Soviet artillery modelled inaccurately in CMBB?

[kipanderson]

Hi,

First a couple of disclaimers.

I always feel guilty expressing adverse opinions on anything related to CM. BTS have produced the game of my dreams, I knew someone would produce a Squad Leader type computer game but never expected it to be of even half the quality CMBO has turned out to be. I feel hugely fortunate that a team of the quality of BTS has taken it upon themselves to produce the CM series of games. I should also add that, clearly, I have not seen CMBB but am only going on what I have read from official sources, in this case the words of Madmatt in the recent FAQ article. Now that’s out of the way, what am I ranting on about here in already having a dig at CMBB before it is even out?

On order for BST to maintain their stunningly high standards there are certain “must have” features required in any Eastern Front version of CMBO, in my view, others will differ. In the case of infantry I would include Human Wave assaults as such a feature. This is to be included in CMBB and is handled very cunningly by being replaced by “assault” for more experienced troops. When it comes to armour, in CMBB the very different characteristics of Soviet APBC rounds and German APCBC rounds will have to be modelled. Soviet APBC rounds had 10%-15% less penetration against vertical plate and 20%-25% greater penetration against plate at high angles of attack then German rounds of the same energy and calibre. At higher velocities, say, over 750mpsecond, these differences reduced but still existed. Finally, when it comes to Soviet artillery there is a need to model the greater rigidity of Soviet artillery command and control. The question is, how to do this accurately within the limits BTS have set themselves for CMBB, given that it is a tweaked version of CMBO and not a new engine.

In the recent Panzer Leader FAQ article Madmatt wrote, with regard to artillery in CMBB,

“Artillery now has more realistic fire delays based on the formation the artillery is attached to. A Battalion asset will have a much smaller delay than an Army or Corps asset. For Soviets, that means they get access to some very heavy artillery support but it comes at the penalty of very long delays. This is offset by the addition of Prep Barrages for both sides.

Prep Barrages allow a Zero Time Delay barrage if the FO plots the barrage on the first turn of the battle. This represents co-ordination between the battery and FO prior the battle. This zero delay barrage MUST be plotted on turn one. If a player waits to turn 2 he loses that bonus and will get the normal delay associated with the battery type (in some cases those delays could be longer than the battle itself!)

A Prep Barrage Target is plotted as normal, it does not need to be within LOS of the FO but it will be a more accurate pattern if it is.

The barrage itself will begin to fall almost immediately at the beginning of turn one and will continue until the FO re-targets the barrage, stops the barrage or the battery runs out of ammo.

And YES the enemy TacAI can and will call in Prep Barrages and they can really really hurt!”

This all sounds great, and as a said above I feel guilty having a dig at it. I know all at BTS have worked hard at it and done a great job. However, if I am honest there are two problems with it. Firstly, Soviet time delays.

“ As a result of these checks and subsequent work on correcting problems, the opening of fire,….was brought down to 40-90 seconds in a number of units. As a rule, prepared fire was opened in 1.5-3 minutes after it was called for and the opening of unplanned fire took 4-7 minutes.”

The Battle of Kursk, The Soviet General Staff Study, 1944.

Just to set things in context, by “prepared fire” they mean what CMBO calls called fire on Target Reference Points, TRP. By “ unplanned fire” they mean the usual fire called by a spotter in CMBO against targets other than a TRPs. It is also important to understand that Soviet General Staff Studies and their “documents and war experience” in general, are remarkably spin free. They include brief comments at their start such as “Our great leader Stalin”, but after that is out of the way, they are as honest and unbiased as any document could be. One of the differences between Hitler and Stalin was that Stalin allowed his Generals to use their professional skills, while Hitler often did not. Plus the Soviets came so close to defeat in the first year of the war that a culture of dealing with matters on their merits grew up, there was no room for spin, things where too serious. After the war all that may have changed, but not during the war. Anyway, the above figures for artillery delay can be taken as correct, for mid-43, in my view.

Importantly, the above figures will include large amounts of fire missions by Corps and Army units, yet the delays were still as above. Given that I have read some real life artillery men consider the delays in CMBO to be a bit short, the Soviet figures above will not have been very different from the German figures for the battle.

In mid-43 the way most fire was called by the Soviets was from carefully camouflaged sites using landlines. As the war went on there was a change over to radios, but the command and control procedures were the same. If Corps or Army artillery was being used the FO would be from the Corps or Army artillery unit in question. In the Kursk study they explicitly make clear that general Corps HQs were not included in the artillery command and control structure so as to speed things up. There is no practical reason why called fire from Army units should take any longer than above. If a unit already had a FO, from an Army artillery unit, it meant that the decision to provide fire support to the unit at that time had already been made. Some seem to believe that every request for fire from a Soviet FO controlling Army artillery had to go through layers of commanders to be approved. This is not how it was. The decision as to which frontline units got Army fire support had already been made by the time the FO was up and running. The Soviets could not swing around Corps and Army artillery fire the way the British could, but nor could the Germans and the Americans. If you are given Army artillery assets in a CMBB battle the delay should be no greater than the above times, in my view.

The time delay of Soviet Corps/Army level called fire was the first problem with what Madmatt wrote, the second is the lack of any modelling of “Fireplans” other than the Prep Barrages fire, which sounds great. This is at the heart of the matter. From what I have read the “rigidity” of Soviet artillery command and control, such that it was, is to be modelled largely by greatly increased time delays over the Germans. In the real world the rigidity of Soviet artillery command and control did not take the form of vast increases in delay, hence the Kursk figures. The real difference was the greater use of Fireplans, in the form of pre-planned “general support” missions, as opposed to “called fire” missions. What is called for is that the principles included in Prep Barrage fire be extended beyond the first turn. This is what I am lobbying for.

For either side, although the Soviets would use it more often, to have the ability to construct Fireplans assuming they were included in the scenario design. The way this may work is for there to be a type of spotter that is only available in set-up and turn one. The spotter indicates targets as in Prep Barrages, but importantly, also the timing of the barrages which “need not start” in turn one. A spotter of this type could indicate a target to be fired on from, say, turn 16 to turn 22, then another target from turn 28 to turn 34 and so on… until the battery had no more ammo. Once set, the Fireplan could not be changed. The spotter disappears.

I hope people understand what I am getting at.

Of course, I realise that to lobby for knew features still late is likely to be a waste of time. I did suggest it earlier but I clearly made no impact. Fair enough, it is not my game. I will be rushing to buy it regardless. It will also set new standards regardless.

The problem is that the modelling of Soviet artillery command and control through vastly increased delays, as opposed to the greater use of Fireplans, is not in accordance with reality. For me, large quantities of Soviet artillery, but within a rigid Fireplan, is as important a feature as Human Wave assaults and the differences between Soviet APBC and German APCBC rounds. It is so important because this was “how is happened in reality”.

All the best,

Kip.

PS. No doubt Charles does not think it worth the effort, although a programmer of his obvious talent could program it standing on his head whilst drink a beer.

PPS. BTS sometimes say features are not relevant at this scale. This is not the case here, 2km by 2km maps and battalion + V battalion + is well within the scale of Fireplans.

[Scott B]

Hey Kip,

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by kipanderson:

When it comes to armour, in CMBB the very different characteristics of Soviet APBC rounds and German APCBC rounds will have to be modelled. Soviet APBC rounds had 10%-15% less penetration against vertical plate and 20%-25% greater penetration against plate at high angles of attack then German rounds of the same energy and calibre. At higher velocities, say, over 750mpsecond, these differences reduced but still existed.<hr></blockquote>

You're describing the different slope effects of those weapons; I am certain the CM engine already reflects this. There's no reason I can think of that would make them leave it out for CMBB.

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Finally, when it comes to Soviet artillery there is a need to model the greater rigidity of Soviet artillery command and control. The question is, how to do this accurately within the limits BTS have set themselves for CMBB, given that it is a tweaked version of CMBO and not a new engine.

(snip)

“ As a result of these checks and subsequent work on correcting problems, the opening of fire,….was brought down to 40-90 seconds in a number of units. As a rule, prepared fire was opened in 1.5-3 minutes after it was called for and the opening of unplanned fire took 4-7 minutes.”

