Various questions from Russian community

[Bolt]

Here's an illiustation of ATGM vs Abrams situation. Pics, test and the whole text are (and were) not mine, but Alek's from cmbb.borda.ru

2 ATGM crews with squad HQ, Regular level (with -1 in Leadership and morale), Regular Abrams

1. Sometimes ATGM launched without being spotted first and second time

2. Sometimes Abrams kills him with return fire with one try, and not misses like it is shown here

[Bolt]

More pictures about other aspects are comming

[Taki]

Bolt - welcome. I agree with all your points. I think a lot of the Syrian capabilities are modelled as worst case, while the US seems to be...optimistic in some cases.

Agree with that. Exept substitute optimistic with way to optimistic

[Secondbrooks]

Bolt: It seems that you ATGM-teams are at "extreme" edge of forest. It's good idea to leave at least one tile of trees between target and shooter, more may cause missile to hit into trees wiping out ATGM-team And brushes, gotta have brushes. Also tree type seems to be those which doesn't offer much visual cover, try other more covering trees (there are two types which has very well-grown branches, they block LOS and reduce ability to spot much more better than rest)

Anyways: Ain't M1A1SA those tanks which got new set of thermal optics and opther opticas imporving it's long distance capabilities? That might explain good spotting results. But from almost 2000 meters, spotting missile's launch should be pretty hard, spotting AT-launcher and it's crew even harder.

[Scipio]

About the artillery delays - I served in a 120mm mortar platoon during my military service. I don't know what equipment the Syrians use, but I assume it wasn't more primitiv as the one we have used, which was not very different from the stuff that was used back in the 1960/70s. With a trained FO we needed maybe 3-4 minutes, and I wouldn't call us better then 'conscript'.

I can't comment about other artillery as the Battallion attached mortars, but I must agree that the delays for the Syrians are MUCH to high here.

[Secondbrooks]

I've read from somewhere (not most reliable source, from 90s so it's out-dated too) that Russia's artillery has to keep tight formations to be able to respond fast due lack of communication systems inside batteries or batalions. If guns are scattered wide then there might be some time consuming UAZ traffic when firing orders are being delivered to guns.

I'd believe that 2008 Syria isn't much better, at least if not counting Republic guards (which gets all the new toys, spoiled brats :mad:). And it would be reasonable to belive that artillery tries to improve it's life span by scattering guns into wider area.

[cmfan]

Okay, not to jump on a bandwagon here, but I would argue we see "best case scenarios" for U.S. troops using a variety of weapons. Take the AT-4 for example. I've trained on it and while it's a fairly simple weapon to use it does require several seconds to arm properly and aim. I've noticed that in-game my grunts almost "John Wayne" it. Perhaps its a shortcut in the animation sequence but I've had regular experience troops knock out APCs with it that are only out of cover for a second. Even if you are walking around with an armed AT-4 (not recommended) it will still take you that long to simply aim it.

Do Syrians of similar experience levels do as well with the RPG-7? I haven't played with them much so I don't know.

[John Kettler]

Secondbrooks,

In watching video footage from the recent Georgian fray, one thing that stood out was that the Georgians were operating their 2S3s well dispersed, while the Russians looked to be barely a vehicle's width apart and side by side. Frankly, I thought I was hallucinating until I got some end on views which confirmed what my eyes showed me but my brain refused to accept!

Regards,

John Kettler

[zmoney]

On the experience level topic, I read a post a while back from BFC that said experience levels dictated whether the unit fired back while taking fire instead of taking cover. So I don’t think it has anything to do with better trained so to speak.

I think the quality of soldier is coded in the game for the respective sides I don’t think you can change that.

The big difference in training is muscle memory. When I was in the military we conducted three to four live fires a year which I believe helped when on deployments when I was fired upon because it didn’t have as big of a shock as it would have if the only time I heard rifle fire was in a controlled environment such as a qualifying range. I’m not sure but I doubt Syrians conduct many live fire exercises.

