WWII doctrines

[Berkut]

Thought I would drop in with a few comments concerning tanks and omaha beach.

A recent underwater search was taken to map the location of all DD tanks assigned to go in with the 29th inf. They were able to locate 19, and despite the heavy corrosion the one undisputable fact was the bearing of the tanks. They were all facing towards the beach.

A recent discovery of orders saying that LCTs were to take their precious cargo further in had not reached the tank battalion destined for Omaha.

So good old bureaucratic snafu, coupled with the atrocious weather and strong currents simply swamped the tanks, and they capsized on the way in. Even hobarts funnies had they been present would have suffered the same fate.

Had they been taken closer, these DD tanks would have have given those troops on Omaha the vital close suport they needed, and would have prevented the huge casualites suffered.

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by Berkut:

Had they been taken closer, these DD tanks would have have given those troops on Omaha the vital close suport they needed, and would have prevented the huge casualites suffered.

I think this conclusion is borne out by the performance of DD tanks at Juno, who were instrumental in knocking out enemy pillboxes with their 75mm guns. But of course, "huge" casualties may only have been downgraded to "heavy" casualties - the troops on Juno still suffered even with the DD tanks there, with some assault companies losing 50 percent of their men.

[Pak_43]

Did not one battalion of tanks decide to ride the LCT's all the way in and therefore were on the beach to support the landings?

"Ninety-six tanks, the Special Engineer Task Force, and eight companies of assault infantry (1,450 men), landing just before and after 0630, were to carry out the first assault missions (Map No. V).

On the right, the 743d Tank Battalion brought in all its tanks on LCT's."

Omaha Beachhead (6 June-13 June 1944) American Forces in Action Series. Historical Division. War Department (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, Facsimile Reprint, 1984), pp. 35-87]

My understanding was that a considerable number of these got picked off by guns zoned in on the beaches..

[Berkut]

My understanding of the event was that at Omaha the first wave of tanks, 27 never made it ahsore, all capsized on the way in. I did not make that clear in the original post and I apologise.

Of the 19 surveyed none showed any signs of battle damage. Even the the lone DD tank rusting in the salt air at a nearby museum is one whole piece.

They left the LCT at the atrranged dropoff point despite orders to have the LCT's take them in because of concerns about the strong currents and bad weather. These orders were recieved elsewhere, but never reached them.

[Brian]

Originally posted by Priest:

and the list goes on and on. The Germans were rampant techno freaks. The Panther is the perfect example, they missed one of the whole advantages of the T-34 when trying to emulate it, that of simplicity.

Err, I think you'll find they didn't miss it, they deliberately ignored it, making a virtue of technical excellence over the rugged simplicity of the Russian vehicles becuase they knew they couldn't compete on a one for one basis.

[Tarquelne]

Techie, maybe. But neither of these were US inventions.

I don't think who invented them matter. But it does occur to me that when the US Army adopted them might make a difference. How long did it take for tung. ammo, for example, to be issued to most tanks/TDs?

What, btw, are some major innovations introduced by a army during WWII that weren't responses to an enemy threat or a pressing need? (A complicated, vauge, "big" question, sorry. But I'm an interested person. You're all here to cater to my wants, right? "An instructing role is a serving role.")

Intersting stuff about the sunk DDs...

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by Tarqulene:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Techie, maybe. But neither of these were US inventions.

I don't think who invented them matter. But it does occur to me that when the US Army adopted them might make a difference. How long did it take for tung. ammo, for example, to be issued to most tanks/TDs?

What, btw, are some major innovations introduced by a army during WWII that weren't responses to an enemy threat or a pressing need? (A complicated, vauge, "big" question, sorry. But I'm an interested person. You're all here to cater to my wants, right? "An instructing role is a serving role.")

Intersting stuff about the sunk DDs...</font>

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by Tarqulene:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Techie, maybe. But neither of these were US inventions.

I don't think who invented them matter. But it does occur to me that when the US Army adopted them might make a difference. How long did it take for tung. ammo, for example, to be issued to most tanks/TDs?

What, btw, are some major innovations introduced by a army during WWII that weren't responses to an enemy threat or a pressing need? (A complicated, vauge, "big" question, sorry. But I'm an interested person. You're all here to cater to my wants, right? "An instructing role is a serving role.")

