Will there be a shortage of Russian 76.2 mm AP rds in 1941?

[Dittohead]

So will there be a shortage of AP rounds for the

Soviet 76.2mm and 152mm guns during the first few

months of the war?

From Fighting Armor of WWII Osprey Military - T-34/76,

Medium Tanks 1941-1945, Steven Zaloga and Peter Sarson,

page 10. "Due to the incompetent leadership of Marshal

K. Kulik, ammunition production for the new 76.2mm tank

guns had been delayed and only 12 per cent of the rounds

were available when the war broke out. Most T-34 tanks

went into action with-out any armor piercing shells, only

high explosives, while many tanks did not have even a full

load of ammunition."

From the Armor at War Series, Stalin's Heavy Tanks 1941-1945,

The KV and IS Heavy Tanks, by Steven J. Zaloga, Jim Kinnear,

Andrey Aksenov & Aleksandr Koshchavtsev, page 4. "Most of the

KV tanks had been delivered in the last three months before

the war. There was only a tenth the required 76.2mm tank gun

ammunition, there was no armor piercing ammunition for the

152mm gun on the KV-2, and no one had informed the KV-2 crews

that they were expected to use the old 09-30 152mm concrete

penetrating ammo instead of the non-existent armor-piercing

rounds."

Sounds like some T-34's/KV-1's should end up with 0 rds of AP

during the first few months of the war.

[Doug Beman]

Ammo loadouts are entirely up to scenario designers, and are not subject to any sort of modifier or setting within the CM game code.

DjB

[manchildstein (ii)]

if it were indeed true that in the summer of 1941 the t-34s, kv1s, and kv2s all had severe ap ammo shortages; well this would help explain the germans' early success.

i could see a couple of t/34s loaded with nothing but HE, sitting there taking a lot of punishment from the german 37mm and 50mm guns but their own fire being at best only marginally effective because of the lack of AP; then finally getting flanked and taken out from the side or rear by the axis.

now what does "10%" of ammo mean? does it mean that tanks only had enough for one full loadout, or 3 loadouts, or just 10% of a single loadout?

how much ammo were they supposed to have on hand?

[Iron Chef Sakai]

Originally posted by manchildstein II:

if it were indeed true that in the summer of 1941 the t-34s, kv1s, and kv2s all had severe ap ammo shortages; well this would help explain the germans' early success.

i could see a couple of t/34s loaded with nothing but HE, sitting there taking a lot of punishment from the german 37mm and 50mm guns but their own fire being at best only marginally effective because of the lack of AP; then finally getting flanked and taken out from the side or rear by the axis.

now what does "10%" of ammo mean? does it mean that tanks only had enough for one full loadout, or 3 loadouts, or just 10% of a single loadout?

how much ammo were they supposed to have on hand?

This is not why the Germans initial advances happend. The operational T-34's and KV's could have had all the ammo they needed, the same thing would have occured.

Contrary to popular belief, the tanks alone are not battle winnners, the bulk of the fighitng load was carried by the infantry.

Also, even a fully loaded T-34 will be just as vulnverable to a Ju-87 or Me-110 attack.

[Iron Chef Sakai]

Here are some reasons of the Germans initial success in the east, T-34's armed, or unarmed...

1.) It was a surprise attack. Stalin did not beleive the Germans would attack, that soon anyway.

2.) Blitzkrieg. The Soviets along with the rest of the world did not use this tactic or had time to learn how to defend against it.(dated tactics.)

3.) The Purge. Stalins massive purges of the military officer class of the 30's greatly decreased the quality of the Soviet military leaders, and functionality for many reasons.

4.) Liberation. When the Wermacht came crashing inot the Ukraine, the people saw the Germans as saviors from Stalin. Many would have swelled the Germans ranks and fought for the Axis if not for the Death Squads moved in behind the army.

