Ideas for a "instant counter-attack" scenario ?

[jtcm2]

I'm thinking of making a scenario (or operation ??). Suitable for solo play as well as h2h. The situation: say late war (June 1944 ?), Soviet attack. A Battn (?) has managed to break the German line of defence (i.e. a Co. sized strongpoint ? I assume the German line is not a continuous line of trenches, but a string of such strongpoints, mutually supporting and in depth, which can call on arty fires. And, of course, "fire brigades" for quick reaction counter-attacks).

The map must show the German strong point (a web of trenches and bunkers and wire ?). perhaps mostly in reverse slope. Perhaps, at the edge of the map, a German bunker with keyhole LOS to part of the strongpoint (representing a neighbouring strongpoint providing supporting fires). Perhaps the remnants of the reinforced co. (Co+ 2 HMGs + 2 ATGs + 82mm ? + FO ?) that held the strongpoint: a few panicked, depleted squads cowering in woods, maybe one diehard fanatic squad in a strong house. All padlocked. Craters, the remnants of a hurricane barrage, over selected points of the strongpoint.

The Soviet attacking force (pure infy ? Infy with T-34 ? with SU-76 ?), is padlocked across the map in positions that reflect the fight that's just finished: heavy weapons in firebase, point assault company still in positions that reflect the hard brawling once the other companies shot and suppressed defenders to allow the assaulting plts to swarm the place. Everyone with casualties reflecting the fight, and ammo depletion to match.

At what point does the German counter attack hit ? What does it have ? What are the chances of the Soviets to hold ? Should the scenario start with e.g. 20 minutes of just moving everyone to defensible positions within the captured strong point ?

Should the Soviet breakthrough elements join in the fun ?

[Erwin]

Too many questions imo. It all sounds fine, but do a rough design and then ask specifics. My only comment would be that while some like all-inf scenarios, most find them a bit boring.

[jtcm2]

I think infy fights are the way to go.

What's the size of a German counter attack group ? Co or above ?

[JasonC]

They were very very small.

Not remotely a full company. More like a platoon, certainly no more than 2.

They were often high quality, well armed, and had some form of special equipment.

They might have a covered route into the position.

I don't think using smashed units helps too much, in reality they'd consolidate on the position. Yes the Russians on the objective can be lower than full ammo.

Here is a sample of this sort of action...

German remnant forces -

one regular platoon HQ

one 9 man heer infantry squad, single LMG variety.

one log bunker with MG, veteran

one tank hunter with 25 ammo, 2 grenade bundles, fausts.

one veteran sniper.

20 men total

These are scattered around the original strongpoint - holdouts left over from the attack.

The HQ and squad are in command distance, the rest scattered.

Sniper off the main position at an intermediate range, with 15 ammo.

German relief aka counterattack force -

Veteran platoon HQ with several +2 bonuses

3 squads of 10 man, 2 LMG infantry, veteran, with max ammo.

1 crack HMG-42 team

veteran pioneer platoon HQ with + morale

2 6 man pioneer "squads", 1 LMG variety, crack, with DCs

1 veteran flamethrower

1 105mm radio FO, veteran

1 StuG III

60 men total (plus StuG)

What should the Russians get?

First, no indirect fire support - it was used getting onto the position.

Second, no armor. It was a Rifle formation attack behind a barrage.

The Russian force consists of 3 elements.

Element one is on the objective. It is the reduced survivors on an attacking infantry company.

Element two is a fire support element and it is 500-800 meters away from the objective.

Element three is an infantry force initially back at the support line with the fire support element, holding the original Russian start line and acting as a reserve during this fight.

To simulate their "release" when they get wind of the counterattack, I'd have this infantry element arrive as reinforcements during the battle.

The fire support element would have something like 2 82mm mortars, 4 Maxim MMGs, and 4 ATRs. A couple of platoon HQs can lead these. They should have LOS to the forward slope portions of the contested position but not full LOS to the whole thing, nor do they cover approach routes into it that the German counterattack force will use - not from back where they are.

The reserve infantry element can be 2 platoons (only 3 squads per) of standard rifle infantry, mostly green - say HQ and 1 squad in each platoon regular quality. Also give each platoon a tank hunter team with 2 RPG grenades and 25 ammo, regulars. Have them arrive in a staggered way, one platoon on say turn 10 and the other on turn 12, behind the fire support element

The Russian force on the contested position is a reduced company.