Intersting stuff about the sunk DDs...</font>

[Andreas]

Original Blitzkrieg doctrine (what was the name of the British chap who thought ahead on this)? Although one could argue that was just a way to get over the risk of a new trench war. But it was developed to combine the new weaponry in the arsenals, in the absence of a direct threat on the battlefield. The Soviet experiments with airborne forces in the 1930s, and the theory of deep operations (or whatever it was called) would also fall into this category.

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

[QB

Maus?[/QB]

[Tarquelne]

Hi, Michael D.

Did you realize that out of the 300 or so words in your last two posts only 2 were actually "new text", and both were German?

And I assume they were answers to my "major innovations" question?

I don't know what the Krummlauf is (so I got 1 new word of the 300.), and I think the Maus could easily be simply considered a desperate response to a desperate need. I dunno, though, what the actual thinking was behind the Maus project. Was in begun before Germany was clearly loosing the war? In other words, "Just because" they wanted a super tank. Not because they didn't know how to stop the Allies, and hoped a super tank would do it.

Andreas: Ah! No quotes, but I'm not certain what you're responding to. Maybe "Krummlauf?" is a doctrine question?

But, assuming it's a response to my question too: I did specify _during_ the war. I specified "during the war" because between-wars, I've been told, is when military organizations often invest time in "pre-emptive" innovation.

(I agree that other than that, the German adoption of the BK tactics fits the bill.)

What I'm fishing for, really, is an example of an innovation that began more-or-less for innovation's sake. Because someone had a bright idea and was able to sell it to the organization, not because there was either a well defined problem that needed a solution or poorly defined but overwhelming problem (ie - "We're loosing the war.") to be solved.

Right now I don't think neither the US Army or the German forces showed a pro-or-anti tech/gadget bias. They just responded to different pressures. Or really, one basic force: Necessity. If they _needed_ a new gadget or tech they adopted it, if they didn't need it, they didn't. Sometimes they were good at realizing when they needed something, sometimes they weren't - but no bias.

I wrote "US Army or German forces" above because as little as I know about them, I know less about the British forces. However, from what I've read here recently I'd say they were "pro-gadget", if I were forced to guess. They might make a much better group to compare the US Army to, at least after the US joined the war and Britain's situation didn't look so desperate.

And I think there might be some Canadians posting here... maybe they know something about Canadian gadgets? Canadian vrs. US might be the best comparison of all.

[Enoch]

Originally posted by Tarqulene:

What I'm fishing for, really, is an example of an innovation that began more-or-less for innovation's sake. Because someone had a bright idea and was able to sell it to the organization, not because there was either a well defined problem that needed a solution or poorly defined but overwhelming problem (ie - "We're loosing the war.") to be solved.

I think the formerly mentioned VT artillery fits your bill. VT was first developed for AA use by both the US Navy and Army and then applied by the Army to regular artillery. That is technological innovation, I don't know if it fits anyone's definition of gadgetry though.

[Michael Dorosh]

Krummlauf was a curved barrel for the Sturmgewehr 44 - so you could shoot around corners. I guess it was used in AFVs, so there really was a need for it - but the infantry version was just silly.

[Redwolf]

I see the Panzerschreck listed as German invention.

It was the US. The Germans built the Pueppchen and stumbled about the Bazooka in North Africa and dumped the Pueppchen in favour of an IS-2 compatible upgrade of the Bazooka.

HEAT, as in direct jet stream, was inventent by some British guy, IIRC.

[ June 14, 2002, 03:56 PM: Message edited by: redwolf ]

[Tarquelne]

[/qb]

I think the formerly mentioned VT artillery fits your bill.

[JasonC]

What did the US sector in Normandy look like from the German side at the time? Is Brian's picture recognizable? The following is largely taken from exerpts from the US official histories of the fighting, which include regular sections on "the enemy side", presenting the assessments of the battle by the various German HQs. (Almost everything below is a quote - if my interjections aren't clear, sue me).

"At noon, 84 Corps stated that attempted sea landings from the Vire to the coast of northeast of Bayeux had been completely smashed and the only critical area was that near Caen.