I have to agree with Dima, I don’t recall my units responding so well to hidden targets. One thing I haven’t seen brought up is the fact that the Syrian and US army’s aren’t even in the same league. There are many factors involved here. Presumably the US side hasn’t got the crap bombed out of them for a week before the battle starts which the Syrians in RL would have to endure. Plus it has been proven twice in the past twenty years or so, Iraq with a similar if not better army has been destroyed with in weeks. Time after time when ever armies in this region equipped with Soviet era equipment fight another Western equipped army head to head they get beaten, and fairly badly beaten.

I read a book about Israeli armor and one of the things described in the book was how they would fire their tanks machine guns at a suspected AT-3 position (which the Egyptians were equipped) in order for it to miss its mark. So I would assume Israeli’s equipped with modified WW2 Sherman tanks in the 60’s-70’s could spot an AT position, then so should modern US tanks. Of course the Israeli’s lost some tanks to the ATGM’s and I lose some CMSF tanks to ATGM’s but I don’t think the ATGM is a supper stealth weapon. I think this is because the back blast involved with ATGM’s is probably pretty substantial.

[Alek]

Very well, road zmoney that you read many books about the Arabian wars. But there can be you will look in the stocks for some data about a small episode. 162 tank division of Israel spent counterattack on the Egyptian armies in 1973 on October, 7-8th. This counterattack has been broken almost completely at the expense of use AT-3 which here is considered the defective weapon. Why you transfer actions of Egyptians on actions of Syrians? You will not transfer action the Romanian in 1942 at Stalingrada on actions of Hungarians in 1945 at defence of Budapest? For example you can compare the general losses in war of 1973 (8 thousand against 78 thousand) and losses particularly on the Syrian front (3200 against approximately 10500). I will not deny a victory of Izralija in the Arabian wars, but Syrians least approach for a role of whipping boys from all Arabs.

[Secondbrooks]

I'd believe Israelis mostly saw missile coming at them, after than all rifle caliber weapons would open fire at suspected enemy locations. And besides AT-3 wasn't most accurate and reliable ones, was it's hitting precent something like 10% in test-fire conditions (no suppression attempts by enemy). So it might seem that fire had effect while missile actually went down on it's own.

Like in Bolt's [EDIT] well infact Alek's, my apologies[/EDIT] example. Syrian launcher would be something like 2.5x2.5 mils big target in 10x optics. If using some very-very rough values. I can't tell how spottable it would be, thermals have their way to make things stand out from background. So maybe it's even an easy target to see for M1A1SA (which probably has much more "zoom" in their optics).

About backblast i'm not sure, it a lot debendant of weather and ground. Dry dust, sand kicked in windless conditions might generate visible cloud (expacely after several shots, but that is more about recoiless rifles), then again it might be possible that not much visible cloud gets generated at all (but is it still spottable?). Smoke from missile and missile in general are another matter too and they reveal direction from where missile came.

So yeah i after about hour of poundering this in my tiny head can agree that M1A1 would have changes to spot and fire back, or might not. Dependant of where optics are focused.

If Syrians would not have livefire exercises before going into war i think then Syrian army messed things up (which i wouldn't doupt to be possible), however i believe that this is showed as a green/conscript status with reservist infantry already. So no hard-coded features (bonuses) for US. It's all about gear and level of experience, leadership, morale and fitness, i would think.

[Alek]

Not necessarily at training carrying out to let out expensive ATGM in thousand and in thousand as the rich countries allow to do it to themselves, such as America.

For AT-14 Kornet there is a set of standart training apparat:

the field training apparat 9P163-1VGM

the class training apparat 9F660-1

according to the directory of indexes ГРАУ of the Joint Staff of the Soviet Army For older ATGM as is available a standard set

for example

9F618 training apparat ATGM 9К11М "MALUTKA" (АT-3)

9F619 fire training apparat ATGM 9K111 "Fagot" / "Faktoria" (АТ-4, АТ-5)

9F640 fire training apparat ATGM 9K115 "Metis" (АТ-7, АТ-13)

9F660-4 a class training apparat of operators ATGM 9K115 "Metis", "Metis M" (АТ-7, АТ-13)

As I know from American FM that the training apparat is and for "Javelin" alwais awiable

which one rocket of Javelin costs as 5 installations of AT-4.

