Comparing echelons in the Red army

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[John Kettler]

Adam,

During the Cold War (hot when the shooting's going on, and there was!) forward detachments were of concern to me professionally in the meeting engagement and prepared offensive cases. I never saw mention of one in the defense. Ever.

Basically, what you had was an ever ascending set of combat groups, starting with, say, a pair of motorcycles and a BRDM-2 for heavier problems, albeit not much, on up through a Tank Battalion (-), a Motor Rifle Company (-), a ZSU-23/4 and SA-9/SA-13 platoon, and a 2S1 122mm SP Battery (-). The idea was to gather intel, brush aside light resistance, and fix heavier opposition in place until big brother just up the road could arrive for definitive smiting. Naturally, this same fixing can permit small forces to pin the enemy down while the larger force bypasses and continues to drive deep into the enemy rear areas.

Every unit down to company level has its own recon screen out ahead of its main body, in a ceaseless quest for information to feed the ever hungry situation map, the commander and his staff.

Forces aren't packed into a river obstacle for the joy of it. Rather, they accumulate there because the river arrests movement all by itself, let alone when strongly defended. Am sure you've been in enough traffic jams to know what happens when something goes wrong at the front of the column. These columns, though, are vastly longer and largely roadbound, for the simple reason that moving large formations cross country is enormously expensive in fuel, wear and tear on vehicles and men. Further, getting across it, assuming the bridges have been blown, requires a massive commitment of resources: water crossing means, bridging materiel and equipment, fire support, air support, massive air defenses, combat engineers, initial bridgehead seizure forces, etc., not to mention all the associated logistics (fuel, ammo, food, medical and so on).

If you posit either a nuclear scared posture or operating in the presence of what the Russians were calling Reconnaissance Strike Complexes (integrated means for locating, identifying, targeting and destroying specific target groups, notably C3I, tanks, artillery, APCs/IFVs, the comment about shifting to a primarily forward detachment type scheme makes sense. From a nuclear targeting standpoint, anything bigger than a battalion was considered a worthwhile tacnuke target, and the Russians were well aware of the kind of devastating blows modern conventional weaponry could deliver.

IOW, a massed target, unless it could destroy its target before being itself clobbered, was likely a dead one. Indeed, tactical nuclear warfare envisioned widely dispersed small groups which would rapidly assemble to deliver a blow, hit, then disperse again.

In the face of such weaponry, a Kursk style defense would be destroyed in minutes at whatever point of breakthrough was desired. The Germans knew where the main defensive lines were, watched many of the positions being built, camouflaged and occupied. What they lacked were weapons powerful enough to overcome them and their enormous quantities of highly motivated, well-protected defenders. With today's reconnaissance means, we'd probably have an eight digit grid on everything worth hitting, making camouflage, concealment and deception/maskirovka vital. OTOH, things like MOAB and its even bigger Russian cousin don't have to be deadly accurate, merely close enough so that the target is in the detonation footprint. FAE's especially effective against entrenchments. The TOS-1 Buratino, for example, could ruin the foe's entire day and do it whether planes were available or not.

The first echelon is the break-in force. It is fully expected to be chewed up in paving the way for the exploitation forces. In a Motor Rifle Division, this entry penalty would've been paid by the BTR equipped regiments, with the expected to be fatal "in the liver" stroke delivered by the BMP regiment, smack into the greatest weakness found. In turn, the Combined Arms Army commander was watching to see where the breakthrough occurred, so he could ram not just his Tank division through the breach, but support that push by ruthlessly stripping less successful units of virtually everything; behind him the Front commander was ready to ram his force through and so on. Liddell Hart's "expanding torrent" indeed!

In the Fulda Gap scenario, the Russian first echelon forces consisted of those formations which would make initial contact with NATO, thus GSFG, East Germans, Czechs, Poles, Hungarians and Romanians. The second echelon we worried about consisted of forces inside Russian territory when the balloon went up. These were the forces we sought to interdict at the Russian border (where the rail gauges switched), at the Vistula, and all the way forward thereafter at every hittable chokepoint. Attrition was a bonus, but what we were really after was imposing delay and taking the strategic steam out of the offensive. Later, we worried about very large forward detachments called OMGs (Operational Maneuver Groups), and the Russians in turn fretted over our ability to stop them dead with any number of minelaying means. An immobilized OMG unhinged no defenses and was a superb high value target.

Regards,

John Kettler

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[Bigduke6]

When thinking of the Soviet word "echelon" the thing to remember is it has two basic meanings, linked but nevertheless different.

The more general meaning is: "One layer of a multiple-layer combat element, usually in the attack and usually in two layers, but sometimes also with a reserve." Since this is an operational term the size of unit it could apply to, theoretically, is theoretically reinforced battalion through Army, although more commonly it encompassed regiments, brigages, and divisions. The reason "echelon" very often seems to work out as "waves of force" is, the Soviet high-paced attack by doctrine was if you will a long line of formations in depth and deploying and striking the enemy successively.

This leads us to the second general meaning of echelon, which simply is "train" or "trainload", meaning of a combat unit, and rougly 40 - 50 cars. Unsurprisingly this is also the carrying capacity needed to haul a battalion or if you pushed it a regiment including people and equipment. So how many echelons (operational blows) a Front commander was able to plan to throw at his bit of NATO, depended on how many echelons (trains) Moscow was sending him of force to replace the force NATO would chew up.

The difference between echelons and the advanced guard is the difference between reconnaissance and attack (and even defense as well, but Soviet doctrine was as we know very agressive.) The advanced guards find the enemy, the following echelons hammer it. In cases where there were three armor/mechanized echelons, the textbook usage would be the first echelon strikes and develops weakness, the second echelon strikes and breaks through the developed weakness, and the third/reserve echelon exploits through the breakthrough.

The thing driving this usage and operational technique is, of course, higher command's assignment of an operational goal. For instance, the three-layer example above would be the standard solution for a regimental or division commander's receiving the basic order "break through there." The breakthrough is the objective, the echelon technique is the basic tool by which the commander aims at that objective.

Therefore, a Motor Rifle Regiment is in the general scheme of things somewhat on the low end of formations expected to use echelon technique. Rather, a motor rifle regiment is the generic echelon element, the Soviets considered it the smallest formation capable of full combined arms operations, and at the same time the largest formation for which battlefield tactics - as opposed to operational priorities - would dictate the commander's actions.

None of this was considered rock solid hard and fast, it was understood that at times for instance battalions and in rare cases companies would operate as combined arms formations, and that at other times tactical necessity would dictate the commitment of an entire division for a simple tactical task. It did not help that their own writing was at times sloppy, and it is possible to find Soviet writers using the terms "echelon" and "reserve" almost interchangably, although by doctrine they were in fact two very different things.

But as general thing, the regiment was the simplest and smallest echelon. What the regiment and elements below it did, that was where tactics started.