5.) Stalin. I beleive someone has the exact directive number the supposed man of steel issued to the armed forces of the Soviet Union (22?) Not a step back. Stalin had ot learn the hard way to let his Generals do their job.

[manchildstein (ii)]

even so, it would be worthwhile to know how much, and what kind of ammo the typical t/34 or kv1 or 2 had.

maybe there is no 'typical' here.

nonetheless it would be interesting to know if the source quoted for the first posting of this thread were accurate about some kind of ammo shortage.

as for the kv2, even without ap it would have been killing axis afvs with 152mm he.

but a t-34 with low or non-existent ap ammo would be an interesting twist in a scenario....

in any event the signal to noise ratio here appears to be quite high...

[Iron Chef Sakai]

Originally posted by manchildstein II:

even so, it would be worthwhile to know how much, and what kind of ammo the typical t/34 or kv1 or 2 had.

maybe there is no 'typical' here.

nonetheless it would be interesting to know if the source quoted for the first posting of this thread were accurate about some kind of ammo shortage.

as for the kv2, even without ap it would have been killing axis afvs with 152mm he.

but a t-34 with low or non-existent ap ammo would be an interesting twist in a scenario....

in any event the signal to noise ratio here appears to be quite high...

The KV-2 had a nice anti infantry gun, but the tank was not that great. The KV-1 performed much better. Take a look at the sillouette of the KV-2, looks like a very bad design to me.

As for the exact ammo load outs, this i do not know off hand. I'm sure there are some people on here who do though so i would'nt worry about it.

[Dittohead]

Basic loadout on a T-34 was 19 AP, 53 HE and 5 shrapnel. So will the range on AP rounds be from 0-6 rds for June-August and 0-12 rds Sept - Nov then 12-22 rest of the war.

[Lee]

Dittohead brings up a good point. Russian tanks that are affected by this extreme

shortage of AP rounds early in the war could be simulated by applying severe

limitations on AP rounds for certain Russian tanks if the battle takes place in the

first several months of the war. This would apply to tanks chosen in QB's as well

the standard loadout in scenarios. Of course, in the case of a scenario, the

designer can tune the loadout as he likes.

The same way that CM checks now for availability of tungsten rounds and such

depending on the month the battle takes place in.

[Kwazydog]

Hi Guys,

This is something we could simulate, but we would really need more than the above references to do so. Zaloga worked on both of the above books and although we do have faith in his work we really need to have some other references stating this info as well, just to be sure. Any chance you guys can dig up any more references to this apparent shortage?

Dan

[The Commissar]

Originally posted by Iron Chef Sakai:

2.) Blitzkrieg. The Soviets along with the rest of the world did not use this tactic or had time to learn how to defend against it.(dated tactics.)

3.) The Purge. Stalins massive purges of the military officer class of the 30's greatly decreased the quality of the Soviet military leaders, and functionality for many reasons.

I always thought that 2 was directly caused by 3. Before the purges, men like Tukhachevski were developing some of the most advanced doctrine in the world. Then Stalin got a wee bit jealous... *sigh*

I always wondered how Mr. T would fare up in the war if he wasn't executed.

"I pity the fool!"

OK, sorry.

Originally posted by Iron Chef Sakai:

5.) Stalin. I beleive someone has the exact directive number the supposed man of steel issued to the armed forces of the Soviet Union (22?) Not a step back. Stalin had ot learn the hard way to let his Generals do their job.

Check my sig. It was 227

[Andreas]

Originally posted by KwazyDog:

Hi Guys,

This is something we could simulate, but we would really need more than the above references to do so. Zaloga worked on both of the above books and although we do have faith in his work we really need to have some other references stating this info as well, just to be sure. Any chance you guys can dig up any more references to this apparent shortage?

Dan

Glantz in 'The early period of war' is confirming this shortage of ammunition (and trained drivers, and fuel, and the tendency of the KV-1 to breakdown-a-lot, and whatnot).