Give it a company HQ, regular quality with some bonuses

2 platoon HQs, no great bonuses

6 squads of infantry with 20-30% casualties and 1/2 normal ammo.

2 ATRs with 2/3rd to 3/4 ammo (enough).

These forces should be mostly regulars, with "weakened" state. A few may be green.

The total Russian force actually on the objective will thus be about 60 or 70 men.

Meaning the counterattack force is basically "even odds" with those they are attacking.

The overall manpower odds are strongly in favor of the Russians - 2.5 to 1. But they are divided "front to back". If the Germans can get back into the initial strongpoint position rapidly enough, they will be "remanning" it by the time the Russian reserves arrive. And the Russians will be effectively attacking to take the position all over again.

Notice also that the Germans get one count em one AFV, but the Russians have no heavy counters to it. Just half a dozen ATRs and a few tank hunters late and far off. The Germans also have the prospect of disrupting the Russian "second wave" with 105mm artillery fire, if they haven't used it all up retaking the position.

Last point is about the German strongpoint design. Don't overuse trenches - they are much stronger than the typical field fortification deserves to be. Try to use multiple foxholes, rubbled wood houses, and patches of "rough" instead. Also make "sunken lanes" in the terrain - grooves below the height of their surroundings.

The side of the strongpoint facing the Russian heavy weapons should have several AP minefields, padlocked but locations known only to the Germans. Several continuous wire obstacles as well. The German holdouts (HQ and squad at least) should be separated from the nearby Russians by additional wire obstacles within the German position.

Give the Germans 3 TRPs - one smack on top of a Russian held portion of the captured position, and the others on the approach avenues from the Russian heavy weapons position, or just outside the outer wire in that direction.

The Germans are not relying on numbers. They don't have numbers to throw at the Russians. They are relying on combined arms advantages and "special weapons and tactics", on covered routes into the position for them, and difficult obstacle-strewn and barrage-able routes of reinforcement for the Russians, on lack of Russian warning (reflected in their force division and delayed reserve arrival), etc.

The Germans can still get clobbered because they are still trying to attack with even odds infantry into cover, and that is always dangerous. They cannot afford to trade man for man with the Russians.

See the idea?

[Vark]

Jason, couple of questions. Would this scenario be better as an operation to better reflect the gradual arrival of troops, perhaps a finale with a german tank platoon v's an infantry force reinforced by ATG's.

Would the Germans have a Stug for the initial counter attack? Most of what I have read suggests the SOP was a near instantaneous counter-attack with the forces at hand (two squads of infantry with some specialised kit). Or did the set up of a small strong point have an AG normally in reserve? I have little knowledge of German small unit defensive operations barring extrapolations from accounts of larger battles or specific tactical vigenettes.

Would your force mix not include 45mm ATG's in the supporting unit? I'm thinking of the storm group compositions, did this knowledge percolate down through to vanilla rifle regiments or was it a buy the book approach eschewing local initiative. Also the Germans had become very stereotyped in their response to Russian break ins and the Russians knew an armour supported attack would be launched rapidly, or did those battles mainly occur on the flanks or base of the penetration?

[jtcm2]

Good questions from Vark.

Should the German rapid reaction come via one of the sunken lanes ?

Should i padlock the Soviet assault Co. remnants, or do I leave them free and just assume that their positions represent the consolidated elements which have been hustled into hasty defensive positions ?

When do the German elements arrive ?

[JasonC]

Don't use an operation. Operations are broken. You don't need one anyway.

Yes the Germans might very well have a StuG for an immediate local counterattack. They would not have a whole company of the things, but that isn't what I suggested.

But the more basic point of the example forces is that the counterattack is based on not fighting fair. It isn't an even forces, matched combined arms, set piece. The whole point is to hit back with something asymmetric, something the enemy on the objective is not expected to be ready for in combined arms terms. Armor vs none, TRPed artillery, engineer "SWAT", veterans vs greens at night with tactical surprise - whatever. Not. Fair.

Definitely don't give the Russians a passel of ATGs.