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[Bigduke6]

Depends. If the regiment is conducting a road march or operational sweep or otherwise not going straight into an attack, then the answer is yes. The regiment commander would typically divide his formation into an advance guard, main body, and tail element, and based on circumstances beef up the advanced guard as necessary. The advanced guard commander would similarly break his force into bits, so the net effect is the whole regiment strung out along one or more roads, but pretty much cued and ready to pile on or maneuver as necessary once contact is made. So not so much echelons as a regiment in motion in a general direction.

If it's a deliberate attack, then the location and disposition of the enemy is known, then on the regiment level you could have something similar to echelons, for example, two battalions up and one back, and the back gets thrown where the success is found. But since the regiment really is a bit small to divide into echelons according to the standard doctrine, on the ground it might well work out to batches of men and vehicles using ground and tactics to get whatever the regimental commander wants, without real regard to who needs to stay in which "echelon".

[JasonC]

I am going to address the fundamental formation aspects of the question and ignore the cold war context, because half to the nuclear coping aspects of that era's doctrine was frankly fantasy from start to finish. There are the basic tactics the Russians actually used successfully in WW II, and their conventional update to cold war conventional thinking, which isn't too far from that practice. And then there is the pipe dream of dodging thousands of tac nukes by being dispersed or "pentatonic" (the US version of the idiocy). The latter basically isn't worth comment, it is approximately as intelligent as "duck and cover" drills. So I will stick with the WW II version and its general, not specifically Russian let alone post-war, principles.

First to clear up the loose usage of "echelon". It is being used to mean three

or four things, none of which are its original or proper meaning (which certainly

isn't "trainload", by the way). Echelon in a formation. It means subelements

are staggered off to one flank with each trailing and to the same flank of the

one ahead of it. Echelon right means the farther right you go, the farther back

that subelement is, and echelon left means the other way. This is the basic or

underlying meaning from which all the others are loosely derived.

Many of the tactics being describe here are instead *column* tactics, and refer to a different formation in which the subelements are directly behind one another. The term column is sometimes avoided in that sense because it can be confused with still being in *road column*, which simply means a column with a frontage of one vehicle, whereas a column formation means a frontage of one subelement, with the formation within that subelement left unspecified, but potentially as broad as a 1 rank line.

An attack in which the first element hits and fixes the enemy, and the second

hits again in the same spot as a second wave, and a third exploits a breech

expected to result from the first trading off the enemy and the second taking

his positions, is not an echelon attack properly speaking. It is a column

attack.

An echelon attack properly speaking is meant to defeat an enemy by turning

one of his flanks - exactly one. And to do so not by wide maneuever but

as a progressively escalation of and widening of a frontal attack. The

first subelement is oriented directly on the enemy and matches his width.

It attacks and fixes the enemy; the attack is typically not pressed home

fully but it is not a mere screening action, but an actual attack. This

can be unpleasant for this component of the attacking force, but it draws

the fire and attention of the defenders, and this is what is meant by

"fixing" them. Not restricting their maneuver, incidentally.

The whole attacking formation is expected to outnumber the defenders by

a step size amount or roughly 3 to 1, and the the fixing element is therefore

the same size as the defenders' entire force. The whole attacking formation

begins in true echelon formation, echeloned to the right or the left. The

frontal attack occurs *first*. The second subelement is, by the definition

of echelon formation, off to one flank of the fixing attack. It may be a

staggered echelon with some overlap with the initial force (half or a third

of its frontage are common amounts of overlap), or it may be completely

clear of the fixing force in the lateral direction. The third is similarly

displaced with respect to the second, and trailing by an equal interval,

as well.

So what happens next in a true echelon attack? The second echelon does *not*

hit the same frontage as the fixing attack, because the attacking formation

is not column, but echeloned right or left. The whole attacking formation

remains in motion, and therefore some time after the fixing attack has begun,

the second echelon reaches the active battle front, off on one flank of the

existing battle. Perhaps overlaping, perhaps not. It continues straight on,

and therefore it either collides with some supporting defensive unit off

on that flank, or if there isn't one, a portion or all of the second

echelon will "hit air" to one side of the defenders or the other.

Assuming no immediately contiguous defenders of equal power (since that

would imply equal overall odds, not the superiority expected), the second

echelon will strike only part of the defense, as a second wave, and will

extend beyond its flank. Its mission is then to turn into the defense,

not to get clear of it. It is the levering portion of an overall,

sequentially delivered turning movement. The part past the defender's

flank continues a modest distance and reorients defender-ward aka

inward, and presses home on that defender's flank.

The third echelon is, by the definition of echelon formation, still further

to the same flank and still further trailing. By the time it reaches

the initial battleline, the fight of the other two elements should be

well developed. Moreover, the degree of overlap of the staggered

formations is always half or less, and therefore the third echelon is

always completely clear of the frontage the first echelon hit directly.

Since the battle is continuing to develop and the second echelon is

working to roll up the defender's flank on the same side, the active,

live portion of the defense is expected to extend less than its full

initial width in that flank's direction, by the time the third

echelon reaches the original battleline.

The *entire* third echelon should therefore hit air, if all has worked

as intended. Moreover, the flank of the defense that it is passing

around, is being actively attacked by the second echelon, as the moment

the third reaches that point. The defense is expected to be engaged

in two directions, by superior forces, for an extended period of time,

by the time this stage is reached. All of the above is expected to mean

the opposition the third echelon directly encounters will be *minimal*.

The role of the third echelon is emphatically not to act as a reserve,

or to support either of the other two attacks, or to pick some weak

spot and add its weight to the attack there. While the second echelon

deliberately turned toward the defense, seeking battle, the role of the

third is to *avoid* the remaining defense, and to exploit the gap

expected to have opened on the flank of the defense hit by the previous

echelon. The third echelon is to "haul ass and bypass", heading straight

for the rear beyond the defenders as fast as possible, ignoring its

own flanks.

This is meant to put a force as large as the original strength of the

entire defense, alive, untouched, in their rear, having passed "close

aboard" one of their flanks, as that flank was actively pushed away from

the point of passage (to avoid hitting further supporting defenders too

far from the originally hit enemy unit). The third echelon is to drive

well behind the whole defense and then to establish blocking positions

behind them, in a tactically defensive posture to prevent their escape.

At this point the defense should be surrounded on three sides, and the

attacker has a intact route into the interior of the defender's zone

for following units. The defenders are expected to be reduced by the

attacks so far, and to be doomed by the force behind them far too strong

from them to attack through on their own, under pressure.

That is the principle of an *echelon* attack. In shorthand, the first

echelon fixes, the second turns the defense, and the third exploits.

But not from column, nor by hitting the same point in three waves, but

precisely by extending the battle repeatedly in the same flanking

direction at separated time intervals. One may also regard this formula

as a kind of "total dose" that is unwilling to pick between a frontal

assault, a turning movement, and an outright bypassing attempt, which

tries all three in succession hoping one will work, or that the synergy

from trying each of the previous will make the next easier. (lol)

It is also meant to be so simple, so hardwired into the original

formation of the attacking unit, that the subcommanders can't screw it

up, and no real decision making or virtuousity is needed by any of them.

