German Tactics

[Michael Dorosh]

Read and Discuss

Source: U.S. War Department "Handbook On German Military Forces"

(Mar'45) TM-E 30-451

Officially released from restricted status by the U.S. Army Center

For Military History.

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Chapter IV

TACTICS

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Section I. GENERAL TACTICAL DOCTRINES

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1. BASIC DOCTRINES.

An outstanding characteristic of the German nation is it's fondness for everything connected with militarism. This is based not only on traditional sentiment but also on long-range

and intense education that glorifies the military spirit.

This gives the German military leaders the essential foundation for aggressive military operations.

The Germans believe that only the offensive can achieve success on the field, particularly when combined with the element of surprise. German military literature, for the

past century, has emphasized the need for aggressiveness in all military operations.

The Germans have been thoroughly aware of the psychological component in warfare and have developed systematic terrorization to a high degree.

At the same time they have placed considerable reliance on novel and sensational weapons such as the mass use of armor, the robot

bomb, and the super-heavy tank. Their principal weaknesses in this regard have been their failure to integrate these new techniques with established arms and tactics - German field artillery, for example, did not maintain pace with German armor - and their devotion to automatic weapons at the expense of accuracy.

A highly trained officer corps and a thoroughly disciplined army are the necessary elements to implement this aggressive philosophy. German tactical doctrines stress the responsibility

and the initiative of subordinates. The belief of former years that the German army was inflexible and lacking in initiative has been completely destroyed in this war, in which aggressive

and daring leadershiip has been responsible for many bold decisions. Yet, while the Germans have many excellent tacticians,they tend to repeat the same type of maneuvers, a fact which has been fully exploited by Allied commanders.

The German specialization in particular types of warfare such as mountain, desert, winter, or the attack on fortified positions, showed thorough preparation and ingenuity. At the

same time, the Germans had been quite willing to learn from their opponents and on numerous occasions have copied Allied tactics and weapons.

2. RECENT TACTICAL TRENDS

Fron the time when the German Army was forced on the defensive

by the Allied armies, German tactical doctrines have undergone

modifications such as renunciation (except in unstated instances)

of air support, and the substitution of linear defense for

elastic offensive defense.

The primary goal of Germany today is to gain time and to

achieve victory in a political sense, since the Germans are

no longer capable of a military victory. Of necessity their

military operations now supplement this effort and have become

a large-scale delaying action.

3. EXERCISE OF COMMAND

The U.S. and German doctrines applied in exercise of the command

are virtually identical. The Germans stress the necessity of the

staff in assisting the commander to evaluate the situation

and in preparing and disseminating orders to the lower units.

They emphasize that the commander should be well forward with

his units not only for the purpose of facilitating communication,

but also because his presence has a salutory effect on the troops.

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Section II. RECONNAISSANCE

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a: PURPOSE.

The purpose of reconnaissance and they types of units employed

to obtain information are similar in the U.S. and the German Armies.

German tactical principles of reconnaissance, however, diverge

somewhat from those of the U.S. The Germans stress aggressiveness,

attempt to obtain superiority in the area to be reconnoitered,

and strive for continuous observation of the enemy. They believe in

employing reconnaissance units in force as a rule. They expect

and are prepared to fight to obtain the desired information.

Often they assign supplementary tasks to their reconnaissance units,

such as sabotage behind enemy lines, harassment, or counter-

reconnaissance.

b. TECHNIQUE.

Only enough reconnaissance troops are sent on a mission to assure

superiority in the area to be reconnoitered. Reserves are kept

on hand to be committed when the reconnaissance must be

intensified, when the original force meets strong enemy opposition,

or when the direction and area to be reconnoitered are changed.

The Germans encourage aggressive action against enemy security

forces. When their reconaissance units meet superior forces, they

fight a delaying action while other units attempt to flank the

enemy.

c. CLASSIFICATION.

Reconnaissance is classified by the Germans as operational, tactical,

and battle reconaissance - corresponding to the U.S. distant,

close, and battle reconnaissance.

2. OPERATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE (Operative Aufklarung)

Operational reconnaissance, penetrating over a large area in

great depth, provides the basis for strategic planning and

action. This type of reconnaissance is intended to determine

the location and activities of enemy forces, particularly

localities of rail concentrations, forward or rearward

displacements of personnel, loading or unloading areas of

army elements, the construction of field or permanent

fortifications, and hostile air force concentrations.

Identification of large enemy motorized elements, especially

on an open flank, is important. Operational reconnaissance is

carried out by the Air Force and by motorized units. Aerial

photography units operate at altitudes of 16,500 to 26,500

feet. Since missions assigned to operational air reconnaissance

are generally limited to the observation of important roads

and railroads, reconnaissance sectors and areas normally

are not assigned. The motorized units employed for

operational reconnaissance have only directions and

objectives assigned.

3. TACTICAL RECONNAISSANCE (Taktische Aufklarung)

a. PURPOSE

Tactical reconnaissance, carried out in the area behind the

operational reconnaissance, provides the basis for the commitment

of troops. Its mission embraces identification of the enemy's

organization, disposition, strength, and antiaircraft defense;

determination of the enemy's reinforcement capabilities; and

terrain reconnaissance of advance sectors. Air Force

reconnaissance units and motorized and mounted reconnaissance

battalions are employed for tactical reconnaissance. Their

direction and radius of employment are based upon the results

of the operational reconnaissance.

b. AIR RECONNAISSANCE.

Tactical air reconnaissance is normally made from altitudes of

6,500 to 16,000 feet. As a rule, air reconnaissance units

are assigned specific reconnaissance areas, the boundaries

of which normally do not coincide with sectors assigned to

ground units. Reconnaissance planes generally are employed

singly.

c. GROUND RECONNAISSANCE.

Sectors of responsibility are assigned to ground tactical

reconnaissance battalions. In order to make them independent

or to facilitate their change of direction, battalions may

be assigned only reconnaissance objectives. In such instances,

boundary lines separate adjacent units. The Germans avoid

using main roads as boundary lines, defining the sectors

in such a way that main roads fall within the reconnaissance

sectors. The width of a sector is determined by the situation,

the type and strength of the reconnaissance battalion,

the road net, and the terrain. In general, the width of a

sector assigned to a motorized reconnaissance batalion does

not exceed 30 miles.

d. ORDERS FOR TACTICAL RECONNAISSANCE.

Orders issued to a reconnaissance battalion or it's patrols

normally contain, in addition to the mission, the following:

(1) Line of departure

(2) Information concerning adjacent reconnaissance units

(3) Sector boundaries or direction of operation.

(4) Objectives.

(5) Phase lines.

(6) Instructions for transmission of reports.

(7) Location of immediate objectives whose attainment is to

be reported.

(8) Instructions regarding air-ground liaison.

(9) Time of departure, route, and objective of the main force.

e. TACTICAL RECONNAISSANCE PROCEDURES.

When a motorized reconnaissance column expects contact with the

enemy, it advances by leaps and bounds. The length of bounds

depends on the cover the terrain offers as well as on the road

net. As the distance from the enemy decreases, the bounds are

shortened. The Germans utilize roads as long as possible and

usually use different routes for the advance and the return.

The reconnaissance battalion commander normally sends out

patrols which advance by bounds. Their distance in front of

the battalion depends on the situation, the terrain, and

the range of the signal equipment, but as a rule they are not

more than an hour's travelling distance (about 25 miles)

ahead of the battalion. The battalion serves as the reserve

for the patrols and as an advance message center (Meldekopf),

collecting the messages and relaying them to the rear.

Armored reconnaissance cars, armored half-tracks, or

motorcycles compose the motorized reconnaissance patrols,

whose exact composition depends on their mission and on

the situation. Motorcycles are used to fill in gaps and

intervals, thereby thickening the reconnaissance net.

When the proximity of the enemy does not permit profitable

employment of the motorized reconnaissance battalion, it is

withdrawn and the motorized elements of the divisional

reconnaissance battalion take over.

Divisional reconnaissance battalions seldom operate more

than one day's march (18 miles) in front of the division,

covering an area approximately 6 miles wide.

4. BATTLE RECONNAISSANCE. (Gefechtsaufklarung)

a. GENERAL

Battle reconnaissance as a rule is begun when the opposing

forces begin to deploy. All troops participating in battle

carry out battle reconnaissance through patrols, artillery

observation posts, observation battalions, and air

reconnaissance units. The information obtained on the

organization and strength of the enemy provides the basis

for the conduct of the battle.

b. ARMORED CAR PATROLS.

The Panzer division dispatches armored reconnaissance units

equipped with armored vehicles and numerous automatic weapons.

The armored reconnaissance unit is fast and has a wide

radius of action.

Armored car patrols normally are composed of three armored

reconnaissance cars, one of which is equipped with radio. An

artillery observer often accompanies the patrol so that in

an emergency fire can be brought down quickly. This type of

patrol usually is organized for missions lasting one to two

days. Tasks are defined clearly, and nothing is allowed to

interfere with the patrols's main objective. If enemy forces

are met, action is avoided unless the force is so weak that

it can be destroyed without diverting the patrol from it's

main task. If enemy action is anticipated, the patrol is

reinforced with self-propelled guns and occasionally with

tanks. Engineers and motorcyclists are often attached to

the patrol to deal with road blocks and demolitions.