As for JTCMs questions, the Germans are on the board. With a useful set up zone or three, and full choice to organize and coordinate any way the commander of that side likes. Yes they will use covered approaches - which can just be a reverse slope or along a draw, it doesn't need to mean a sunken lane in the literal sense. But yes it ought to be a covered route into (and out of) the position, that the Germans had planned all along as part of that position - a way to withdraw from it or to feed forces to it before it fell, or for this counterattack route purpose.

As for the Russians on the objective, you can padlock them or you can just give them small set up areas, and perhaps divide them into platoon sized bits. Not really that important. The main thing is not that they are out of position or in the open - not at all. It is just that they are separated front to back and in coordination terms from both their fire support elements and their reserves or additional infantry forces, and do not have a pre-canned correct combined arms mix for the threat they immediately face.

[jtcm2]

I've got a rough version. Anyone interesting in giving it a spin ?

[dieseltaylor]

My view is it seems a shame that with the tank model being imperfect, but the most developed of the CM systems, there seems a desire to make infantry games. Each to his own. Best of luck.

[coe]

ok so I'm wondering in real life how was this one platoon supposed to successfully counter attack - would they be advancing in by bounding or be basically doing a mad charge with guns blazing.

Also what's the thing about supposedly the Germans had a doctrine to immediately counterattack... in practice how did this work if they were strung thin against vastly greater enemies.... or better yet... your position falls and you were defending it... what else do you have left to counterattack with (is it presuming the reserves weren't already called in)...

[jtcm2]

Well, in my scenario, you set up a base of fire with the HMG and the Stug, rain 105mm down, and try to bound into the position. Or if you're the AI, you rush.

[Vark]

If you read Grossmans's book, "On Killing" he makes the point that soldiers, after an intense fight, find it very hard to act at their level of proficiency. The brain powers down as the psychological trauma, of recent events is processed. This is why a rapid counter attack often works, despite the smallness of the force whereas one delayed, to increase the bayonet strength, rarely does. I do not have the book with me but believe the figure is 20-30 minutes.

I guess in CM terms making troops exhausted, reducing there morale level and shocking/pinning some might be representative, though the CM engine is not really about psychological realism for the pixel troops. I wonder if any psychologists have been asked to particiapte in designing wargames rules?

[Kingfish]

In addition to the psychological effects, there is also the chaos following loss of command and control, depleted ammo levels, and the fact most attacks "string out" a force away from the protection and support of heavy weapons / artillery.

It's only after reinforcements have been brought forward and communications established is the objective truly captured.

[dieseltaylor]

My reading of WW" Normandy suggests that another Company would come up pretty quickly to take over the position - possibly a reaction to known German tactics.

[JasonC]

In practice how does this work?

Any position is taken away from some unit or other, that is less than the whole German army.

The army has units on all scales. Whatever position was taken, tops out somewhere on the scale escalation ladder.

There is therefore some unit size one step larger than the unit that lost the position, that is the parent formation of the unit that lost the position.

That is practical background. Now the principle the doctrine uses can be stated simply.

Every formation is responsible for the ground physically held by all of its subelements.

If any of its subelements lose a portion of their ground, the parent formation is responsible for a counterattack attempt, trying to recover the original defensive line.

What is the parent going to have available? Certainly not the whole parent formation. One, it just lost a fight conducted by one of its major subelements, which must be presumed to be combat ineffective afterward.

Certainly not the whole remainder of the parent, because its other major subelements have their own assigned positions and frontage.

Thus, what will be available are the reserve elements of the parent, and the reserve elements of its major subelements. Everything else is spoken for defending other ground or already committed or destroyed.

How is the doctrine implemented? The officer in charge of the parent formation (CO, or his staff if he is unavailable) at that moment must implement the doctrine without waiting for orders or higher coordination. Some one field officer is put in charge of the attempt. It may be a superior from the parent formation, including the CO himself, or a staffer he designates, or the commander of a neighboring subelement, or of a reserve element - whatever. The responsible officer designates the implementing officer.

The responsible officer quickly assesses the forces available, assigns them to do whatever the implementing officer commands, and informs said officer of the available assets. This may mean attaching reserves to a neighboring subelement, or vice versa, or artillery fire tasking, whatever. The principle is simply, one man is in charge of the whole attempt and he is told what he has to try it with and given complete control of those assets for the balance of the attempt.

