German-Japanese Cooperation

[Hamstersss]

Question for the political grogs out there, why didn't the Germans and Japanese share more technology and tactics? From what I understand, the Zero was an incredible airplane and I assume German panzer tactics (If not technology, considering we'd be talking about the early, early days) would have helped Japanese military actions on the mainland. On the other hand, Japanese naval air tactics, especially using superior Japanese torpedoes, sure would've helped the Luftewaffe to engage British and American naval assets.

There's also the possible collaboration on jet engine, torpedo, submarine and rocket technology, kripes, think of Komet Kamikazes in Me-162s...

[Silvio Manuel]

My guess is that such exchanges were difficult, since the land/air/sea routes b/w Japan and Germany were somewhat blocked by the Allies' presence on a N-S line from USSR south down thru Egypt/Indian Ocean, etc. I don't see why they couldn't have snuck a few morsels by, whether it's just one tech-ambassador.

Ironically, the U.S. wound up using the Uranium that Germany tried to ship to Japan on a submarine...thus Germany wound up producing some of the material used to slaughter their Japanese "allies."

[ July 26, 2002, 01:15 PM: Message edited by: Silvio Manuel ]

[Bruno Weiss]

Short answer. They didn't much like each other. Really, the Kriegsmarine at one point if

I remember correctly, made an issue of the Japanese food available to the German U-Boat crews at Japanese bases. More to the point though, it was two different types of strategic aims. The common thread might have been naval warfare, and indeed several Japanese

I-Boats were sunk in the Atlantic (a half dozen or so I think it was, over the course of the war), while the Germans did throughout hostilities provide Japan with aircraft engine technology and even some goodies which might have led to the building of an atomic weapon, eventually. But overall, communications were difficult at best, there was something of a language and cultural barrier, and the distances involved between the two did not lend to a close partnership on the field of battle. The Japanese being engaged in primarily jungle-island warfare and the Germans being for the most part engaged in open plains warfare the two of which were separated by thousands of miles. The Germans did not view the Japanese as equals per say, and the Japanese were not overly impressed with the Germans. Again, it was as I see it basically a discriminatory cultural bias. And, given the nature of the two governments, one that was naturally to be expected.

Now, the one nightmare that haunted the Russians was ofcourse, the possibility of a joint German/Japanese attack where Japan struck at the Eastern Soviet sector. But, the Japanese, in an ill-conceived attack on Soviet positions were fairly thrashed by the Russians and Manchurians at the Khalkin River on the Manchurian border in May 1939, if again memory serves me correctly, where the Japanese thereafter became pretty timid at the prospect of agreeing to what Hitler desperately wanted, a joint attack on the Soviets. The Japanese Army much preferred a joint attack on Madagascar, which almost came off and which at the time would have given the Axis control of the Indian Ocean, and cut the Allies in two. But, the Germans basically backed away from the deal, while the Japanese toyed around with it too long, deciding instead in favor of the IJN plan to draw the US Navy into a decisive battle at Midway and which then allowed the Brits to secure the island to the degree where it became impossible for the Japanese to successfully take control of it on their own, particularly after the Japanese Naval disaster that followed at the Battle of Midway Island.

There are some interesting "what if" theories based on these two opposing strategies what might have happened if, the Japanese had launched themselves into a major effort against the Eastern Soviets jointly with the Germans invading from the West, or even more tantilizing what might have happened if, the Germans had jointly invaded Madagascar with the Japanese, who then would then have avoided the defeat at Midway and subsequently linked the Axis together at the under belly of the Middle East, controlling the Indian Ocean, splitting the Allies in two, and threatening East, Central, and South Afrika, along with all of India, particularly given the Japanese invasion of Burma and East India. At that moment in time, the Allied Naval strength in the Indian Ocean was almost non-existent, Allied forces in Burma were stretched to the limit, the Indians were on the verge of revolting against the British, and the German campaign in North Africa was not as yet a completely decided event. It can easily be suggested that such a successful invasion of the East African coast might well have altered the plans for the US invasion of North Africa, and drawn the British 8th Army, possibly even the US Army away from Rommel and further to the South to counter the potential loss of South and East Africa, and to counter the ensuing threat to the South Atlantic. The what might have happened "if", guessing game is pretty interesting stuff really.

[ July 26, 2002, 03:10 PM: Message edited by: Bruno Weiss ]

[rune]

Along with the Uranium being shipped to Japan on U-234, was a ME-262, a V-2, and a dozen scientists. They were trying to share, but the distance involved was too much.

Rune

[Marlow]

Originally posted by Elijah Meeks:

From what I understand, the Zero was an incredible airplane .

