Is the attrition rate in combat mission "accurate"

[dieseltaylor]

On the Napoleonics the best book in terms of analysis is:

Battle Tactics of Napoleon and his Enemies

by Brent Nosworthy

516 pages in all

Even that excelent book is not the be all and end all as:

The French cavalry 1792-1815

by David Johnston

reveals quite serious reasons why the French cavalry had trouble keeping thier horses in a fit condition.

[dieseltaylor]

I think I actually suffer in CM by actually favouring force preservation - its a mindset problem. For me to press for an overwhelming victory would be extremely unlikely. {Assuming I ever got to that position]

Generally I take enough flags to win or at least draw [and I count my and enemy tank/gun losses]. And if winning will take ceasefires.

However in a recent tournament at WeboB the casualties in most of the 21 pairings were actually quite light. Probably due to a very large map and people settling for what was achievable. Where their were heavy loss of life it was normally due to a big mismatch in player quality. Another factor was that being in the desert armour are more potent even with early war pop-guns.

A few tanks lost would be few men injured so body count would be low. Overall troops involved 650 and the least loss was 55 though most would have been between 100-200 casualties.

[Zarquon]

I'm participating in an ongoing campaign (Onion Wars) and I did some light statistics a while ago:

Counting only committed and lost squads of the Green side in 101 battles, a total of 1886 squads were committed and 480 of these were lost (sometimes the GMs combined casualties in different squads). Average battle size was 19 squads, some had only 5, a few saw 50 or 60, even 90. Most scenarios lasted 30 turns, some 40, a few 50.

That's a loss rate of 25%, with most battles ranging between 15% and 40%. Although the casualty rate ranged from 0% to 100%, the overall average of 25% was remarkably consistent.

[Michael Emrys]

...the overall average of 25% was remarkably consistent.

And in actual fighting that would be considered a near disaster. Anything over 5%/day was usually regarded as serious although acceptable if the objective justified it, so it did occur.

Michael

[JasonC]

There is a player's solution to overly aggressive use of the men, tolerating overly high losses. It requires the players agree beforehand and scenario designers to specify two extra numbers in the briefing files, but if actually used it works great.

The procedure is that each side is given a "demoralization level". The game already tracks a global % morale based on how many men are alive and in good order, modified by their ammo state. The mechanics are simple - whenever your global morale level is below your scenario specific demoralization number, you *must* use the "offer ceasefire" button on that turn. You always *may* offer ceasefire, as normal, but you are *required* to do so if your global morale number when you get the turn to give your orders, is under your demoralization number.

That's it.

If the other side chooses to offer cease fire, the scenario will end then and there.

If both sides are pushed below their demoralization limits, instead of grappling to the last man, they will back off and call it a day.

This forces a serious attention to causalties and to the overall morale state of your force. And it is entirely realistic.

Picked forces of elite troops can have very low demoralization numbers, or have none set at all, thus behaving like everyone does now. But simply veteran forces get a signficantly higher DM level - 40% e.g. - and normal forces get more like 50% - 60%. Scenario designers can use the figure to adjust for the level of commitment or loss tolerance the operational situation demands, e.g. making them higher for a probe.

One proviso, for scenarios balanced without this rule in mind. When early ceasefire becomes more common, flag points rise in relative importance. It is a good idea to have the likely possessable flags distributed across the field on both sides, not all sitting in the defender's set up zone. If you are going to put all the flags in the defender's set up zone, limit their quantity - or offset them somewhat with attacker bonus.

The practice of instead putting 1000 points of flags in the defender's backfield and having practically no global morale limits, forces a "die trying" battle that practically never occurred in reality. Possession of an insignificant scrap of terrain at a specific half-hour mark was never worth a battalion of live troops able to fight every day. Killing an enemy battalion might be worth losing one of your own - a different matter.

Just blaming players for how aggressively they play is not realistic or fair to them. They are acting within the game system and the victory conditions the scenario designers supplied. Get those right instead of unrealistically asking players to pull punchs.