The second echelon doesn't need to do something different depending on

what happened with the first, or base on what scouts say about where the

enemy's flank actually is, or where he is strong or weak. If the enemy's

position is too strong and too extended, the second echelon winds up

delivering another frontal attack - and the whole attempt has to bump up

a step size in scale. That's about all the "online learning" needed to

adapt the attack. It can therefore be delivered rapidly from the march.

From their roles in an echelon formation or attack, the sub-elements

themselves come to be designated as echelons. Thus the loosely usage to

mean just the first, second and third "thirds" of the overall force to

reach and engage the enemy. Which is then transfered to descriptions

of *column* tactics, in which all of the subelements follow *directly*

in each other's footsteps. But strictly speaking, column tactics are

column tactics and echelon tactics are echelon tactics, and they are

not the same.

A third form of loose usage speaks of 2 up, 1 back formations, which are

strictly inverted wedge formations, or the reverse, the true wedge

formation, as being "in echelon". Because the same principle of a

staggered supporting unit occurs with those formations, as with the first

and second elements of a true echelon formation. If a portion of a wedge

or inverted wedge is unengaged by the enemy, it can "act" as the third

echelon. The third echelon gets conflated with any reserve. But these

are loose adaptations that arise from some of the same principles of

echelon tactics, applying to those other common formations.

Defensively, an echelon formation is used to meet a threat to one of the

flanks of the unit, as a kind of refused flank, with elements of reserve

flexibility. Compared to a true refused flank, which might put 2/3rds

of the formation in line across the main expected axis of enemy advance, with

1/3rd angled back to defend a threatened flank, the echelon formation in

defense in less linear and puts less of its force right along the expected

front line. But it is reasonably close to putting 2/3rds in that formation

with a remaining third held farther back in reserve - the reserve is just

prepositioned opposite an expected threatened flank instead of in the

interior or rear of the formation.

I go through all of this at such length because I find the looser usages

maddening in the confusion they can cause, compared to the crystaline

geometric clarity of the original and underlying meaning. Which is brutely

simple. Nearly all the real effectiveness of the idea comes from the

brutally simple original version and not from the complications and

qualifications and adaptations of the looser meanings of the term.

Compared to first accurately knowing the enemy's flank and enveloping

it by maneuver alone in silence and with surprise, echelon attack is

potentially much more expensive, less artful, less clever, attritionist,

all the usual hate-words of the perfectionist maneuverist. But it is

incredibly robust to battlefield friction and confusion, while perfectionist

ideals cannot be expected to survive contact with a trap-laying enemy.

Especially in the hands of a perfectly average, merely professional commander.

The required roles can be reduced to a clear duty based on position in the

formation.

"I am in first echelon, therefore as soon as I find the enemy I must put my

forces on-line and attack him vigorously".

"I am in second echelon, therefore I must march to the sound of the guns,

extend existing friendly forces and envelope the enemy, attacking from the

moment of contact".

"I am in third echelon, therefore I must heed all reports of the preceeding

waves, avoid enemy strength, and drive hell for leather into his rear. Only

once across his main routes of withdrawal should I deploy, to block his

withdrawal."

These are maneuevers that can be accomplished knowing where friendly forces

are and how they are doing, almost exclusively. Perfectly accurate and

timely information about the dispositions of the *enemy*, are not strictly

required, though they can of course make each force's job easier.

No one trying to make Russian doctrine into a perfectionist formula to

meet each contingency with the perfect counter, understands that doctine.

Its guiding star is, instead, simplicity, clarity, and robustness to friction.

Echelon tactics now being understood, it is trivial to answer Adam's actual

question. Forward detachments do not use echelon tactics. They screen.

In some circumstances they might act as a first echelon or transition to that

role, by delivering a fixing attack as their supporting main formations

maneuver against an open enemy flank or deploy into a standard echelon attack.

But normally a forward detachment only seeks to fight enemies so small it

completely outmatches them, and even then only does so to gain information -

that is, to prevent an enemy screen from denying the forward detachment

the ability to see the bulk of the enemy force.

A forward detachment normally just wants to establish visually and by experience

of taking enemy fire, where the enemy positions are - and to deny to the enemy

any information about where its own covered main elements are. Its normal

tactical posture is defensive - or in CM terms "move to contact". Once in

contact it may snipe, it might look for an open flank to see more or lever

a small enemy force out of position, or it might try to bowl over a small

roadblock if the commander thinks it a bluff rather than a real position.

All recon tactics, flexible and up to the detachment CO.

A first echelon of a main formation, on the other hand, considers its tactical

stance not its own autonomous affair, but an integral part of a scheme

of maneuver of its larger parent. If it finds the enemy it is to attack

him outright, regardless of the chances of winning, simply to develop the

battle from the decisive remaining echelons. Not merely screen, and not

based on the COs assessment, nor based on his real time intel picture. He

is first echelon, so he attacks, because that is what his role is, that is

what will allow the remainder of the formation to do its own jobs, etc.

Maneuverists in the west fixate on forward detachment roles in Russian

doctrine as closer to their own flexible mindset with its recon pull and

close intel adaptation. The Russians only employ that for gathering info,

and do not rely on it for actual battle. Compared to western thinking, their

tactics are formulaic, brutal, direct, and apparently unadaptive. That they

are also reliable and highly dangerous to the enemy is occasionally admitted,

but usually this is put down to their alleged similarity to pet fetishes of

western thinking (breakthrough, flanking to avoid strength, flexibility and

recon pull, etc). This is projection, and not the internal logic of the system

itself, which is scarcely even noticed.

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[JasonC]

That conventional maneuver elements can expect to survive and remain effective in a general nuclear war with hundreds of tac nukes going off, at a minimum, up to a full strategic exchange as a maximum. This was always highly dubious at best, a bit like continued faith in the power of the bayonet against machineguns and steel breechloading artillery in WW I. Men trying to address that problem by just putting a quarter as much in each tactical basket were grasping at straws. Men designing nuclear bazooka rounds in an attempt to keep infantry relevant in such a hypothetical war, were certifiable.

[JasonC]

For those with no idea what I am talking about, see e.g. -

http://www.guntruck.com/DavyCrockett.html

[JasonC]

Incidentally, I notice that the least interesting aspect of the question is the first laid hold of. Is anyone actually interested in concrete and real tactical systems and how they work, or does everyone just want to launch off into fantasy nuclear wastelands roamed by decimated "companies" of survivors pretending anything they do would matter to anyone?

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[John Kettler]

JasonC,

Nice exegesis!

I know exactly what a Davy Crockett is, having both read about it in open source and classified docs and seen one in the Infantry Museum at Ft. Benning. ISTR, the thing's days grew short what it was realized how dire the consequences of a short round, fired at the behest of that extraordinarily dangerous creature (second lieutenant with a map) might be! BTW, "pentatonic" is a musical scale; the word you're looking for is "Pentomic," as described here in the Wiki.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pentomic

Regards,

John Kettler

[costard]

Incidentally, I notice that the least interesting aspect of the question is the first laid hold of. Is anyone actually interested in concrete and real tactical systems and how they work, or does everyone just want to launch off into fantasy nuclear wastelands roamed by decimated "companies" of survivors pretending anything they do would matter to anyone?

fer sure. you rock.