The 352d Division advised Army at 1335 that the Allied assault had been hurled back into the sea; only at Colleville was fighting still under way, with the Germans counterattacking. This reassuring view was sent on to Army Group.

At 1620 Army gave Army Group a general estimate of the situation: the situation in the Cotentin was noted as reassuring, and German forces on hand there were regarded as adequate; Army expressed its surprise that no landings by sea had supported the airborne troops, and hazarded the view that the Allied operation in sector was diversionary.

Twenty minutes later, this conclusion was upset by word from Corps that sea landings had taken place in the Madeleine area, just north of the Vire mouth.

At 1800 more bad news came from the 352d Division: Allied forces had infiltrated through the strongpoints, and advance elements with armor had reached the line Colleville - Louvieres - Asnieres; the objective of this attack was believed to be Bayeux (i.e. link-up with the British beaches).

The situation in the Cotentin was not causing particular worry. Information as to the Omaha Beach sector had been scanty throughout the day, and both Corps and Army tended to pay little attention to developments there, even after the evening news of Allied penetrations.

The evidence suggests that both Corps and Army regarded the assault in this area as a mere adjunct of the main effort directed at Caen and Bayeux. Communications were evidently poor in the 352d Division's sector, and no inkling had come back to Corps of the scale of landings in progress at Omaha.

In the Cotentin, information of 7 June indicated Allied reinforcement by air and by sea. On the next day, heavy Allied pressure was exerted from the Ste-Mere-Eglise area in attacks north toward Valognes and south toward Carentan. German units which had been attempting to organize counterattacks against the Utah beachhead were thrown on the defensive and began to lose ground. Growing concern was felt at Army over this situation, particularly after studying a (U. S.) VII Corps operations order, washed in on the beach on 8 June, which made it clear that Cherbourg was a main Allied objective.

The Allied push south from Colleville was interpreted as an effort toward Carentan, designed to roll up German coastal defenses by passing to rearward of them. It was recognized that a "wide hole had been torn between Bayeux and St-Lo." Although no particular anxiety about that sector was yet expressed, plans for commitment of the reinforcements under way from Brittany were somewhat modified.

Part of these reinforcements were under II Paratroop Corps. the 3d Paratroop Division, the 77th Division, and the 17th SS Panzer Grenadier Division. Rommel decided on the morning of 7 June that Brittany was not in danger of early attack and started these offensive units on the way to Normandy, the 17th SS to come from positions south of the Loire River.

Plans for use of II Paratroop Corps were reshaped during the next few days in view of changing appreciation of the battle. At first, because of reported paratroop landings in the Coutances area, the corps was ordered to that region to guard against any Allied attempt to cut off the Cotentin peninsula. Such an attempt was feared by Rommel himself.

On 8 June Seventh Army notified Army Group of its intentions as follows. to annihilate the Allied beachhead north of Caen and then turn toward Bayeux; to hold the VII (U. S.) Corps attack toward Cherbourg by means of the units already in the Cotentin; and to bring II Paratroop Corps up to the St-Lo region, where it could help I SS Panzer Corps in the attack on Bayeux, or if not needed there, smash the Allied bridgehead north of Carentan. Rommel approved this plan, but by evening of 8 June the increasing Allied pressure toward Montebourg was already causing Army to think in terms of using II Paratroop Corps to protect the Cotentin.

Allied air power was hindering movement by attacks on columns, on bridges and railroads, and on important communications centers. As a result, I SS Panzer Corps had so far failed to mount its counterattack. Movement of II Paratroop Corps was "greatly delayed by air bombing and sabotage of communications."

One result of the Allied air effort on 8 June was so bad a breakdown of communications as to hinder all command functions. For hours Army had no contact with I SS Panzer Corps or with II Paratroop Corps, and was unable to determine their positions.

Particular trouble was caused by bombing attacks at Avranches, bottleneck on main routes leading from Brittany to Normandy. By attacks on the evening of 7 June, Allied air had severed communications across the lower Loire River, where the 17th SS Panzer Grenadier had just brought forward elements across at Angers. By evening of 8 June, apparently none of the reinforcements coming from Brittany had yet reached the Avranches area.