All these training apparatus are delivered together with fighting means ATGM., also there are they cheaply even in comparison with 1-2 rockets from AT-4. It allows to organise training to fighting skills of operators ATGM, without spending millions dollars for thousand rockets. Training of operators can be conducted both on range and in a computer class. For example, in the same way? x as well as any country trains experts SAM (S-300 or Partiot, is unimportant) in fight conducting, using training apparatus and without shooting expensive SA a rocket for hundred thousand and millions dollars of one.

In case of ATGM or SAM, practical shooting by combat missiles only finishes a curriculum and fixes the skills received on training apparat.

[Bigduke6]

Several points.

On the RPG, it sorta depends on how ready to go the gunner is. To make an RPG-7 fire, the round has to be loaded and seated right, the hammer has to be cocked, and the rocket safety has to be off. Also, although this won't keep the rocket from firing, the gunner also has to make sure the rocket fuse cap is off, and the round safety pin out, as otherwise the round won't go off if it hits anything.

Obviously some if not all of this of this can be done well before you actually see the target, but on the other hand if you get told armor may be showing up at some point, you're probably going to leave the fuse cap and safety pin in for a while, as it's not healthy to wait in a hole with a live RPG round. And of course there is the back blast to be looked for.

Also there's sighting time, which can be close to instantaneous if we're talking a guy in a hole and waiting for a tank to stop 80 meters away in his engagement area, and maybe 20 - 30 seconds if he's trying to lob a rocket into a target 250 meters away, and there's wind.

So no matter how you cut it there's some time involved, and definately the skill and combat experience of a troop would have a big influence on how fast he could get his rocket launched. I'd guess a really good gunner with an assistant, who had good nerves and some live fire practice, could fire in about 2 - 3 seconds, i.e. make an aimed snap shot.

A couple of guys handed an RPG and only told how to use it, and in combat for the first time, could take maybe a minute or more to get the rocket fired, and you can bet they're going to screw something up. A common greenie error is forgetting to cock the hammer.

On the Georgia-Russia artillery thing, it is true the Georgians attempted more modern artillery technique including dispersed firing, and shoot-and-scoot. It is also true that the Russians with their relatively concentrated batteries succeeded in supressing and/or destroying most Georgian artillery by about the third day of the war, simple counterbattery stuff.

On the reaction to ATGM, and anti-ATGM tactics, I think we need to be a little careful on drawing conclusions from Yom Kippur '73, although certainly ATGM are not particularly stealthy weapons. The tactics the Israelis came up with - throw as much automatic fire as possible as fast as possible, at anything even seeming like a missile launch, were ultimately more or less successful, but there are several qualifications:

1. Absolutely open desert environment with near ideal visibility, and Egyptian infantry with no more cover than a hole dug in soft, shifting sand.

2. Near absolutely flat environment, meaning the missile threat was two-dimensional, i.e. the tankers needed only to look on one plane for ATGM launches.

3. Poor to non-existant Egyptian combined arms coordination, meaning aside from the Sagger teams the Egyptians weren't trained to shoot at tanks or particularly to drop artillery on them, which as we all know buttons tanks and really undermines tankers' ability to see missile launches.

By this same token, the Egyptians had no counter planned for mechanized infantry which eventually came to support the Israeli tanks, past throwing Saggers at them.

4. Relative willingness of Israelis to accept tank crew casualties as a price for tank crew situation awareness, by having the TC by doctrine with hatch open and looking. Contrast this to US modern tank doctrine which buttons the tank on almost any contact, and depends on electronics to see, rather than the MKI human eyeball. The sensors are very good, but their field of vision is narrow, and for all their ability to see in smoke and low light, modern vision technology is nowhere near the human eye's peripheral vision when it comes to detecting motion or a sudden change in an image - which of course a smoke cloud is.