[JasonC]

Stalin's Organist - those accounts are all pretty lopsided and misleading.

The Brit commentators essentially never understand the French military system they are describing, and are frequently just plain bragging (in highly selective ways), not analysing tactics.

The main point your comment ignores was half the subject of my previous post on the subject - the general uselessness of just trying to maximize the number of men firing.

More men firing always means more men exposed to incoming fire as well. When the incoming is pure area fire, without any serious aim component, increasing the men exposed to that area fire drives up own side losses in direct proportion to extra shots fired by those men.

Side A puts 100 men on line and fire 100 times. His firepower is 100 - yay. But his exposure is also 100.

Side B *on the same frontage* puts 25 men in open order. His firepower is 25, oh no. But his men exposed is also only 25.

Each shot by side B is 4 times as likely to hit something as a shot by side A.

There are 4 times as many shots coming out of side A, but each hits a quarter as often.

There are 1/4 as many shots coming out of side B, but each hits 4 times as often.

Ergo, hits *per unit time* are *the same*. Having 4 times the number of men firing does *nothing* to the loss rates experienced by the two sides. One side is merely picking "smaller target" instead of "more shots".

But, hits *per shot fired* are *not* the same. The side that picked *defense* over offense, is hitting much more often *per shot fired*. The side that picked offense is throwing many more rounds per unit time for the same number of achieved hits.

But a smoothbore flintlock misfires and jams about once every 8 shots.

A single flint will last 10 to 15 shots before being worn so much in needs replacing.

The men carried 60 ball in their ammo pouches, sometimes only 40.

Extras on battalion wagons brought the total to only 75.

That supplied had to last *all day*.

Firing *time* was not scarce. Battles lasted *hours*. A decently trained man could fire 4 shots *per minute*, reload time only. Discounting jams that means *15 minutes* of max rate of fire. Even leaving a full minute every 8 shots for jams and such, and slowing the average rate, and topping off from wagons - anyone could fire off their entire ammo supply in well under an hour.

All of which means *open order beats formed lines* for fire combat. Hands down, no contest, not even close. The line doesn't get any more hits per unit time, and open order guys can keep it up all day, and the line cannot.

This was discovered at the latest during the revolutionary period, when loose clouds of the most determined men ahead of milling masses of undisciplined troops, routinely beat the pants off the best drilled and formed central European formations of dress-right-dressed lines of battle. The Napoleonic French system restored discipline but kept this lesson.

And it added a shock arm from the separate, chicken-played-with-guns game I described in the previous post.

Neither point can be considered in isolation from each other.

The French were not fighting in column all day, formed vs. formed. They were fighting in open order all day, combined with artillery fire.

Columns had the specific role of hitting thin enemy formations in shock action - which doesn't mean bayonets it means muskets held loaded down to 40 paces or less then fired as an organized volley, by a still advancing formation.

A formation that completely lines the frontage with thin skirmish screens and then occasionally has 100 yards of that frontage a full target of column-front, is a smaller exposed target area than the same frontage lined with a continuous 2 or 3 rank line.

Both are going to bleed the same in the fire combat duel.

The column bits can also press home to 30 yards, or 5, more successfully than a continuous 3 rank line would.

"But I get more shots from my overlapping 500 yard long, 2 rank line".

The column also has 500 yards. You don't get more men by being in line and you don't get more yards either.

The column just uses 400 of those yards for men in open order and only 100 of them for men in close order.

The open order bits are 1 man every 5 yards.

The close order bits are 9 men per yard - 1 per yard and 9 deep.

Total men 980, total yards 500.

The 2 rank line instead has 2 men deep all along the frontage, 1000 men on 500 yards.

The column and skirmish formation fires 280 times at a continuous high density target.

The 2 rank line fires 200 times at the column front and 800 times at skirmishers with about 1/10th the exposed area (the formed are 2 men per yard visible in first or second row).

Each side has a shots at density of 280, the line used nearly 3 times the physical musket discharges to get it.