The Battle of Kursk, The Soviet General Staff Study, 1944.<hr></blockquote>

The above quote unfortunately doesn't specify what level the fire was called from, and therefore it doesn't disprove the validity of adding longer delays to artillery that is centralized at a higher level of command. Could it not be that the low end of the figures (1.5 and 4 minutes, respectively) was a more common response time for Division artillery, while the longer response times were from Army and Front artillery?

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>They include brief comments at their start such as “Our great leader Stalin”, but after that is out of the way, they are as honest and unbiased as any document could be. One of the differences between Hitler and Stalin was that Stalin allowed his Generals to use their professional skills, while Hitler often did not. Plus the Soviets came so close to defeat in the first year of the war that a culture of dealing with matters on their merits grew up, there was no room for spin, things where too serious. After the war all that may have changed, but not during the war.<hr></blockquote>

Hehe. Mostly on target, but I always wince when positive generalizations are made about Stalin's hold over the Red Army in WWII. The Soviet war experience research is quite valuable stuff, though.

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>In mid-43 the way most fire was called by the Soviets was from carefully camouflaged sites using landlines. As the war went on there was a change over to radios, but the command and control procedures were the same.<hr></blockquote>

At Kursk nearly all artillery would have been called using land lines; it was a prepared defense. The radios would have been better used with maneuver units, particularly those tasked as reserves or in the wings for the counteroffensive. Later in the war landlines were still the primary means, as the shortage of radios was such that there was difficulty equipping even maneuver forces.

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr> If Corps or Army artillery was being used the FO would be from the Corps or Army artillery unit in question. In the Kursk study they explicitly make clear that general Corps HQs were not included in the artillery command and control structure so as to speed things up. There is no practical reason why called fire from Army units should take any longer than above.<hr></blockquote>

Two things: what's a general Corps HQ refer to (Rifle Corps or Tank/Mech Corps-- makes a big difference for the Soviets). Also, if leaving out a level of the chain of command sped things up, doesn't that contradict what you're saying?

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr> If a unit already had a FO, from an Army artillery unit, it meant that the decision to provide fire support to the unit at that time had already been made. Some seem to believe that every request for fire from a Soviet FO controlling Army artillery had to go through layers of commanders to be approved. This is not how it was. The decision as to which frontline units got Army fire support had already been made by the time the FO was up and running.<hr></blockquote>

I'll offer a counter theory. The Soviet use of artillery at a high level of command was due to their understanding that firepower is of the greatest use when used in mass. Since they didn't have the ability to support all their units with all their artillery like the Western allies, they (and the Germans) had to choose between mass and coverage. The Germans chose a decentralized artillery structure, emphasizing responsiveness and deemphasizing massed fires. The Soviets, on the other hand, chose to group their artillery at high levels of command (front and army levels being the most important), in order to use lots of it where the army or front commander thought it'd do the most good.

So the Soviets had their centralized artillery at the Army level on up (rifle corps weren't all that common). By definition, it wasn't there to be used one battery at a time, but if necessary, it could probably be requested through channels outside the direction of the Army artillery FO system. The actual intended use of Army and Front artillery was in such mass that it should never be allowed on the Combat Mission battlefield, unless someone cranks up the scenario editor with thoughts of vaporizing their least favorite battalion or so of Germans.

In all honesty, it's still a stretch - more likely that artillery simply wouldn't be available at all. It'll probably have a pretty high 'rarity' modifier slapped on it. As far as the Soviets were concerned, that was what mortars were for anyway.

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr> The Soviets could not swing around Corps and Army artillery fire the way the British could, but nor could the Germans and the Americans.<hr></blockquote>

Germans no, Americans yes. That one's been discussed, and as yet I haven't seen any convincing arguments placing US or CW artillery beyond the other in practice. Which is for another thread anyway.

On the point of artillery fireplans - I agree. I'd like to see them as an option in the engine rewrite, but I think there's plenty enough on the table as it is. The first turn prep barrage is a significant step toward a true fireplan, but certainly they could add to it to some extent. There are a few simple ways they could be done, but fireplans are somewhat lower on my list of "artillery things to fix/add for the new engine," when compared to stuff like more closely reflecting national artillery systems.

Scott

[Mace]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by kipanderson:

Soviet time delays.

“ As a result of these checks and subsequent work on correcting problems, the opening of fire,….was brought down to 40-90 seconds in a number of units. As a rule, prepared fire was opened in 1.5-3 minutes after it was called for and the opening of unplanned fire took 4-7 minutes.”

The Battle of Kursk, The Soviet General Staff Study, 1944.

....

Anyway, the above figures for artillery delay can be taken as correct, for mid-43, in my view.

<hr></blockquote>

One thing to recall is that the Soviets knew well in advance the timing of the German attack on the Kursk salient.

This allowed to them over a period of months to plan the defence in depth, and to better co-ordinate their artillery.

Hence IMHO the speed in which an artillery barrage arrived after being called was the exception there rather than the rule.

Mace

[kipanderson]

Scott, hi,

Thanks for taking the time to respond in such detail.

When I read your response the thing that struck me was how much we agree on, the spin is very different to mine, but the substance very similar on most points. However, there are some differences between us, it would be boring if there were not.

First a few general points. There is no point in going over all the ground again, but lets just take another brief look at what Madmatt actually wrote, as this is the heart of the matter.

“Artillery now has more realistic fire delays based on the formation the artillery is attached to. A Battalion asset will have a much smaller delay than an Army or Corps asset. For Soviets, that means they get access to some very heavy artillery support but it comes at the penalty of very long delays. This is offset by the addition of Prep Barrages for both sides.

Prep Barrages allow a Zero Time Delay barrage if the FO plots the barrage on the first turn of the battle. This represents co-ordination between the battery and FO prior the battle. This zero delay barrage MUST be plotted on turn one. If a player waits to turn 2 he loses that bonus and will get the normal delay associated with the battery type (in some cases those delays could be longer than the battle itself!)”

I take this to mean that Soviet Corps and Army FOs may have a delay of as much as 15, 20 even 30 turns. My concern is that this is unrealistic. Soviet rigidity of command and control is going to be modelled in very much longer delays then for German guns. When in reality, the difference between them was that Soviet Corps; Army and Front artillery units used “general support Fireplans” more often than the Germans. All sides in WW2 used general support Fireplans and also called fire, CM spotters. I do not know the exact frequency of use between them for each nation. But I do know that Soviet Corps; Army and Front artillery was very often used in general support/ Fireplan missions. Currently this is not modelled in CM. Lets assume that BTS are not going to budge on this one, so the question becomes one of the relative delays for German and Soviet higher level artillery when firing called, CM spotter type missions. (I agree 100% that the introduction of Prep Barrages is a big step towards Fireplans, but I would have liked to see them go a lot further due to the importance of Fireplans on the Eastern Front. But life is not perfect; I like everyone else can not have everything I want.) So what should the delays be?

The quote I gave above from the Soviet General Staff report gives a timing of 1.5-3 minutes for fire on TRPs and 4-7 minutes for fire controlled by CM type spotters against targets other than TRPs. I can confirm that these are the figures for fire from all types of Soviet artillery at Kursk. If you read the document this point is clear. I do not claim to know anything about German artillery methods in WW2, however, there seems to be a general view from those on the forum with RL artillery experience that the current CMBO delay time may be bit short. If this is the case, then it is likely that German and Soviet delay times were, in fact, very similar in reality.

However, I also fully accept Scott’s point that Soviet Corps, Army and Front artillery was more centrally controlled than German. Given that Soviet higher level artillery was more centrally controlled, how is it that they had the same delay times as decentralised German artillery? There is an explanation to this; the confusion lies in what is meant by “centrally controlled”.

Lets start with the decentralised German system. What this means is that a Corps artillery battalion would be attached to a given infantry division. The staff officers within that infantry division would then decide which battalion combat team received support from the given attached Corps artillery battalion. In the Soviet centralised model the decision as to which battalion combat team would be supported by the a given Army level artillery regiment would be taken, not within the infantry division as in the German system, but by the Army level staff officers. This is the key difference between the Soviet centralised system and the German decentralised system.