While scouting a woods, a favorite German ruse is to drive

the leading car towards it's edge, halt briefly to observe,

and then drive off rapidly, hoping to draw enemy fire that

will disclose the enemy positions.

At road blocks, the leading car opens fire. If fire is not

returned, men dismount and go forward to attach tow ropes to

the road block. If necessary, the patrol dismounts and

proceeds with machine guns to reconnoiter on foot.

A patrol is never split up, but in open country distances

between cars may be as much as 200 to 300 yards.

c. OBSERVATION BATTALION AND AIR RECONNAISSANCE.

The German observation battalion locates enemy artillery

and heavy weapons positions by sound and flash ranging and

evaluated aerial photographs. The Air Force assists in

battalion reconnaissance by observing the distribution of

the enemy's forces, his artillery, bivouac and movements,

reserves, tank assemblies, and any other special occurences

behind the front. In general, air battle reconnaissance is

executed under 6,000 feet.

d. BATTLE RECONNAISSANCE PATROLS (Spahtruppen)

The Germans send out reconnaissance patrols consisting of

a noncommissioned officer and three or four men, to get such

information as the location of enemy positions and minefields.

They generally avoid contact and retreat when fired on.

e. COMBAT PATROLS (Gefechtsspahtruppen or Strosstruppen)

These consist of at least one noncommissioned officer and

eight men, but are usually stronger. As a rule, the combat

patrol is commanded by a sergeant who has under him 15 to 20

men, organized in two equal sections, each commanded by a

section leader. These are raiding patrols, and their mission

often includes bringing back prisoners of war. Since Allied

air supremacy has neutralized German air reconnaissance to

a great extent, the Germans have placed increased importance

on prisoners of war, especially officers, as a source of

information on enemy strength, dispositions, and intentions.

Combat or other types of patrols are often sent out to test

the strength of enemy outposts. If an outpost proves to be

weakly held, the patrol attacks, occupies the position, and

remains there until relieved by troops from the rear. If the

patrol is strongly garrisoned, the patrol attempts to

return with a prisoner of war.

f. SPECIAL PATROLS (Spahtruppen mit besonderen Aufgaben)

These vary in strength in accordance with their special mission.

Special patrols are sent to carry out such tasks as demolitions,

engaging of enemy patrols that have penetrated German positions,

and ambushing enemy supply columns.

g. MISCELLANEOUS RECONNAISSANCE.

Engineer patrols are employed to reconnoiter approaches to

fortified areas, defiles, or rivers. Artillery patrols, usually

consisting of an officer and a few mounted men, reconnoiter

routes of approach, observation posts, and firing positions.

h. TERRAIN RECONNAISSANCE. (Gelandeerkundung)

The Germans place great emphasis on terrain reconnaissance,

realizing the influence terrain has upon the conduct of

operations. Most of their usual reconnaissance missions

include terrain reconnaissance tasks. Terrain may be so

important at times as to require reconnaissance by special

units. Ground and air reconnaissance units give special

attention to the road net - its density, condition, road blocks,

mines, and demolitions - as well to the terrain itself,

particularly tank country.

i. EQUIPMENT AND SUPPORT.

The Germans equip their ground battle-reconnaissance patrols

with machine pistols and one or two light machine guns that

are used to cover the patrol's approach or withdrawal.

Engineers often are attached to guide a patrol through German

minefields and to clear a way through enemy wire or mines.

Artillery support is given in the form of harassing fire

put down just before the patrol reaches its objective.

Sometimes the artillery fires into adjacent sectors to

mislead the enemy as to the actual area to be reconnoitered.

In other instances, artillery and mortars that have

registered during the previous day shell during the

night the area to be reconnoitered. As soon as the barrage

is lifted, the patrol advances under cover of machine-gun

fire from flanking positions.

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SECTION III. MARCHES

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1. GENERAL

The formations and the organizations of the march column in day

or night advances are the same in the German Army as in the U.S.

Army and are governed by the same principles. for a smooth

functioning of the march the Germans stress: systematic training

and practice; attention to physical welfare; care of vehicles

and equipment; previous reconnaissance of routes; warning orders;

and the issue of detailed march orders.

2. ORGANIZATION AND CONTROL OF THE MARCH COLUMN

In order to secure the march column against enemy attacks, the

Germans divide the column in the same manner as U.S. doctrine

prescribes, namely into Advance Guard (Vorhut), Main Body (Gros),

and Rear Guard (Nachhut). German equivalents for the U.S. terms are:

ADVANCE GUARD

Spitze Point

Spitzenkompanie Advance Party

Vortrupp Support

Haupttrupp Reserve

REAR GUARD

Nachspitze Rear Point

Nachspitzenkompanie Rear Party

Nachtrupp Support

Haupttrupp Reserve

The issue of orders for march and traffic control is the

responsibility of the higher command. Movement by road of

formations from battalion strength upward is carried out in

the Zone of the Interior at the orders of the Army High Command

(OKH) or a headquarters acting on the orders of the Army High

Command. In the Theater of War such movements are controlled by

Army Headquarters, which issues orders in accordance with

instructions from Army High Command or the Army Group. Movements

in the areas of military commanders of line-of-communication

areas are controlled by orders of the commanders of such areas.

Orders for movement are issued to the formations of fighting

troops by the operations group of headquarters; those to supply

services and units in the line-of-communication area emanate

from the supply and administrative group.

The Germans set up a well organized traffic control service

which is under the orders of the operations group. All traffic

control services usually wear orange-red brassards, while

the members of the military police are distinguished by

metal gorgets.

The Germans allot to each front-line division its own road

or sector of advance, usually marked by advance parties. General

Headquarters or any other troops directed simultaneously on

the same roads, are subordinated to the division for the

duration of the move. All-weather roads usually are alloted

to motorized or armored divisions, while subsidiary roads

are assigned to infantry divisions.

3. CONDUCT OF THE MARCH.

When a German infantry division advances along several routes,

an infantry element normally forms the head of each main body.

The commander of the main body usually marches at or near the

head of the main body. The motorized elements of the division,

unless employed on reconnaissance or security missions, are

organized into one or more motor echelons which follow the

march column by bounds, or move in a column along a separate

road. Before the march begins, the division signal battalion

lays a trunk telephone line as far forward as the situation

permits and extends this line while the march proceeds. The

leading signal unit usually marches with the support of the

advance guard and establishes telephone stations at important

points. In a march along several roads the trunk line

normally is laid along the route of the division commander

and his staff. In addition to the construction of the trunk

line, the Germans stress radio communications to the rear

and flanks, as well as the use of messengers mounted on

horses, bicycles, or motorcycles.

4. SECURITY OF MARCH COLUMNS.

As a rule, the Germans allot motorized units for the

protection of the flanks and rear of march columns. However,

a smaller unit, such as a battalion, may advance without

security detachments.

The Germans are very much concerned about antiaircraft

protective measures and often march in open columns

(Fliegermarschtiefe); an advance in deployed formation

(Fliegermarschbreite) is seldom practical. Antiaircraft

defense is concentrated at important terrain features,

such as bridges, crossroads, and defiles. Because of

Allied air supremacy the Germans now instruct their

troops to conduct movements and the transport of supplies

only at night, and without lights. They also order their

troops to leave burned out vehicles standing on the road

to attract fresh attacks by enemy aircraft.

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Chapter IV

TACTICS (continued)

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SECTION IV. OFFENSIVE

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1. GENERAL

The fundamental principle of German offensive doctrine is to

encircle and destroy the enemy. The objective of the combined arms

in attack is to bring the armored forces and the infantry into

decisive action against the enemy with sufficient fire power

and shock. Superiority in force and fire power, the employment

of armored forces, as well as the surprise element, play a great

part in the offensive.

Coordination between the combined arms under a strong unified

command is, the Germans emphasize, an absolute requisite to the

success of these shock tactics. This has become more and more

true as the Allies have developed effective antitank weapons

and have adopted deeper defenses, limiting the self-sufficiency

of German tanks. To counter these measures, the Germans have

increased the mobility and armor protection of their

motor-borne infantry, and have mounted a large proportion

of both their direct and indirect heavy support weapons on self-

propelled carriages.

In attempting thoroughly to paralyze the defender up to the

moment of the tank-infantry assault, the Germans realize that

even the most formidable forces are never sufficient for

overwhelming superiority on the entire front. They therefore

select a point of main effort (Schwerpunkt) for a breakthrough,

alloting narrow sectors of attack (Gefechtsstreifen) to the

troops committed at the decisive locality. There they also

mass the bulk of their heavy weapons and reserves. The other

sectors of the front are engaged by weaker, diversionary forces.

In selecting the point of main effort, the Germans consider

weaknesses in the enemy's defensive position; suitabiltiy

of the terrain, especially for tanks and for cooperation

of all arms; approach routes; and possibilites for

supporting fire, especially artillery. Although the Germans

select a point of main effort in all attacks, they usually

also make plans for shifting their main effort if they

meet unexpected success elsewhere. To allow such shifts,

sufficient reserves and a strong, unified command are

organized.