The line will therefore experience 3 times the rate of misfires and jams and run through its ammo 3 times faster. While getting in return, exactly nothing.

Note furthermore than the column will not be visible *at all* except when in the process of pressing home to 40 paces or less along part of the frontage.

Most of the time there is just an extra 100 yards of skirmish screen along that part of the frontage, and the main column is ~100 yards behind that screen and out of danger completely.

Meaning most of the time your 1000 men in 2 rank line are trading shots with 100 men in open order and they are both bleeding the same amount.

The skirmishers can just keep it up much, much longer.

Then they pick a range where the hit chances for them are only a few percent, firing at your continual formed front.

Your own hit chances with the replies are miniscule.

Their few percent hit chances times the ball in their pouches are sufficient to shoot your entire army down to the last man.

Your lower hit chance replying against men that far off and in open order, isn't.

The only time line is better is when the fire is effectively *aimed* (more hits vs. open order than the straight exposed area would predict - which in practice means when using rifles or at about 10 paces distance), or the column plus skirmisher system can't bring its skirmishers to bear (e.g. because they have been swept off by cavalry).

[JasonC]

If you want an historical example of the above, consider Arcola.

The battle lasted *3 days*.

The Austrians had more men, and more disciplined men.

(The French army had only been under Napoleon a modest period and was still largely a revolutionary-era force).

The Austrians held favorable positions on higher ground and stood on the tactical defensive.

They were nowhere turned or routed.

The French tried unsuccessfully to close with them several times, and frequently failed to get within 200 yards of them.

Meaning plenty of musketry happened over a very prolonged period at ranges that were quite long for smoothbore muskets.

The French were off in a marsh while the Austrians held a line of raised dikes.

The Austrians, however, fought in line - the French fought in open order.

The Austrians lost 3 men for every 2 the French lost (despite outnumbering them, better position and terrain, better disciplined troops etc), and eventually were so worn down by these losses that they voluntarily quit the field.

Why? Because formed lines flat lose extended-time fire combat to men in open order.

[dieseltaylor]

I am quite perplexed JC. You seem to be suggesting that a block of men are less vulnerable - which is a point to argue perhaps but surely dismisses the penetration of a musket ball which could easily hit several men in a block. The 0.75" ball of a Brown Bess at sub-100 range would do serious damage - I believe it would go through 0.75" of oak at 100 paces but would need to check that.

In any event despite Oman being substantially wrong on the reason for British success it is generally agree line does provide more muskets to fire. The important ingrdient for the British success was holding fire to the last minute , destroyoing the opponents cohesion with a volley and charging with the bayonet.

[dieseltaylor]

Missed your second post JC

Brent Nosworthy says the Battle of Arcola was lost on the third day when the Austrians went on the offensive and the French were able to swing on to the flank of the victorious Austrian advance. It would suggest either he or you are barking up the wrong tree. However as I do not propose investigating it in depth tonight I will leave it at that.

This from linkie

From extensive recorded target practice sessions in Madras, the soldiers firing individual aimed shots with flintlock Brown Bess muskets at target 6 feet tall by 2 feet wide, the percentage hits were:

80 yards: 31%

100 yards: 25%

120 yards: 19%

200 yards: 8%

The accuracy in battle was obviously much lower than this, especially if the battalion was in close order, but it should be pointed out that these soldiers were only issued 36 rounds and 3 flints for live fire practice per year. In view of this, the figures are impressive. I normally fire more than 36 rounds per week with similar weapons and can do a bit better, but the smoothbore is inherently innaccurate.

Regarding the penetration capabilities of musket balls, in one test three targets 30 feet long and 8 feet high were placed one behind the other, separated by one pace, at 200 yards range. The targets were constucted of mango planks one inch thick. Out of 150 shots, 102 struck the target:

45 penetrated all three boards.

32 penetrated two boards.

24 penetrated only one board.

1 lodged in the first board.