The Zero was very overrated and generally inferior to the 109s and 190s that the Germans already had. Its positive points were that it was very maneuverable and had a good climb rate, but this was not enough to defeat allied fighters that were using proper tactics. Even relatively early in the war, most allied fighters were faster in level flight, and virtually all were faster in a dive. The key was for allied pilots to stay away from the zero’s strength (a low speed turning fight) and stick to a high speed hit and run style of fighting (B&Z). It was when the allied pilot tried to out turn the zero that he got into trouble. If proper tactics were used, then the allied pilot could use the higher speed of his aircraft to pick and chose when to engage, and run away if the situation favored the Zero.

It is no coincidence that virtually all late war fighter designs (including Japanese designs) sacrificed low speed maneuverability for speed.

[ July 26, 2002, 01:30 PM: Message edited by: Marlow ]

[Gyrene]

There's also the possible collaboration on jet engine, torpedo, submarine and rocket technology, kripes, think of Komet Kamikazes in Me-162s...

The Germans did share some rocket plane tech with the Japanese:

From my own pic collection, this one is at the Chino Planes of Fame:

Looks a bit familiar?

Gyrene

[Chupacabra]

On the Zero's worth: when the plane Hollywood uses as a mockup is a freaking T-6 Texan, it can't be all that hot.

[Gyrene]

Originally posted by Chupacabra:

On the Zero's worth: when the plane Hollywood uses as a mockup is a freaking T-6 Texan, it can't be all that hot.

Well, there's only one of these around that is still original and can fly:

Can't blame Hollywood for having to substitute.

Gyrene

[Frenchy]

About the Zero - don't forget the lack of self-sealing fuel tanks. When hit it made a great fireball!

[YankeeDog]

the late war Kawasaki "Ken" fighter drew heavily on the Me 109 in it's design, so there was some technolgy sharing, at least between the air forces.

The fact that this design was developed from the Me 109 suggests that the Japanese were not entirely happy with the Zero and were looking for a replacement by mid-war.

Cheers,

YD

[Alsatian]

One of the most significant exchanges between Axis members was of information. Japanese strategists visited and studied the results of the British raid on Taranto, Italy. In 1940, Swordfish torpedo planes were lauched against that Italian port and severely damaged 3 battleships.

The Japanese picked up a few pointers and tricks to be used at Pearl Harbor.

Materially, as said before, the exchanges were limited to what could be fit in submarines; both Germany and Japan building a few gigantic transport subs for this unique purpose. A few were used to get Indonesian raw materials to Germany, no? But not nearly enough to really be significant.

And don't forget that Britain thought enough of Madagascar to not leave the issue to chance. They invaded the island to wrest control of it away from the Vichy French.

[Das Reich]

Originally posted by Silvio Manuel:

My guess is that such exchanges were difficult, since the land/air/sea routes b/w Japan and Germany were somewhat blocked by the Allies' presence on a N-S line from USSR south down thru Egypt/Indian Ocean, etc. I don't see why they couldn't have snuck a few morsels by, whether it's just one tech-ambassador.

I believe a U-boat delivered fighter engine plans to the Japanese at some point int he course of the war...

I will have to dig into that one for more specifics.

[Shosties]

My understanding is that the Japanese were divided into two major camps of strategic thought: "strike north" and "strike south". Their primary goals were to achieve a decisive victory in their invasion of China and ensure access to the resources needed to keep their economy going.

The "strike north" camp saw the Soviet Union as Japan's most evident foe. They had tangled before in the Russo-Japanese war and the hotheads were left highly unsatisfied by the peace deal brokered by Teddy Roosevelt. Naturally, had the "strike north" camp prevaled, Stalin would have found himself in quite a bind, particularly if the Japanese had attacked in mid-1941 to tie down the Siberians and prevent them from being available for his winter counteroffensive against the Germans. However, when asked just how their plans would satisfy Japan's primary goals, they did not sound very convincing. That Siberia was a treasure trove of oil and minerals I don't think was known or widely appreciated at the time, so it would not have seemed a ready answer to Japan's resource troubles. Add to this the defeat at Khalkin Gol, which showed the Japanese Army rather unprepared to fight the Red Army.

The "strike south" camp saw the Dutch East Indies, the Phillipines, and so on as the ideal place to acquire resources. That going after these would force a conflict with America already hostile over China was beyond doubt, so the centerpiece of this strategy was a knockout blow to the U.S. Pacific and Asiatic fleets and the Army and Marine garrisons in the region. Surely such a blustering opponent as America, throwing it's political weight around without being seriously prepared for war (a lesson to be learned here folks!!) would balk at the cost of retaking the lost ground and sea. That the Navy would be doing the major lifting in this scenario was actually attractive to the more politically powerful Army as it meant fewer resources would need to be diverted from China.