An attack along a narrow front, according to German doctrine,

must have sufficient forces at it's disposal to widen the

penetration while maintaining its impetus, and to protect the

flanks of the penetration. Once the attack is launched, it

must drive straight to its objective, regardless of opposition.

2. TYPES OF ATTACK

a. FLANK ATTACK (Flankenangriff)

The Germans consider that the most effective attack is against

the enemy's flank. The flank attack develops either from the

approach march - sometimes through a turning movement - or from

flank marches. It attempts to surprise the enemy and permit him

no time for countermeasures. Since mobility and the deception of

the enemy at other positions are required, the flank attack

is most successfully mounted from a distance; the troop

movements necessary for the maneuver can be executed in close

proximity to the enemy only with unusually favorable terrain

or at night. Attacks are launched on both flanks only when

the Germans consider their forces clearly superior.

b. ENVELOPMENT (Umfassungsangriff)

The envelopment is a combination flank-and-frontal attack

especially favored by the Germans. The envelopment may be directed

on either or both the enemy's flanks, and is accompanied by

a simultaneous frontal attack to fix the enemy's forces.

The deeper the envelopment goes into the enemy's flanks,

the greater the danger of being enveloped oneself. The Germans

therefore emphasize the necessity of strong reserves and

organization of the enveloping forces in depth. Success of

the envelopment depends on the extent to which the enemy is

able to dispose his forces in the threatened direction.

c. ENCIRCLEMENT (Einkreisung).

An encirclement, the Germans think, is a particularly

decisive form of attack, but usually more difficult to execute

than a flank attack or an envelopment. In an encirclement, the

enemy is not attacked at all in front, or is attacked in front

only by light forces, while the main attacking force passes

entirely around him, with the objective of maneuvering him

out of position. This requires extreme mobility and deception.

d. FRONTAL ATTACK (Frontalangriff).

The Germans consider the frontal attack the most difficult

of execution. It strikes the enemy at his stongest point, and

therefore requires superiority of men and materiel. A frontal

attack should be made only at a point where the infantry can

break through into favorable terrain in the depth of the

enemy position. The frontage of the attack should be wider

than the actual area (Schwerpunkt) chosen for penetration,

in order to tie down the enemy on the flanks of the

breakthrough. Adequate reserves must be held ready to

counter the employment of the enemy's reserves.

e. WING ATTACK (Flugelangriff)

An attack directed at one or both of the enemy's wings has,

the Germans teach, a better chance of success than a central

frontal attack, since only a part of the enemy's weapons

are faced, and only one flank of the attacking force or

forces is exposed to enemy fire. Bending back one wing may

give an opportunity for a flank attack, or for a single or

double envelopment.

f. PENETRATION (Einbruch) AND BREAKTHROUGH (Durchbruch)

These are not separate forms of attack, but rather the

exploitation of a successful attack on the enemy's front, wing,

or flank. The penetration destroys the continuity of the

hostile front. The broader the penetration, the deeper

can the penetration wedge be driven. Strong reserves

throw back enemy counterattacks against the flanks of

the penetration German units are trained to exploit a

penetration to the maximum so that it may develop into a

complete breakthrough before hostile countermeasures can be

launched on an effective scale. The deeper the attacker

penetrates, the more effectively cn he envelop and

frustrate the attempts of the enemy to close his front again

by withdrawal to the rear. The attacking forces attempt

to reduce individual enemy positions by encircling and

isolating them. The Germans do not consider a breakthrough

successful until they overcome the enemy's artillery

positions, which usually is the special task of tanks.

Reserve units roll up the enemy's front from the

newly created flanks.

The Germans often refer to this maneuver as "Keil und Kessel".

3. ORGANIZATION OF THE ATTACK

a. ATTACK ORDER.

The attack order (Angriffsbefehl) generally contains the

objective of the attack, the disposition of the infantry, unit

sectors and boundaries, disposition and support missions of

the artillery, location of reserves, and the time of attack.

The order is not drawn up in accordance with any stereotyped form,

but as a rule follows this pattern:

(1) Estimate of the situation

(disposition of hostile and friendly troops)

(2) Mission.

(3) Assembly areas for the forward companies; objective; sector

boundaries; orders for the continuation of combat

reconnaissance.

(4) Instructions for the preparation of the heavy-weapons fire

support, especially for massed fire.

(5) Orders to the artillery for fire preparation and coordination.

(6) Assembly areas for the reserves.

(7) Time of attack.)

(8) Instructions for rear services (medial service and supplies).

(9) Location of command posts.

(10) Miscellaneous.

b. SECTORS OF ATTACK.

The width of a sector assigned to an infantry unit in the attack

depends on the unit's mission and battle strength, on terrain

conditions, on the availlable fire support of all arms, and on

the probable strength of enemy resistance. Normally the sector

assigned to a platoon is betwen 165 and 220 yards. A company

attack sector is about 330 to 550 yards. A battalion sector

is about 440 to 1,100 yards, while a division sector may be

4,400 yards to 5,500 yards. These sectors also provide the

boundaries for the other arms, especially for the artillery

in support of the infantry, although the artillery may

utilize favorable observation positions in neighboring sectors.

This also applies to the heavy infantry weapons.

For large units the sectors are determined from the map; for

smaller units, from the terrain. These sectors extend as deep into

enemy territory as the plan of battle may require. As the

situation develops, changes are frequently made. Important

points always lie within units' sectors, unless they are to

be attacked by several units. The Germans do not consider it

necessary to occupy the whole width of the sector with

troops. Open flanks ordinarily are not bounded.

c. FIRE PLAN.

Fire superiority is achieved through coordination of the

infantry and artillery weapons. The basis of the fire plan

(Feuerplan) is the regulation of the commitment of

all weapons. The fire plan includes the following:

(1) Assignment of combat missions.

(2) Distribution of observation sectors and fields of fire

for the infantry and the artillery.

(3) An estimate of capabilities of the artillery for

effective execution of the combat mission.

(4) Orders for the commencement of fire and fire schedules.

(5) Orders for the preparation for massed fire.

(6) Instructions for ammunition supply.

The Germans stress the coordination of flat and high trajectory

weapons so that all dead spaces are covered by fire. Lack of

signal equipment however, often hinders the application of

this principle.

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SECTION IV. OFFENSIVE (continued)

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4. CONDUCT OF THE ATTACK

a. GENERAL.

Most of the German successes in the present war have been

achieved with armored formations. Years of secret training and

equipping were devoted to the development of the Panzer division.

The original German blitzkrieg tactics were based on the belief

in the irresistable power of tank formations operating

independently with the support of dive- bombers. Considerable

modifications have taken place in this theory over the past

few years. At the present time, the offensive tactics of the

Germans are less spectacularly bold than they were in 1939, but

the fundamental theory behind them has changed remarkably little,

though in their armored tactics they stress more tank-infantry

coordination since unlimited air support is no longer at their

command.

The main weight of all major German attacks since 1939 was

borne by the Panzer division. Where infantry divisions have

been employed, they were limited to local attacks on a

comparatively minor scale, or to mopping up in rear of the

Panzer divisions. The Germans never envisaged a full-scale

attack by infantry formations on fixed defenses. German tactics

have been to outflank or encircle the main area of the enemy

defenses with tank formations and to have the infantry roll

up the defenses from the rear, or to break frontally through

the enemy defenses with massed tanks and develop the famous

"Keil und Kessel" maneuver.

The Germans learned at heavy cost the futility of charging

a hostile antitank defense with tank concentrations and of

engaging in tank-versus-tank combat without having

superiority in range and armament. They have learned that

large formations of tanks cannot achieve a breakthrough,

opposed by an effective screen of antitank guns, without

the assistance of other arms. Therefore attention has to be

given to the combined tactics of tanks and Panzer Grenadiers,

the mechanized or motorized infantry who accompany the tanks.

Great emphasis in German offensive theory is laid on the role

of the artillery, but in practice the artillery-support role

has devolved to an ever-increasing degree on the tanks and

assault guns. Nevertheless, the principle that the supporting

fire should be concentrated on a narrow frontage where the

tanks and infantry are most likely to achieve a breakthrough

has been retained.

The fact that part of the enemy resistance is likely to remain

undisclosed until the attack has already begun has caused the

Germans permanently to decentralize a portion of the field

artillery. This tendency has led to the emergence and continual

development of the assault guns, whose main function is the close

support of infantry and tanks in the attack. Their armor and

mobility allow them to operate much farther forward than the

field artillery.

The tendency to detach field artillery battalions from their

field artillery regiment remains strong. In fact, this tendency

is so prevalent that a concentration of massed artillery preceeding

an attack seldom is achieved, necessitating, as it does, a great

degree of centralized control. The Germans however, replace the

massed artillery fire to a large extent with the fire of multi-

barreled mortars and rocket projectors, though these latter

have not the accuracy of the former.

The Germans make a clear distinction between an attack made

from movement and an attack from a prepared position, which is the

more common of the two.

b: ATTACK BY MECHANIZED AND MOTORIZED FORCES.