[Kwazydog]

Thanks Andreas, Ill pass it onto Chalres!

If you guys have any more specific info, please dont hesitate to pass it on This is something I think we would like to see in game if it was as bad as it sounds, but we really need to tie down info such as dates, how many rounds may have been taken info combet, etc to do so properly.

Dan

[Lee]

Dittohead: Have you been able to come up with any other sources to back this up?

I think Steve commented he'd like another source or two before modeling this in CM2.

Now is the time to get him the info. so it can be included.

[ April 22, 2002, 06:49 PM: Message edited by: Lee ]

[Kwazydog]

That was me whom mentioned that actaully Lee, and it came straight from Charles.

Yes, this is something we would consider modelling (though the clock is ticking now), but we would be after some more detailed info before we could do so.

Dan

[Scott B]

Examples abound of general fuel and ammunition shortages, so I'm citing only what I can find on armor piercing rounds.

Glantz, David. Stumbling Colossus: The Red Army on the Eve of World War.

Page 134:

On 4 August 1941, Major General B.S. Vasil'evich, then titular commander of 6th Mechanized Corps' 7th Tank Division, reported to the Red Army Armored Directorate about his division's performance during the first five weeks of the war. Unlike many other divisions, Vasil'evich's was at nearly full strength, with 98 percent of its required enlisted strength and 60 to 80 percent of its senior and junior officers. Its 348 tanks included 51 KVs and 150 T-34s. The 7th Tank Division's 'Achilles' heel' was its supply condition. When it began to march into battle it possessed only one to one and a half combat loads of 76mm ammunition, no armor-piercing ammunition for its tanks, three refills of gasoline, and a single fill of diesel fuel.

Page 138:

The absence of evacuation means and reserve equipment for KVs and T-34s; the presence of factory defects; the lack of familiarity [with the tanks]; insufficiently trained personnel; weak antitank reconnaissance of the enemy; systematic bombing on the march, in concentration areas, and during attacks; extensive maneuvering over 800 to 900 kilometers without aviation cover and artillery coordination over almost prohibitive (for tanks) forested-swampy terrain; strong opposition by a predominant enemy; and the absence of armor-piercing shells for KVs and T-34s; has left to huge mechanized corps losses and lack of combat readiness on the part of those which remain.

(The page 138 excerpt was part of a report from the Southwestern Front's Armored Directorate to the chief of the Main Armored Directorate.)

Oddly, I didn't see anything about armor piercing rounds in Charles Sharpe's Soviet Order of Battle in World War II Vol. 1 (Tank and Mechanized forces in 1940-1942).

I guess the problem is that this isn't an across the board issue - what a Soviet unit had on hand when war showed up in their front yard varied wildly. There are stories of Soviet tanks going into battle without any ammunition at all and little fuel, with orders to ram German tanks. There are many cases of anecdotal evidence that show that there were enormous supply issues in the Red Army in 1941, but isolating that on the Combat Mission battlefield is problematic.

I'd leave it up to scenario designers. I can't remember - has it been mentioned whether QBs will have ammunition settings? This would probably be the best solution anyway.

Scott

[Skipper]

> There are stories of Soviet tanks going into

> battle without any ammunition at all and little

> fuel, with orders to ram German tanks.

I think cases like that could only happen when the tank would be lost anyway. Like, a breakthrough from encirclement. In any other conditions, no sane soviet commander would give such an order.

[Scott B]

Originally posted by Skipper:

I think cases like that could only happen when the tank would be lost anyway. Like, a breakthrough from encirclement. In any other conditions, no sane soviet commander would give such an order.

I'd normally agree, but there are so many cases of disorganized and uncoordinated counterattacks during the frontier battles that I'd say the above case is just one of the worse examples. Outclassed, heavily outnumbered, no ammo, and ordered to attack-- any sane Soviet commander at this stage was probably thinking about ways to surrender, since most of them didn't yet know what a lousy option that was as well.

