Arabs at War - Syrian Chapter

[Runyan99]

Taken in toto from the summary of Syrian effectiveness, 1948-1991

"In general, Syrian military effectiveness showed many of the same patterns of behavior as other Arab armed forces. On the positive side, the Syrians consistently demostrated superb unit cohesion and individual bravery. Indeed, the Israelis always remarked on the ferocity and determination of Syrian soldiers and pilots. Syrian forces fought well in static defense roles and performed adequately when conducting set-piece operations.

On the negative side, Syrian forces regularly displayed problems in tactical leadership that hampered their conduct in freewheeling maneuver warfare. In particular, junior officers showed little initiative, improvisational ability, flexibility, or capability for independent action. Syrian chains of command were rigidly overcentralized, plagued by compatmentalization of information, and skewed by bizarre command and control relationships and the constant reshuffling of senior commanders. Their skills in armored, artillery, air to air, and air to ground operations were miserable. Syria had tremendous difficulty assimilating new weaponry into its force structure, and its personnel never were able to take full advantage of the capabilities of their equipment. The Syrians were also hindered by poor maintenance and technical support."

The summary goes on to state that Syrian commandos were able to develop marginally better skills than the bulk of the Syrian army in a number of different aspects of combat operations.

[Runyan99]

And the upshot of 500+ pages covering all Arab actions from '48-'91 leads to the following conclusions regarding Arab capabilities in general:

"So why did Arab armies and air forces perform relatively poorly in every war they fought since 1948? There are at least three purported explanations - cowardice, poor unit cohesion, and poor logistics - that were simply not problems for the Arab militaries. Although some soldiers and officers were cowardly in battle, the majority of Arab military personnel demonstrated impressive degrees of self-sacrifice and personal bravery. Although there were units that melted under the slightest pressure, it was more often the case that Arab formations had to be defeated in detail even long after the situation had become hopeless. Similarly, with the exception of the Syrians (and potentially the Saudis), Arab armies demonstrated a capacity to move and sustain their forces in battle. Ultimately, far from being sources of ineffectiveness, logistics, unit cohesion, and personal bravery would have to be considered among the strengths of the Arab armed forces.

Another set of issues emerged as secondary problems for the Arabs. Poor morale, poor generalship, and inadequate training were clearly contributing factors to the ineffectiveness of their armies and air forces, but these cannot be considered major influences.

[snip]

Four areas of military effectiveness stand out as consistent and crippling problems for Arab forces: poor tactical leadership, poor information management, poor weapons handling, and poor maintenance. These complications were present in every single Arab army and air force between 1948 and 1991. All had significant and identifiable effects on the performance of Arab armed forces. These were, without question, the principal sources of Arab misfortune in war during this period in history. The lack of initiative, improvisation, adaptability, flexibility, independent judgement, willingness to maneuver, and ability to integrate the various combat arms effectively meant that Arab armies and air forces were regularly outfought by their adversaries. The distortion, compartmentalization, and inattention to information and intelligence meant that Arab units were forced to conduct operations in a fog of war far worse than Clausewitz imagined. The neglect of day to day maintenance practices and inability to conduct repair work generally meant that Arab forces could count on far less of their eqiupment when the balloon went up than could their adversaries. Finally, the inability of Arab pilots and weapons crews to take full advantage of their equipment meant that they fought at a disadvantage against even primitvely armed foes."

[Peter Cairns]

Runyan99,

For me another significant factor in this (not just for arab armies),the primary purpose and orientation of the force.

Where as we in the west tend to see our armed forces as primarily for domestic security against foreign threats, in many parts of the world the army is primarily directed against internal opposition or even the general populus.

In addition as the US found to it's cost with ARVN an army can be internal structure so as not to be a threat to the regeme, by deliberatly giving out commands by personal loyalty or faction.

This type of general "corruption of purpose" was to an extend in most arab armies far more apparent than in Israels.

Peter.

[Nidan1]

Where did the most belligerent Arab armies get their training and equipment during most of that time?

It would seem dishonest not to mention the fact that the Arabs were trained in Soviet-style military doctrine. Could that fact in itself point to their poor performance?

[flamingknives]

Some studies I've read do cite Arabic nepotism and Soviet command styles for poor Syrian performance.

Although neither would actually make much difference on a CM battlefield, as tactical initiative is down to the player.

[Battlefront.com]

The Soviet connection is certainly a part of the equation, IMHO. When you read about the failings of Arab forces in the field one has to be daft to not recall the performance of the Soviet forces in 1941. The quotes Runyan99 posted are clear about that parallel. For example, I've changed only ONE word in the quote Runyan99 posted:

Four areas of military effectiveness stand out as consistent and crippling problems for Soviet forces: poor tactical leadership, poor information management, poor weapons handling, and poor maintenance.

This could be lifted out of any serious study of the Soviet performance in 1941-1945, though less so at the end of this period than the beginning.

Interesting, no?

Steve

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Battlefront.com:

This could be lifted out of any serious study of the Soviet performance in 1941-1945, though less so at the end of this period than the beginning.

Interesting, no?