However, there is an important point to be understood. In both systems, once it had been decide which infantry battalion combat team was to be supported, a FO, CM spotter, would be sent forward and communications would be established between the FO and the supporting artillery battalion or regiment/ battery fire control officer. When you look at the line and radio nets the Soviets had you will find that there were communications between the FOs and their supporting artillery. Soviet FOs did not talk to a higher HQs, say Army level HQs, which then in turn decided if they got fire and if so from which regiment. Neither the German nor the Soviet system was that flexible. In both systems it had to be “pre-determined”, some hours before, which infantry battalion combat team was to get which artillery regiment in support. The British, and I am happy to accept Scott’s view that this applied also to the Americans, had systems that could decide this kind of stuff “on the fly”, but not the Germans nor the Soviets. The important point is that the Soviet FO, CM spotter, supported by an Army level artillery regiment, did not have to ask for support through a higher level HQ during the contact battle, the CM battle. He would have been talking to a regimental fire control officer, as would his German counter part. Hence one would expect the delay times during called fire missions, current CM spotter type missions, to similar. As they clearly were at Kursk.

Anyway, enough of my ranting. BTS, no doubt, are not interested in taking Fireplans further for CMBB. However, I hope they will have another think about the delay times for Army and Front artillery assets. In the real world Army and Front artillery asset were normally used within rigid, general support Fireplans. However, when used for called fire, CM spotter type missions, their delay times will have been as indicated by the Kursk report.

All good fun.

All the best,

Kip.

[kipanderson]

Mace, hi,

I understand the point you make, but at Kursk the Soviets were very much still on the learning curve. They General Staff report is clear about this. Post-Kursk, say in 44, they will have got better at everything, including artillery control.

All the best,

Kip.

[Skipper]

In fact, as I remember from two or three artillery memoirs I've read, in "mobile" situations wirelines would go from FOs to a fire control post of regimental or even battery level.

From that post they would have a line to division's artillery chief. The regiment (battery) would be assigned to an infantry unit, and would have a certain number of shells "budgeted" for targets of opportunity. In such case they wouldn't need anyone's approval for firing on anything worthy of attention.

By the way, there is another aspect here. At least until 1943, Germans definition of "worthy of attention" was much wider. Well, such was the soviet perception, anyway. I.e., germans much more often spent arty shells on insignificant targets.

When assaulting fortified positions, regimental or even divisional CO would be at observation post with as much LoS as possible, up to the second line of enemy trenches, and call all the shots personally. But this kind of engagement is not what CM models, anyway.

Also worthy of notice, soviet FOs always tried to put wirelines even when a radio was available, for the fear of counter-battery fire directed by radio azymuth finders (sp?).

If I were BTS, I would probably have two kinds of artillery for the same caliber. Something like available for direct support (faster response time, more expensive for purchase), and the arty that you beg from a higher HQ (slow and uncertain response time, but cheap). And then leave it up to scenario designers.

As far as yours truly is concerned, just give me plenty of mortars, including 120 mm, and a good choice of tubes for direct fire - that's all I care.

[Grisha]

From what I've read about Soviet offensive artillery practices, a lot of the fire plan was laid out from extensive reconnaissance - both land and air. Targets were generally enemy artillery and C3i positions. Soviet artillery was most effective from the initial breakthrough phase, when most enemy positions could be considered static and identified. Once into the exploitation phase, Soviet forces tended to rely mainly on regimental/brigade artillery assets, and/or any self-propelled direct fire artillery. In fact, the jack-of-all-trades gun for most rifle units was the 45mm AT gun, since it fired an HE round too.

Personally, what I think would be cool is to have Soviet TRP's by gun bore. This way you could set it up so that a corps/army level 152mm FO with, say, 3 152mm TRP's would have the same cost as a German 150mm FO. Make sure that TRP's bring Soviet delay times down to German On-call times, and you have a rough fire plan.

To be frank, I'm actually going to be looking to the SU-76/122/152(or even towed guns) for most artillery needs in the majority of Soviet non-assault scenarios played. And, regimental 120mm mortar fire. 82mm mortars at battalion level are fine, but 120mm's have just the right 'punch'.

[ 12-30-2001: Message edited by: Grisha ]</p>

[Scott B]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by Kip:

Lets start with the decentralised German system. What this means is that a Corps artillery battalion would be attached to a given infantry division. The staff officers within that infantry division would then decide which battalion combat team received support from the given attached Corps artillery battalion. In the Soviet centralised model the decision as to which battalion combat team would be supported by the a given Army level artillery regiment would be taken, not within the infantry division as in the German system, but by the Army level staff officers. This is the key difference between the Soviet centralised system and the German decentralised system. <hr></blockquote>

Centralized control is not a higher level command tasking an artillery unit to direct support a line unit; rather, the control is actually being the one to tell the guns where and when to fire.

What you're describing is still decentralized artillery control, which the Soviets considered sort of a necessary evil on the defense. The reason this artillery exists at the army and front level is to provide the commander with massed artillery under his direct control. Army level artillery should basically never be under the control of a lowly maneuver battalion. In fact, you should be more likely to see those units tasked out to perform direct fire than to support you indirectly in a Combat Mission battle.

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>The important point is that the Soviet FO, CM spotter, supported by an Army level artillery regiment, did not have to ask for support through a higher level HQ during the contact battle, the CM battle. <hr></blockquote>

The kind of spotters that typically had this level of control should not often be present on the CM battlefield. In fact, again, you'd be more likely to see the guns themselves in my opinion.

Army level artillery wasn't organized in independant battalions; it came in regiments, brigades, and divisions. They were used in massed fires-- the use of army and front level artillery in direct support of front line units one battery at a time is completely the opposite use of what they were intended to do. It was, in the Soviets' opinion, a waste of ammo. Something that only needs a battery fire mission to kill isn't the army commander's problem.

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Given that Soviet higher level artillery was more centrally controlled, how is it that they had the same delay times as decentralised German artillery?<hr></blockquote>

They didn't. By definition, they couldn't have had the same delay times. German artillery was employed in a manner to maximize speed of response; Soviet artillery was employed in a matter to maximize control. The two were mutually exclusive under either system. You can't have both without adopting a US or CW type system, which was beyond either of their capabilities.

Anyway, the Soviet answer to the problem of providing fire support to needy front line units, given the lack of a responsive army level and higher system, has already been mentioned in this thread. They used direct fire systems (the SU series of SPGs) and lots of mortars. Rifle formations would have their own mortar and direct fire support to deal with their own problems.

Army level artillery probably doesn't belong on the CM battlefield except in the rarest of circumstances. When it is, I don't think the CM player should have much control over the fires anyway, so the prep-fire + TRP and adjustment thing is probably the most suitable answer. Here's hoping we can make adjustments from TRPs again in CMBB.

Scott

[kipanderson]

Scott,

Interesting points, and once again I agree with 90% of what you say, but not 100%.

I should start by saying that I am not an artillery men, as you will have noticed, but have read a lot of original Soviet sources on how the Soviets did things in WW2. In fact all I can get hold of. What this means is that I may be using the wrong jargon and terminology, certainly by modern definitions. I will try again, for what it is worth to explain myself.

As far as I can see we are agreed on the number one, major point. Soviet Army level artillery was normally used in general support, Fireplan type missions. At the CM level this means it would hit a given village, with a given number of rounds, at say, turn 15, then a given ridge line at turn 23 and so on… All of it pre-planned and to a fixed time table. Much the same way Prep Barrages are to work, but importantly not just at the start of the game but at given turns throughout the game. I am now assuming that Prep Barrages are as close to Fireplans as we are going to get in CMBB, and I agree this is a big step in the correct direction.

However, the next question is, given the artillery engine we are going to have for CMBB, what is the best way to model Soviet Army/ Front level artillery? By Army/Front level artillery I agree we are talking about independent artillery regiments/brigades and divisions.