The method is entirely up to the implementing officer.

Everyone knows that the doctrine stresses time and surprise to the exclusion of practically every other element in the attack attempt.

The danger of this doctrine is that it exposes the subelements nearest an enemy success to defeat in detail, drawing them out of prepared positions, and pushing them into combat against an enemy known by recent practical outcomes to be strong on the ground.

The strength of the doctrine is that it can force the enemy to fight for the same real estate over and over. If the ground was chosen wisely, its possession may well convey tactical advantages that repay the losses such counterattacks necessarily involve.

The Germans applied it with a fanatical literalism, even when it was very costly and not conspicuously successful. It fit the whole offensive minded tactical doctrine they entered the war with, it fit the high command's insistence on holding everything and disregarding costs, it fit the emphasis on initiative and pushing command responsibility as low as possible. Sometimes it got experienced formations bled to death on a time scale of days fighting uselessly and stubbornly for frankly not very important ground.

They didn't care that it sometimes blew up on them. It was doctrine and they tried it.

As a result of all of the above, the scale of the attacks was frequently small, and they could be delivered at even odds or worse.

The enemy attacks with a battalion. OK then they probably hit about a company and maul it. The responsible higher formation will thus be the battalion that was parent to the company hit initially. It will have 2 other companies and at least one will have frontage, and often both, and even if one is actually in reserve it will be covering important secondary positions in some other sectors. So the counterattack force will rarely be even a whole single company.

Much more likely, it is the reserve platoon of the nearest neighboring company, plus whatever the battalion commander can scrap together and add in to help them, on about 10 minutes notice. They will pick up whatever they can in the way of volunteers, picked men, extra weapons, extra ammo, supporting special arms, etc. But nothing like the full battalion or what is left of it, is available.

How is the attack typically delivered tactically speaking? They try to exploit a defender's knowledge of the ground, and the intel passed to them about the original attackers during the course of the previous attack, and by the survivors on their side of it. Those guide them into the position, and inform them about the key tactical features.

They try to exploit the rapid change in the initiative and in the sub unit the enemy is facing, to create confusion. They try to attack from a direction that is not the one the enemy was oriented on, directly, in the immediately preceeding fight. The substance of the attack is the usual with German infantry - get machineguns into positions with good cover that dominate locations where the enemy physically is, and shoot the heck out fo them. Supplement this with hand grenade and SMG fighting at close range against enemy elements isolated by the previous, or most exposed front to back.

Will they risk crossing open ground to get at the enemy? If they think that open ground isn't covered by enemy fire at that moment, sure. But they aren't recreating Pickett's charge. They just want to get their MGs into position at good small arms range, and get to grenade and sidearm range when and where they expect to have surprise or (very local) odds or both.

The objective is also finite. They want to recover the position lost and "reman" its planned defensive scheme. If they give up pieces of that, as long as they are "separable" ones that don't "unlock" the whole position, that is acceptable.

If the instant counterattack fails it will not be re attempted at the same echelon level. The next higher formation, on a longer time scale, may make another attempt with heavier assets. But German experience in the matter was that bigger counterattacks delivered later in time were far less likely to recover the ground and were much more likely to incur high losses on failure.

Failed small scale instant counterattacks might approximately double the manpower losses of the original fight, without losing additional ground. Successful ones would leave the losses from the initial fight about the same and recover the lost ground.

There was also a definite impact in terms of buying time, for other larger elements to slide forces over to the threatened area.

I can find plenty of operational cases where it was done to the letter, and hurt the Germans more than it helped - and others where it was also done to the letter, and clearly helped. The surprising thing, really, is how often they actually lived up to their own doctrine in the matter. They really did this stuff and they did it routinely. Hang the cost.

[jtcm2]

In the scenario, the German position is a Co. sized stronghold, bashed in by a Battn sized attack, pure infy under a barrage. Would the Russian attack not have gone in as a 2-Co strong formation, either in column, or manoeuvering ? If so, should the remains on the position not be those of two, not one Co ?— i.e. 9 squads rather than 6 ?

[dieseltaylor]

Every formation is responsible for the ground physically held by all of its subelements.

Subelements?!!!