Actually, this thread has a goodly number of "views", even accounting for those that posted returning and being disappointed with the lack of replies.

I am acutely aware of my limitations discussing this level of tactics and so can only contribute irrelevancies, but I do enjoy the learning aspect - this place has a good set of teachers/writers.

Nukes is not worth discussing, IMO. History please, not fantasy.

[JasonC]

I'll try to illustrate the various distinct systems and specific modes

of attack they typically make use of, with some concrete examples.

The basic idea is that the attacker always has a battalion sized force -

though if armor heavy, that may be mixed between armor and infantry

companies etc - attacking a defense of a reinforced company in position,

in an "up" defense (meaning, not reverse slope), with somewhat favorable

but not impregnable terrain. For each example I'll give the attacker

plan and dispositions, and characterize the expected flow of the combat,

and the approach's specific ideas, rationale, strengths and weaknesses.

To be concrete about it, the defense is assumed to have one company

of regular quality infantry, with 2 small heavy weapons sections, each

with HQ, MMGs, and a mortar (or pair of light ones). The defense also

gets a couple of light guns on the map, and a light FO (e.g. 81mm).

AT is limited, maybe one heavy PAK and a few infantry AT teams. The

defense may have no reserves or reinforcements expected, or may as

a curve ball occasionally get one extra platoon or a couple of AFVs

halfway through the fight, or both. Another curve ball would be an

upgrade of the FO to medium caliber (e.g. 105mm or 120mm mortar).

The attacker has either an infantry battalion with a single AFV

platoon in support, weapons teams to match and a few FOs --- or has

a mechanized force with a reinforced infantry company and more like

a company of armor (which could be mixed "vehicle" screen stuff or

mostly main battle tanks - national methods vary on that score).

Again some nations will have more artillery than others or may use

it differently. But the basic problem is always, attack and destroy

a defending reinforced company with a superior attacking force, the

superiority either coming from raw infantry numbers or from superior

armor along with approximately equal, to slightly superior, infantry.

Mixes and matches are possible, I will not attempt to give all

possible combinations. Instead I will give a characteristic

method of attack for each nation and arm, or occasionally two.

Different nations might also have their own constraints as to

loss tolerance, level of risk that can be run, time available,

typical attack timing and conditions, etc.

Russian rifle forces, low quality infantry battalion, frontal

attack in column formation. This is a characteristic case of

"column tactics". The principle is attrition and victory through

possession of the last intact reserve. Typical support would

be a couple of high caliber but unreactive FOs, low quality

(e.g. 2 122mm gun FOs, conscript), and perhaps one green to regular

reactive medium FO (120mm mortar e.g.). On map support would

be available from a flock of mortars and Maxim MMGs, plus ATRs,

and probably a pair of field guns (76mm usually, occasionally

only 45mm meant to cover any wooden bunkers etc).

A typical time would be dawn in clear skies with decent ground,

dry or in winter, light snow only. This method presumes plenty

of available time for the battle and a high loss tolerance, but

limits risk - both of failure and of any loss of the attackers'

own original positions. The aggression level is moderate to

high, level of micromanagement medium, skill level required of

the commander is low.

The tactical arrangement of the battalion is column of companies,

each company deployed in line of platoons across the field, or

across only half of it sometimes. All companies have the same

assigned frontage, they are arranged in waves behind one another

at intervals of around 200 yards. Each component platoon is

in "blob" formation, aka 2 rank line. Only minimal scouts are

out ahead of the main body, if any are used at all. Heavy

weapons teams are in covered locations at the start line and

arranged in the gaps between the rifle platoons in the forward

two waves.

The plan of attack is straight up the middle, or a wing attack

on one side of the board, but conducted straight ahead. The

entire battalion is oriented on the same axis and stays in that

orientation throughout. A prep fire of the unreactive heavy

artillery is timed to begin in the first five minutes and to

finish by minute 10 at the latest. It is directed at expected

enemy positions with large amounts of cover directly ahead

of the intended attack, and may use "target wide" at spread

aim points to distribute heavy shells over a wide area, while

more closely saturating the chosen aim points.

Characteristic movement orders are advance and human wave.

The distances for each are 50 meters to 200 meters, and this

applies to the leading edge of the battalion. Following

companies are using move and maintaining interval, waiting

for the men in front of them to vacate a given body of

cover before moving up to reoccupy it. The forward movements

are all occuring simultaneously at first. Once heavy fire

is encountered, roughly half the front company is moving at

any one time, while the remainder fire, rally and rest.

Roughly half the heavy weapons support by fire from the

start line, if it has LOS to any enemy positions. The

other half move forward behind the first company to reach

better firing positions, but set up and go stationary

once those are reached. Once they are all in position,

the initially stationary weapons teams may move up to join

them or may pass beyond them, leapfrog fashion, to locations

still closer, from which to fire. But always a full "block"

of cover behind the leading infantry.

Tactically, the leading infantry is expected to draw fire

and get messed up. The remainder of that wave - to either

side and the second line of each platoon hit - fire back,

along with any heavy weapons that bear on the shooters.

Everyone who has rallied to good order and is at the front

edge steps out again on advance or human wave, making for

the next patch of cover closer to the defenders, but never

directly on top of any living defenders.

The column slowly chews through the defense by outshooting

those who fire at the leading edge of the column. Men

fall out and are left behind to rally under the command

of company HQs. Each body of cover reached by the column

is kept "topped off" by men from later ranks, and therefore

spits back fire without let up. Defenders directly in the

path of the attack are expected to either be outshot or

to run dry of ammo by the time the 2nd or 3rd wave is

firefighting against them. Continual new shooters are

expected to reveal themselves to prevent close approach.

Whenever there aren't enough of those in an area for any

specific time window, the column oozes forward another

100-200 yards in that area, and its small arms firepower

thereby increases in power.

Single point shooters like guns and HMGs are hit by

multiple mortars and by the field guns. Several MMGs

also hit each one as long as they are up and firing,

and one remains on each that is suppressed, to prevent

rally. The reactive FO, if available, is used up

on the largest body of defending infantry that stands

up to the first wave, after that wave "breaks" for the

first time, and before the second attempts to hit the

same spot again.

The overall effect desired is relentlessness, melting

the defenders with firepower and continually creeping

closer to keep that firepower intense. If the last

company has drawn up opposite the defense and the

defense still hasn't broken, then it does not press

home but goes stationary in the last decent cover

reached, holds there and fires at any spotted defenders.

In the meantime, higher HQs patch back together whatever

they can of the broken rest of the battalion. Only

once those have rallied does the last fresh company

attack itself, and the rallied "company" takes its

place defending the cover already reached. If this

last attack also fails, the whole thing is called off

and the reduced battalion goes over to the defensive

and retains the ground already gained.