I'm not sure how a one inch mango plank compares to human flesh and bone, but these figures indicate that a ball fired 200 yards would probably do more than just "digging in one and a half inches".

http://theminiaturespage.com/boards/msg.mv?id=186439

I think the writer is confusing shortrange penetrative power with overall shooting but the implication is obviously that going through more than one body was not unlikely.

Another writer says at 80 yards a shot went through 4" of a target post.

[JasonC]

It is more than unlikely, it didn't happen. Not with any frequency worth mentioning. And the parade ground accuracy figures are useless - every actual fight shows vastly lower to hit chances. As for Arcola, none of the map maneuvering was decisive. What was decisive is that the Austrian left on a raised dike facing Massena's men in the marshes for hour after hour, lost far more heavily to the French fire, than the reverse.

The Austrians had 24000 men at Arcola. Over 3 days of fighting they inflicted 4500 casualties on the French. The French had about 17000 men - 15000 on the first day rising to 20000 on the last. They inflicted 7000 causalties on the Austrians - nearly a third of the Austrian force. In general Napoleonic era armies that lost a third of their men on the field came apart.

Why did 24000 Austrians fighting for 3 days from superior positions only hit 4500 French?

Why did 17000 French fighting for 3 days from inferior positions hits 7000 Austrians?

It wasn't generalship. It wasn't clever maneuver. It wasn't morale. The French didn't have more guns or use combined arms more effectively. If the armies had been equal in all respects, the Austrians deserved to win the battle of Arcola.

There was no shortage of time to cycle men through the front in good order.

There was no shortage of time to fire off every round either side possessed.

Anything retained was retained by policy, to save something for closer shooting to protect formations.

An individual Frenchman had about 2 chances in 5 of hitting a single Austrian opposite, using practically the entire contents of his ammo pouch.

An individual Austrian had only about 1 chance if 5 of doing the same back. Despite the French occasionally pressing to closer range in column formations, failing to take certain bridges and causeways, etc.

The reason for the great discrepancy in average achieved musketry results is simple - the Austrians fought almost exclusively in shoulder to shoulder line formations. The French were occasionally in dangerous brushes in such formations, but the bulk of the men over the bulk of the time, that were actually within musket-shot of the Austrians, were in open order.

Notice also the very low achieved hits per man. Even with all the time in the world.

If formed infantry were routinely getting multiple hits per bullet, there is no way you'd see such average outcomes. Nor would battles take so long.

Cannonballs did carry through formations and occasionally hit multiple men. But even this should not be overstated. Yes, there are anecdotal outliers where one roundshot kills or wounds 25 men in a tight square formation (not at Arcola, I mean at Waterloo for example). But the average effectiveness of artillery fire was nothing remotely like that. The Russians lost 45000 casualties at Borodino, making it one of the bloodiest fights in the whole history of the Napoleonic wars. We know what the French fired to inflict those causalties - 2 million musket rounds and 90000 artillery rounds (including shell and canister).

Average accuracy of musket fire was thus on the order of 1% to 1.5%. Average effectiveness of artillery fire was well under 1 men hit per round fired - and probably more like 1 out of 10 actually.

Nor is Borodino out of the ordinary in those respects - it is merely at the high end of the scale for both losses and ammo expenditure. At Leipzig the combined allies lost 55000 men; the French artillery alone fired 200,000 rounds.

Reading tactical accounts meant for drama or parade ground fire tests, you can easily get the impression that every time a gun was touched off a dozen enemy fell down dead or wounded, and for the infantry every 3-4 shots at the worst. If that were actually normal the Russians would have taken 1.5 million causalties at Borodino (lol). The actual achieved accuracies are *3%* of that. This means it wasn't even the case that 1 shot in 20 was delivered under such conditions, even if every other shot was sent randomly into the air, like avoiding an outcome in a duel.

If cannon shots hit 10 men apiece instead of having a 1 in 10 chance of hitting anything, the French artillery park at Borodino would have inflicted the full Russian loss figure in about 8 minutes. If musket fire hit 25% of the time at typical battle ranges, 8 minutes in action would suffice for every infantrymen present to shoot his counterpart in the enemy army 6 to 8 times. Needless to say, nothing remotely like that actually happened.