I think even a lopsided conflict like US vs. Syria it would be at least somewhat harder for the Americans to pick up ATGM launches than it eventually was for the Israelis in the Sinai, if Afghanistan and Iraq are to be used as guides. For starters the Americans have never faced massed ATGM launches, also they fight mostly buttoned-up to avoid personnel casualties, there is much more cover for an ATGM team in most of Syria than there is in the desert next to the Suez canal, and the Syrians unquestionably have a better idea on how to deal with anti-ATGM tactics, than the Egyptians did.

Of course, there are plenty of gee whiz people who will tell you the Americans don't have to worry about ATGM because they will soon have interceptor rockets on their vehicles, but of course there are other gee whiz people who will tell you about the special new ATGM that operate with a velocity/trajector/electronicity/whaterverity so as to make the US counter useless.

I think the US' greatest advantage overwhelmingly is the fact their force is combat-experienced, and that on top of that all mech forces have gone through the NTC and faced OPFOR far more competent than pretty much the entire Syrian army; and that's not even taking into account US ability to lace air and ground ops together, where they're lightyears ahead of a country like Syria.

My point being, the key US advantages are operational, not tactical. If the Syrians really tried, and played their cards right - which probably would not happen - I have no doubt they could bang up an invading Americans in ATGM ambushes.

[rant]

What a shame the quick battle editor makes it almost impossible to play around with something like that, for practical purposes the only wat to get ATGM is by accident, and then only what the engine hands you. Right now the only way to test out what ATGM do to American forces is to build a scenario from scratch, and with missile engagement ranges pushing 4 kilometers that's a ridiculously big map you have draw up, just to play around with detection times, flight times, safe cover distances, etc.

[/rant]

[zmoney]

Alek, my comparison of the AT-3 to an AT-14 was kind of weak I agree. I was merely just using an example of RL tankers being able to see ATGM launched at them from hidden locations.

There are training aides for the US AT-4 as well. It’s a mock of an AT-4 that shoots a 9mm tracer round. There are various other training aides for other weapons. My point mostly dealt with how often the Syrians actually get good training on their weapon systems and how important they think training is. I could be wrong but I don’t see the Syrians being as well training on their equipment as soldiers coming from Eastern European countries.

Bigduke you have a great point about terrain. I believe Lebanon has more similar terrain to Syria than does the Sinai and the Israeli’s had some trouble due to the RPG-29. But part of that was due to poor leadership on the Israeli’s side. From what I read it seemed like the Israeli tanks were sitting ducks. Maybe they underestimated the Hezbollah AT capabilities.

It is true, the US hasn’t faced a competent ATGM front but that is kind of my point. It’s not the Soviet era weapons which make their armies crappy it’s the way they use them. Before the invasion of Iraq we were told about their ATGM’s and how dangerous they could be. Well I never heard of any attacks by them I don’t even know if they had them because if they did I don’t think they used them. So I doubt the Syrians would do any different. Maybe I am under estimating them.

[Taki]

Im really intrested to see how BFC will react to those facts given in this Topic.

[Secondbrooks]

On the Georgia-Russia artillery thing, it is true the Georgians attempted more modern artillery technique including dispersed firing, and shoot-and-scoot. It is also true that the Russians with their relatively concentrated batteries succeeded in supressing and/or destroying most Georgian artillery by about the third day of the war, simple counterbattery stuff.

Yup. Could speculate that because Russian's had their tubes able to respond fast they got success. That is how Russian system seemed worked well at least in Georgia. If they would have been scattered around success might not have been as good as they are not technically up to that task (takes long time to prepare battery to be ready fire and response time might be longer).

But really i know almost zero of this subject.

[Alek]

Why specificity and Israel fired at Sinai when Egyptians could not hide in desert at random in those few places where it was possible to take cover is transferred on battles in cities or bushes in CMSF?