These are typical Russian-system column tactics for

the rifle forces.

Next I consider echelon tactics for Russian mechanized

forces. Assume the available force this time has

a motor rifle company, 2 T-34 platoons with SMG riders,

and a recon section with a few T-70s and a motorcycle

platoon (Recon C in jeeps). Heavy weapons and

artillery support are limited - a single group with

a pair each of MMGs and mortars for the first, and

a single medium FO for the second. A typical time

for this sort of attack might be dusk, or dawn with

fog.

The Russian plan is an echelon attack on the left

flank. To carry it out, the force is divided into

3 teams, first echelon in the center of the map,

second echelon half way to the left edge, and third

echelon on the left corner of the board, all the way

back to the board edge initially. First echelon

in the center gets 2 motor rifle platoons, the T-70s,

and the heavy weapons, second echelon gets one T-34

platoon with riders and the 3rd motor rifle platoon,

plus the FO, and the third echelon on the left flank gets

the 2nd T-34 platoon with riders, plus the motorcycle

infantry, mounted.

First echelon is initially in line formation, the

other two are each in column. So right to left

across the frontage one sees a motor rifle platoon

with a T-70 supporting it, the heavy weapons, another

motor rifle with T-70, then the third motor rifle platoon

with an FO, trailing those, and a T-34 platoon behind it.

On the far left there the other T-34 platoon, farther back

still, with the motorcycle infantry behind them in the far

lefthand corner.

The first echelon moves off behind a few half squad

scouts, each supported by a couple of full squads and

a T-70. Between then the weapons are initially in

overwatch, but will move up if they don't have LOS to

likely enemy positions yet (e.g. under limited

visibility conditions). Meanwhile the second pauses

for a few minutes then steps out using "move", with

the tanks trailing. Notice the use of vehicles in

the first echelon is meant to generate tank noise,

to help conceal where the main body of AFVs will be.

The third echelon is initially stationary until the

second has progressed beyond the start line by a

couple hundred meters at least.

When the first echelon scouts make contact, their

supporting full platoons move up to the nearest

cover and return the fire. Single enemies are

approached by a T-70, buttoned, to get within

spotting range. The heavy weapons retaliate if any

guns reveal themselves to mess with the T-70s, and

if not, then all arms can suppress the first shooters.

The first echelon closes only cautiously and does

not attempt to press home - it is too thin to

do so anyway. They just want to establish themselves

in cover roughly 250 yards from the leading defenders,

and determine the shape of their line.

As the first echelon slows, the second in column to

their left will close up with them, and can extend

the contact to the left. The third motor rifle

platoon will look at first like a mere extension

of the skirmish line formed by the other two. This

platoon pushes hard on advance to close with the

leftmost enemy spotted so far. The FO targets the

expected left end of the enemy position and counts

down. The first T-34 platoon, initially holding

back, picks a route expected to be free of heavy

PAK observation and dashes for cover close to the

leftmost enemy, dropping its tommy gunners behind

the cover nearest them. Then the tanks show themselves

and plaster that corner of the defense.

The third echelon goes to "fast" as soon as the

first T-34 platoon attacks. It is directed straight

ahead near the left edge, initially to the left rear

of the second echelon. They should be passing the

second echelon as the artillery falls, and the SMG

riders of 2nd echelon should assault into the defense

positions behind the barrage and tank fire, around the

time they do so. The FO may even use one minute of

smoke to aid this movement, blinding the left side

of the defense.

The 2nd T-34 platoons drives fast for the left rear

of the map and then angles right. The motorcycle

infantry trails them initially, and drops its men

to the left of and ahead of the foremost elements

of the second echelon, extending the frontage around

the enemy left. The second T-34 platoon drops its

SMG riders farther forward still, and assaults tanks

foremost along the back edge of the map. The SMG

riders trail them on advance, occasionally even run,

to keep up.

The idea is a cracking whip extending clean round

the enemy on the left side of the board in the

space of less than five minutes, counting from

the time tanks and off board artillery begin

plastering that end of their line. The forward

screen from first echelon meanwhile cuts up lateral

repositioning with ranged fire, and may push forward

a tank to get the angle to do so, over this or that

patch of open ground. All of the T-34s, all of the

SMGs, the artillery, and 2 platoons with rifles, all

impact the left end of the enemy line in a short

time window. This is expected to crush that end

of the enemy position. The T-34s and SMGs then

advance left to right, rolling up the enemy line.

The recon C trails the tanks and uses its ammo depth

to finish off cowerers and holdouts the tanks have

already plastered, once the SMGs run dry.

Notice that the first echelon is intended to "feint"

a slow recon-pulled attack to be delivered somewhere

along the wide front of the defender's position,

and thereby freeze most of the defenders in place,

awaiting the point of main effort revealing itself,

and in the meantime make them feel good about their

present "cover everything" dispositions. In reality

the attack is fully committed to a heavy left from

the start. The aggressiveness level is extremely

high over most of the frontage, though the first

echelon is initially careful, using a mix of advance

and move to contact. The second is mostly using

advance and the third is frequently using fast

while mounted, or run, and hunt and advance only

once actually in contact. Lots of time is not

needed, though if it is available it may make the

feint aspect of the first echelon more believable.

The risk level is considerable, if the point of

main effort has been chosen badly or the launch

of the third echelon is mistimed. But no great

tactical finesse is needed of any of the subelements.

Those are typical echelon tactics as they would

be implemented by a Russian mechanized force.

Next consider a German infantry battalion with support

from a single StuG platoon, heavy weapons, and 2 105mm

FOs. It decides to use line tactics to attempt a

double envelopment, a favorite ambitious German maneuver.

The three companies are all deployed on line, and

within each company the platoons are again deployed

in line formation. A single platoon is held in second

line behind the center, with one StuG, and forms the

only overall reserve. At the joints between the companies

there are heavy weapons platoons each with a 105mm FO and

a single StuG; each StuG initially carries 2 HMG teams

from these. Each platoon in turn is in blob formation

aka two rank line, with a few half squads detached 50m

ahead of the leading line as a scouting wave. The whole

formation thus has immense width. In addition, it

may be lengthened still further by extending the wing

companies to 4 platoons, using their company HQs.

The time to carry out this sort of attack is dawn with

fog or dusk with rain or snow, or at night. It may be

attempted in better visibility in tight enough terrain,

(e.g. nearly continuous woods) but not in the open in

full daylight. The higher the infantry quality level

the more likely it is to succeed.

The whole skirmish line moves off at once, initially

on move to contact. The extreme ends may even run

briefly to give the whole some forward "bow" before

contact with the enemy, but they should not push to

full tired. Heavy weapons are on move, but will be

slow enough they trail the forward infantry line.

Whenever any of the half squads makes contact, the

nearest platoon may move to support it and fire back

at whoever shot up that scout, but the rest do not

veer toward the contact. They stay in their lanes

and continue to move forward, cover to cover. Any

group checked by enemies stops and returns fire

briefly, but is careful not to exhaust squad ammo.

