How will it not be a "Turkey shoot"

[juan_gigante]

As I understood it, we'd get M1s in a few scenarios in the campaign. A few. And they'd be out of their element, and very, very valuable.

Maybe it's the FPS player in me, but I'd like to see one really big scenario, with tons of air and arty support and tanks and all sorts of cool things and a whole buttload of territory to control. A "To The Volga" of CM:SF. While it would be tough on the machine and might stress the boundaries of what you really should have, I'd enjoy a big tank battle through the streets of Damascus. Baghdad thunder run kind of thing.

I confess. I just like saying "Thunder Run". It reminds me of "Thunder Cats".

Thunder run.

[Battlefront.com]

One thing to keep in mind is the timescale. The broader the time sampling, the "easier" things look for the US side. Same thing can be said for WWII. When you look at the breakout from Normandy to the German border, for example, it looks like it was a total piece of cake. Then you read the memoirs of the guys who were doing the advance and you see that the Germans didn't just drive out of France one day and then the Allies drove to Germany the next. There were plenty of small unit engagements at the CM level.

The same is true for CM:SF. The defeat of Syria is a foregone conclusion. Militarily, in the strategic sense, it can not win a war against the US. Pretty much no potential advesary can expect to hold out for more than a couple of weeks, or months at most. But that doesn't mean they just give up and let the opposing forces walk in and assume control. As others have said, the US forces lost quite a lot of armor in OIF over the last 2 years. If they stood back and had JDAMs dropped on everything then the only explaination for the loss of armor would be friendly fire

I heard an excellent talk by a senior FAC (Forward Air Controller) during the battle for Fallujah. He said that GBU 12 (1000#) and GBU 338 (500#) were the bomb of choice, especially the smaller ones. However, they liked the AC-130 Slayer Gunship. Better results with less damage. It also was said to scare the enemy quite badly. They found that flying around a regular C-130 aircraft at night, when the Slayer was somewhere else, kept them hunkered down. They didn't want to venture out to see if it was the kind that shoot.

Steve

[Scott B]

A big contributor to American armor losses in Iraq has been the fact that its crew protection is seen as so effective that the tanks have been used with great audacity. If you're standing back and hammering away at an enemy with an Abrams you are effectively invulnerable; if you're pushing forward and accepting some risk in order to destroy key enemy units or to cover less well protected units, you'll take some hits. Armor protection is a significant offensive advantage; anyone can hide behind a berm or in someone's house, but the ability to bring your own protection with you is what makes successful attacks in an urban setting.

The vast majority of damaged or destroyed Abrams still have intact crews; most of the wounded I'm aware of have been unbuttoned, and most of the dead from overmatch, like your 500 pound IED.

A side note worth mentioning - my understanding is that Abrams is quite likely to throw a track if it pivots too often, and most third world countries don't have the infrastructure to allow a "thunder run" the success it enjoyed in Baghdad. Baghdad was laid out with crowd control as its main objective, with wide boulevards and highways that let our tanks enter in early April 2003 with enough room to maneuver. The contrast with, say, Grozny could not be more pronounced.

Scott

[RMC]

Is there a new version of the AC-130 called the slayer? IIRC they are all Spectres.

[cassh]

I think that a turkey shoot very much depends on the Syrian player's skill in a two-player game, and the scenario designer use of victory conditions. Hopefully they will reflect the political reality of military actions.

Remember that in the game the victory conditions may not be as simple as 'clear this area' or 'take that position' - they may reflect current realities more: 'clear this position without destroying the mosque', or 'hold this position without reaching 10% casualties'.

If there were a significant breach of the ROE and civilian casualties occurred pell-mell due to undisciplined firepower and indiscriminate use of say artillery or airpower, then an operation would soon feel the unbearable weight of external political pressure and someone's arse would be on the line. In game terms it would mean minus victory points.

Although one possesses enough firepower to atomise an entire city block - this is not politically possible in many circumstances - and a more clinical solution [infantry units clearing house to house] is often called for.

Modern war is watched vulture-like by the world's media. Casualties [either civilian or US military] don't go down well at home in America, even when they occur at a relatively low level. If opinion polls are correct, the support for Iraq is waning, and this is in part no doubt due to the casualties that occur on a weekly basis. Modern man's stomach for casualties is no weaker than say the public during the Napoleonic wars - it's just we see them nowadays and the reality of war is more, well real.

Add to this political-military-victory mix a certain section of the global 'village' who crow gleefully every time the American military receive 'a bloody nose' and you have the real victory conditions of the modern US ground commander.

Force protection is one of the biggest changes in US ground doctrine since Vietnam and it is taken very seriously - mostly because of a sense of 'duty of care' but also because of the two factors above.