Given that we have to live with the artillery engine as it is in CMBB, it is necessary to make a couple more assumptions. Firstly, I am assuming that a given Soviet Army level regiment of, say, 122mm howitzers, “has been tasked” with supporting a given battalion combat team with what I would term a “called fire mission”, CM type spotters. I agree that this was not the most common use of Soviet Army/ Front level artillery assets but it did happen at times. You only have to read the Soviet reports on Kursk to see that. Secondly, we all have to accept that one CM spotter only controls four tubes, not 24, that is just how the engine is. If you wish to model the fire of more tubes you have to use more spotters and have them all target the same spot at the same time, if they fire at all. Agreeing such rules between human opponents before a game is perfectly possible, amongst reasonable people. Given the above assumptions, what should the delay be for such artillery assets in a CMBB game?

My view remains that the delays should be similar to those for German guns. My reasons are these. Firstly, it remains my view that once a Soviet Army level artillery asset had been tasked with the support of a given FO/ battalion combat team the FO was in direct communications with the regimental fire control officer, not an Army level staff officer. The FO would be in communication with the regimental fire control officer for a pre-planned period and with the use of a pre-planned number of rounds, as in other Armies. From all my reading of Soviet original sources, this appears to be how they did things. Having the FO talk directly to an Army level staff officer who then parcelled out artillery assets on the fly assumes a flexibility that I do not believe the Soviets, nor the Germans had, no matter how long the delay, by the time scale of a CM battle.

My second reason for believing that the delay should be the same for German and Soviet Army level guns, is that at Kursk they clearly were similar. The Soviets knew the importance of speed and at Kursk set out to measure their own performance at the very thing we are discussing. I can only say again that my reading of Soviet “documents on war experience” is that they are spin free. They really are “lessons learnt” documents and not propaganda. As is the case in all matters in life we probably do not all agree on this. But I do ask people to read some of these documents, they can be purchased from the publisher Frank Cass, before “assuming” the statistics in such material is biased or doctored. Given the statistics in the Kursk report I feel it is difficult to support a view that Soviet Army level artillery, when firing “called” FO type missions, which a I agree was not the most normal use of such assets, had delays greater than those at Kursk. However, what makes life interesting is that we do not all agree.

All the best,

Kip.

PS. Another very fine source is the original, November 45, US DoD, Handbook on Soviet Military Forces. It is part of the same series as the more famous Handbook on German Military Forces, spring 45. However, the Soviet one is even better and quite a bit longer and more detailed. I offered my copy to the publisher Greenhill, they publish the German and Japanese books in the series, however they said the Soviet one was just too long and complex to reproduce commercially. This surprised me, as I would have thought the market for a Soviet version was huge, by the standard of these things. However, they are the experts.

[ 12-30-2001: Message edited by: kipanderson ]</p>

[Jeff Duquette]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Kip Said: For either side, although the Soviets would use it more often, to have the ability to construct Fireplans assuming they were included in the scenario design. The way this may work is for there to be a type of spotter that is only available in set-up and turn one. The spotter indicates targets as in Prep Barrages, but importantly, also the timing of the barrages which "need not start" in turn one. A spotter of this type could indicate a target to be fired on from, say, turn 16 to turn 22, then another target from turn 28 to turn 34 and so on… until the battery had no more ammo. Once set, the Fireplan could not be changed. The spotter disappears.<hr></blockquote>

Great post Kip. I think you hit the nail on the head regarding how to best model some of the limitations facing Red Army Artillery during the war, and how to best model it within the constraints of a wargame. I guess I would add that generation of pre-game artillery fire plan would be applicable to all folks...Germans, American or Commonwealth armies.

The biggest distinguishing feature is perhaps the ability of varying armies to engage surprise targets or targets of opportunity. I would be curious if you could elaborate somewhat on how to best integrate an artillery fire plan approach in wargames with surprise target engagements.

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Kip Said: The Soviets could not swing around Corps and Army artillery fire the way the British could, but nor could the Germans and the Americans.

Scott Replied: Germans no, Americans yes. That one's been discussed, and as yet I haven't seen any convincing arguments placing US or CW artillery beyond the other in practice. Which is for another thread anyway.<hr></blockquote>

I have to agree with Scott regarding the real lack of conviencing evidence, although as already indicated this is seemingly a topic for another thread.

[Scott B]

In my opinion, there's a satisfactory workaround - make TRPs purchaseable from the 'artillery' points list rather than from 'fortifications.' That way the Soviets have an opportunity in QBs for the kind of 'fireplans' that they might have on the attack. I think this would represent pre-battle planning of fires and would go a ways toward allowing the Soviets to use their artillery in a historical manner, should they so choose.

I guess part of the discrepancy here is that I'm looking at Army level firing units as being used primarily in General Support, while Kip is looking at them while being used in the Direct Support role. I don't think these units were commonly used in Direct Support, although it is clear that they probably were from time to time.

Having solid numbers for Kursk is nice, but not as useful as I'd like. Kursk breaks all the rules; you have Soviet units with months to prepare their fire plans and conduct survey and registration, and a well laid and organized fire support network. There's no reason they shouldn't have had a highly responsive artillery system at Kursk, but it doesn't necessarily follow that they were ever able to replicate that level of responsiveness in an offensive operation, particularly after the first week or so once the mobile groups were committed and pursuit began.

Scott

[kipanderson]

Jeff, hi,

Thanks for the kind words on my post. I do hope that Charles and co. will give it go with the Fireplans. We are already going to have Prep Barrages, which is a big move in the right direction. But to model Soviet WW2 artillery correctly I feel an extra push to “full Fireplans” is needed. All that is required is for the Prep Barrage spotter to be able to set a time for the barrage to start and end other than turn one. I can but hope.

Jeff you wrote,

“The biggest distinguishing feature is perhaps the ability of varying armies to engage surprise targets or targets of opportunity. I would be curious if you could elaborate somewhat on how to best integrate an artillery fire plan approach in wargames with surprise target engagements.”

Jeff, in my view, all one can do is have Fireplans/General Support missions and CM type spotters/Direct Support missions run in parallel within a game. What I mean by this is that the same battery cannot do both in a given game of CM. Nor in WW2 could a real life battery, as I understand things. In WW2 if a given battery was tasked to fire a General Support mission according to a given Fireplan between, say, 0900 and 1100 on a given day, then that is all it did between 0900 and 1100. However, at 1101 it may have been tasked to fire a Direct Support mission in support of a given FO, CM spotter. What WW2 artillery could not do, as I understand it, is be engaged in firing a General Support mission according to a given Fireplan, and then half way through, suddenly fire in support of a given FO/CM spotter because some better target had come up.

In a given CM game I would have to have “two different spotters”. One would be the Fireplan/Prep Barrage spotter that would then disappear at the end of turn one, the other would a normal CM type spotter. The Fireplan/Prep Barrage spotter would set his targets, and their timing, and then be gone at the end of turn one. The normal CM type spotter would fire at opportunity targets as they currently do. Two different spotters in the same game, doing two different things. This is an abstract, but is much as it happened in reality in WW2. This is also something that I believe the current CM engine could handle. But, of course, I do not “know” for certain that this could be done with the current engine, only BTS could tell you that.

My main point is that modelling Soviet WW2 artillery command and control rigidity through delays far greater than German delays, is not historically accurate. The greater use of Fireplans by the Soviets is historically accurate.

Scott wrote

“I guess part of the discrepancy here is that I'm looking at Army level firing units as being used primarily in General Support, while Kip is looking at them while being used in the Direct Support role. I don't think these units were commonly used in Direct Support, although it is clear that they probably were from time to time.”

Agreed. I would tend to regard the Kursk figures as more representative of the norm than you, but other than that we seem to be pretty much in agreement. One reason I would give the Kursk figures weight is that the document is very clear about the Soviets being on a learning curve at Kursk. Thus post-Kursk, if there were any changes delays may have reduced. However, I do agree with you that after the initial break-through there will often have been relatively few Soviet FOs connected and up and running. Thus the reliance on organic artillery and assault guns.

All the best,

Kip.