(1) THE ATTACK

In armored-force operations, the Germans stress the

need for the concentrated employment, at the decisive place and

time, of the entire combined command of tanks and other arms, less

necessary reserves. The tanks constitute the striking force of

such a command and normally advance as the first echelon of the

attack. Their primary mission is to break through and attack the

enemy artillery, rather than to seek out and destroy enemy tanks,

which can be more effectively engaged by antitank units. The mission

of the other arms is to assist the tanks in their advance, and

particularly to eliminated antitank weapons. The smallest combat

unit in such a force of combined arms is the comany.

The basic formation for the tank platoon, company, and battalion

are file, double file, wedge, and blunt wedge. The type of formation

used for a specific task depends to a large extent on terrain

conditions and the strength of enemy opposition. A German tank

platoon normally consists of one command tank and two tank squads

of two tanks each.

The tank regiment normally attacks in waves, in either of the

following manners:

The tank regiment is echeloned in depth, one tank battalion

following the other. The regimental commander's location is between

the two battalions. This formation has the advantages of a sufficiently

wide front (about 1100 yards), and close contact by the company

commander of his units in the conduct of the attack. When two tank

battalions are attacking, one behind the other, it takes them about

half an hour to pass their own infantry.

When the two-battalions-abreast formation is employed, it is

almost essential that another tank regiment form the following

wave. This formation usually has the disadvantage of being too wide.

The regimental commander cannot observe his units, and he has no

units of his own behind him which he can commit in a decisive moment.

The attack normally proceeds in three waves.

The first wave thrusts to the enemy's antitank defense and artillery

positions.

The second wave provides covering fire for the first wave, and

then attacks the enemy's infantry positions, preceded, accomapanied,

or followed by part of the Panzer Grenadiers, who dismount as close

as possible to the point where they must engage the enemy. The

objectives of the second wave are the remaining antitank positions,

positions of heavy infantry-support weapons, and machine-gun

emplacements which hold up the advance of the infantry.

The third wave, accompanied by the remainder of the Panzer Grenadiers,

mops up.

These three waves now often are telescoped into two, the first wave

speeding through the enemy's positions as far as his gun positions,

the second crushing the enemy's forward positions in detail and

mopping up the opposition no dealt with by the first wave or which has

revived since the first wave passed through.

A typical attack formation of this type might be divided up among

the Panzer division's units as follows: the first wave, on a frontage

of about 2,000 to 3,000 yards, might consist of one tank battalion,

two companies forward, supported on the flanks by elements of the

assault gun battalion. Close to the rear of the first wave usually

follow one or two Panzer Grenadier companies in armored half-tracks.

About 150 yards to the rear of the first wave moves the second

wave, formed of the second tank battalion in the same formation,

closely followed by the remainder of the armored Panzer Grenadiers,

who are in turn followed at some distance by the motorized Panzer

Grenadiers. The flanks are protected by antitank guns which normally

operate by platoons, moving by bounds. The artillery forward observer

travels in his armored vehicles with the first wave, while the

artillery commander of the supporting artillery units usually

travels with the tank commander. Assault guns normally also accompany

the second wave.

The tanks help each other forward by fire and movement, medium or

heavy tanks taking up hull-down firing positions and giving covering

fire while the faster tanks advance to the next commanding feature.

Then the latter give covering fire to the former moving forward

to their next bound.

Once the first wave has reached the rear of the enemy's forward

defenses, it pushes straight on to attack the enemy's artillery. As

soon as these positions have been neutralized, the tanks reform

beyond the artillery positions and either prepare to exploit the attack

or form an all-round defensive position on suitable ground.

The tank commander, as the leader of the strongest unit, is in most

cases in command of the combat team, and all the other participating

arms (Panzer Grenadiers, artillery, engineers, and antitank units)

are placed under him. The Germans realize that a strong and unified

command is an essential feature of any military operation. For

certain missions, however, tank units are attached to another arm,

in which case the tank commander is consulted before the final

plans for the operations are made.

(2) INFANTRY-TANK COOPERATION

When the enemy has well prepared positions with natural or

constructed tank obstacles, the German infantry attacks before

the tanks and clears the way. The objective of the infantry is

to penetrate into the enemy position and destroy enemy antitank

weapons to the limit of it's strength and the fire power of it's

own support weapons, augmented by additional support and covering

fire from the tanks and self-propelled weapons sited in their rear.

Only after the destruction of the enemy antitank defense can

the tanks be employed on the battle line to the fullest advantage.

When the tank obstacles in front of the enemy position are already

destroyed, and no additional tank obstacles are to be expected in

the depth of the enemy's main defensive position, the infantry

breaks through simultaneously with the tank unit. The infantry

attack is conducted in the same manner as it would be without the

cooperation of tanks. Heavy infantry weapons are kept in readiness

to fire at possible newly discovered antitank positions. Of

particular importance is protection of the open flanks by echeloning

the flank units and employing heavy weapons at the flanks.

In most cases, the infantry follows the tanks closely, taking

advantage of the fire power and parazyzing effects of the tanks

upon the enemy's defense. The Germans normally transport the

infantry to the line of departure on tanks or troop-carrying

vehicles in order to protect the infantry and to increase it's

speed. The infantry leaves the vehicles at the last possible

moment, and goes into action mainly with light automatic weapons.

The tanks advance by bounds from cover to cover, reconnoitering

the terrain ahead and providing protective fire for the dismounted

Panzer Grenadiers. The tanks do not slow their advance to enable

the infantry to keep continuous pace with them, but advance alone

and wait under cover until the infantry catches up with the advance.

Terrain that does not offer sufficient cover is crossed with the

grreatest possible speed.

The infantry attacks in small formations also by bounds under the

fire cover of it's own heavy weapons and of the tanks, staying away

from individual tanks because they draw the strongest enemy fire.

When a tank company attacks with infantry, there are normally two

platoons on the line, one platoon back, and the fourth platoon

in reserve. The interval between tanks is usually 100-120 yards.

The tank's machine guns usually engage infantry targets at 1000

yards range and under, while the tank guns engage targets at

2,000 to 2,500 yards.

The coordination between tanks and Panzer Grenadiers moving into

combat on armored half-tracks is similar to the technique employed

in a purely armored formation, since the armored half-tracks

are not only troop-carrying vehicles but also combat vehicles.

When the terrain is favorable for tank warfare, the Panzer

Grenadiers in their armored half-tracks follow immediately with

the second wave, after the first tank wave has overrun the

opponent's position. A deep and narrow formation is employed.

After the penetration, the main mission of the Panzer Grenadiers

is to overcome the enemy positions which survived the first wave.

In attacking enemy pillboxes, the Germans use combat groups

consisting of tanks, infantry, and engineers, assisted by artillery.

The normal composition of a combat group attacking one bunker

is one platoon of tanks and one platoon of infantry reinforced by one

squad of engineers. Before the combat group is committed against

the enemy pillbox, artillery fires high explosives and smoke

shells at the neighboring pillboxes to isolate them, shells the

terrain between pillboxes, and conducts counterbattery fire. Under

the protection fof this fire, the combat group advances close to

the pillbox while other infantry units attack the enemy in the terrain

between the pillboxes.

One tank squad covers the advances of the other tank squads and

the infantry platoon by direct fire against the pillbox, particulary

against the observation and weapons' openings. The first tank squad

halts under cover whenever possible and covers the advance of the

second tank squad.

When the combat group reaches a barbed wire obstacle surrounding

the pillbox, the two tank squads have different missions. One tank

squad remains in front of the pillbox, and it's tanks are driven

into a position from which they can overlook the terrain, and watch

out for antitank guns and machine-gun emplacements, while the other

tank squad (the pillbox tank squad) rolls across the obstacle to

enable the infantry and engineers to get close to the pillbox.

The pillbox tank squad then fires on the pillbox at close range.

The infantry squad meanwhile takes the surrounding terrain and

covers the engineers who blast the entrance of the pillbox with TNT.

(3) ARTILLERY-TANK COOPERATION

Artillery support is of decisive importance for the preparation

and the successful conduct of a tank attack. A unified command

for the entire artillery controls the artillery fire as long as

the infantry and tank units are fighting on the same line. When

the tanks break through the enemy forward defense lines, the

self-propelled artillery or any other artillery battalion

designated for the support of the tank unit is placed under the

command of the tank unit commander.

The Germans believe that the artillery fire must not check the

momentum of the attack. Consequently the heaviest fire must fall

well ahead of the tanks or outside their sector.

The mission of the artillery preparation before the attack is to

destroy, or at least neutralize, the opponent's antitank defense in

the area between the line of contact and the regimental reserve line.

Continuous counterbattery fire prevents the enemy from shelling the

tank assembly area and from breaking up the preparation of the

tank attack.

The artillery has the following missions before the tank attack:

Counterbattery fire on enemy artillery located in positions which

command the ground over which the tank attack is to be made.

Concentrations on enemy tanks in assembly areas.

Harrassing fire on all areas in which the antitank units are located

or suspected. Fire is heaviest on areas in which tanks cannot

operate but from which they can be engaged effectively.

Adjusting fire with high explosives on probably enemy observation

posts commanding the sector to be attacked. These observation

posts are blinded with smoke as soon as the attack begins.

Experience has taught the Germans that the flanks of a tank

attack are vulnerable. Therefore they assign to the artillery and

the rocket projector units the task of protecting flanks by

barrages using high explosives and smoke shells.