What happens instead is the overwhelming majority of the armies for the overwhelming majority of the time are completely out of range of each other, one. The overwhelming majority of fire is delivered by batteries firing roundshot at range and by skirmishers in open order firing at range - ranges significantly longer than typically depicted as the "effective range" of muskets in wargames.

In closer approaches by formed infantry, the majority of the time is spent marching in and ice cold, fire held way beyond what seems the last possible moment. Ragged volleys fired too early miss high and hit very little, even firing at huge formations 100 to 200 yards away. Closer in volleys drop whole front ranks in seconds and formations facing such an outcome frequently disorder or dissolve at the mere prospect - and when it happens, dissolution is the normal outcome. The men assume open order of their own initiative, as it were (lol).

Since firing time is not scarce and frontages are all lined on either side, trying to maximize on-line muskets is just a simplistic misunderstanding of what is actually going on and what is driving outcomes.

Overall casualties are being governed entirely by the men's willingness to stand them. As soon as that willingness is reached, one army comes apart and the other has won. There is no physical limit on the ability of either army to kill the other to the last man. They just won't stand in the places and for the lengths of times necessary for that to happen.

This means maximizing the staying power of the army is the battle winning step.

The guy that shoots last wins. Victory usually goes to the last reserve. Nobody wins by firing sooner or faster or more overall, than the opposing army. But the winners do fire under conditions and in match ups that give them better achieved accuracy, on average, than their opponents.

And the single biggest determiner of that achieved accuracy is how much of the army spends how much of the time presenting as poor target as possible by being out of sight entirely or in open order. The next biggest determiner of that achieved accuracy is at how close a range full rank volleys are delivered in the close infantry fighting - which is a function of balls of brass and willingness to get shot at first, then get closer for the reply.

All the people talking about the Brits being more effective because they fight in line are hopelessly missing the point. Wellington was a successful commander because he mastered *reverse slope* tactics and kept those lines *out of enemy view* and therefore out of fire as much as possible. Standing on front slopes in line got anyone trying it butchered by artillery and skirmisher musketry.

[Kingfish]

This forces a serious attention to causalties and to the overall morale state of your force. And it is entirely realistic.

One problem - this assumes a commander had access to real time status reports from forces locked in combat, a state of affairs that just didn't exist circa '39-'45.

Not saying that your suggestion wouldn't help with regards to the overly aggressive games, it would.

It's just not realistic, that's all.

[dieseltaylor]

Wiki

Just when the day seemed lost, Masséna appeared with reinforcements from the western flank. With these, he ambushed the Austrians on the western dike and sent them reeling back toward Arcole. Heartened, Augereau's men recrossed to the east bank of the Alpone and renewed the fight. Masséna and Augereau finally battled their way into Arcole around 5 pm. A lieutenant and 25 Guides aided the final attack by riding into the Austrian rear area and blowing several bugles to create the impression of a large force. The French followed up their success by advancing north and threatening to block the main east-west highway. Alvinczi threw in Schübirz's brigade to hold off the French, and this allowed Provera's division to escape.[21]

Aftermath

Losses

French losses at Arcole numbered 3,500 dead and wounded, plus 1,300 captured or missing. The Austrians suffered only 2,200 dead and wounded, but lost 4,000 men and 11 guns captured.[22] On the French side, Robert was killed,[23] while Austrian GM Gerhard Rosselmini died in Vicenza on 19 November.[24] The Austrians managed to move the bulk of their army to safety, but Bonaparte could still count himself successful in that he had forced the Austrians to temporarily abandon their plan of advancing to Mantua.

Apparently JC your theory is dust as despite losing the battle the Austrians took less losses.

[womble]

Wiki

Apparently JC your theory is dust as despite losing the battle the Austrians took less losses.

Not necessarily. You have found a different source which offers a different set of casualty figures... Jason's not attributed his 7000 Austrians/4500 French figures, but I don't doubt that he will. The theory isn't disproven just yet.