Assume contact is made along the middle of the frontage,

heavy weapons groups instead steer to positions that

can observe any group spotted so far. Those and the

StuGs by direct fire, suppress the foremost enemies.

The wave continues forward and curls past any active

enemy shooters, avoiding their LOS wherever possible,

using low ground, natural cover, and LOS distance

limits.

The idea is to press as many infantry groups as

possible, as far forward as possible. Every scrap of

ground not physically occupied by the enemy is

seized, or cleared and passed. Spots physically

occupied are screened lightly by a small group,

not assaulted. Instead the slow weapons set up

opposite the foremost and plaster then in turn.

The attackers don't really care what shape the

defense has assumed. They ooze around it and

conform to that shape, whatever it is. Tactically

as much time as possible is spent moving and beyond

enemy LOS. Squads are dropped in spots of good

cover if there are unbeaten enemy still in view

of that location, but no great attempt is made to

build up lots of men there or to beat those

enemies in a direct squad to squad firefight

through numbers alone. Not initially.

As the enemy formation takes shape, the 105s are

used on full platoon positions, mortars and StuGs

on single heavy weapons positions. The enemy is

expected to be unable to maneuver because closely

confined by bypassing infantry with overlaping

or nearly overlaping LOS. Artillery then hits

located enemy unable to dodge. Ideally, the whole

line overlaps the enemy on one or both sides,

and those clear to the end of the map reorient

inward to roll up flanks.

These tactics put strain on individual small groups

of the attacking infantry, which sometimes hit strong

areas of the defense with little help, but are expected

to go to ground and hold on without it, at least

screening the enemy hit. There isn't much of a

reserve to meet failures and it is meant to be

used opportunistically to smash the easily killed

instead.

Against an IDed position, the formula is to first

fix it and bring HMG teams to bear on it, then

hit it with 30 rounds of 105mm HE (half a battery

load), and sometimes a StuG or 81mm mortar in addition.

After the HE barrage lifts, close in rapidly from

two directions with the adjacent infantry platoons,

always using more than one.

As parts of the defense are eaten in this fashion,

the platoons nearest the success push deeper into

the defense and envelope the neighboring defenders.

This sort of attack can require time to fully

develop. The execution needs a fine mix of

aggressive exploitation of weakness and a willingness

to stop dead and just screen when strength is hit

instead. Local subunits need to act on the overall

situation and exploit whatever weaknesses the enemy

leaves. The enemy is also given chances to make

fatal mistakes, like trying to move too much after

already closely beset - that can add a reversed

cover differential to the existing odds edge.

That is a typical maneuverist use of linear tactics

by German infantry. Notice the importance of the

limited visibility conditions to make it effective.

Next I will give an example of a turning movement

by a German panzer force, using screen and column

tactics.

The force here might have a single Panzer IV platoon,

a motorized panzergrenadier company plus a 4th platoon

take as armored with SPWs, plus supporting weapons

halftracks - 2 SPW 251/9 and 2 SPW 251/2. Also a

radio FO, preferably 150mm 4 tube variety. Much of

the infantry and the tanks might be veteran quality.

Then use the following unorthodox (but entirely

typical of these methods, in that respect) tasking.

A feint and screening force gets a single Panzer IV,

a reduced Panzergrenadier platoon (HQ and 2 squads),

and a heavy weapons section of 2 HMGs and a mortar.

Their mission is to screen the entire frontage and

demonstrate there. The HMGs are to cover the open

ground with fire at least, the Panzer is to make

noise and threaten here and there, the infantry

should be half squads and prowl around, into cover

and hiding and back out again. The idea is to look

like up to a company. Later on, the Panzer and

weapons will support by fire at range. The mortar

is to ensure if a gun takes out the Panzer at least

it dies in reply.

The main body, meanwhile, has the entire balance of

the force, and is in column on the left side of

the map. Initially they are "coiled", but step out

sequentially and gradually narrow their frontage.

The SPWs are all assigned to a heavy weapons group

lead by the company HQ, with one squad attached,

and one of the SPW 251/2s The 37mm halftrack can be

the HQ's mount or the FO's. The SPW-1s get the

remaining HMGs and mortar, and the attached squad.

One platoon of panzergrenadiers, dismounted, leads the

column in blob formation. A second rides the

panzers in second position. Then the weapons, while

the last position gets the last platoon supported

by the SPW 251/9s and the remaining 251/2.

The mission of the main body is to travel right

around the left flank of the defense, avoiding

anything powerful and crushing anything in the way

too weak to stop them. The first platoon acts

as scouts and use move to contact, and initially

the rest of the column does not show itself. They

can catch up rapidly, and in the meantime the scout

platoon and diversion force elsewhere are not

distinguishable, really.

When a force stops the scouts - that they can't

just swing around - the column launches, on "fast".

The panzers close up to the scouts, drop their

riders and with them and the scouts, destroy the

blockage. The column then advances forward and turns

inward through the defense, maintaining speed if

at all possible. The FO should by then be walking

his aim point ahead of the attack, which is mostly

carried by a compact fist of panzers overwhelming

enemies at close range - escorted and followed up

by panzergrenadiers, but the idea is not to hang

back with the tanks and merely plink from distance.

The heavy weapons pick a spot with a view over the

interior of the defense and set up. Their mission

is to paralyze adaptative repositioning by infantry,

interlocking their lines of fire with the overwatch

weapons in the screen in front. The 251/2s also

need to be available to wax any gun that challenges

the panzer fist. The last platoon is a mere reserve

and replaces losses in the leading pair. The company

HQ in the middle of the main body can gather squads

and join the battle line up with the panzers as

required. The 251/9s trail early, and replace

lost tanks later on, as the enemy AT defense degrades,

to supply ammo depth and maintain momentum.

Ideally the whole main attack of the column is

delivered from the left rear of the original

defensive position, having found a route clear

around to there free of defenders. In practice

this is rarely possible on smaller CM maps, and

an attack launched at a corner of the defense is

accepted as a substitute.

Tactical combined arms coordination needs to be

very high. Everyone fights only the specific sort

of enemy he is best at destroying, in close cooperation.

The timing of column start needs to be well planned

and adapted to the intel found so far. And once

started, it should be driven with the utmost recklessness

and speed, without any sacrifice in combined arms

coordination. (Which is the hard part). Losses to

the point units need to be topped off almost immediately

from the trailing elements of the column and the push

continued without pause.

This sort of attack benefits from limited

visibility and in the paradigm case would be delivered

on a clear night, with visibility of few hundred meters.

It does not need much time, it needs fussy micromanagement,

and the opportunities for boneheaded error are numerous.

That is a typical example of a deception or misdirection

attack using screen and column, by German panzer forces.