The artillery has the following missions during the tank attack:

Counterbattery fire.

Blinding enemy observation posts.

As the attack progresses, engaging successive lines of antitank

defense, especially areas to the rear and flanks of the sector

attacked.

Screening the flanks of the attack with smoke and neutralizing

the enemy's infantry and rear areas.

Delaying the movement and deployment of enemy reserves,, particularly

tanks.

The Germans stress that this wide variety of tasks must not lead

to the wholesale dispersal of effort. The main task of the artillery

is at all times the destruction of the enemy's antitank weapons, tanks,

and artillery.

Liaison between artillery and tanks during the attack is established

by the comanding officers and the artillery liaison group, which

normally moves with the first wave. Artillery forward observers,

if possible in armored observation posts, ride with the most forward

elements. A German field expedient is for the tank unit to take along

a forward observer in one of it's tanks. It often happens that

the tankman himself has to take over the observation of the

artillery. He himself can request fire and shift concentrations

when the situation requires such changes.

********************************

SECTION IV. OFFENSIVE (continued)

*********************************

c. THE INFANTRY DIVISION IN THE ATTACK.

(1) General principles for employment.

German teaching envisages infantry divisions being employed to

make a penetration in the enemy defensive positions through which

armored and mechanized formations can pass. During the course of

this war, however, no major attack has been carried out by infantry

divisions without the support of Panzer divisions. In fact, more

major attacks have been carried out by Panzer Divisions with only

a minimum of ordinary infantry elements. Infantry divisions have

been employed almost entirely in a role of consolidation, following

up the armored and mechanized formations, systematically eliminating

centers of resistance by-passed by the latter, or exploiting the

latter's success by mopping up demoralized enemy defenses to the

flanks of the armored breakthrough - in short, consolidating

and holding the ground won by the mechanized formations.

In view of the unspectacular role allotted to the infantry

division it is difficult to give information about other than

minor infantry tactics, such as attacks on a small scale.

(2) PREPARATION FOR THE ATTACK

The method of forming up for an infantry assault on a prepared

position is similar to that employed by the Panzer division. While

the infantry is in assembly positions, the artillery makes all

preparations for the support of the attack. It draws out hostile

artillery fire and executes counterbattery fire against known

enemy batteries. Large troop concentrations and especially

important targets are taken under fire at great ranges. In order

not to betray their full strength and intentions, the Germans

withhold a portion of their batteries from these missions. They

also try to deceive the enemy as to their intentions by covering

other sectors simultaneously with fire. When possible,

preparation for an attack is avoided during the day in order

to prevent Allied observation. Occasionally, to obtain a success

by surprise, the Germans launch attacks without artillery

preparation. Surprise attacks are also launched under cover

of darkness or fog.

The Germans normally occupy their line of departure by means

of infiltration in order to avoid losses. Their orders direct

what actions have to be taken when companies run into enemy

defenses; when enemy fire is opened from the flank; when an

enemy counterattack is launched; when objectives are reached;

when companies appear to be getting dispersed; when part of a

company pushes too far ahead of neighboring units or is held up.

The heavy machine guns of the rearward company and some of the

mortars and heavy mortars are assigned to deal with enemy

flanking fire.

The commander of the heavy company is normally at the battalion

headquarters, from which he can control the fire of the infantry

heavy support weapons.

(3) DEPLOYMENT

(a) FIRST STAGE.

The Germans carry out deployment in two stages. They call the

first stage Entfaltung or "shaking out", which is equivalent

to the deployment of a march column according to U.S. procedure.

In the first stage, an infantry regiment normally deploys down

to battalions, although the procedure may go down to companies

if a high state of preparedness is necessary. Features of the

first stage of deployment are as follows:

Companies retain their combat vehicles until their weapons

and equipment arrive at the off-carrier position, which is

located as far forward as the situation permits.

The Germans often place only one company forward, the main

strength of the battalion being kept under control of the

battalion commander as long as possible so that he may deploy

it in the most advantageous direction for the attack.

If the condition of the terrain and the enemy fire cause a

change in intervals between units, the normal intervals are

resumed as soon as possible.

Support weapons are used to cover the "shaking out" phase

of deployment and the subsequent advance, the weapons being

kept within the march column between companies or behind the

battalion.

After the first stage of deployment has been carried out,

the leading elements of the battalion may be ordered to seize

important tactical features.

When deploying by night or in woods, a careful reconnaissance

is made, routes are marked, and strong protection is placed

forward. Intervals between units are shorter.

After the first stage of deployment has been completed, the

battalion commander marches with the leading elements and

normally will send reconnaissance patrols ahead or reconnoiter

the enemy position himself. The commanders of support weapons

accompany him, reconnoitering for firing positions.

( SECOND STAGE.

The second stage, called Entwicklung (development), is

deployment in detail, which is the final action of the company

extending itself down to platoons and squads. Features of

the second stage of deployment are as follows:

The copanies deploy in depth as soon as they come in range

of artillery fire. An advance in columns of files is considered

desireable because it affords a small target and the company

is easier to control, but before adopting this formation

the danger of enfilade fire is weighed.

If enemy fire and difficult terrain necessitate further

deployment, the companies disperse in depth by sections. Reserves

and support weapons also adopt open formations, but they remain

far enough behind to avoid coming under the fire directed at

their leading elements.

When the rifle companies are deployed, they exploit all

possible cover as they advance, employing column-of-file

formations with irregular distances. The leading elements are

not extended until they are to engage in a fire fight.

The elements that follow continue advancing in file.

In determining when to deploy, the Germans take into

consideration additional physical strain placed on men when

they march cross country.

(4) TECHNIQUE OF ATTACK.

The infantry attack on prepared positions is made in the same

sequence as that of the Panzer division, namely penetration,

breakthrough, exploitation by the reserves. In the infantry

attack, however, the first phase is a series of local attacks

by so-called assault detachments (Stosstrupps) with the aim

of overcoming key points in the enemy defenses, so that wedges

into the enemy's forward positions can be established from

which the attack can be driven forward into the depth of

the enemy position, or rolling up the positions on either

flank of the wedge.

Assault detachments normally are composed of infantry with

engineers attached. A typical assault detachment consists of the

following: one officer; obstacle clearing party, consisting of

two to six men for each lane to be cleared, equipped with

small arms, wire-cutters, and bangalore torpedoes and other

explosives; embrasure-blasing party consisting of three or

four men equipped with grenades and demolition or pole charges.

This party may also include, though it may work independently,

a flame-thrower party, consisting normally of two men; covering

parties, normally two or three parties of varying size from

three men with one light machine gun to full platoons;

smoke party consisting of two or three men equipped with smoke

candles or grenades; supply party, carrying reserves of

equipment and ammunition, their strength depending on the size

of the assault detachment.

Attacks most often are made at dawn, and are preceded normally

by heavy artillery preparation, one purpose of which is to make

shell holes which afford cover for the advancing assault

detachments as they move forward. When the latter reach the

wire obstacles surrounding the enemy position, Very signals

are fired, calling for availlable artillery fire to be

brought on the position to seal it off from flanking positions.

If, by reason of proximity of the assault detachment to the

artillery's danger zone, the former cannot be protected

by covering fire, the smoke party may lay a smoke screen.

The obstacle clearing party then cuts one or more lanes through

the wire, using wire-cutters or bangalore torpedoes. The

embrasure-blasting party passes through and attacks the

embrasures. Flame throwers, if employed are not intended

by themselves to cause the surrender of the position, but to

cover the advance of the embrasure-blasing party with it's

explosive charges which are considered the decisive weapon.

Antitank guns may be used to give close support to the

embrasure-blasting party, being manhandled from cover to cover.

They will attack the embrasure with armor-piercing ammunition,

and also give protection against possible tank-supported

counterattacks.

It is probable that several such operations will be in

progress on any one sector at any one time before an attack,

in the first place to probe for weak spots, and in the second

place to keep the enemy in uncertainty as to the final point

of main effort of the attack. German feint attacks have

often been delivered in such strength or with such violence

as to be indistinguishable from the main attack.

Once a wedge has been firmly established in the enemy positions,

the second phase of the attack begins. Troops so far held in their

assembly area, or slowly making headway under cover of the

artillery fire supporting the first phase of the attack,

advance to cut the enemy position in two and to roll up the

positions flanking the wedge.

Because the Germans anticipate enemy defenses organized

in depth, and because these are unlikely to be fully disclosed

until after the beginning of the attack, they do not make detailed

plans for close-support covering fire, which would be hard to

work out in advance, but tend to decentralize their support

weapons and artillery for the second phase of the assault, in

which reinforced battalions, companies, or platoons fight their

own way forward, independently of their flanking units, until

they have gained their final objective.

Attack on lightly defended positions is more similar to the

conduct of the attack by the Panzer divsion. The first phase

is likely to be a deployed attack on a two-regiment front, the

third regiment in reserve.

The Germans believe that in the advance extended formation

of units is advantageous because it forces the enemy to

scatter his fire.

To counteract the overwhelming Allied superiority in artillery

and planes which frequently knock out the attack before it is

under way, the Germans have been known to use the following

method: Small groups of less than platoon size infiltrate

mainly at night over a period of three to four days into the

hostile battle position or at least well behind the advanced

positions. During the day the infiltrated groups conceal

themselves, but if caught pass themselves off as ordinary

patrols to avoid raising suspicion. When the actual attack

is launched these units try to give the impression that

the defender is surrounded and often cause great confusion.