[Joachim]

2,200 cas + 4,000 captured + unknown missing is roughly 7,000 Austrians

3,500 cas + 1,300 captured/missing = 4,800 or roughly 4,500 French

That might explain the "different" numbers and would support DT.

IMHO JC lacks the morale component for the Austrians and the "priority target" column for all firers in range.

a) morale component

The average Austrian soldier spends lots of time on the front while the French has only a fraction of the force up front. The rest is reserve, out of shooting range. It does not matter whether the skirmishers actuallly fire - the threat is enough to wear soldiers morale down. After 3 days Austrians who probably spent several tours in the front row are routed by fake bugle calls while being in disorder already. While France routinely sends their rested column troops into the decisive moment of battle.

Soldiers in line formation close to where the column attacks will target the column, not the skirmishers in open order directly ahead of the respective firers. That changes the numbers for the effective target density a bit, but does not change the overall effect. Only a fraction of the line is in range of the column.

[Stalins Organ]

JC's theory is flawed because the Austrians did not quite the field due to casualties - they quit due to their position being turned and not wanting to be trapped.

It is also far from clear that the French fought with clouds of skirmish screens and hte Austrians all in column - the battle for het bridge and the bridgeheads on both sides of hte bank would have had moth sides in close formation - while the initial austrian defenders of the bridge were Croats - irregular light infantry and not well drilled professionals at all (although they may have been veterans)

It is also flawed because of the numbers captured in the total casualties - the relatively large number of Austrian prisoners is, as I'm sure we all know, typical of a defeated force losing men in the final disintigration or pursuit.

He also assumes that the Austrians remained in defensive positions whereas they launched counter attaks - one of which across the bridge was apparently hit on 3 suides, partly by hidden troops.

The Action at the bridge at Arcola was also not the only fighting that occured - Augerau had crossed to the Austrian side on a pontoon bridge and was attacking along the dike, while at Belfiorie Massena had faced Provera's Brigade also in defensive positions.

Lastly the appearance of troops to the rear has always had a particilarly deletorious effect on morale - there are occasions in history where baggage servants have routed armies by appearing on one flank as unexpected reinforcements!

All in all, the French were mostly attacking the Austrians across limited frontages into the face of galling fire....and they mostly lost - hence they had higher actual casualties - there is nothing at all surprising about this and no need to think that being skirmishers or close order had much to do with it.

At this particular battle both of het main bodies would ahve been out of fire most of hte time - I dont' think that matters weither.

AS for targeting skirmishers and columns - in this era skirmishers were sent forward to pepper the lines while columns remained out of range - the columns would advance when they thought the enemy was suitably weakened.

A classic example of this is the French vs Spanish on the Allied left at Albuera - 4 battalions of Spanish in line were peppered by the skirmishers of 2 divisions - those moving aside when the columns got to 50 yards, at which point the whole of each side was engaged in a firefight - perhaps to everyone's surprise the Spanish held and deffeated the assault. Even when attacked in the rear by Polish lancers the Spanish held (although by then they had a 2nd line to fight off the cavalry)

Later in that same battle a British Brigade under Hoghton faced anotehr divisional assault with a musketry duel - in this case the British suffered so many casualties, that the brigade, closing to teh centre, shrank so that it could no longer cover the frontage of the French column! However eth column itself had been massivey damaged, losing perhaps 2000 men from perhaps 8000.

Battle casualties were heavy on both sides - 5500-6000 for each from 35000 Anglo-allies and 24,000 French - although the French had suffered 2/3rds of their regimental officers as casualties in that and perhaps understated their real numbers. But neither side was broken.

[dieseltaylor]

The Austrians had 24000 men at Arcola. Over 3 days of fighting they inflicted 4500 casualties on the French. The French had about 17000 men - 15000 on the first day rising to 20000 on the last. They inflicted 7000 causalties on the Austrians - nearly a third of the Austrian force. In general Napoleonic era armies that lost a third of their men on the field came apart.

Why did 24000 Austrians fighting for 3 days from superior positions only hit 4500 French?