I cannot understand why when wish to explain use - weapon non-use, people here wish to show level of equipment start to recollect or Iraq with which exhausted with blockade of 13 years (1990-2003). Blockade did not allow to organise use and repair of the most difficult means. Iraq could not repair difficult kinds of the tool which itself did not make - planes, rocket, an armour. Iraq could not buy anything abroad.

Syria can buy AT-14, repair and modernise tanks, conduct constant contact in respect of use of the tool and spare parts.

Iraq had blockade and humanitarian accident, had hunger and measure children for hunger. Therefore to it have allowed to sell an oil part in exchange for deliveries the foodstuffs. About what development or use âûñîêîòåõíè÷åñêèõ means and training there could be a speech?

I do not understand, why Iraq result as the standard by level consideration about - the pro-Soviet army.

Why when speak about use of the weapon at Syria, recollect low level of training?

Low level of training is modelled by low level of experience – Conscript, Green. In game Conscript cannot get a rocket on Abrams. When in game there is a level of Reguliar or the Veteran, it seems to me that there is no sense to recollect about low training

level the Veteran means that training at good level.

[dan/california]

The Russians had a LOT more tubes in the Georgia fight. Quantity has a quality all its own. Also the Georgians did not have truly significant air assets. The U.S. wouldn't launch a ground war without near complete air superiority, which means 4 plus guns laid out in a nice tight formation would have limited life expectancy to put it mildly. I will also at least mention guided MLRS hooked up to counter battery radar.

The Russians may have the toys and training to deal with some of these issues. The Syrians, not so much.

And even in Georgia I kept looking at the footage thinking that a single squadron of fighters could end the entire Russian effort with one sortie's worth of SFW cluster bombs the way the Russian convoys were bunching up.

[Alek]

In Georgia all has come to an end for three days.

Georgia had at the order an artillery brigade and battalions from the infantry brigades (1,2,3,4,5).

This is 90 How 122 mm D-30, 13 152 mm How (2A65, 2A 36), more than 50 SPGun 152mm (Dana, 2S3), 6 203 mm SpGun (2S7), 40 MLRS (BM-21 Grad, BM-30 Uragan and Orkan)-about 200 total.

Russian Arty OOB:

292 ArtReg of 19 MRF Div (36-SpGun 2S19 Msta, 12 MLRS Grad)

artDivs of 135,503,693 MRF REGs (about-11-SpGun 2S19 Msta, 24 SpGun 2S3, 15 How D-30, 4 MLRS Uragan)

, 1415 MLRS-Div (4 BM-30 MLRS Smerch, 4 MLRS BM-27 Uragan),

artdiv 205 MRF BDE (12 SPGun 2S3, 12 MLRS BM-21 Grad)

1065Airbone ArtREg (18 120 mm2S9, 12 How 122mm D-30)

Total 180

944 ArtReg of 20 MRF DIV - has come after the termination of 5 days war

Obviously Russia had no any huge advantage on number of tubes

Certainly Russia have SSM Tochka and aircraft (about 3 Summary regiment ,may be 60-70 aircaft vs 14 at Georgia, and Georgian AD systems more powerful either Iraq)

But Georgia had perfect system of dispersal, radio means, pilot-less aircraft devices

Georgian soldiers are good- trained on the American training system, by the way

Besides Georgia has attacked the first and swept advantage of the first days, and Russia approached by turns on one road

But have not helped Georgia any new means

Actually Russia has achieved an impressing victory and a panic at Georgia as Israel won Arabs in 1967.

It seems that the Russian artillery has won the Georgian as because of the Soviet system of centralisation, is better itself has shown in battle about the identical sizes of armies –not have a total lot of tubes

[Taki]

I read the Last Pages and couldnt find an official Word on the given Topic. What will BFC do? Leave it as wrong as it actually is?

[Taki]

*bump* *bump* *bump*

[HetzerII]

Bump....