Yes, but how much of that is exclusively due to the Soviet connection may not be a simple matter. I think the point that Peter raises is a valid one. Even without the Soviet connection, Arab militaries would have exhibited the traits being discussed. But the fact that those pre-existing parallels to Soviet society meant that it was very easy and natural for the rulers of Arab countries to adopt the Soviet military system, including all its weaknesses.

Michael

[John D Salt]

Originally posted by Runyan99:

Four areas of military effectiveness stand out as consistent and crippling problems for Arab forces: poor tactical leadership, poor information management, poor weapons handling, and poor maintenance.

I'd be interested to hear what people think "information management" (as distinct from recce, C4ISTAR or SA) means in this context, and the nature of the mechanism by which it helps people win or lose battles. Feel free to cite historical examples of good or bad "information management".

All the best,

John.

[Waycool]

One item that I have read relating to poor Arab performance is the lack of developing good NCO and Junior Grade Officer corps. The desire for people who think outside of the box is frowned upon in most dictatorial/ totalitarian situations.

[Oleg Mastruko]

Originally posted by Battlefront.com:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Four areas of military effectiveness stand out as consistent and crippling problems for Soviet forces: poor tactical leadership, poor information management, poor weapons handling, and poor maintenance.

This could be lifted out of any serious study of the Soviet performance in 1941-1945, though less so at the end of this period than the beginning.

Interesting, no?

Steve</font>

[Sergei]

I don't think that Steve really meant it that way, Oleg. He's read a few history books.

Sergei (who is not Russian BTW I just happen to be Sergei)

[Runyan99]

Originally posted by Peter Cairns:

For me another significant factor in this (not just for arab armies),the primary purpose and orientation of the force.

Where as we in the west tend to see our armed forces as primarily for domestic security against foreign threats, in many parts of the world the army is primarily directed against internal opposition or even the general populus.

Syria's army was a highly politicized force focused on internal security from 1948-1970. When a guy named Hafiz al-Asad took power in 1970, it was reformed and made a more professional force with a focus on external security and conventional fighting. The purpose of this transformation was to be able to fight Isreal effectively.

I get the impression however, that this transformation was never completely successful.

[flamingknives]

Actually, Arabs using Soviet-style tactics and strategy is covered in the Center for Strategic and International Studies paper "The Military Balence in the Middle-East"

The Syrians, and Egyptians are key users of Soviet advice, while Jordan tended towards more western techniques and equipment.

This is not just that the "Sovs sold their T-55s to the Arabs", but sent military advisors to train said armies in their brand of warfighting.

The Soviet model calls for strong centralised command, which limits lower-level initiative. The failings of this strategy - the inflexibility of any plan - are exacerbated by choice of command staff based on political considerations rather than ability.

[Nidan1]

The 1973 Egyptian crossing of the Suez Canal, was a feat of arms unprecedented in Arab military history.

This was accomplished after Russian advisors had been kicked out of Egypt. Unfortunately political pressures on Sadat caused him to violate his limited scope of offensive action plan against Isreal, and his forces were cut off and nearly completely destroyed.

[Oleg Mastruko]

Originally posted by flamingknives:

This is not just that the "Sovs sold their T-55s to the Arabs", but sent military advisors to train said armies in their brand of warfighting.

Hm, like, so what?

There are tons or armies that are trained by western military advisors, equipped by western equipment, or they do their best to use western "brand of warfighting" yet they perform poorly on the field.

No one (with half a brain) would use ARVN as example that American military doctrine/equipment/training is flawed. Yet, many do similar logical mistake when talking about Soviets and, say, Arabs.

The fact that they wanted to use, or tried to use Sov-style "brand of warfighitng" is not enough to draw a parrallel between Sovet army and any of the Arab armies (which, among themselves, are sometimes vastly different, with very diverse track records).

I just have slight problems imagining any Arab army (or all of them bunched together) doing Bagration vs German AGC.... Come to think of it I have problems imagining any force on the planet, except Soviets themselves, doing Bagration vs AGC...

O.

[Oleg Mastruko]

I guess what I am trying to say is...

Soviet doctrine, especially on operational level - worked very very VERY well for Soviets, '43 and later. Don't take my word for that. Just ask Guderian, Heinrici, Manstein, Paulus & co.

Anyone who would try to deny this is not very clever, and anyone who would project Arab failures to mean Soviet doctrine is flawed *for Soviets* themselves is downright stupid.

Due to many varied reasons, Sov doctrine may not work all that well (and usually does not) for other forces. It may not work well if applied on Arabs, Americans, Indians or Martians.

Given many inherent Arab military characteristics (described among other places in the book quoted here), I doubt any known doctrine (equipment/training etc.) would have produced different results for them.

Oleg

[Oleg Mastruko]

Originally posted by Sergei:

He's read a few history books.

Yeah I know. I just wanted to post "you need to read more books" for auto-erotic reasons.

O.

[Runyan99]

I agree with Oleg, and it should be remembered that the Arab militaries performed miserably before Soviet advisors were ever brought in.

Rather than being a weakness, Soviet advice and training seems to have given the Arab militaries some ability to conduct competent set-piece battles when given time to plan and rehearse them. This is something they couldn't do in 1947-48, during the war of Israeli independence.