Scott

[Mattias]

I have been laboring under the impression that one of the reasons they were attacking with poorly supplied units was because they knew exactly what a lousy option surrender was..

It takes a brave man to be a coward and all that stuff...

Or is that just cold war propaganda?

M.

[Scott B]

Originally posted by Mattias:

I have been laboring under the impression that one of the reasons they were attacking with poorly supplied units was because they knew exactly what a lousy option surrender was..

It takes a brave man to be a coward and all that stuff...

Or is that just cold war propaganda?

M.

I wouldn't dispute that totally; there's a lot of truth to it in later stages, but here I'm talking about June, July, and August 1941. In these first few months there were literally hundreds of thousands of troops surrendering-- it was by and large what was happening to them and what was happening in the occupied territories that convinced the population of the need for fanatical resistance. I don't think you really see the across-the-board fanaticism by surrounded Soviet forces until later in 1941 - probably late September with the opening of Typhoon and the push for Moscow.

I don't mean to downplay the resistance by the Soviets in the opening stages of the war because the fact remains that they did resist fiercely in many cases, but in many other cases there were surrenders en masse. Indeed, the Germans took higher casualties in the "frontier battles" than at any stage prior to that in the war (some numbers- scroll down to KIA/MIA by month), but at the same time they caused an incredibly high number of Soviet casualties as well (some other numbers).

There's a sort of randomness in the early period, due in no small part to the complete confusion on the side of the defenders-- but it seems that not all Soviets were initially convinced that the Germans were as bad as Soviet propaganda said they were. My point is that surrender didn't look as bad as death to a whole lot of Soviet soldiers in 1941. And to tie it in with the ammo discussion, surrender likely didn't look as bad as going into combat unarmed, either.

Scott

[Skipper]

> but there are so many cases of disorganized and

> uncoordinated counterattacks during the

> frontier battles that I'd say the above case is

> just one of the worse examples.

Can you give some reference? Who, where, when, the source? It very much looks a fisherman tale. Totally contradicting anything that I know about how the RKKA commanders functioned in 1941 disaster.

Basically, a commander who would give such an insane order in "normal" circumstances could expect to end his days in penal batallion.

Regarding supply situation, in June-July it was not the problem of general availability (as long as the pre-war stocks lasted), but local logistical situations, that in many areas were totally disorganized by incomplete mobilisation (of trucks from the civil sector), german spearheads, air interdiction etc. Besides, mobilization of trucks and horses was not carried out. E.g., Rokossovsky's 9th mech. corps went to war with (supposedly) motorized infantry having no trucks or horses at all.

This (disorganised logistics) is the primary mechanism of how element of surprise worked in germans' favour on the operational scale.

[Scott B]

Originally posted by Skipper:

It very much looks a fisherman tale.

Hehe. "The rifle division that got away."

Okay, dug up some sources on fruitless (specifically, poorly coordinated) counterattacks and uncoordinated performance in general. I think most discussions on Soviet force structure touch on the difficulty of employing the early war combat formations, particularly in the tank and mechanized units.

Glantz, David and House, Jonathan. When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler.

In Chapter 5:

Many of the initial Soviet defeats were the direct results of the inexperience of the surviving Soviet officer corps. Field commanders lacked the practical experience and confidence to adjust to the tactical situation and tended to apply stereotyped solutions, such as distributing their subordinate units according to textbook diagrams without regard to the actual terrain. The result was forces that were not focused and concentrated on the most likely avenues of German advance and that attacked and defended in such a stylized, predictable manner that the experienced Germans found it easy to counter and avoid Soviet blows.

Headquarters at every level lacked trained staff officers to coordinate maneuvers, fire support, and logistics. The border battles in the Ukraine were typical, with field army headquarters that proved incapable of coordinating simultaneous attacks by more than one mechanized corps and unable to direct the few available aircraft to provide effective support by the ground units. There were exceptions, of course, but the overall performance of the Red Army hierarchy was so poor that it contributed to the confusion caused by the surprise attack. Small wonder that both German and Western military observers concluded that the Red Army was on the verge of final disintegration.