[Grisha]

Kip,

I like your fire plan idea, and generally agree with you. The Soviets got around the 'initiative/flexibility' issue by very intensive pre-planning, starting from Front level down to small units. Due to very good reconnaissance work, and comprehensive contingency planning, a form of 'predetermined flexibilty'(boy, now there's an oxymoron) emerged within the confines of the overall operation. However, it should also be noted that this sort of thing didn't come to fruition until mid-1943, and that after Kursk, the majority of Soviet operations were offensive in nature, resulting in diminshed artillery effectiveness after the breakthrough phase. It could even be said that Soviet losses remained high in the 3rd period of the war due to this very limitation: lack of responsive, flexible artillery during mobile operations.

Maybe, it might be an idea to do away with Soviet spotters for artillery at 152mm and higher, and replace them with a 'fireplan' setup, since from Corps level artillery up, most fire missions were part of an overall plan.

[Moon]

Sorry, but I'm not convinced

Not about the use of fireplans by the Russians in real life and other points brought forward here, but just about its implementation in CM.

It seems to me that fireplans are something much bigger in scale than involving firing 4 tubes of heavy artillery at a street crossing near a nameless village for 5 minutes. More likely are 50 tubes at four villages for an hour or two, then switching to another five villages on the flanks for another hour and so on.

If this assumption is true, then fireplans have no place on CM's scale, other than what is already coded in CMBB, i.e. the remnants of a planned barrage at the beginning of a Russian attack (or defense), striking known and suspescted enemy setup or defensive positions.

The kind of artillery support given to the players for local control should therefore solely represent on-call fire. And this is, IMO, done realistically in CMBB as it is.

Note that the excessive delay times mentioned above are NOT what you will usually see in CMBB. Very rarely will you see more than 15 minutes of delay, usually only when you replot your target point a couple of times, and usually only for the biggest calibers, which, I should also mention, are often way too expensive for your average QB or small scenario.

If, however, you get a big-a$$ gun spotter on the map anyway, chances are that you can plot ONE target point, and get 8 or 10 minutes delay (representing on-call artillery support). You're only in trouble if you decide to move that target point, as the delay can grow quickly, so in a sense you HAVE to plan ahead and stick to the plan often in order to get your artillery down within the usual 30 minute engagement at all.

Frankly said, artillery in CMBB as it is "feels" Russian I'm not saying it couldn't be improved, but it's a lot further than many here assume judging from CMBO's artillery model, I think.

And yes, I do have the luxury of a CMBB beta to verify what I'm saying

Martin

[kipanderson]

Hi,

Yup, happily we all seem to be pretty much in agreement on the fundamentals, except Moon( see below). Different spin, but agreed on the fundamentals. It’s good to have comments from as many people as possible. It increases the chances of BTS bothering to implement a full Fireplan feature from zero to a fraction above zero! All that is really needed is for the Prep Barrage spotter to be able to set barrages to start at sometime other than turn one. And then disappear. Then one would have a full feature Fireplan, given the scale of CM; it is a tactical and not an operational game.

Grisha wrote,

“To be frank, I'm actually going to be looking to the SU-76/122/152(or even towed guns) for most artillery needs in the majority of Soviet non-assault scenarios played. And, regimental 120mm mortar fire. 82mm mortars at battalion level are fine, but 120mm's have just the right 'punch'.”

I would second that. But just add that, happily, there were a lot of independent 120mm mortar regiment/brigades kicking around so at times one could be generous with the 120 mortars!

Grisha also wrote,

“However, it should also be noted that this sort of thing didn't come to fruition until mid-1943, and that after Kursk, the majority of Soviet operations were offensive in nature, resulting in diminished artillery effectiveness after the breakthrough phase.”

As the Russians themselves always put it, there were three distinct phases to the war. 41-42, 43 and finally, 44-45.

However, when it comes to the “diminished artillery effectiveness after the breakthrough phase” I have a slightly different spin on things to others. In my view, the reason for this diminished effectiveness, regarding artillery, was that the post-breakthrough phases on the Eastern Front tended to involve advances of 20km, 30km or even 50km in just a few days. Advances only seen on in NEW during the last week of August and first weeks of September 44. With such rapid advances moving forward the artillery and all the FO related command and control will have been challenging. In such situations, more often than not, there will not have been Army level FO/CM spotter type artillery support. However, “if” there were such support, as sometimes will have been the case, then the same SOP will have been used. The Soviets will have either had a regiment of, say, 122mm howitzers, in place with ammo and communications set up to support a FO or not. If they did, then the usual Standard Operating Procedures will have been used. It follows from this that the delay times will have been the same as usual. In my view, very similar to those of the Germans.

Moon, hi,

Thanks for taking the time to give such a full response, great to hear from someone with inside knowledge of CMBB and how it really is. However, I do not quite agree with all you say, no surprise there.

Moon wrote,

“It seems to me that Fireplans are something much bigger in scale than involving firing 4 tubes of heavy artillery at a street crossing near a nameless village for 5 minutes. More likely are 50 tubes at four villages for an hour or two, then switching to another five villages on the flanks for another hour and so on.”

I knew something like this would come up as an objection to Fireplans. I have seen a number of Soviet WW2 Fireplans, well three or four any way. BTS may not wish to include them, but battalion + V battalion + engagements, on a 2km by 2km map, are well within the scale of Fireplans, on all fronts. As they would be today. I agree that a four-tube battery is too small a scale, but that is why above I gave as an example the fact that I would always use Prep Barrage/Fireplan spotters in threes anyway. Have them target locations within 100m of each other at the same time. This is a limitation of an engine designed to be able to run on a P200 machine, I guess. CM gamers already, routinely, play games where, to be strictly realistic, one should be using an eight or twelve tube artillery engine. In my view, this is no reason to exclude Fireplans. All that needs to be done it for the Prep Barrage Spotter to be able to set a mission to start at sometime other than turn one.

When it comes to delays for Soviet artillery, what you say confirms my fears, or “may confirm my fears”. You give an example of a big $$$ Soviet spotter, assume you mean, say, 152mm, having a delay of 8-10 minutes. I cannot know for sure, I have not seen the game, but I would put money on the fact that German 150mm spotters gets a delay around half this. In my view, this is historically inaccurate. The figures from Kursk include Army level artillery, lots of it, and for CM type spotting they give 4-7 minutes as the delay time. The guys at BTS may have evidence for Soviet delays being double German delays for similar guns in similar situations. My fear is that they do not have such evidence but have simply “assumed” the Soviets where a lot slower. i.e. they have fallen for a classic “Eastern Front myth”. None could be a bigger fan of BTS than I am, and I know they have tried, and succeeded, in avoiding all sorts of myths. But this time they seem to have tripped up. I have hard, solid evidence of what Soviet delay time actually were at Kursk. Which is a very big sample to go on. Unless BTS have better evidence, which they may have, I have no way of knowing, they should think again regarding Soviet delays from mid-43 onwards.

All good fun,

All the best,

Kip.

[Scott B]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by kipanderson:

With such rapid advances moving forward the artillery and all the FO related command and control will have been challenging. In such situations, more often than not, there will not have been Army level FO/CM spotter type artillery support.<hr></blockquote>

I agree completely with this. In a late war offensive, army level artillery support would remain back with the rifle forces, and the mobile groups exploiting into German territory would bring their own fire support and receive priority for CAS. By the time they were introduced into the German rear area they'd likely be at the very limits of army artillery range, anyway. Whatever high level artillery they had would assist with the advance of the main line after resistance began to crumble.

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr> However, “if” there were such support, as sometimes will have been the case, then the same SOP will have been used. The Soviets will have either had a regiment of, say, 122mm howitzers, in place with ammo and communications set up to support a FO or not. If they did, then the usual Standard Operating Procedures will have been used. It follows from this that the delay times will have been the same as usual. In my view, very similar to those of the Germans.<hr></blockquote>

I'm not sure about that. My question is this-- under what conditions do you think an army artillery commander would relinquish control over his firing units during an offensive?

Army Artillery Group firing units often didn't actually belong to that army - they belonged to the GHQ artillery reserve. They weren't organic to any maneuver formation and often didn't have their own targeting/observation assets. There's no reason to believe they had similar response times compared to German units that were better equipped with communications equipment, had always been tasked with directly supporting line units, and had trained with those very same units since their creation.