Keep up bumping until we see some official thoughts on the topic

[Lindan]

Dima, Сделал вас для того чтобы сказать " Glocks" или " Glucks"? Не обращайте внимания я, I' m имея & чтения потехи; играть с Babelfish.

Mein Luftkissenboot ist voller Aale.

[Bigduke6]

Alek is correct, Russia had no major tube advantage. The superiority was in doctrine and quality of troops.

On the northern front, which I know better, the Russians mobilized for practical purposes a motor rifle division plust attachments. Against that, the Georgians had at least theoretically three mixed brigades, also with attachments.

Among the Georgian kit was a pair of NATO-standard howitzer battalions, and Nato-standard MRLS battalions, roughly 70 pieces total, made in the Czech republic and by the advertising far superior technically than whatever artillery the Russians brought to the fight.

These weapons were the main cause of Russian casualties; they were the ones bombarding Tskhinvali and the Russian "peacekeeper" infantry in the town. Russian counterbattery supressed those systems by about the third day of the war, and by the fourth day of the war something like eight of those howitzers were abandoned on the Tbilisi-Gori road; and by abandoned I mean hatches open, crew gone, crew-served weapons still attached, and shells ready to use still in the SP howitzer ammo bay. In other words, Russia managed to disable these weapons by destroying the morale of the Georgian crews. (At least some of whom who had, supposedly, received training from US green berets.)

The Georgian air force was a joke, for practical purposes about 5 x Su-25, two of which Saakashvili pissed away at the beginning of the war in an attempt to bomb the Roki tunnel. But as a matter of fact Georgia had an SAM missile system called "Buk", which is basically a SAM-6 updated to roughly modern standard by the Ukrainian arms industry. The Russians either had not idea the Georgians had these missiles, or they thought the Georgians couldn't operate them. As a result Russia lost between 6 and 12 aircraft by most accounts, the exact number depending on whom you believe. For practical purpses all were Su-25 making pre-planned strikes in the Georgian rear. There was also one Backfire bomber lost when the Russian general staff decided they needed aerial recon.

The US with its practice and skill would have supressed the Georgian air defence network very quickly. However, had the defenders been some one else than the Georgians, it is far from a foregone conclusion US forces could have waltzed into Georgia. The Georgians had updated T-72, a goodly number of ATGM, and the standard mix of Soviet hand-held antiaircraft missiles and autocannon. If the operators are competent, Russo-Soviet kit can be effective.

Making judgements on how US forces would perform against Russian forces is a bit dangerous if one uses the Ossetia war as a baseline; the Russians knew from the get-go the Georgians were not particularly competent and they exploited that. Among other things the Russians made a conscious decision to intervene with troops based in Chechnya, i.e., soldiers who had already fought against a much tougher foe than the Georgians, and who had all the experience in the world moving cross country, exploiting terrain, and living in the field, and insurgents are a constant threat. The Russians didn't need their best tanks, or latest electronics, or zippiest airplanes. They needed to intervene quickly, break the Georgians' will to fight, and field armored spearheads able to cut Georgia in two in a matter of hours. This, the Russians did.

As to Russian defenses against a theoretical intervention by US air, I am not positive the US would have had a cakewalk. The Russians brought Su-30 or Su-33 squadrons, reports vary, to station on the north side of the Caucasus, and the entire region is integrated into Russia's national air defence network. The Caucasus has always been a priority area for Russian air defence, and for the Georgia war all they had to do was bump the number of aircraft on the Caucasus front; the electronic side already is set and if I know the Russians pretty much all in hardened shelters. There is no question the US if it had wanted to very badly could have broken into that network from time to time, but I am not sure the US could ever supress it; that's a huge amount of space jammed with a massive amount of missiles, and tomorrow the Russians could bring in more.

So if it looked like the Russians weren't worried about enemy air, I think the reason is that they weren't.

Heck, if you look at the way US forces park their vehicles in huge CF in Iraq and Afghanistan, you would think the Americans had no earthly idea they are creating big fat targets for artillery or air strikes. But obviously they do, it's just that the opposition there has no capacity to strike a big fat CF of military equipment - precisely the same situation as the Russians were in in Georgia.