Soviet staffs also lacked effective communications to control their subordinates and report the situation to their superiors. Once German infiltrators and air strikes hamstrung the fixed telephone network, many headquarters were unable to communicate at all. Even the military district headquarters, which upon mobilization became front commands, were short of long-range radio equipment and skilled radio operators. Existing Soviet codes were so cumbersome that commanders often transmitted their messages "in the clear," providing ample tactical intelligence for the German radio-intercept units.

There's a lot more Glantz stuff on this - I'd also suggest The Initial Period of War on the Eastern Front and Stumbling Colossus.

I checked Ziemke's Moscow to Stalingrad, which glosses over the frontier battles in like four or five pages, tops. Not anything of use there, unfortunately-- because of its focus, Ziemke gets to October 1941 by page 36 in the book!

Originally posted by Skipper:

Basically, a commander who would give such an insane order in "normal" circumstances could expect to end his days in penal batallion.

I would agree with this, although I do not consider the frontier battles in June and July to be "normal" circumstances. In fact, according to John Erickson in Road to Stalingrad, the opposite was often true. The last part of chapter 3 has some good quotes:

Pages 130-131 (22 June)

Korobkov [commander of 4th Army], using Major-General Oborin's 14th Mechanized Corps, was to attack to clear the enemy from Brest and reach the frontier. Since 10th Army could not be contacted for support, Korobkov should call on Akhlyustin's 13th Mechanized Corps. Sandalov, chief of staff to 4th Army, protested vigorously; Shlykov, operations officer, asked Korobkov to seek permission to take up defensive positions. Korobkov reacted violently, pointing out that this was merely an invitation 'to be labelled cowards and relieved of command'. In fact, permission to go over to the defense was expressly withheld. Shortly afterwards Colonel Pern, liaison officer from 10th Army, appeared at Zapruda, followed by General I.N. Khabarov, 'Front representative' from Minsk; the latter had nothing to hand over but written confirmation of the morning order about 'Fascist bands', though his news about the moving up of 47th Rifle Corps was heartening. In the evening, Korobkov and his staff officers moved off to Zhabinka to prepare the counter-attack which Pavlov had not only ordered but insisted upon. Not a man thought it had the slightest chance of success.

Page 132 (still June 22):

Timoshenko issued... Directive No. 3, which prescribed nothing less than all three Soviet Fronts taking the offensive... the impediments to any kind of success, however, were enormous... the artillery, like much of the infantry, was stuck for lack of transport; where transport existed, like many of the tanks it stood stalled for lack of fuel; where there was fuel, there was little or no ammunition. And even where all these requirements were met, there was no time...

The entire fourth chapter is on the "disaster on the frontier," and goes into more detail on failed counterattacks and general inability to effectively command and control forces above the low tactical level.

Coordinated attacks or withdrawals were the exception rather than the rule, with the caveat that I think things were better with the Southwestern Front than with the Northwestern and Western Fronts. Kirponos did an outstanding job there, in my opinion, and particularly in a situation as poor as his was.

The mechanized corps were the Red Army's operational level combined arms units, and they were complete failures. Less than a month after the invasion began they were disbanded completely, and the Red Army lacked a fully combined arms operational level formation until the tank armies were fixed in January 1943. At the tactical level, by August 1941 the tank divisions were being broken up into independant brigades and being used chiefly as infantry support. They were not pieced together into the tank corps until the next year. These units were disbanded as much because they were structurally flawed as much as they were depleted in combat, and one of if not the single most important reason they were considered flawed was the difficulty of controlling them in combat situations.

I am not aware of a single instance of a well coordinated combined arms attack by the Red Army in June or July 1941, successful or not, at the regimental level or above. If there are any, I'd be very interested in hearing about them.