If war is the continuation of politics by other means then military action, even low-level tactical engagements a subject to political assessment and measure.

Militarily the 'Black Hawk Down' skirmish/battle was a victory for the guys that fought the battle - yet ultimately for the US Army politically, and therefore strategically - and therefor operationally - and therefor tactically - it proved to be a failure as it curtailed the US mission in Somalia.

Looking at the casualty figures from the battle of Mogadishu one might conclude it was a turkey shoot of sorts. But to the guys who fought it was a tough battle with significant casualties. And to the political masters and US public it was at the time viewed as a defeat.

The ambiguity of victory and defeat in an overtly politicised and media scrutinised combat environment means the old fashion notions of we killed more of his guys than he killed of ours are redundant.

The hangover of gung-hoism and an attritional approach to warfare makes people believe 'blowing the crap out of the enemy' somehow equates to victory, whereas defeating your enemy to achieve your political aim is the purpose of combat. Of course paradoxically one must occasionally blow the crap out of someone to defeat them, but this is the means, not the end in itself - which sometimes gets lost in the wash.

Anyway regardless of victory conditions I think in CMSF an imaginative Syrian ground commander of a Company+ force can give a US rifle company a really bad day at the office without having to create faux scenarios and lame-arse restrictions.

Suggest you might want to read Phantom Soldier by H.John Poole to see how the Japanese, Chinese and Vietnamese all developed fighting methods that disarmed America's overwhelming superiority in firepower, and allowed their forces to engage more effectively.

[ October 10, 2005, 05:44 PM: Message edited by: cassh ]

[YankeeDog]

Other thing to keep in mind is, from what I've seen, the central US unit involved is a *Stryker* brigade, so you many be seeing a lot fewer M1A1s than you think.

Stryker brigades were specifically designed from the ground up to be highly mobile in the operational/strategic sense -- they are intended to bridge the gap between highly mobile, but lightly armed units (light infantry, like the 82nd airborne) than get in-theatre within 48 hours, and heavy, but strategically slow-moving Armored units which can take weeks to get in-theatre. Supposedly, all elements of the Stryker brigade are able to be inserted on the Ubiquitous medium range, C-130J transport, which an get into pretty small, unimproved airstrips. There have been some difficulties with meeting this goal, but that's a whole different debate.

So I wouldn't be surprised if many of the early scenarios in the main campaign represent the time period between when medium units, like Stryker brigades, get in-theatre, but the M1A1s are still on a ship somewhere. . .

In addition, while the Abrahms is certainly an effective weapons system, Iraq has shown it to be vulnerable to a whole spectrum of weapons and tactics. Most have alraedy been mentioned, bu IIRC, one not yet menation is that was taken out in an urban setting by 23mm fire to the rear quarter.

Basically, I don't see the Abrahms superiority as being any more significant than the superiority of the Tiger I in late 1942/early 1943. It certainly presents a challenge, but in a properly designed scenario, it's not insurmountable. . .

Also, in re: Air Support. This is why the insurgents in Iraq tend to get in close with the civilian population. Politically, CW is that he US cannot afford to drop a 500-lb. bomb into an urban area to destroy one tank, or a dozen enemy combatants, and in the process cause a couple of dozens of civilian casualties.

So I think it would be quite realistic to exclude heavier support - Air Strikes and Large-bore artillery - from the US OOB in scenarios.

Cheers,

YD

[aka_tom_w]

So I wouldn't be surprised if many of the early scenarios in the main campaign represent the time period between when medium units, like Stryker brigades, get in-theatre, but the M1A1s are still on a ship somewhere. . .

um

Except that the REALITY of this present day situation is that the M1A1's are in Iraq right now AND Iraq borders Syria so they should "theoretically" NOT be on a boat somewhere. IMO

They should be immediately available despite the theory of how Stryker brigades "should" be deployed.

-tom w

[gunnergoz]

I'll be a lot more interested in seeing what BFC does to replicate the increasing use of small-unit UAV's on the battlefield. The tanks and infantry carrieres will be present but if this game truly models modern day urban fights, the grunts and the intel they get -- along with their organic support -- will be far more influential to the outcome. Sure, there are times when pulling up an Abrams and knocking down a house is all that's needed; but there will be many more times when you have to be more surgical and less overwhelming. And command, control and communications seem to be the modern keys to winning. Overwhelming firepower is pretty useless unless you know where to bring it to bear.

If CMSF models today's urban combat adequately, imagine what a kick it will be to play the follow on WW2 games in a similar urban setting...should be very interesting to compare and contrast the techniques and tactics in each era.