When the Germans go over from the attack to the defense,

even if only temporarily, they concentrate the supporting

weapons around the commander of the unit that is to be

supported, so that he can control the fire plan.

(5) INFANTRY-ASSAULT GUN COORDINATION

The assault guns are organized in assault gun battalions

and are under the control of the division commander.

The Germans regard their self-propelled assault guns as the

decisive weapons to be employed particularly at the point

of main effort. In cooperation with infantry they facilitate

the penetration and breakthrough. These weapons, the Germans

believe, complement artillery fire by their ability to follow

the infantry right up to an objective. Their use for small

actions before an attack is forbidden, so as not to betray

their presence. Surprise is sought by bringing them into

position by night and camouflaging their assembly area.

Used primarily to neutralize enemy support weapons at close

ranges over open sights, assault guns are preferably

employed in concentrations; to employ them singly or in

comparitively small number is frowned upon by the Germans.

German assault guns advance with or just behind the infantry;

they never go ahead of the infantry. When an objective is reached,

the assault guns do not remain with the infantry while the

position is being consolidated but retire about 1,000

yards to await further assignment.

In close combat the assault guns are rather helpless and

therefore it is the task of the infantry to keep the enemy away from

the assault guns. Newly-organized assault gun escort batteries

have the same task.

(6) ARTILLERY

The Germans employ their field artillery in general support

(Allgemeine Unterstutzung), in the same manner as the U.S. Army.

The Germans consider the battalion as the firing unit.

Splitting up an artillery battalion into batteries and placing

batteries under an infantry battalion is the exception

justified only when the infantry battalion has an independent

mission (for example, flank protection) or when the terrain

does not permit unified fire control by artillery battalion

commanders. Single commitment of guns is against German

tactical doctrine.

Various recent reports, however, describe

deviations from the prescribed practice. Normally the

Germans do not employ single field artillery pieces for

direct fire, as, for instance, the Russians do. But much

use is made of roving guns (Arbeitsgeschutz), and of guns

firing from alternate positions to make identification

more difficult. Standing German orders call for the preparation

of alternate firing positions, which, however, are used

now only in cases of very heavy counterbattery fire, as

the gasoline shortage keeps all movements to a minimum.

The Germans often designate the number two piece as the

roving gun, and unlike the other pieces, it normally

is not dug in. It frequently changes it's position, which

is about 250 to 300 yards from the rest of the battery.

The German artillery often engages a target from a lateral

position. This deception, particularly identified with

longer range weapons, is extended by employing another gun,

often of lighter caliber, in a carefully coordinated attack

on the same target. Flash simulators also increase

the difficulty of visual location of active guns.

The first step to obtain infantry-artillery coordination

is taken in the attack order and is assured by direct

contact between the commanders, artillery liaison units

(Artillerievebindungskommando), and direct contact

between artillery observers and infantry units.

The Germans also employ forward observers (Vorgeschobene

Beobachter), who have the same task as their U.S. counterpart.

The signal equipment necessary for communication between

units, liaison units, and observers is only partly organic.

The Germans keep most of the signal equipment centralized

in the division signal battalion, which allots equipment

as needed to the various units.

In the attack the greater part of the artillery supports the

main effort. The remainder of the artillery is assigned the

mission of flank protection against possible enemy

counterattacks.

5. MEETING ENGAGEMENT. (Begegnungsgefecht)

In the meeting engagement the Germans believe that the

advantage lies with the side which succeeds first in making

effective preparation for the attack and thereby deprives

the enemy of his freedom of action. When both adversaries

attack immediately from march columns, the decisive factors

are the initiative of the junior officers and the efficiency

of the troops. The senior commander quickly coordinates

the functions of the various officers, while the advance

guard secures for him freedom of action and the opportunity

for a speedy deployment of his troops.

6. PURSUIT.

U.S. and German tactical doctrines on pursuit are very much

alike. Pursuit begins when the enemy is no longer able to

maintain his position and abandons the combat area with the bulk

of his forces. The object of the pursuit is the complete

annhilation of the retreating or routed enemy. Effective pursuit

requires great initiative from commanders of all echelons of

command, who must not hesitate to start pursuit immediately,

even when their troops are exhausted. The enemy must be given

no time to pause to reorganize his forces and reconstitute

his defense.

The pursuit is conducted on a broad front by means of fire

and movement. When making for distant objectives every effort

is made to get around the enemy's flanks and effect a surprise

attack in his rear. However, care must be taken that enemy

attack on one's own flank does not cause deflection from the

original direction.

Fast-moving troops are used in the pursuit. These troops often

are organized into pursuit or advance sections. The infantry

scatters the enemy and by-passes resisting enemy strongpoints,

leaving their destruction to units following in the rear.

Part of the artillery places concentrations at the avenues of

retreat, while the remainder displaces forward in echelon,

providing continuous support for the units in front. The Germans

emphasize that a pursuit without the necessary artillery support

may lead to disaster. Assault guns travel well forward with the

rapidly advancing infantry, their comparatively heavy armament

enabling them to crush quickly and decisively any enemy forces

attempting to make a stand. Combat aviation bombs routes of

retreat and strafes the hostile forces in direct support of

the ground attack. Combat engineers repair damaged roads,

facilitating the continuous flow of supply and troops.

Pursuit after a successful breakthrough, is regarded by the

Germans as an ideal mission for the Panzer division. Panzer

Grenadiers in armored half-tracks or in unarmored vehicles

and tanks supplement each other in pursuing the enemy.

During the advance on roads, the tanks form the point. However,

through wooded areas or larger villages the Panzer Grenadiers

take over the point. Tanks and Panzer Grenadiers stay close

together so that either, according to the situation, can be

committed as soon as enemy resistance is encountered. Tanks are normally not used in units of less than company strength.

Available at this URL

[JonS]

...Tanks are normally not used in units of less than company strength...

Those Germans! What a bunch of gamey bastiches!

[Wisbech_lad]

The tanks constitute the striking force of

such a command and normally advance as the first echelon of the

attack.

The tanks do not slow their advance to enable

the infantry to keep continuous pace with them, but advance alone

and wait under cover until the infantry catches up with the advance.

So they would lose most CMBO games? Tanks first is (usually) a no no, as I have found to my cost.

[JonS]

Originally posted by Wisbech_lad:

So they would lose most CMBO games? Tanks first is (usually) a no no, as I have found to my cost.

That's ok ... they lost WWII also. Quite realistic modeling on BFCs part if you ask me

[Michael Dorosh]

You guys miss the point - it seems on the face of it there are a lot of things in the here the Germans just plain did not do or at the least have been grossly generalized. I thought somebody might be able to spot one or two. Silly me.

This is one document that has been highly recommended on this site by several posters, usually (one hopes) with the admonition "take with a grain of salt."

So, which grains are the pepper and which are the fly specks?

[ June 24, 2002, 11:22 PM: Message edited by: Michael Dorosh ]

[JonS]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

You guys miss the point - it seems on the face of it there are a lot of things in the here the Germans just plain did not do or at the least have been grossly generalized. I thought somebody might be able to spot one or two. Silly me.

Come on Mike - you post just shy of 10,000 words, of which only 3 are your own original work (the rather high-handed directive to "Read and Discuss"). What did you expect?

Regards

JonS

[Pacestick]

I gotta tell you I only skimmed the document but I did not see any grains of salt. Much of what was described could have been written by our Ops officer as a brief for junior officers back in the days when I wore green. In our combat teams, the tanks always led with the inf carriers one bound behind. The only minor differnce that stood out is that our infantry commanders commanded the combat teams(1 x mech inf company plus 1 x tank troop of which there were three in the Bn) There was a tank heavy combat team which the tank Squadron Commander commanded which made up the fourth combat team of the Bn.

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Wisbech_lad:

When the quoted German doctrine was annunciated before and during the early war years (1939-1941) it worked that way pretty well because opposing infantry had little to nothing to fight the Panzers with. By the time of CM:BO, the infantry was much better armed and was taught that armor had its vulnerabilities, to seek and exploit them. At that point, coöperation between armor and infantry became essential, with infantry sometimes even assuming the lead.

Michael

[ June 25, 2002, 12:28 AM: Message edited by: Michael emrys ]

[Tero]

Originally posted by Michael emrys:

When the quoted German doctrine was annunciated before and during the early war years (1939-1941) it worked that way pretty well because opposing infantry had little to nothing to fight the Panzers with.

I think this is not exactly the case. The opposing infantry thought they had little to nothing to fight the panzers with. At least in the case of the Polish, the French and the British armies. All of these had a substantial number of AT assets and armour comparable to or better than what the Germans had, technically speaking. What made the difference was the fact the Germans did not play ball with their tactics and doctrine.

In addition to that: in the case of Poland the attack came when the army was mobilizing. And in the case of the French there were serious problems with morale.

[Paul Lakowski]

Originally posted by Wisbech_lad:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr /> The tanks constitute the striking force of

such a command and normally advance as the first echelon of the

attack.