German Corps/Army level artillery formed a small minority of available German firing units. It was mostly at the Division level and could reasonably be expected to provide support in a far more timely manner than artillery units from Soviet high command reserve that enjoyed none of the advantages that made German units quick to respond to fire mission requests. Remember, the Germans gave up the ability to mass fires effectively in order to respond more quickly to calls for fire - their artillery was probably less effective overall as a result.

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>The figures from Kursk include Army level artillery, lots of it, and for CM type spotting they give 4-7 minutes as the delay time.<hr></blockquote>

Really? How much of it was army artillery and how much was divisional and regimental artillery/mortar fire?

Kursk was a static defensive operation in the Summer of 1943. The more variables you change from the Kursk standard, the less valid that 4-7 minute figure is going to be. I consider it marginally useful for the second period of the war, and really only valid for static defenses from Summer-Fall 1943. I can't possibly see how it is in any way useful for the first or third periods of the war - there are so many things different that it's no longer an applicable standard at all.

On a side note, the argument against fire plans on reasons of scale isn't entirely valid - just because high level artillery plans may have involved more assets than are available to a CM level commander doesn't mean that said plans wouldn't have a noticeable and relevant effect on the tactical battle itself. They did plan fires against everything down to individual unit positions, and regimental and battalion weapons would be employed in the tactical commander's fire mission planning as well. Every army in WWII did this to some extent.

The best case would be to allow the Soviet commander to decide where all his artillery's going to fall before the battle starts, but I think a 70% workaround would simply be to provide TRPs to the attacker. This can already be done in the scenario editor, so the only true issue then is whether there should be this sort of thing in QBs, which isn't actually all that big of a problem anyway. The addition of the first turn "preparatory bombardment" is a big step by itself, and I'm really looking forward to trying that out.

Thanks for the post, Moon - I don't think the figures you quoted sound too far out there. Are you allowed to tell us whether those numbers change over time? Does a regular Soviet 152mm artillery spotter in 1941 have the same delay as one in 1945?

Scott

[Moon]

Hi Kip!

(Sorry I missed it to the Ardennes, by the way)

Just want to clarify a few things...

"I have seen a number of Soviet WW2 Fireplans, well three or four any way. BTS may not wish to include them, but battalion + V battalion + engagements, on a 2km by 2km map, are well within the scale of Fireplans, on all fronts."

While certainly true, the question would be: to what extent? How many Fireplans would be in existance for your typical 30 mínute engagement? In other words, what would be the usual duration of such a planned strike? If the answer is 30 minutes, that leaves room for one massive artillery strike in your typical CM scneario, and I am not sure I would like to play such a scenario...

CM has been designed to simulate the "hot" 30 minutes of a battle which, in total, could rage for hours or days, with recon, counter-recon, massive strikes (artillery AND air), but only the gist of all this is what makes up a typical CM scenario. And, naturally, those 30 minutes should hardly be the one's with an intense artillery barrage raging on the whole map for the duration of a scenario (pre-planned or not)...

"As they would be today. I agree that a four-tube battery is too small a scale, but that is why above I gave as an example the fact that I would always use Prep Barrage/Fireplan spotters in threes anyway."

Who says CMBB has 4 tube batteries only?

"In my view, this is no reason to exclude Fireplans. All that needs to be done it for the Prep Barrage Spotter to be able to set a mission to start at sometime other than turn one."

Any FO can do that, with a certain minimum delay, as it is. So what you are asking for is to reduce that minimum delay to be able to call for artillery sometime after the first turn and before the "normal" delay. I am sure that this is something, which - when easy to code - might make it in, but it sure doesn't sound like a big problem with modelling Russian artillery to me

"The figures from Kursk include Army level artillery, lots of it, and for CM type spotting they give 4-7 minutes as the delay time."

As has been pointed out, Kursk is on the "optimal" side of the scale, with prepared defenses and an excellent knowledge of German plans beforehand. In CM, for Russians, you typically get 4-7 minutes of delay by using TRPs even for the big guns, so you would get the exact delays for on-call artillery strikes as you're asking for.

"My fear is that they do not have such evidence but have simply “assumed” the Soviets where a lot slower. i.e. they have fallen for a classic “Eastern Front myth”. None could be a bigger fan of BTS than I am, and I know they have tried, and succeeded, in avoiding all sorts of myths."

One thing I can tell about BFc (rather than BTS lol) is that very little (if anything) is done based on "myths". (Look at smoke handgrenades in CMBO - there is a "myth" that every US infantrymen had smoke grenades to magically block him from German fire when in need of crossing a road or open ground, but BFc decided to leave them out because no hard evidence is available that smoke handgrenades were used for anything else but signalling regularly.) In other words (and sort of the whole meaning of this and my previous post) - keep up the faith.

Scott B - no, I'm not

[kipanderson]

Scott, Moon, hi,

From Scott’s last post

“My question is this-- under what conditions do you think an army artillery commander would relinquish control over his firing units during an offensive?”

I agree with what you imply. However, to entirely ban the CMBB scenario designer from having on call CM spotters for any Soviet unit over 122mm would be a bit harsh. In defence it certainly did happen now and then, and in attack I am sure it happened now and then, but not often.

When it comes to Scott’s opinion, as I understand it, that Soviet artillery men would not have been as well trained as German, and not as well equipped, I am not at all convinced. Not for the last half of the war. Commonwealth and American artillery units in North West Europe managed to operate OK although 90% of them were green. Huge amounts of communications equipment were sent to the Soviet Union, most of it arriving post-Kursk. And for Kursk we have the figures, they did OK even without all that equipment from the west.

Of course, when I mention Kursk we get to the heart of the difference between Scott and I.

Firstly, I have seen many a record of all the Soviet units involved at Kursk. Sadly, I do not have my sources to hand due to the fact that I have just moved house and “stupidly” put all my books into storage. With CMBB developments reaching their peak this was not smart, but even I sometimes have other things on my mind. However, quite a few people reading this post, if they have some the same books I do, which I guess they will, would have a list. May well be one in the David Glantz Kursk book, cannot remember. Anyway, yes, there were many higher level/independent artillery units at Kursk. Off the top of my head I would go for 30% of the total. By the time of Kursk higher level artillery units were starting to turn up big time. Certainly, enough to make a representative portion of the Kursk General Staff study.

Scott wrote,

“Kursk was a static defensive operation in the Summer of 1943. The more variables you change from the Kursk standard, the less valid that 4-7 minute figure is going to be. I consider it marginally useful for the second period of the war, and really only valid for static defenses from Summer-Fall 1943. I can't possibly see how it is in any way useful for the first or third periods of the war - there are so many things different that it's no longer an applicable standard at all.”

I, of course, do feel that the Kursk figures are a good guide to Soviet delay times in 43 and later. All I can say is that the quote from the General Staff Study is not taken out of context; they do mean what they appear to mean. Also, importantly, it is made unambiguously clear that the Soviets considered themselves on a learning curve at Kursk and therefor the SOPs developed at Kursk may well have been tweaked post-Kursk. This in turn means that the delay times are likely to have reduced post-Kursk, if they changed at all, in my view. It seems unlikely to me that Kursk represented the “peak” of Soviet wartime artillery command and control. Scott and I just are not going to agree on this one. I believe the Soviets will have gone on using the same or improved SOPs post-Kursk. I do acknowledge that all battles differ to some extent, but the entire point of SOP is that they are a good base to work from. I do not think it likely that the “actual method and SOP used to call down fire”, “when” CM type spotters were being used, would have taken a backward step post-Kursk. Although at the operational level the Soviets may have been attacking rather than defending. We will just all have to make up our own minds on this one.

I agree that the use of TRP may go some way to addressing the problem, but not far. The reason is that is still gives the Soviets far too much flexibility. For me the point of the Fireplans is that they are totally inflexible within the time scale of a CM battle. Both the location, and the timing of a barrage, needs to be fixed.

Moon, hi,

(Yup, sorry you missed us in Ardennes, Panzers and beer go perfectly together!)

I have just spotted your latest post, “after” typing up the above reply to Scott. So I hope you will forgive me if above it sounds as though I am only addressing Scott. Anyway, thanks a lot for coming back to me. A few points regarding your latest post.