(Ironically, it is unclear how either strategy really would have resulted in a decisive victory in China, it all seems like a lot of handwaving to me. [EDIT] Aha, the strike southers could at least point to the Burma Road! [/EDIT])

So that is basically why what happened, happened, as I understand it. Germany and Japan's alliance was more along the lines of moral and propaganda support than a strategic partnership. The Allies certainly devoted much more and much better cooperative thinking and effort at the level of grand strategy considering the inevitable differences of view and competing post war agendas.

[ July 26, 2002, 04:05 PM: Message edited by: Shosties4th ]

[Chupacabra]

Originally posted by Gyrene:

Well, there's only one of these around that is still original and can fly:

Can't blame Hollywood for having to substitute.

Gyrene

Oh, I don't blame Hollywood for making the substitute. I blame the Japanese Navy for designing a fighter plane that looks like a prop trainer that's been around at least since the '50s

[Michael Dorosh]

If you guys would only play the demo for Battlefield 1942 or whatever POS coolcolj is hawking in the GF, you will realize the Japanese had Sturmgewehrs and Sd Kfz 251s and lotsa cool stuff.

[Bruno Weiss]

Yeah, but do they got Finnish calvary?!?

[ July 26, 2002, 03:14 PM: Message edited by: Bruno Weiss ]

[Geier]

Originally posted by Marlow:

The Zero was very overrated and generally inferior to the 109s and 190s that the Germans already had.

It had superior fuel economy and range if memory serves me. Which wasn't a bad thing in the Pacific where flying at top speed for a little too long could mean you needed a terminal bath. The designs were very different and were created to fulfill completely different purposes, esp if you compare the Zero with the FW-190.

To return to the topic and disregard it for a bit (Since I think Herr Weiss answered it nicely):

What would imo have been really interesting were if Adolf had not declared war on the US after Pearl Harbour but instead kicked the Japanese out of the Axis. Maybe even made sympathetic noises in DC on December 8th. That might have left him just one (instead of two) of the worlds two industrial giants to fight. Or not.

[Shosties]

Originally posted by Elijah Meeks:

think of Komet Kamikazes in Me-162s...

There was the Ohka, "cherry blossom", code named Baka, "fool", by the Allies.

http://www.aerospaceweb.org/aircraft/attack/ohka/index.shtml

I've heard that there was insufficent control surface area to affect terminal manuevers during the high speed dive (or maybe transsonic effects were kicking in?) so most never hit their targets.

[Splinty]

In a way it seems to me that the political racism of the Nazis would have collided with the cultural racism of the Japanese.

[Gen-x87H]

I believe if Hitler didnt make the blunder of declaring war on the United States it would have been harder for the U.S. to get into the war in Europe. There was a strong German lobby in washington at the time which really hindered help directly to Britain. And the thought of coming to the aid of the Communists when Germany wanted nothing to do with the U.S. would have left us with the option of kicking Japans arse.

It would have been interesting IMO.

Gen

[Rat]

Originally posted by Splinty:

In a way it seems to me that the political racism of the Nazis would have collided with the cultural racism of the Japanese.

There you go. The Nazis racist opinions stopped them from getting anymore connections but the strict neccesairy ones. The only thing they had in common was that both natins were pissed of at the rest of the world since they believed the way the world was setting their rules was good for the rest but negatively affected both Axis forces.

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Shosties4th:

Ironically, it is unclear how either strategy really would have resulted in a decisive victory in China, it all seems like a lot of handwaving to me.

In the case of the southern strike, oil. After the American embargo was put in place (and joined by the British and the Dutch) Japan had a reserve of only six months. Without oil, everything grinds to a halt, the economy and the war in China. Going after the NEI theoretically guarantees them a supply of oil, provided they can get the refineries back into production and protect their tankers. Big if there.

Of course, none of this assures them of victory in China, merely that there is no immediate defeat.

Michael

[ July 26, 2002, 07:28 PM: Message edited by: Michael emrys ]

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Chupacabra:

...a prop trainer that's been around at least since the '50s

Actually since at least the early '40s. BTW, in addition to impersonating Zeros, the Texan has also stood in for P-47s and Typhoons/Tempests (cf. A Bridge Too Far).

Michael

[ July 26, 2002, 07:37 PM: Message edited by: Michael emrys ]

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Splinty:

In a way it seems to me that the political racism of the Nazis would have collided with the cultural racism of the Japanese.

To get around this, the Nazis adopted the expedient of declaring the Japanese "honorary Aryans".

Michael

[Michael Emrys]

To return to the original question, the German/Japanese "alliance" was strictly a marriage of convenience aimed primarily at discouraging the US from becoming an active belligerent. There was no real attachment between the two cultures (in fact, the Germans had been providing instructors and weapons to the Nationalist Chinese army for some time). But both wanted the British and the French out of the way so as to have a free hand in the areas they wanted to bring under their control, most of Asia for the Japanese and Eastern Europe for the Germans.

Michael