Scott

[Scott B]

Originally posted by Scott B:

I am not aware of a single instance of a well coordinated combined arms attack by the Red Army in June or July 1941, successful or not, at the regimental level or above. If there are any, I'd be very interested in hearing about them.

Actually, I'm wrong in at least one case. Just checked, and Yelnya was in the last week of July 1941. Although whether it was well coordinated is probably subject to question.

Scott

[Grisha]

I am not aware of a single instance of a well coordinated combined arms attack by the Red Army in June or July 1941, successful or not, at the regimental level or above. If there are any, I'd be very interested in hearing about them.

True, effective Soviet combined arms attacks in June/July of 1941 were rare, but effective defenses were not. Glantz writes in When Titans Clashed:

Major General K.K.Rokossovsky, commander of 9th Mechanized Corps, had only a limited view of the battlefield, but it was obvious to him that the counteroffensive order was unrealistic. He dutifully attempted to attack on 27 June, but lost contact with 19th Mechanized Corps and suffered significant losses among his obsolete light tanks. When ordered to renew the attack the next day, he chose instead to take up defensive positions and ambush the leading task force of the 13th Panzer Division en route to Rovno. For perhaps the first time in the war, the German Army ran into the massed fire of Soviet artillery and suffered severe losses. After two days of escalating German air and ground attacks, Rokossovsky was ordered to fall back.

In Rokossovsky's memoir, he says this about the battle:

We received another order to counterattack but the enemy forces were so superior to ours that I took the responsibility of meeting the enemy on the defensive instead of attacking. In those woody and marshy parts the Germans advanced only along the major roads. I ordered Novikov's division to deploy along the Lutsk-Rovno Highway and had the 20th Tank Division with its artillery regiment armed with the latest 85mm guns transferred from the left flank to reinforce it. The Chief of Staff organized, and Chernyaev quickly and energetically executed the maneuver. The guns were set up in road ditches, on the heights overlooking the highway, and in the middle of the road for direct fire.

The Germans approached in a large diamond formation: motorcyclists in front, followed by armoured cars and tanks.

We watched the large enemy force bearing down on the 20th, and saw what happened to it. The artillerymen let the Germans come very close before opening fire. A terrific pile-up was left on the highway: motorcycles, wrecked armoured cars, dead bodies. The impetus of the advancing troops presented our guns with new targets.

The enemy suffered great losses and was thrown back. General Novikov exploited Chernyaev's fine success, moved forward and was able to capture the heights we needed.

Charles C. Sharp says this about the type of Soviet AT guns used during this period:

By July 1941 the antitank forces had devolved to individual anittank regiments. Each of these was made small and easy to handle, with only 5 batteries of 20 guns like the regular wartime artillery regiments. Since the 45mm anitiank gun was not in production when the war started, many of the new antitank regiments formed in the summer of 1941 were equipped with whatever high-velocity gun was available. Among other expedients, 366 85mm antiaircraft guns were transferred from the PVO units to antitank units, and many regiments were equipped with 76mm division guns. These were the infamous 'Crash-Boom' guns of German accounts, so called because the shell's initial velocity was faster than sound, so that the sound of its passing - 'crash', reached the target before the sound of the gun firing - 'boom!'.

Also:

While the 'blitzkrieg' of July- August 1941 caused huge losses in units and territory to the Red Army and the Soviet Union, those same two months saw the highest German tank losses of the war between 1939 and 1943. Since the Soviet armored force was virtually nonexistent at that time, the 1500+ tanks 'written off' in those months were almost all destroyed by antitank artillery fire.

Definitely, something to think about.

[Andreas]

Does anyone have information on the capabilities/quality of Soviet 21st Army attacking the southern flank of AG centre near Rogachev in mid-July? If so, I'd be interested to know a bit more about it. Also a bit more information on Yelnia would be welcome.

TIA