Why did 17000 French fighting for 3 days from inferior positions hits 7000 Austrians?

It wasn't generalship. It wasn't clever maneuver. It wasn't morale. The French didn't have more guns or use combined arms more effectively. If the armies had been equal in all respects, the Austrians deserved to win the battle of Arcola.

There was no shortage of time to cycle men through the front in good order.

There was no shortage of time to fire off every round either side possessed.

Anything retained was retained by policy, to save something for closer shooting to protect formations.

An individual Frenchman had about 2 chances in 5 of hitting a single Austrian opposite, using practically the entire contents of his ammo pouch.

An individual Austrian had only about 1 chance if 5 of doing the same back. Despite the French occasionally pressing to closer range in column formations, failing to take certain bridges and causeways, etc.

The reason for the great discrepancy in average achieved musketry results is simple - the Austrians fought almost exclusively in shoulder to shoulder line formations. The French were occasionally in dangerous brushes in such formations, but the bulk of the men over the bulk of the time, that were actually within musket-shot of the Austrians, were in open order.

I think JC must have taken his figures from David Chandler's The Campaigns of Napoleon where the summary at the back - of the battles - gives those figures 4/7000 as casualties.

The Greeenhill Napoleonic Wars Data Book gives the breakdown thus:

Austrians losses - killed 600, wounded 1600, captured 4000. Force 18500 men

French losses - 1200 killed, 2300 wounded. Force 20000

So the Austrians lost less men from a smaller force. However being a predominantly defensive battle with the Austrians in good positions that would not be unexpected - however it does not demonstrate what JC wants it to.

On more general note:In Hughes's Firepower notes that a battalion of 500 men with 22inch spacing [150 yards frontage] could fire between 1000-1500 bullets per minute; in effect, six to ten shots per yard.

Incidentally the misfire rate was roughly 15% and could be as high as 25% in light rain so when someone takes shots fired to kills one ought to ask if this has been abstracted. Hughes calculates that at Talavera the hit rate was 3% or 4% depending on whose account you take for whether 20 [30000shots] or 30 volleys were fired in a half hour session that accounted for 1250 French casualties.

Another point is that the Anglo-Portugese divisions would put out many more skirmishers than the French divisions - up to 25% of the division. With the use of the Baker rifle the British could reliably hit a man sized target at 200yards whereas musket armed infantry would be incredibly lucky to do so. As the French never took to rifles the 20-30000 Baker rifles produced made it a little bit of an unequal contest between skirmishers.

Wikipedia

The accuracy of the rifle in capable hands is most famously demonstrated by the action of Rifleman Thomas Plunkett (or Plunket) of the 1st Battalion, 95th Rifles, who shot French General Colbert at an unknown but long range (as much as 800 yards according to some sources) during the retreat to La Coruña during the Peninsular War. He then shot one of the General's aides, suggesting that the success of the first shot was not due to luck.

Houghton - This quote is from Wikipedia and sets the scene:

Following this hiatus the second phase of the battle began—if anything even more bloodily than the first.[72] The French only deployed a skirmish line against Abercrombie's brigade, so the weight of the renewed assault fell on Hoghton. Despite being joined by the sole survivors of Colborne's brigade (the 31st Foot), just 1,900 men stood in line to face the advancing corps.[74] Hoghton's three battalions (the 29th Regiment of Foot, 1/48th Regiment of Foot and 1/57th Regiment of Foot) suffered huge casualties, with 56 officers and 971 men killed or wounded from their complement of 95 officers and 1,556 men.[76]

Ordinarily in a duel between British line and French column, the greater volume of fire laid down by the line (where every single weapon could be brought to bear on the front and flanks of the narrower column) could be expected to be the decisive factor. In this case however, the French were well supported by artillery. More than compensating for the firepower disadvantage of his infantry formation, Girard brought guns up to just 275 metres (300 yd) from Hoghton's line—close enough to enfilade it with a crossfire of grape and canister.[77] Early in this engagement Colonel William Inglis of the 57th Foot was wounded by grapeshot from the French artillery. He refused to be carried to the rear and lay with the Colours; throughout the battle his voice could be heard calmly repeating "Die hard 57th, die hard!"[78] In following his exhortations, the 57th earned their nickname: the "Die-Hards".[75]