Next I will give an example of wedge probe tactics

used by American infantry forces. A typical force used

for this would have 2 companies of infantry with their

supporting weapons, perhaps an additional MG platoon,

and one platoon of Sherman tanks. In addition it would

use 2 105mm FOs and rely on them heavily. The third

company of the battalion would not be used, it would

be left out of battle to take on the support role the

following day. The whole approach is meant to be easily

sustained through time, delivered again and again, day

after day, with companies of the battalion rotating the

lead, support, and rest roles.

The two companies are tasked as point and support. The

support company acts as a base of ranged fire and does

not close. It may "move" up to maintain LOS and occupy

positions in no man's land, trailing the point company

if it does so. If there is an extra supporting MG platoon,

it is assigned to this support company. The support

company may use a line of platoons with weapons

between, or leave one platoon in reserve behind such

a line. Its role is to hold the frontage by fire,

whatever happens to the point platoon; to deny open areas

to the enemy and so prevent counterattacks; and to support

by ranged fire, especially with its MGs and mortars. One

FO may also be with this company, and acts much as the

other does, as will be described below.

The point company has the role of leading the attack,

and is deployed in a wedge formation, with one rifle

platoon on point, the rest in line behind it, weapons

in the middle of the line and rifles to each side. The

FO is with the weapons typically, but could be to one side

or the other to be less predictable to enemy replies

or to get better observation of some key target area.

The tank platoon is positioned level with the main line

of the company or slightly trailing. Their mission is

fire support, not scouting or direct entry into the enemy

position, themselves.

The lead platoon is in turn deployed in wedge formation

again, with one squad out on absolute point, typically

split into 2 half squads, both forward and scouting. The

remainder of the point platoon trails these by 50 yards, and

the main line of the company is another 100-150 yards back,

at its leading edge. The company line platoons are in blob

formation aka 2 rank line, and conforms to the available

cover. Weapons platoon and company HQ split the weapons in

the center - if desired, one squad of rifles can be put there

too under company HQ direction, to lead the way into areas

of cover and check out routes, etc.

The FOs call in their aim points on turn 2 and continually

walk them ahead of the point. The whole lead company

advances on move to contact. If under ranged fire, the

point platoon, only, may switch to advance and press through

fire - the rest just worm forward to the limits of cover and

enemy LOS, and wait to reply with fire of their own. If

absolutely required to get a spot, a single Sherman may

be risked forward, buttoned - with lots of mortars to reply

to a gun, and keyholing if possible.

The idea is simply to double-dare anybody to shoot at the

point. When they do, the kitchen sink is dropped on their

heads in reply - tanks, 105s, mortars, MGs, etc. The point

goes to ground and hugs cover for dear life, while everyone

else gets the shooters "off" them. When those shooters have

been silenced or have had enough, the point steps out again.

As the point gets ragged out, the role of point platoon is

rotated through the rifle platoons of the lead company. This

is done by pausing the point platoon and letting the main body

draw level with it, then having one of its component platoons

take over the lead. If a particular strong set of enemy is

met all at once, all rifles add their fire to the heavy weapons

for 2 minutes, and the tanks all make sure they have LOS. This

produces "mad minutes" and should overwhelm the defenders. If for

some reason it fails to do so, the tanks fire for several minutes

more and the chain is yanked for more 105mm. Infantry is not

risked closing with up and firing enemy.

This approach requires a fair amount of time and hideous amounts

of ammo. It is relatively economical with your own losses and it

is incredibly easy to execute. (Some combined arms skill is

required, using the best shooter for a given target type, but

that can be learned as professional formula and applied by rote).

Indeed, it will trump virtually any "up" defense, when enough HE

is available to implement it. Defenders facing it need to shift to

reverse slope principles or it will chew through them, perhaps not

rapidly but efficiently and relentlessly.

Those are typical wedge - overwatch tactics as used by US infantry

forces.

Next I will give an example of V (inverted wedge) bounding

overwatch tactics as implement by US armor division forces.

A typical force for this would be a company of armored

infantry, taken as 1 platoon with halftracks and 2 without,

plus 2 full platoons of Shermans and a single 105mm radio FO.

As an attachment, also add an AAA section with several foot

HMG teams with abundant ammo (use 5 man HMG 1917s e.g.) and

1-2 40mm Bofors, transported by M3A1 or M5A1 halftracks.

The tasking is as follows. The AAA section merely screens

the majority of the frontage and supports by fire against

targets visible from it. Its 'tracks initially stay in full

defilade, and come out only at the end, and if needed.

The main body delivers a wing attack up one side of the board -

again assume the left to stay consistent with the previous examples.

The formation is a V with tank platoons in both up positions, and

the halftracked armored infantry platoon trailing in reserve,

between them. Each tank platoon has a dismounted armored infantry

platoon working directly with it. Each tank platoon is in turn

in a wedge formation, with HQ tank trailing and off center, not

in the middle or leading position. The FO is with the rightmost

or interior platoon, and walks his aim point across likely enemy

positions, starting from just left of their expected center.

The tanks lead and the armored infantry follow. The idea is for

the tanks to be within spotting distance of any HMG that can hit

the infantry before the latter step into the open. But the tanks

should be outside panzerfaust or tank hunter range of any cover.

The tanks work over suspected enemy positions with their MGs,

area fire, and buttoned to avoid using up their scarce 50 cal ammo.

The whole main body advances in steps as a four legged creature.

Right tanks, left tanks and right infantry, left infantry and

right tanks, right infantry and left tanks. Each infantry step

brings them level with the tanks and then just beyond into the

next cover the tanks stopped just shy of. Each tank step sees

the next field that the infantry now border, and then closer

to within HMG spotting range of the next set of cover (150m is

ideal). Infantry is always the first to pass cover, tanks the

first to pass open areas. Moreover, one side of the formation

is always stationary and ready to fire whenever the other side

is moving.

The 'track mounted platoon just trails in full defilade, as a

reserve, for now. The company HQ should be with them. Each

platoon has its own 60mm mortar, with a primary mission of

gun work, ammo jealously saved for that. Let tank HE do

everything else.

Any enemy encountered is shot to ribbons by the massed tanks.

Woods interiors that the tanks cannot reach are scouted by

infantry, or if known to be occupied, hit with 105mm HE first

and then rushed by the nearest infantry platoon.

At any time, one of the legs of tanks may accelerate, if it

thinks the defense ahead of it has broken. That is the signal

for the reserve to come forward and engage in its own right.

The 'tracks supplement the tanks as the latter get low on ammo,

once the defending AT network has been smashed. The reserve

platoon engages whenever it can hurt the enemy the most, once

his line has been broken. They can also run infantry up to a

tank platoon that has run away from its own, and "resupply" it

with close infantry escort, thereby.

The whole movement is slow and methodical. Speed is not an

issue and the attack is thoroughly telegraphed. If the enemy

wants to get out of the way they are invited to do so. If they

want to stand in front of the attack they are reduced to mincemeat.

Single parts of the attack can be traded off, but the whole won't

be. Obviously this requires a truly lopsided armor superiority,

but the whole point is how to "cash" that when it is present.

Cheaply.