[RMC]

Originally posted by YankeeDog:

Other thing to keep in mind is, from what I've seen, the central US unit involved is a *Stryker* brigade, so you many be seeing a lot fewer M1A1s than you think.

BFC have complete freedom in creating the OOB for this game. The campaign may center around a Stryker brigade, but for the QBs, the full arsenal should be available.

[Scott B]

Originally posted by aka_tom_w:

They should be immediately available despite the theory of how Stryker brigades "should" be deployed.

This is not a dilemma; the theory of how SBCTs should be deployed has included armor attachments for high intensity combat from the very beginning, and that was before we had the unpleasant experience of having to emergency ship (via C-17) more tanks over to Iraq in April 2004.

Most of the "light and fast" rhetoric has been tempered by a fairly strong dose of reality by this point; a few weeks ago they dropped the C-130 requirement for the FCS manned ground vehicle. I wouldn't expect to see a Stryker brigade in any kind of serious offensive action without a company or more of heavy armor to stiffen it up a bit.

Scott

[RMC]

If they do it right, CM:SF could make for an interesting test bed for some these hare-brained schemes coming out of Monroe and the UAMBL.

[YankeeDog]

But how many M1A1s can the MAC get in-theatre quickly, esp. with the ongoing conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan to worry about as support as well?

My understanding is that the US has relatively few airlift platforms that can lift something as big and heavy as an M1A1, and they're in high demand

Also, Assuming they're still there at the hypothetical time that CM:SF represents, driving a M1A1s all the way from Baghdad to Damascus create it's own set of problems, not the least of would depeleting the forces in the Iraq theatre. Also, the heaviest population of Syria is on the coast, and approaching from Iraq basically forces you to fight your way through the hinterlands in order to control the important cities. . .

Not to mention the wear-and-tear cost of driving the M1A1s that distance. You could truck them, of course, but that takes logistics hook-up, which also takes time. In any event, I think a few days, at least, w/o M1A1s in-theatre is perfectly justifiable. Things move pretty darn quickly on the modern geopolitical front. . .

Cheers,

YD

[hellfish]

Originally posted by aka_tom_w:

They should be immediately available despite the theory of how Stryker brigades "should" be deployed.

-tom w

I have a semi-official statistic for you.

From "On Point: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom". Page 407.

"The 173rd BCT (173rd Airborne Brigade) including TF 1-63 Armor required 89 C-17 sorties to deploy two (airborne) infantry battalions, five M1 tanks, four M2 Bradleys, a battery of 105mm howitzers, three platoons of 120mm mortars, and two Dragoneye UAVs. In contrast, for the same number of sorties, a Stryker BCT can deliver one Stryker battalion of 700 troops, 65 Stryker variants, along with an artillery battery, organic CS (combat support - engineers), supporting CSS (combat service support - intelligence, supply and recovery vehicles) and seven days of supply. Finally, a brigade assault command post would provide command and control. Once landed, the Stryker package would enjoy greater lethality and mobility than its counterparts in the 173rd. On the other hand, the 173rd has forcible-entry capability by virtue of its ability to do an airborne assault that the Stryker does not have."

And later on, the book goes on to say "It was another 10 days before the full BCT and sufficient supplies for brigade-sized operations were available (for the 173rd)."

(All text in parenthesis is mine).

[RMC]

5 M1 + 4 M2 > 65 Strykers

The Stryker brigade would have better mobility for the infantry, though it brings less. I don't buy the lethality argument.

The Stryker brigade is about getting somthing to the hot spot more quickly than the heavies can, but still having a little more firepower and a lot more mobility than the light fighters.

[hellfish]

Well you gotta look at what the M-1 and M2s were used for. Then look at the capabilities of the Strykers.

A Stryker battalion will bring 9 MGS systems with all sorts of 105mm ammo, maybe 4 TOW systems (if attached from brigade AT coy), nearly 40 Javelin ATGMs, plus plenty of mortars and engineering support that have all been trained together as a cohesive units.

I seriously doubt the team from 1-63 Armor had ever worked with the 173rd before. Add to that the intelligence gathering capabilties of the Stryker battalion (each company has their own UAVs) and I'd argue that a Stryker battalion is far more useful in a low-to-mid-intensity conflict than a handful of heavier vehicles (especially when you consider the logistics of providing fuel to M-1 tanks!)

[dalem]

Comparatively, how useful are 20 or so 120mm HEAT rounds in the M1A1 as compared to 50+ round of HE in a Sherman?

-dale

[JonS]

For context, there are a total of ~140 C17s in the USAF incventory (apparently).

This is interesting, if slightly OT.

[RMC]

The digital systems of Stryker are nifty, but they cannot, in an of themselves, replace the firepower of the Abrams tanks. We seemed to have learned this kind of lesson again recently.

