to defend Avdiivka.
 
RU arty cannot shell it properly because they are afraid of UKR arty. They can't drone it since the majority of the drones sent are destroyed. They can't bomb it properly because VKS fears Patriot (they don't believe in S-200).

As a result, they cannot containt it unless they apply consistent pressure to keep UKR on the defensive. As soon as they stop, the same thing (new bridgehead/bulge) will happen a few km closer to Crimea.  

1.  There are migrants in desperate parts of the world who would man the modern equivalent of Birkenau crematoria blocks if they could wire home 700usd per month.
2.  That said, they can't wire home that monthly pay if they are missing arms, legs or their heads; or if it's simply getting stolen. And word will get around, fast.
3. My personal KPI for Russia running out of mercenary cred, FWIW, is Norks. The Kim dynasty has sent thousands of young men to awful jobs in inclement parts of USSR/Russia (logging camps, mines) to earn money for the glorious Juche state ever since the Gulag tailed off. Their opinion in the matter is not requested.
I suspect there are already some DPKA military specialists working to support the RUAF. When tiny corpses of (underfed) Korean kids start showing up in the storm units, we'll know other options for mercs are running down for Putin Inc.

Duuude, this is the LongLeftFlank© gambit I've preached before here; others have too.
As our @The_Capt hath taught us, this is the very thing that the AFU has been doing brilliantly since 23 Feb: set the RU up in no-win situations and then force them to ride the hell ride anyway.
Planting bushels of landmines and lobbing in giant bombs won't help Ivan out of this one. There's just too much squishy ground to cover. Their only possible counter is to feed in equally tough swamp rat infantry, but even after 2 years my read is even VDV just don't have the C4ISR to match the Ukes.
Kinburn spit.

 
...All that said, those Ukrainian forces are going to suffer heavy losses, make no mistake.

1.  There are migrants in desperate parts of the world who would man the modern equivalent of Birkenau crematoria blocks if they could wire home 700usd per month.
2.  That said, they can't wire home that monthly pay if they are missing arms, legs or their heads; or if it's simply getting stolen. And word will get around, fast.
3. My personal KPI for Russia running out of mercenary cred, FWIW, is Norks. The Kim dynasty has sent thousands of young men to awful jobs in inclement parts of USSR/Russia (logging camps, mines) to earn money for the glorious Juche state ever since the Gulag tailed off. Their opinion in the matter is not requested.
I suspect there are already some DPKA military specialists working to support the RUAF. When tiny corpses of (underfed) Korean kids start showing up in the storm units, we'll know other options for mercs are running down for Putin Inc.

Duuude, this is the LongLeftFlank© gambit I've preached before here; others have too.
As our @The_Capt hath taught us, this is the very thing that the AFU has been doing brilliantly since 23 Feb: set the RU up in no-win situations and then force them to ride the hell ride anyway.
Planting bushels of landmines and lobbing in giant bombs won't help Ivan out of this one. There's just too much squishy ground to cover. Their only possible counter is to feed in equally tough swamp rat infantry, but even after 2 years my read is even VDV just don't have the C4ISR to match the Ukes.
Kinburn spit.

 
...All that said, those Ukrainian forces are going to suffer heavy losses, make no mistake.

Thanks for this, and as of 2022 I might have agreed with most of this.
But consider the following:
1. The Krynki bridgehead remains after 4+ months, in spite of nonstop attacks by Russian heavy forces + VDV. And that's a zone the Russians can actually supply via a major highway. It's hell for the Uke marines who are there, indeed, but they and their support forces are also giving better than they get, by plastering the RU attacks and LOCs.
2. The further you get down the delta (past the Kherson bridge), the harder it is for the Ivans to deploy and sustain heavy forces -- AFVs, shells, in that boggy, poorly roaded area. I'd actually argue that their logistical challenge out there is WORSE than the Ukrainian one.
At a bare minimum, this zone is flypaper to chew up their best remaining troops (VDV/Spetsnaz) as sustaining mech is going to be a nightmare. Pure Sun Tzu.
3. On the other hand, there's plenty of space in those bayou lands for savvy crack troops to spread out and minimise the damage from glide bombs. Drone airlift/medevac and drone ships can keep Ranger battalions supplied indefinitely; heavy forces, no, but they're not useful here.
The Cossacks invented these tactics hundreds of years ago.
4. The RU aircraft and helos are going to need to make attack runs from the southeast, given that the Western Black Sea is quickly becoming a Ukrainian lake....
5. In spite of being marshlands, Kinburn spit east to Oleshky sands is probably the most essential strategic territory for Ukraine to recover, as the Russians can be expected to build another Sebastopol there in a cease fire situation so as to menace the entire Kherson-Mykolaiv-Odesa portion of Ukraine. I'd actually argue that this is a must have!
Look forward to your reply, as none of the above is going to be easy....

Thanks for this, and as of 2022 I might have agreed with most of this.
But consider the following:
1. The Krynki bridgehead remains after 4+ months, in spite of nonstop attacks by Russian heavy forces + VDV. And that's a zone the Russians can actually supply via a major highway. It's hell for the Uke marines who are there, indeed, but they and their support forces are also giving better than they get, by plastering the RU attacks and LOCs.
2. The further you get down the delta (past the Kherson bridge), the harder it is for the Ivans to deploy and sustain heavy forces -- AFVs, shells, in that boggy, poorly roaded area. I'd actually argue that their logistical challenge out there is WORSE than the Ukrainian one.
At a bare minimum, this zone is flypaper to chew up their best remaining troops (VDV/Spetsnaz) as sustaining mech is going to be a nightmare. Pure Sun Tzu.
3. On the other hand, there's plenty of space in those bayou lands for savvy crack troops to spread out and minimise the damage from glide bombs. Drone airlift/medevac and drone ships can keep Ranger battalions supplied indefinitely; heavy forces, no, but they're not useful here.
The Cossacks invented these tactics hundreds of years ago.
4. The RU aircraft and helos are going to need to make attack runs from the southeast, given that the Western Black Sea is quickly becoming a Ukrainian lake....
5. In spite of being marshlands, Kinburn spit east to Oleshky sands is probably the most essential strategic territory for Ukraine to recover, as the Russians can be expected to build another Sebastopol there in a cease fire situation so as to menace the entire Kherson-Mykolaiv-Odesa portion of Ukraine. I'd actually argue that this is a must have!
Look forward to your reply, as none of the above is going to be easy....

Duuude, this is the LongLeftFlank© gambit I've preached before here; others have too.
As our @The_Capt hath taught us, this is the very thing that the AFU has been doing brilliantly since 23 Feb: set the RU up in no-win situations and then force them to ride the hell ride anyway.
Planting bushels of landmines and lobbing in giant bombs won't help Ivan out of this one. There's just too much squishy ground to cover. Their only possible counter is to feed in equally tough swamp rat infantry, but even after 2 years my read is even VDV just don't have the C4ISR to match the Ukes.
Kinburn spit.

 
...All that said, those Ukrainian forces are going to suffer heavy losses, make no mistake.