[Runyan99]

Originally posted by John D Salt:

I'd be interested to hear what people think "information management" (as distinct from recce, C4ISTAR or SA) means in this context, and the nature of the mechanism by which it helps people win or lose battles. Feel free to cite historical examples of good or bad "information management".

This is sort of a catch all term, that encompasses the following things.

1) Poor information flow up and down the chain of command, and a tendency to compartmentalize information. Officers exaggerating or falsifing reports to superiors.

2) Arab intelligence services making little effort to collect information on adversaries order of battle, doctrine, intentions, capabilities, during peacetime.

3) Tactically, junior officers rarely conducted reconnaisance, patrols, screens, observation posts, etc. Instead relying on information passed down from superiors.

[Battlefront.com]

Oleg, I consider myself an expert on only a few things in this world. WWII Eastern Front is one of them. If you think the Soviets acheived their victories through excellent tactical leadership, excellent information management, excellent weapons handling, and excellent maintenance you need to read a LOT more books. You might want to specifically do a search on the after effects of Stalin's purges of the 1930s since nobody, including Soviet officers in high standing, dennies this had a huge impact on the ability of the Soviet forces to conduct themselves sucessfully on the battlefield.

The super, dupper summation of about 18 years of my research into the Eastern Front (which includes ungodly amounts of money spent on books) is as follows:

The Germans excelled at the tactical level, the Soviets at the strategic level. Operational brilliance, and stupidity, was about even for both. The Germans focused on technological solutions, the Soviets leaned more towards brute force. As the war went on the Soviets improved dramatically, but so did the Germans. Problem was the Germans lost too much in the process, were engaged in too many big fights all at once, had an economy that was not up to the task, and more internal problems than I can shake a stick at. But tactically, even late war units were generally tough nuts to crack. There just weren't enough nuts

If you go back into the CMBB archieves you will see that I have a very profound respect for the accomplishments of the Soviet fighting forces (not just the Red Army!) and a sizeable amount of contempt for the German's conduct of the war (especially economically). But the Soviets weren't perfect, and the four issues attributed to the failure of Arab forces in the field are nearly identical to the problems they faced in 1941/42 in particular, but to some degree until the end of the war and all the way to modern day Russia.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

Michael,

Yes, but how much of that is exclusively due to the Soviet connection may not be a simple matter. I think the point that Peter raises is a valid one. Even without the Soviet connection, Arab militaries would have exhibited the traits being discussed.

Oh, I think that culture plays a large role for sure. That is independent of Soviet thinking/teaching, and therefore the similarities are coincidental and not direct. Didn't mean to undercut that point.

I was just saying that the Soviet system, which is what these countries used (at least as a boilerplate), lent itself to these military failures instead of creating a new military structure that would have put Arab forces more on a par with Israel and the West. But... since the problems are largely cultural and financial, it is not something that can happen overnight. Intensive work over decades under extremely enlightened leadership would be necessary for such a transformation to be successful. Just like one can't create a Democratic society overnight, one can also not build a flexible, modern fighting force with a few advisors, some money, and decent equipment.

Military doctrine and equipment are just tools. If you don't know how to use them, and aren't willing to invest in training and funding to keep them running, then the end result will be less than perfect. Especially if one shows up to a job and finds he's packed the wrong tools As said above, not such a problem if the force goes up against unarmed civilians or an external foe with the same failings, but going up against a Western style force... disasterous.

Steve

[ November 27, 2005, 01:44 PM: Message edited by: Battlefront.com ]

[hellfish]

I think a lot of it might have to do with conscription, no? Arab, Soviet and ARVN militaries were/are largely conscript-based - especially since a lot of their brighter citizens were exempt from military service. Soviet tactics work well for conscript armies - you don't NEED people who know how to work a machinegun's T&E mechanism on the tripod when you've got 50 MGs all firing at the same place.

Western style militaries are smaller, often smarter (universal conscription of well educated populations and/or all volunteer forces), quicker to adapt and are more easily trained consistently.

It's not saying that the Soviets didn't do anything right - it's just saying that the Soviet system of warfare isn't the same as the one that western nations espouse. You can't expect two radically different military doctrines to be equivalent. They've got their strengths and weaknesses vis-a-vis each other.

[Sergei]

Originally posted by fytinghellfish:

I think a lot of it might have to do with conscription, no?

What's wrong with conscription? USA still had it in Vietnam. Finland still uses it. Conscription does NOT equal poor training.

[John D Salt]

Originally posted by Oleg Mastruko:

[snips]

Given many inherent Arab military characteristics (described among other places in the book quoted here), I doubt any known doctrine (equipment/training etc.) would have produced different results for them.

I think the performance of the Arab Legion in 1947-48, and the Jordanian Army at times since then, is a clear case of Arabs getting very much better results.

All the best,

John.

[John D Salt]

Originally posted by Sergei:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by fytinghellfish:

I think a lot of it might have to do with conscription, no?

What's wrong with conscription? USA still had it in Vietnam. Finland still uses it. Conscription does NOT equal poor training. </font>