Fireplans need not be huge in scale, either in reality nor in CM. As Scott pointed out. Also I like to play operations or longer games, 40-50 turns. I believe it is more realistic to allow battles to die down in their own time. For me, CM really is a simulation, not a game. That does not mean I do not enjoy the latest Mods, I do. I always watch the first showing of the “one minute movie” with all settings on their most realistic, truly great stuff. However, CM is the only computer game I play. My priorities are tactical realism, tactical realism and tactical realism. Thus a lack of Fireplans is a bit of a shame. However, I say again that Prep Barrages area big step in the right direction. Just go the extra mile; allow the barrage to be set to start in a turn other than turn one! And you have Fireplans. You “hint” this may make it in, believe me, it makes a big difference.

You than go on to give “hints” of other great news.

“Who says CMBB has 4 tube batteries only?”

If what is implied by this is true, it is great news. Prep Barrages, may be Fireplans, even spotters controlling more than four tubes, all sounds great. Better than I could have hoped for.

However, this leaves what has become the thorniest issue, both between Scott and I, and I fear with CMBB as it currently is. The timing of called Soviet fire, the delay.

Quick restatement of the figures from Kursk,

“As a result of these checks and subsequent work on correcting problems, the opening of fire,….was brought down to 40-90 seconds in a number of units. As a rule, prepared fire was opened in 1.5-3 minutes after it was called for and the opening of unplanned fire took 4-7 minutes.”

The above means exactly what it appears to mean. Fire against, what in CM is called TRP, took 1.5-3 minutes, normal CM spotter type fire, against targets other than TRPs, took 4-7 minutes. From what you tell me the delay in called Soviet fire, in CMBB, has effectively been doubled from its real world timing. All I can ask is that all in the BFC/BTS have a think about where you got your figures from? Why have you assumed that Soviet called fire took twice as long as German called fire? What is our primary source for the delay of Soviet called fire?

I have no way of knowing where you all got your figures from for the delay of Soviet called fire.

I will just add a few points in my defence. When it comes to my request for what may be called “full feature Fireplans” I am in fact asking for more rigidity, in the modelling of Soviet artillery, than is currently in CMBB, given your kind reports and Madmatt’s interview. I will be using Prep Barrages, and hopefully Fireplans (if they make it) a lot. It is, in my view, by far the most realistic way to model Soviet artillery support in an assault. However, regarding the delay time for Soviet called fire, normal CM spotters, the only high quality source I have found is the one I give above. It answers the question, “what were Soviet delays?” perfectly, but for Kursk. So the next question is, post-Kursk, will the delays have increased or decreased? I agree that often the Soviets will not have been using called fire, normal CM spotters, but “when they did” where they using the same SOP “to actually call in the fire” or an improved SOP “to actually call in the fire” or less inefficient SOP to “actually call in the fire”, than used at Kursk? My view is that it is highly unlikely that they took a backward step.

Not to make use of a primary source of the quality of the Kursk General Staff Study I feel is a mistake. If there were a better one, that actually gives timings, not just comments such as “the Soviets hoped to deduce these delays” I would be very keen to know of it. I am not saying there isn’t one, I just have not found it.

As I always say, the fact that we do not all agree is a plus, not a minus. Adds to the fun.

All the best,

Kip.

PS. Moon, yes, I do keep the faith. CM has no great fan!

[ 12-31-2001: Message edited by: kipanderson ]</p>

[Scott B]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by kipanderson:

I agree with what you imply. However, to entirely ban the CMBB scenario designer from having on call CM spotters for any Soviet unit over 122mm would be a bit harsh. In defence it certainly did happen now and then, and in attack I am sure it happened now and then, but not often.<hr></blockquote>

We agree here completely. As an aside, I don't consider 122mm howitzers necessarily an army level asset anyway; those existed in divisional artillery in most rifle divisions. 152mm gun howitzers and up, though, are going to be army and front level assets in all but a few rare cases. In any case, this is a 'rarity' issue, to be true, but we're not so concerned with rarity here.

Part of my argument is based on the fact that we're talking about the large caliber high level weapon systems in Soviet armies and fronts, and comparing them to similar systems in German divisions. It's an apples vs. oranges comparison - the division level stuff should be more responsive than the army level stuff. A Soviet rifle battalion should expect a more timely response from a divisional 76mm field gun than an army level 152mm gun howitzer, even in the odd chance that said 152mm battery is tasked with supporting that maneuver unit.

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>When it comes to Scott’s opinion, as I understand it, that Soviet artillery men would not have been as well trained as German, and not as well equipped, I am not at all convinced. Not for the last half of the war. Commonwealth and American artillery units in North West Europe managed to operate OK although 90% of them were green. Huge amounts of communications equipment were sent to the Soviet Union, most of it arriving post-Kursk. And for Kursk we have the figures, they did OK even without all that equipment from the west. <hr></blockquote>

Throughout the war the Soviets suffered from major shortages of communications equipment. For example, in early 1944 the 5th Guards Tank Army, at full strength with two tank and one mechanized corps, had a mere 254 radios; this was less than that assigned to a single US armored division (source: Charles Sharp's WWII OOB series, vol 3). There were never enough radios for everyone, and preserving the maneuver chain of command took precedence to fire support. It was this way in the German army too; when radios were in short supply, the artillery made do with landlines. It's far, far more a problem on the offense than on the defense.

As far as training, it's not a measure of Soviet artillerymen not being as well trained as their German counterparts. Rather, think of it this way: Assume you have two 120mm mortar batteries, created at the same time with the same equipment and personnel. One of these batteries is organic to a rifle regiment, while the other is organic to a separate mortar regiment assigned from army artillery to support a rifle division, where it was attached out to support a rifle regiment.

Which of the two batteries do you think would be better able to provide responsive fires for its maneuver unit? I know which one I'd want backing me up - the guys that'd been there the whole time, knew the unit SOPs, and made their living firing unplanned fire missions, rather than the attached army level unit that spends 99% of its firing time conducting preplanned fire missions. Even if the two units have spent identical time in training, the organic direct support unit will always have an advantage.

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Sadly, I do not have my sources to hand due to the fact that I have just moved house and “stupidly” put all my books into storage. <hr></blockquote>

Haha. I'm in almost exactly the same boat - I have maybe half a dozen books in my place that aren't sealed in boxes; I'm moving out on Thursday... what a pain.

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>With CMBB developments reaching their peak this was not smart, but even I sometimes have other things on my mind. However, quite a few people reading this post, if they have some the same books I do, which I guess they will, would have a list. May well be one in the David Glantz Kursk book, cannot remember. Anyway, yes, there were many higher level/independent artillery units at Kursk. Off the top of my head I would go for 30% of the total. By the time of Kursk higher level artillery units were starting to turn up big time. Certainly, enough to make a representative portion of the Kursk General Staff study. <hr></blockquote>

I agree that there were a high proportion of high command reserve artillery units at Kursk. This was something the Soviets had been big on since the Summer of 1941, when they basically pooled half the guns in the entire Red Army into GHQ Reserve. I wouldn't be surprised if there were more than 30% of the guns and mortars over 76mm at army and front levels at Kursk, but that's not the point. The point is that 4-7 minute number doesn't really help us find out what we're looking for.

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>I, of course, do feel that the Kursk figures are a good guide to Soviet delay times in 43 and later. All I can say is that the quote from the General Staff Study is not taken out of context; they do mean what they appear to mean.<hr></blockquote>

I'm not contesting that. The problem is "what they appear to mean" isn't all that helpful. What if 95% of the fire missions at Kursk were at division level and below? Army artillery fire missions could have all taken 20 minutes or more and the end number would still have been low if the average response time was low. One general delay for ALL artillery missions at Kursk doesn't answer our specific question regarding artillery at high levels of command, particularly as it could reasonably be expected that these units would be performing fewer unplanned missions than division and regimental level systems.