The Mobile Gun Systems are not ready for primetime and may never get there. In the meantime the brigades are using the TOW anti-armor version which is hardly a suitable replacement. And if the MGS ever does make it out of development, the basic load of 18 rounds is going to dry up pretty quick.

[JonS]

Originally posted by dalem:

Comparatively, how useful are 20 or so 120mm HEAT rounds in the M1A1 as compared to 50+ round of HE in a Sherman?

IANAT, but I kinda view it in terms of a few smart rounds vs loads of dumb ones. Granted the actual rounds aren't guided, but the aquisition and aiming systems in the M1 are so very very far ahead of the M4.

[Scott B]

Originally posted by dalem:

Comparatively, how useful are 20 or so 120mm HEAT rounds in the M1A1 as compared to 50+ round of HE in a Sherman?

-dale

Not as much as one would like, but it's the 11,000 rounds of coax that'll really keep you warm at night. Early in the invasion our guys were screaming for a 120mm beehive round, though.

Scott

[Battlefront.com]

A big contributor to American armor losses in Iraq has been the fact that its crew protection is seen as so effective that the tanks have been used with great audacity

I heard a 101st battalion commander state that he purposefully sent Abrams down streets as "shit magnets" during the opening phase of OIF. Fortunately in his sector, an Najaf, the Iraqi forces didn't have advanced ATGMs so all they did was identify their positions so the overwatching infantry and helos could knock them out. Apparently it worked very well, even though the tanks got hit a lot. One Abrams was seriously damaged and disabled according to another source. Not sure if it was in this commander's sector or not.

5 M1 + 4 M2 > 65 Strykers

That's a load of rubbish You didn't learn much from years of playing CMx1, did you? I'd take redundancy (and reliability, which we are simulating this time round), superior numbers, and superior mobility over a static force with a few toys any day of the year. While I agree that there is a very important role for the heavy tracked stuff to play, it is rather incredible to argue that its few benefits outweigh its negatives AND outweigh the positives of the alternative force structure.

Obviously the exact type of engagement and terrain is relevant to which would do better, but since these aren't likely to be solid givens prior to deployment I'd take a fleshed out medium weight force over an anemic mixed heavy/light force any day of the year (repeating myself ).

When you have to get your forces somewhere fast, and lift is limited in terms of quantity and time tables, logistics must be considered. I've got a copy of a study written by RAND that has some very interesting statistics on the issues surrounding deployments. It shows that Stryker is a better solution for rapid deployment of a significant force, but it also shows that the Army's "96 hour" vision is quite impossible to do even with prepositioned forces. Interesting study to say the least.

Steve

[hellfish]

Originally posted by RMC:

The digital systems of Stryker are nifty, but they cannot, in an of themselves, replace the firepower of the Abrams tanks. We seemed to have learned this kind of lesson again recently.

It kind of depends on what you're fighting (or expecting to fight). If you're just looking to put a round into a building or bunker, then a 105mm HE round is just as useful as a 120mm HEAT round, if not moreso. If you're looking to kill a tank, yeah, I'd want a 120mm APFSDSDU round. But the Strykers will have TOWs and Javelins for the tanks that a 105mm would be less than ideal for (a T-55 is still a good candidate for a 105mm, IMHO, but a T-72 is not).

The Mobile Gun Systems are not ready for primetime and may never get there. In the meantime the brigades are using the TOW anti-armor version which is hardly a suitable replacement. And if the MGS ever does make it out of development, the basic load of 18 rounds is going to dry up pretty quick.

Too true. If the MGS is fielded. Big "if" right now. I still prefer the M8 AGS, but that only carries 30 rounds, still less than an M-1A1 (40 rounds, but most of those are likely to be HEAT or APFSDSDU).

[aka_tom_w]

even in 2007?

are we talking about what works right now or what "should" work in 2007?

:confused:

-tom w

[JonS]

2007 is not very far away.

[Scott B]

Originally posted by Battlefront.com:

When you have to get your forces somewhere fast, and lift is limited in terms of quantity and time tables, logistics must be considered. I've got a copy of a study written by RAND that has some very interesting statistics on the issues surrounding deployments. It shows that Stryker is a better solution for rapid deployment of a significant force, but it also shows that the Army's "96 hour" vision is quite impossible to do even with prepositioned forces. Interesting study to say the least.

Believe that would be this study, right? There's something of an art to rapid deployment - this was the monograph that I believe best lays out the factors for strategic lift, and what helped convince me that fast sealift and ultra-heavy airlift (Pelican) are the way to go.

Rand's going to be getting a few more hits from the BFC crowd, I suspect, once it's figured out what an excellent resource they can be.

Scott