The tanks do not slow their advance to enable

the infantry to keep continuous pace with them, but advance alone

and wait under cover until the infantry catches up with the advance.

So they would lose most CMBO games? Tanks first is (usually) a no no, as I have found to my cost.</font>

[JasonC]

"When the enemy has well prepared positions with natural or constructed tank obstacles, the German infantry attacks before the tanks and clears the way.

"The objective of the infantry is to penetrate into the enemy position and destroy enemy antitank weapons to the limit of it's strength and the fire power of it's own support weapons, augmented by additional support and covering fire from the tanks and self-propelled weapons sited in their rear.

"Only after the destruction of the enemy antitank defense can the tanks be employed on the battle line to the fullest advantage."

Oops. Sounds like "tanks go first" is only for situations without AT defenses or obstacles. Which, incidentally, was US doctrine only for pursuit style operations. It is not at all clear this is what they actually did, by the way. Most of this stuff sounds like it is read out of manuals, with only limited corrections for actual practices being different.

What are characteristic of the offensive armor doctrines are -

(1) several varieties of flanking/enveloping attack whose purpose is always "many on few" and eventual isolation of bits of the enemy, for subsequent "any amount on few".

(2) heavy weapons and artillery fire groups directed at securing flanks, diversions, counterbattery, etc - subsidiary aids to maneuver, not destroying the enemy main force.

(3) reliance on shock action by concentrated tank-infantry teams, and especially on first winning "the armor war".

(4) objective of concentrated shock and flanking maneuvers is not terrain or deep objectives but annihilation of the enemy.

(5) column like formations on very narrow fronts in depth, in waves, with follow on elements tasked to reduce enemy positions in detail, while leading ones strike further into the position.

What is to me most noteworthy about the whole document, however, is how little of it has anything to do with defensive fighting by infantry, which was in reality the main German "pastime" by then. It does mention that defenses had become "linear" rather than "offensive" (that is, based on "instant counterattacks" and defense in depth - defended zones idea). That may even be true, due to limited resources here or there, though it was certainly not doctrine. And the AARs I've read leave little doubt that plenty of German units took that doctrine pretty literally. Which was really a 1918 era system.

[ June 25, 2002, 02:11 AM: Message edited by: JasonC ]

[Tero]

Originally posted by JasonC:

And the AARs I've read leave little doubt that plenty of German units took that doctrine pretty literally. Which was really a 1918 era system.

Not surprisingly a certain former corporal in the Imperial German army during WWI was supposedly calling the shots from Berlin down to individual unit positions in the far corners of the frontlines.

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by tero:

Originally posted by Michael emrys:

When the quoted German doctrine was annunciated before and during the early war years (1939-1941) it worked that way pretty well because opposing infantry had little to nothing to fight the Panzers with.

I think this is not exactly the case. The opposing infantry thought they had little to nothing to fight the panzers with. At least in the case of the Polish, the French and the British armies. All of these had a substantial number of AT assets and armour comparable to or better than what the Germans had, technically speaking.

Ah, but my dear, those AT assets were not in the hands of the infantry! The AT guns were grouped either in battalions at the division level or in companies at the regimental level. There was nothing that the grunts had at squad or platoon level, unlike four years later.

Similarly, the armor was either in brigades or battalions of armor. The infantry guys seldom saw any of their own armor.

To recapitulate, at the squad and even company level, the infantry neither had the weapons nor the training to stand up to tanks. Their only hope would be if there were some AT guns in the vicinity, and those were usually gone in pretty quick order. It's no wonder they often broke and either surrendered or ran.

Michael

[Tero]

Originally posted by Michael emrys:

Ah, but my dear, those AT assets were not in the hands of the infantry! The AT guns were grouped either in battalions at the division level or in companies at the regimental level. There was nothing that the grunts had at squad or platoon level, unlike four years later.

True. But that does not mean they were totally out of means when going against tanks with no infantry support. Unless they were under orders not to do anything to remedy the situation.

To what degree were they (the armies) victims of their own, pre-war propaganda and doctrinal hazzles ? The individual soldiers had been indoctrinated during peace time to hold the armour in high esteem and to regard is as an allpowerfull, unstoppable force. That indoctrination was reinforced by their training. They were taught to leave the undefeatable beasts to the specialists.

Similarly, the armor was either in brigades or battalions of armor. The infantry guys seldom saw any of their own armor.

When did they penny packet them out then to be lost piece meal to the Germans instead of massing them and using them as a cohesive fist ?

To recapitulate, at the squad and even company level, the infantry neither had the weapons nor the training to stand up to tanks. Their only hope would be if there were some AT guns in the vicinity, and those were usually gone in pretty quick order. It's no wonder they often broke and either surrendered or ran.

This has intriqued me. Did they open up on the tanks and reveal their positions prematurely so the Germans could stand back and call in arty on them while their infantry huzzled up to join the battle ? Was it totally out of the question to let the tanks go past the positions and engage the infantry that was following up ?

You make it sound like a widespread bug out syndrome developed that foiled the defences almost more effectively than the actual attacks and that it was preordained because the infantry had been indoctrinated and trained not to respond to the new set of battlefield stimuli as a matter of doctrine.

I must admit my personal frame of reference does incline me to think in slightly different terms. But then again the period reference I have does entail troops with absolutely no armour support and very few "proper" AT assest defending static positions for the better part or a 105 day struggle against a formidable force using combined arms tactics.

They managed to KO over 1200 enemy tanks, quite a few of them with Molotovs and satchel charges.

The similarities are: few regular AT assets at squad level

The differences are: long campaign (which gave the infantry enough time to get accustomed to fighting against tank/infantry teams), static positions (the Germans did not attack the Maginot line head on), climate and terrain (IMO these are marginal and the reason for this is the fact the armies develop their tactics and doctrine and also trained to act in the kind of terrain they are supposed to defend/invade).

[Michael Dorosh]

Michael Emrys - funny that I never picked up on that before when we discussed Men Against Tanks - ie that AT assets in Allied units were at divisional level. You are right - CW infantry battalions did have a 6 gun battery of 6-pounders but AFAIK never had the excellent 17 pounder which went to the divisional AT regiments.

As for infantry training, I suspect you are right, but of course I got in trouble for pointing out that German infantry were far better prepared (not just "equipped", but prepared mentally also) for combatting enemy armour.

JonS - "heavy handed"? Aw, C'mon...it was meant partly in jest, you know, like the Coffee Talk lady Linda Richman. I saw two or three things in the opening paragraphs that struck me as goofy, thought I would throw it out and see who would actually want to respond to such a document...interesting discussion so far. If I actually read it myself I may join in further!

[Austrian Strategist]

Originally posted by Paul Lakowski:

...that combat mission fails as a sim too!

Not really. Real life differed from CM in (mostly) one thing: At the tactical level, when attacking, you tried to have 3:1 or even 5:1, not just 1,5:1. And this allows for less subtle tactics, because with such an amount of superiority, you can attack with tanks only, for example, and still overrun a defence.

CM only simulates relatively balanced engagements, for obvious reasons. But balanced engagements, at the tactical level, were unusual, because irl you try to attack with overwhelming force.

[DarthMaul]

CMBO is a game after all, so of course your going to see a some gamey elements right guys?

Mr.Dorosh, that life size German doll you use may be considered gamey by alot of people as well.

Kidding aside that was an interesting post Dorosh.

:mad:

[Paul Lakowski]

Originally posted by Austrian Strategist:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Paul Lakowski:

...that combat mission fails as a sim too!

Not really. Real life differed from CM in (mostly) one thing: At the tactical level, when attacking, you tried to have 3:1 or even 5:1, not just 1,5:1. And this allows for less subtle tactics, because with such an amount of superiority, you can attack with tanks only, for example, and still overrun a defence.

CM only simulates relatively balanced engagements, for obvious reasons. But balanced engagements, at the tactical level, were unusual, because irl you try to attack with overwhelming force.</font>

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

Michael Emrys - funny that I never picked up on that before when we discussed Men Against Tanks - ie that AT assets in Allied units were at divisional level. You are right - CW infantry battalions did have a 6 gun battery of 6-pounders but AFAIK never had the excellent 17 pounder which went to the divisional AT regiments.

I take it you are speaking of the divisional TO&E from 1943-on. In 1940, I don't believe they had anything bigger than the 2pdr, did they? According to my sources, the 6pdr didn't start reaching the troops until 1942, and then it was in the divisional AT regiment. As those began to be replaced by the 17pdr, the 6pdrs began to find their way into the inf battalions. At least I believe that's what Chamberlain & Gander have to say about it.

Michael

[Brian]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

Michael Emrys - funny that I never picked up on that before when we discussed Men Against Tanks - ie that AT assets in Allied units were at divisional level. You are right - CW infantry battalions did have a 6 gun battery of 6-pounders but AFAIK never had the excellent 17 pounder which went to the divisional AT regiments.

Not completely true. By 1945, many battalions had re-equipped with 17 Pdrs IIRC. Further, the Airborne Battalion had from the major reorganisation in early 1944, 17 Pdrs and 6 Pdrs. The choice of which to take on a given operation was taken by the CO. Usually they took a mix. At D-Day, Arnhem and VARSITY, both types were present.