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Also, importantly, it is made unambiguously clear that the Soviets considered themselves on a learning curve at Kursk and therefor the SOPs developed at Kursk may well have been tweaked post-Kursk. This in turn means that the delay times are likely to have reduced post-Kursk, if they changed at all, in my view. It seems unlikely to me that Kursk represented the “peak” of Soviet wartime artillery command and control. Scott and I just are not going to agree on this one. I believe the Soviets will have gone on using the same or improved SOPs post-Kursk.<hr></blockquote>

I don't think Kursk necessarily represents the peak of Soviet artillery responsiveness. I do, however, believe that if anything, response times were probably shorter than average. They occupied static positions; they had range markers and cleared fields of fire; they had several months to conduct registrations, and they had perfect survey. They likely would not have had survey as good anywhere in Poland or Germany as they did at Kursk.

The most important part is this: we're trying to puzzle out Soviet artillery responsiveness, and we've narrowed our discussion to high level artillery assets. We want a general answer that makes sense. We have one example of a response time from one battle in a war that lasted for four years. It is foolish to assume that our one sample tells us anything about the rest of the war. During the opening stages of the war, most Soviet artillery had insufficient communications for control of fire whatsoever. Now we have two samples - what's halfway between "4-7 minutes" and "never?"

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>I do acknowledge that all battles differ to some extent, but the entire point of SOP is that they are a good base to work from. I do not think it likely that the “actual method and SOP used to call down fire”, “when” CM type spotters were being used, would have taken a backward step post-Kursk. Although at the operational level the Soviets may have been attacking rather than defending. <hr></blockquote>

There will be significant differences in artillery responsiveness in an attack vs. a defensive battle. I just read an article about 2nd Guards Tank Corps in Bagration; their entire artillery complement consisted of two SU regiments and the rest mortars, organic 76mm field guns, and Katyushas. Despite being 11 Guards Army's mobile group and the deciding factor in that army's success, they apparently received no field artillery attachments from army level. Army level artillery being attached to forward units and conducting unplanned fire missions were probably so rare that it's going to be very hard to find any specific numbers on how long it took them. For that matter, we're still looking for a single hard number example; there are none that I know of.

Scott

[Grisha]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>However, when it comes to the “diminished artillery effectiveness after the breakthrough phase” I have a slightly different spin on things to others. In my view, the reason for this diminished effectiveness, regarding artillery, was that the post-breakthrough phases on the Eastern Front tended to involve advances of 20km, 30km or even 50km in just a few days. Advances only seen on in NEW during the last week of August and first weeks of September 44. With such rapid advances moving forward the artillery and all the FO related command and control will have been challenging. In such situations, more often than not, there will not have been Army level FO/CM spotter type artillery support. However, “if” there were such support, as sometimes will have been the case, then the same SOP will have been used. The Soviets will have either had a regiment of, say, 122mm howitzers, in place with ammo and communications set up to support a FO or not. If they did, then the usual Standard Operating Procedures will have been used. It follows from this that the delay times will have been the same as usual. In my view, very similar to those of the Germans.

- Kip<hr></blockquote>

I agree, and again, this would have been previously implemented as part of the Army/Front plan. It'll be neat making scenarios of engagements with elements of forward detachments - offensive ad hoc units that were well balanced with firepower and speed.

I think what people tend to believe is that Soviet formations tended to keep everything centralized, making for terrible flexibility. In the 1st period of the war this was definitely true, but not because of Soviet military doctrine. The real reason was due to a military leadership that was inexperienced, resulting in an inability to implement proper Soviet doctrine and procedure. By the 2nd period of the war, this was changing rapidly, and by the 3rd period Soviet doctrine was being implemented properly. The fact is, what was really centralized was the planning process, which made decisions as to who and where the major effort was to be established. These decisions based on comprehensive reconnaissance/intelligence reports and knowledge of their subunit commanders' capabilities. Combined with very effective use of deception during the deployment phase, most decisions were well made, and the result was that in the end - at the tactical level the units that needed the most support had it. On the other hand, all the planning in the world can't predict when and where defensive strongpoints will arise during exploitation, nor what degree of resistance will be encountered. And as exploitation further develops, the amount of engagements encountered multiplies. This requires a truly flexible response from support assets, something Soviet doctine was weak at due to centralization of uncommitted assets.

[Cauldron]

I started to read these posts but they are fairly long winded ( but never the less useful).

The idea that the Soviets have to wait 15 + turns for a fire mission ( particularly after 1943) is fairly far fetched.

It should be abundantly clear that, as Stalin stated, " Artillary is the God of war".. After 1943 the Soviets had at lest 5 X the artillary that the Germans had.

The C & C issues of the infantry/ AFV are significantly different form the German are fortunatly seem to be taken care of. Artillary on the other hand ( for the Soviets against the German's)was as Henrici says " Both significant and powerful".

Things that make artillary land often in no man's land are a - historical.

There are some dramatic passages in the book by Guy Sajer on artillary, for those who want a more viseral version of the above points

I am also lookign forward to game engine 2 LOTS...

My main grips are the way it handles operations, and draws perimiters after a battle and the way it refuses to encircle ... I am not sure if BTS knows this but almost every operation involved some level of encirclement.......... anyway that's another story

[Cauldron]

However, it should also be noted that this sort of thing didn't come to fruition until mid-1943, and that after Kursk, the majority of Soviet operations were offensive in nature, resulting in diminshed artillery effectiveness after the breakthrough phase. It could even be said that Soviet losses remained high in the 3rd period of the war due to this very limitation: lack of responsive, flexible artillery during mobile operations.

That is rubbish.... Artillary has to be repositioned, i guess because the Soviets had SO MUCH OF IT this probably took about 5 times as long as the Germans

The Soviets continued loosing in the so called 3rd period of the war because they continued to feed units into killig zones or in the case of AFV's had nowhere near the C & C of german units ethier tacitcaly or esp strategically.

The WHOLE reason the Kursk salient existed at ALL was German strategic thinking ( in this case Von Manstein).

The effectiveness of artillary ( Soviet) is unquestioned or at least its abundance. As stated by Henrici

" Soviet artillary was both abundant and powerful."

end of story

\

[Grisha]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by Cauldron:

That is rubbish.... Artillary has to be repositioned, i guess because the Soviets had SO MUCH OF IT this probably took about 5 times as long as the Germans

The Soviets continued loosing in the so called 3rd period of the war because they continued to feed units into killig zones or in the case of AFV's had nowhere near the C & C of german units ethier tacitcaly or esp strategically.

The WHOLE reason the Kursk salient existed at ALL was German strategic thinking ( in this case Von Manstein).

The effectiveness of artillary ( Soviet) is unquestioned or at least its abundance. As stated by Henrici

" Soviet artillary was both abundant and powerful."

end of story

\<hr></blockquote>

Not quite, Cauldron. Though I won't 'grace' your response as one only fit for the trash bin, I will say your answer is a bit narrow.

Many Soviet casualties during the 3rd period of the war(incidently, a Soviet/Russian term used to delineate the different phases of the war - Kip posts the dates they roughly represent up above) resulted from a lack of firepower during crucial phases of their offensive operations. For example, an unexpected German strongpoint prevents exploiting Soviet forces from cutting off a German retreat route. The lack of appreciable artillery from division or higher that can be made available in a timely manner forces these Soviet units to assault the German position with little or no indirect artillery support, resulting in higher casualties. And while direct fire support in the form of tanks or assault guns could help, there is nothing quite like artillery to saturate an area.

So, yes, the Soviets possessed tremendous artillery assets, but they were mainly limited to the breakthrough, and immediate exploitation phases of an offensive operation. Once exploitation was underway one couldn't expect more than divisional level artillery, and more often than not regimental artillery was as much as you got, ie 120mm mortars.

[Skipper]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by Scott B:

All of it pre-planned and to a fixed time table.<hr></blockquote>

Disagree. All pre-planned (except mortars), but each phase of the plan is implemented on a signal (codeword on field phone, radio, rocket lights etc).

[Cauldron]

Unless U have field manuals for both sides and actual case studies... I can think of Kharkov in 1943 where the SS were about to be annialated by artillary until Hausser decided to pull out..

Within CM though all this divisional talk is pure naval gazing, much more interesting would be to get what IS there to work properly.

Gee, I'm gald it was'nt trash ..........hee heee