The Russians had a LOT more tubes in the Georgia fight. Quantity has a quality all its own. Also the Georgians did not have truly significant air assets. The U.S. wouldn't launch a ground war without near complete air superiority, which means 4 plus guns laid out in a nice tight formation would have limited life expectancy to put it mildly. I will also at least mention guided MLRS hooked up to counter battery radar.

The Russians may have the toys and training to deal with some of these issues. The Syrians, not so much.

And even in Georgia I kept looking at the footage thinking that a single squadron of fighters could end the entire Russian effort with one sortie's worth of SFW cluster bombs the way the Russian convoys were bunching up.

[Alek]

Thanks for support were not valid the superiority of pipes at Russian artillery T

here was anti battery struggle, it was heavy to conduct Russian.

Russia has no pilotless planes, was not LOT of number tubes to knock down as Germans in 1944-45

Interesting fact advertising of the American training for the Georgian, bad training for Russian soldiers (and Syria too ))))))

Also Georgians had very good radio-electronic systems which to them were put by Americans

Russia had such systems only of the Soviet sample

Georgian have modern M-4 rifle, Negev machineguns, Russian –only 30-s years ago - AK-74 rifle, PKM machineguns

And the result became opposite,

Very well that SMSF was not about Georgia – urgently it should to do a patch )))))))

I know that armies of Russia in South Ossetia – may be the best that is in Russia, they much trained also some were at war in the Chechen Republic (71 MRF for example)

Result of 5 days of war was unexpected even for us )))))

About AD-systems I will tell following

Position 08.08.08 was very difficult – Georgia has attacked and had the initiative of approach and the superiority in a scope

Anything could be directed to Georgia- only planes, and were directed quickly

was not experience to organize SEAD actions,

There was no time to specify conditions

Therefore the big losses of planes

At Us speak about 6 planes (4 SU-25, 1 SU-24, 1TU22m3), 1 of which is destroyed in air the nose could to land, officially-4 is

Not enough preparation of pilots in comparison with USAF, it is not enough planes.

At Iraq have directed 1000 or more planes, 1500 helicopters, 1000 cruise missiles

To Georgia could be directed 60-70 planes, 50-70 helicopters

AD of Georgia are stronger than at Iraq (on territory which should be protected and to quantity of installations on territory kilometer)

Gerorgian have:

SA-11Gadfly (BukM1–SA-11c, Ganges) average radius-4 batteries-8 Launch System, standard tactical unit – a battalion (3 batteries) – Iraq and Serbia at all had no such http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SA-11#9K37M1_Buk-M1_. 28Ganges.29

SA-8d, SA-8b Gecko. (The OSA-AKM, the OSA-AK), small radius, – approximately 15 Launch System (it is an antiaircraft regiment for MRD) – Iraq had a little similar, Serbia had no such

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SA-8

There were 2 batteries SA-3 (С-125) – average radius, 7 stationary Launch System – Serbia and Iraq had ONLY such systems

As were much small one-men AD rocket systems, Shilka, an antiaircraft artillery etc

Russia has gone to the aid of the ‘keepers of the world’

Iinstead of NATO attacked the first as to Iraq or Serbia under the ready plan

08.08.08 – time some pilots and planes has come to offer rescue hundreds infantrymen in Tskhinvali

It can be condemned in the USA- cant to be condemned here – death of 5 officers in air has saved a life of hundred and hundred soldiers on the earth

In the same way in 1941-45 in the Great Patriotic War daily death of thousand and thousand our soldiers have rescued hundred millions lives of Soviet Union

the Georgian system AD was not broken also planes were lost

But all planes were brought down in first 1-2 days

Then have begun blows by a radar, On positions AD, applied OTR-21 Tochka (4 Launch System) and SS-26 (2-4 Launch System) across Georgia then planes began to fly better and more freely