Under this combined arms assault Hoghton's brigade was decimated. The Brigadier himself was killed, and as casualties rose its shrinking line could no longer cover the frontage of the attacking column. However, the French were in no condition to press home their numerical advantage; British volley fire had taken its toll and Girard lost 2,000 men [out of 8000] during the confrontation.[79] He had tried to form his unwieldy corps-sized column into line to bring his full firepower to bear and overwhelm Hoghton's brigade, but his deploying companies were constantly driven back into the column by the intense British musketry.[80]

Bloody stuff indeed. And it seems line won out over a column formation supported by guns.

[undead reindeer cavalry]

If I line up 10 t-34c's and 10 Panzer IVH's at under 1000 meters in open terrain they pretty much obliterate each other in two minutes. After the first minute less than half the vehicles are still operational. That sound about right?

it sounds right. it's not that unusual to read about events where a company of panzers or a regiment of tanks goes up in flames in just two minutes. usually followed by a testimony on the lines of "suddenly there was an explosion and when i looked up i saw that the entire turret had disappeared! somehow i managed to crawl out of the tank/panzer. i had lost hearing and i looked in disbelief at the world around me. everything was happening as if in slow motion or in a dream. the field was full of burning, smoking and exploding tanks/panzers, the surviving crews trying to find cover amongst the wrecks. i couldn't believe i had survived the exposion, but there was no time to think about it now. somehow i managed to find cover in a small ditch. Ivan/Franz was there as well, with someone i didn't know who was missing half of his body - staring at me smiling with an empty look in his eyes. slowly my brains started to work again and there was nothing to do but cry out of frustration, anger and despair. what unbelievable waste! it was all over before we had even understood what had happened."

[Stalins Organ]

Stalin's Organist - those accounts are all pretty lopsided and misleading.

The Brit commentators essentially never understand the French military system they are describing, and are frequently just plain bragging (in highly selective ways), not analysing tactics.

The main point your comment ignores was half the subject of my previous post on the subject - the general uselessness of just trying to maximize the number of men firing.

<intersting math deleted>

And yet the British accounts, "lopsided and misleading" are what actually happened.

The French did not have several hours to skirmish with the British at Bussaco as they did with some of the Prussians at Jena, for example - the link gives an account of Grawerts Division, which suffered exactly the fate your math predicts.

Why then the difference?

The French, as I said, did not spend a lot of time skirmishing with hte British at Bussaco - they thought they were attacking weak points due to few or no troops being visible, so their columns were effectively surprised/ambushed at short range by massed volleys.

This was a result of British doctrine - specifically the Duke of Wellington's tactics which he was stille developing but which he consciously adopted after Bussaco - of hiding troops behind crests.

the fate of many other armies with good infantry stands in contrast to the Hodge-podge allied army at Waterloo for many reasons - but one of them is undoubtably the DoW's personal penchant for deploying just behind crests to minimise expoure to skirmishers and artillery.

Where he failed to do so - eg Talavera, Albuera - victory was still achieved but at much higher cost.

Other armies never cottoned on to this - the Russians, Prussians & Austrians all adopted columns and clouds of skirmishers on the French model, but never so well, and invariably on the front slopes of terrain in full view of the French, and suffered accordingly.

The British too adopted clouds of skirmishers - as you pointed out a very large proportion of the British army could be in specialised light infantry units - up to 25% including light companies. IIRC there was one battle where the French "broke through" the skirmish lines thinking they were the main line of battle...and yet again were surprised by the formed troops they had not seen behind - alas I do not recall which battle that was - quite late in the war I think.

I'm not sure what you mean about the Brits not understanding the French doctrine - whethe they understood it or not is irrelevant to what they described, which is usually substantially what actually happened.