The only thing this attack method worries about is superior

enemy AFVs in unflankable keyhole positions. A few TDs with tungsten

can help in that case, but those issues are beyond the scope

of this post anyway. The defense being hit doesn't have any, only

a few on map guns and infantry AT weapons.

Those are typical bounding overwatch tactics as used by US

armor division forces.

I hope this series is interesting. These are real tactical

systems, simple enough and formulaic enough to actually be

implemented by mortals, to be trained into masses of

competent professionals, without requiring perfectionism or

genius. And implemented competently, any one of them is

dangerous. And no, they aren't all the same thing nor are

they arranged in some rank order of best and worst. They

are concrete and practical tactical systems.

[TheVulture]

Thanks for taking the time to write all that JasonC. Chalk me up as one of those who finds this kind of stuff fascinating (and very much worthwhile to read) but is aware that I don't know anywhere near enough to contribute to the discussion in any useful way.

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[JasonC]

Because the point of that particular method of attack is to maximize the impact of surprise about the assault's direction and focus. The reasons a column formation is used are - to minimize the width of an uncovered corridor needed to make the early movement, to focus the point of attack and thus overload the forces hit at each moment, to maintain the intensity of combat power brought to bear on that focused point against losses taken, and to move that focused point rapidly through the defense before it can react. Local odds are meant to be high at any moment in time, but impacts must be delivered in succession along the main axis to destroy any appreciably portion of the defense. 10 to 1 odds on a single squad, once, will not destroy the defense. A slow grind will not gain anything from the unexpected avenue of attack - the defense will have adapted by the time anything appreciable is hit, if it goes too slow. The intended effect is for the attack to have already smashed a portion of the defense and dislocated and discoordinated all of it, by the time it has reacted effectively to the unexpected direction of the main strike.

[Der Alte Fritz]

That is of course the main divisional body, which stands in marked contrast to the recce forces and the forward detachment. Soviet recce forces were infantry scouts for Rifle Divisions and motorcycle and scout car based for tank and mech forces. The main point of interest is that they did not fight for information, preferring to spread out, use stealth and go around obstacles in order to build up an intelligence picture. They had three sizes of formation, usually a platoon of motorcycle troops for a general 'sweep' kind of search, a platoon of scout cars for investigating point targets or a company based force with a couple of guns and a platoon of tanks for large point targets. In the case of Tank and Mech forces behind these came a point section of two tanks often 15km in advance of the point battalion and then followed by the main force of a reinforced battalion of tanks and Motor Rifle troops. Following them came the corps main body.

So the recce troops spy out the land using stealth but what is the point tank section for and does the point battalion clear the way ahead or does it go around the obstacles and leave the clearing to the main body?

[JasonC]

The principle of a forward detachment can be used at any scale. It

just means something down 2 step sizes is sent well ahead of the

main formation with a scouting or screening mission.

Yes mech corps recce was typically a motorcycle battalion, or a

regiment of them in the case of a tank army. Their role wasn't

really based on stealth, however. Infantry recon did recon by

stealth (Recon A in CMBB terms), especially night infiltration,

remaining stationary and just observing during daylight hours.

Or working as pathfinders in an assault, sometimes.

But the cyclists (Recon C, realistically mounted on jeeps in CM

terms) just flooded the road net with bifurcating formations,

splitting at each junction and flowing through the whole capillary

structure like water, larger groups on the larger roads, etc.

They avoided heavy contact and went around, but weren't particularly

sneaky.

When they encounter any enemy some dismount and keep them under

observation and others back off. The rest of the formation is

already exploring all the alternate routes. They will maneuver

off road with infantry through cover to turn a small enough

position, or seek to fight through a roadblock using a few

armored cars, if they think it is weak enough.

But that is during a move to contact or while the whole

major formation is moving through empty space. Once actually

in contact, the cyclists are in a supporting role only.

Screen the flanks, scout down new side routes, but the job

of point and of battlefield recon for it would pass to the

tanks (with riders, of course). Typically with motor rifle

support, obviously. (But the whole motor rifle brigade

had a mission of holding stuff already cleared by the tanks,

in the division of labor within a tank corps).

What is the advanced detachment, battalion for a corps e.g.,

doing tactically? It has a recon and screening mission so

it does not deliver a full assault, but only skirmishes.

It is willing to fight weak enemy screening forces to

penetrate further than a few cyclists could, to get more

information about the location of the enemy main line of

resistence. But it is not expected to deliver a full

operational scale attack. It might occasionally transition

to a fixing role in an echelon or column attack by the

lending brigade of the corps, along the axis nearest its

chosen route. But that is an adaptation, a reversion from

forward detachment use of the battalion to its main body

use.

These tactics are incredibly old. The cyclist role is

the same as that of light cavalry or cossack scouts in

the Napoleonic era, and the advance detachment role is

the same as that of a Jager advanced guard in the same

period. Gain intel by flooding the countryside with tiny

subdivided elements for the first. Screen and skirmish

on the main body route only, well ahead of it, for the

second. The means of transportation and types of weapons

changed, the principles and tasks did not.

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[costard]

How was the intelligence sent back for analysis? I mean, if you're sending men back with it (not using a radio net), then you're going to reach a limit for your "reach". Of course, they're going backwards and forwards anyway, for fuel and water.

What sort of area would a Recon Company, say, be tasked to cover?

[costard]

Hang on, see if I can answer that second one myself...

A recon company - two steps down from a regiment. Therefore the expected area assigned would be the entirety of the area the regiment would be fighting in, plus a bit around the edges. The tactics dependent on terrain, task, time, and thought. oh and TOE.

's.

[JasonC]

Adam - nonsense. Mere motorcycle scouts can't screen, because they lack the combat power to resist any push through their own positions. They meet any push by just getting out of the way. A forward detachment does not - it possesses the usual mix of combat power of its parent formation and it can and does stop enemy movement. Similarly it can and will fight for info more than scouts.

The forward detachment is an advanced guard, just for its whole parent. Can that same principle be duplicated levels lower, sure. Immaterial.

As for what dislocation and discoordination mean at the scale of a company vs. battalion fight, it merely means the defenders are not properly disposed to maximize their firepower at the hot-spot the attacking column is creating. Guns don't have LOS to the right places. TRPs are forward. Trench positions have LOS to the wrong area. HQs spotting for mortars can't see the place the attack is being delivered, yet. Keyholes are blocked by their sides. The platoon nearest the point of attack faces a many-on-few. Attacking lines of sight and fire split up the defense, such that they can't all readily reposition to correct this, either by withdrawing the front platoon (too deep into contact) or by sliding another up alongside it.

Discoordination. It is the natural result of any unexpected development of the battle, as to location and pace. It produces less than optimal combined arms match ups and it produces many of fews, or at least avoids them for the enemy.

Because the scale is small, if you give the defenders 5 minutes completely unmolested they will correct nearly all of it. Or 10 minutes under only moderate pressure such that 2/3rds of them can afford to be moving at least half of the time. But if they don't have that much time or movements draw too much fire, they stay discoordinated.