Possibly you mean elements. Curiously even sub-elements which would be a logical if invented formation does not appear in my on-line dictionaries.

[Vark]

Jason, couple of points; regarding the Stugs "They would not have a whole company of the things, but that isn't what I suggested." Never suggested that, I was just surprised the Germans would penny packet armour that way, though in 1944, it is understandable if the local reality of needs must, trumped official doctrine occasionally.

"Definitely don't give the Russians a passel of ATGs." Again never suggested, though I had to look up the word to understand your response so thanks for expanding my vocabulary. I would have thought though that the pair of 45's, in the TOE of a vanilla rifle battalion, would be rushed forward to consolidate the position, after having helped support the assault by targeting embrasures, weapons pits etc. They should have reduced ammo but any surviving gun would surely be used for consolidation, especially if the Russians were aware of the likelyhood of individual SPG's being included in the counter-attacking force. Perhaps have the guns half-way to the outpost before the Germans attack, as CM so poorly models their mobility, as it does with all support weapons.

Talking of AT elements, would the Russians not scavenge the captured outpost for every working faust available? Making a weapon so easy children can use it does have drawbacks.

[JasonC]

No no and no.

The Russians get a handful of ATRs and close assault weapons.

The whole point is to model surprise and not fighting fair, the attackers being ready for what *they* planned for - an artillery intense assault on a fortified *infantry* strongpoint - and *not* for what they actually *get*.

Why is this hard to grok?

[jtcm2]

Would the attacking support weapons relocate ?

Would the defending support weapons stay put ?

[JasonC]

The original attacker can try to move up his support weapons but it would happen during the counterattack attempt, not before it. That is the point of doing it instantly - if the original attackers are given several hours, they will move defensive weapons up to hold the ground taken, relieve the original attack force, and replace it with a full strength element of equivalent size. By then the opportunity has passed. The original attackers can instead decide not to risk it and support only by fire from the original start line. The risk if they try to move up instead is they may get caught in the open moving up; the risk in staying back is they may not have LOS to influence the counterattack decisively. Normally they'd play it safe and stay back, but up to the local commander...

The defending support weapons, meaning those of the original defenders, is an ambiguous term. The ones originally defending the position were probably wiped out or at least severely reduced when the position was lost. Any survivors still in place would generally support by fire from where they are, and not attempt anything more than that. Support weapons with the *counterattack* force, on the other hand, would initially support by fire obviously, but by the end, yes, would attempt to reposition onto the original position as part of "remanning" the defenses. But after the original attackers are ejected by the counterattack maneuver elements (infantry and armor).

[jtcm2]

In my scenario, the German position in on a reverse slope, below a wooded, and mined and wired, crestline.

Behind the position, a small hillock, with 2 HMGs with depleted ammo, and empty 82mm. They're suppressed (to show that they've been noticed and shot at, perhaps even hit with mortars), and very tired from the firefight. The main effect is that they've got LOS over the position, can take potshots at the Soviets and locate them if they move (and tell the counter attacking force)

[Vark]

Is the position (the main one not the hilltop outliers) visible from the treeline so that weapons can be bought to bear on it and vice versa and if there are hills, is their a road leading to the position? Also what distances are we talking about between the crestline and the outpost, finally how have you simulated the Russian sapper operations allowing the initial break in or did the assault force use the unmined sally points?

The problem I have had with the German tactic is that borg spotting kills it, literally. I once kept a small two unit force (two of the platoons sections were under command of the HQ) with attatched elements under a platoon HQ with good morale and attack ratings. When the main position fell I launched an immediate response and was taken apart, I went back to having a platoon set back but able to cover the mainline by fire and never counter attacked again, unless in urban environments or with armour back up.

[jtcm2]

Yes, the main position is visible from the treeline. There is a draw leading up to the crest-- the assault position took it, and so will the reinforcements if they have sense.

Sapper operations-- good point ! How do you put landmarks in your map ? I think I'll sprinkle the map with indications such as

"German fire support position from neighbouring strongpoint" (a bunker in one corner with LOS to some of the German position)

"Minefield-- uncleared"

"Minefield-- cleared"

"Minefield lane--marked"

"German heavy support weapons"

-- after all, it's not as if the reinforcement Co (counter-counter-attack ?) is going in blind.

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