However, even so, the majority of heavier AT assets were not held by the infantry but by the RA. This division isn't quite as artificial as it seems, afterall, did the US Army have something similar with Tank Destroyer Command or what ever it was called, also holding most of the heavier AT guns, both towed and self-propelled?

Its interesting though, that despite the presence of such AT guns in the British battalion, that when I pull out my venerable copy of British and American Infantry Weapons of World War 2 by Lt.Col.A.J.Barker, published in 1969, he states:

The 2pr, 6pr and 17pr Anti-Tank guns which first supplemented and later replaced the British Boys anti-tank rifle, 25mm Hotchkiss and P.I.A.T cannot properly be considered infantry equipments. As their designation implies they were "guns" in the true sense of the word - pieces of artillery which became more complex as the weight of shell increased.

The good Lt.Col, was between 1954 and 1956, the Infantry Weapons Instructor at the Royal Military College of Science, as well as having served in the British Army from 1936 to 1958 and in various theatres, in Europe, East Africa, the Middle and Far East.

So, should AT guns be considered infantry weapons or not?

[Tero]

Originally posted by Brian:

So, should AT guns be considered infantry weapons or not?

Depends how you look at it.

IMO artillery is pure and simple artillery only if it fires at targets out of immediate LOS using indirect fire under the direction of a FO.

From a organizational POV the AT guns may be artillery but if they are an integral part of a infantry regiments OOB then it could follow they are infantry support weapons just like the direct fire IG's are and thus classifiable as (heavy) infantry weapons.

Different armies had different organizations. Some had designated direct fire support artillery pieces for point support and separate indirect artillery pieces (and/or mortars) for general support even at lower (down to regimental level) echelons.

http://www.skalman.nu/third-reich/heer-org-infanterie-44.htm

lists the organizational chart of a typical German infantry division.

3 x Infantry Regiment

Regimental Staff

Regimental Staff Company

2 x Infantry Battalion

3 x Infantry Company

Heavy Company

Cavalry Platoon

Infantry Close Support Howitzer Comapny

(2 x 150mm sIG, 6 x 75mm leIG)

Panzerjäger Company

(3 x 75mm PAK 40, 3 x 50 mm PAK 38, 18 88 mm Panzerschrecke)

Then there are the separate artillery regiments and Panzerjäger battalions within the divisional organization.

[JasonC]

I see numerous misconceptions about the early war. One, the Germans did not win because everybody ran away when tanks rolled into sight. They had to fight their way through the Allied positions, which they did successfully in a few days. The Allies had not only not run, they were then on the wrong side of the German armor, precisely because they hadn't run. The German armor then ran behind them and encircled them. Only after that, and after failed attempts to counterattack, relieve, etc, did anybody start surrendering.

Two, every breakthrough fight in the west saw an Allied armored counterattack in battalion strength or higher within 48 hours of the break-in. Sometimes more - whole divisions with brigades of armor. It was not at all the case that the Allied infantry "never saw" their own armor. There own armor attacked the shoulders of German breakthroughs - not just once, all over the place, a dozen times. And failed almost every time. (They got local drawish stalemates a few times. The Germans just shifted behind the breakthroughs that hadn't been stoppered).

Three, they lost these fights at least in part because their own armor formations were armor heavy, lacking sufficient support of infantry and artillery. They did best with the French Mech divisions, which were the closest to combined arms in TOE layout. The Germans stopped them with infantry, PAK fronts, artillery gun fronts firing direct, and their own tanks.

Four, the Germans still had to fight armor on armor engagements in approximately equal numbers - under 2 to 1 - numerous times in support of every breakthrough except Guderian's massed one on the left of the German wheeling movement. Guderian had to fight such battles too, but had local odds. His armor soon passed on, however, and subsequent French counterattacks, with armor, were broken by a motorized infantry division holding his left flank.

Five, they won virtually all of those armor on armor engagements. Not due to massing, not due to many on few, not due to superior guns or armor, and not due to the Allied tanks running away. The bigger the tactical engagement the more lopsided the score. Tactical surprise helped in some cases, but was not necessary for all of them. They did this with an armor force that was half 20mm Pz II, with most of the rest 37mm Czech or Pz III. Armored car light, much lighter than Stuarts for instance.

Six, the French infantry did have guns, both divisional artillery and ATGs, which were fully effective against all German tanks. The thickest armor plate on a German tank at the time was 30mm. You can blow through that with 75mm HE. The Germans overran units anyway by using all arms attacks, not simply by charging with armor like the British later at Knightsbridge. In the critical Meuse crossing fight, there weren't even any German tanks across the river yet when they broke through the French line.

How? Stukas suppressed French div arty in the rear, infantry heavy weapons and tank fire across the river suppressed positions visible from the far bank, German artillery blasting the crossing sites and anything somewhat farther back, smoke was layed, infantry crossed in boats, and assaulted every position in front of them, fanning out along the bank to widen the crossing site. No, the French did not look across a wide river at Pz IIs, soil their shorts, and run away. The lost a set piece defensive fight.

The French AT guns were considerably better than the German models. The Germans had 37mm "doorknockers". The French had heavier 47mm guns. The Germans were impressed enough with those they mounted some self-propelled on Pz I chassis as tank destroyers, the first little Marder they tried.

When none of their own dedicated AT weapons could hurt a Char-B, Guderian personally tried to KO one with a captured French 47mm. That failed too. Rommel was using 88mm Flak and divisional artillery firing over open sights. These are not Pz Jgr privates; it was a serious problem. If anybody had a serious AT problem, it was the Germans.

Seven, after the first half of the campaign, in the fighting southward to take the rest of the country, the French adopted a new strongpoint form of defense to avoid German armor. Initially the infantry had been in trenches right across open ground, as in WW I. Now they went to defending only villages and woods with infantry, trying to cover the spaces between by fire.

The Germans just drove around them. Artillery suppressed them, follow on infantry encircled them and began reducing them. But the tanks just drove through the open fields between and kept on going. The French system was supplimented by armored counterattacks in battalion strength and upward, trying to turn the open ground into pure tank country while infantry did tighter terrain.

The Germans beat them back, sometimes armor fights (which again they won, the bigger the better), sometimes their motorized infantry holding places after the German tanks had past on. They mopped up bypassed infantry in many-on-fews (without needing armor) and after shelling them at will with artillery.

The French armor sucked because of design issues - lack of radios, lack of visibility, two or even one man turrets, innaccurate, low muzzle velocity guns, slow - and because of doctrinal issues - especially lack of combined arms, armor used as pure armor in the larger formations, while most meant to work with infantry were too spread to do much good, or too slow.

French infantry sucked because they were isolated and shelled, with tanks already past them by the time they fought German infantry, which could come up in whatever strength was necessary to outmatch each position.

Some French commanders nevertheless improvised effective systems. The Mech divisions fought better than most, but ran through most of their armor in company sized engagements they lost lopsidedly. Then they devised gun front of their own, and those held. The Germans lost 50 tanks in one afternoon trying to get through ones of those.

But such successful improvisations - nobody had doctrine about it, even Rommel was jumping through his ass trying to come up with one - were relatively rare, and they would have needed to happen *everywhere* to prevent *somebody* from getting through. When that happened, others were just rerouted behind the successful penetration, and the stand elsewhere bypassed.

What you can say is that it is better to *attack* than the defend with armor when nobody has a doctrine of how to defend against armor. And that combined arms is better than tank heavy uses of armor. Oh, and just a minor little item, it is better if a tank commander can talk to his men, to other tanks, and his commander - and does those things instead of loading, aiming, driving, etc. Tanks that are deaf and blind don't fight as well as ones that can hear and see.

[Ozzy]

So they would lose most CMBO games? Tanks first is (usually) a no no, as I have found to my cost.

Wrong. Read the part about Panzer strength - usually not below Kompanie size.

Did you ever have a KOMPANIE of German Panzer on a CM battlefield?

Mass concentrations of armour to achieve a Durchbruch and mechanized infantry to exploit it was one of the most successful German tactics, especially at the Eastern front.

What you read here is about OPERATIONAL movement, not close combat movement, and CM definetely deals with the latter.

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Ozzy:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />So they would lose most CMBO games? Tanks first is (usually) a no no, as I have found to my cost.

Wrong. Read the part about Panzer strength - usually not below Kompanie size.

Did you ever have a KOMPANIE of German Panzer on a CM battlefield?

Mass concentrations of armour to achieve a Durchbruch and mechanized infantry to exploit it was one of the most successful German tactics, especially at the Eastern front.

What you read here is about OPERATIONAL movement, not close combat movement, and CM definetely deals with the latter.</font>

[Brian]

Originally posted by JasonC:

The French AT guns were considerably better than the German models. The Germans had 37mm "doorknockers". The French had heavier 47mm guns. The Germans were impressed enough with those they mounted some self-propelled on Pz I chassis as tank destroyers, the first little Marder they tried.

Errr, the gun in the Panzerjaeger I was a Czech 47mm, not a French one, Jason.

Furthermore, the French had relatively few of their 47mm weapons. I believe their main infantry AT weapon was the little 25mm Hotchkiss, which wasn't a bad weapon, in itself, except it was too lightly constructed to survive much towing.