These three days, 9-11 June, marked a period of disillusionment for the German command. On 8 June, they had still been looking forward to the imminent counteroffensive which was to destroy the Allied beachheads, beginning at Caen. In the succeeding days, these hopes had to be given up, and Seventh Army concentrated on efforts to bring enough strength into Normandy to prevent further loss of vital ground.

On the morning of 9 June the sector south of Omaha Beach loomed into prominence for the first time at Seventh Army Headquarters. At 1035 General Marcks reported from LXXXIV Corps. Isigny had been taken by a surprise attack; tanks were reported on the Lison-St-Lo road, so that the commanding general of Seventh Army was advised not to make a trip to St-Lo as planned; Allied intentions were probably to cross the Vire and link up with the western bridgehead, and LXXXIV Corps had no available force to stop them, the 352d Division having been reduced to "small groups" and the 726th Infantry having practically disappeared.

General Marcks wanted to withdraw behind the Vire and assemble II Paratroop Corps for later counter-attack, with one of its divisions (77th Infantry) to go to the Valognes area. He also asked that LXXXIV Corps be freed of responsibility for action east of the Cotentin, suggesting that II Paratroop Corps be put under I SS Panzer Corps and take over the sector east of Carentan.

Army disagreed with all these proposals except that of using the 77th Division to meet the growing pressure of Allied attack toward Montebourg. Army was aware that the "hole between Isigny and Bayeux had now been widened," but still planned to assemble II Paratroop Corps at Balleroy for a counteroffensive toward Bayeux. It was beginning to doubt, however, whether this would be practicable.

At 1730, General Marcks reported again. This time he was more reassured about the Carentan area, for the Allies showed no tendency to push beyond Isigny. The 352d Division believed it might be able to hold the attack in progress at Trevieres, but an Allied breakthrough threatened at Montebourg. This was the background for an appearance of Field Marshal Erwin Rommel at Seventh Army Headquarters.

Briefed on the situation, the Army Group Commander stressed two points. The Allies must not be allowed to get Cherbourg; and every effort must be made to prevent their linking up bridgeheads west of the Vire (note - 3 1/2 days after the invasion, the first clear understanding of the main issue on the US part of the front - link-up between Utah and Omaha. Way too late).

He agreed with the Seventh Army viewpoint that counterattack by II Paratroop Corps had better be postponed until the corps was fully assembled and its action could be coordinated with that of I SS Panzer Corps. Rommel expressed his conviction that this counteroffensive, when staged, would be successful.

Following this conference, Army ordered II Paratroop Corps to change its direction of advance from Balleroy toward the Isigny area (i.e. from behind the US-UK link-up point to behind the Utah-Omaha link-up point), while the 77th Division was to go to Valognes (i.e. protect Cherbourg). Rommel emphasized that the problem at the moment was to prevent linking of the bridgeheads, however serious the situation at Montebourg (i.e. on the road from Utah to Cherbourg).

That evening, nevertheless, saw II Paratroop Corps still far from the threatened area, despite urgent orders to make all possible speed. The 77th Division was near Avranches; one regiment of the 3d Paratroop Division was nearing St-Lo, but the rest of the division was still in Brittany. Advance elements of the 17th SS Panzer Grenadier Division were approaching Balleroy, with main units near Avranches and Laval and location of its halftracks and heavy equipment (coming by rail) unknown.

General Marcks had expressed the conviction that 10 June would be the day of crisis in the battle on the approaches to Cherbourg. Rommel on that morning expressed a change of view with regard to the mission of the oncoming II Paratroop Corps; his main concern now was not so much to prevent linking of the bridgeheads as to forestall any Allied effort to cut off the Cotentin peninsula by pushing westward. Army ordered the 17th SS Panzer Grenadier Division to move to a position just southwest of Carentan, while the 3d Paratroop Division assembled on St-Lo.

(Rommel realizes that the Utah-Omaha appreciation of the day before is far too late, and focuses on cutting his losses. He tries to keep open a line to Cherbourg).

At the end of the day, Seventh Army felt that things had not gone as badly as had been feared. The German units had managed to hold on at Montebourg in heavy fighting (protecting Cherbourg); the Allies had crossed the Vire near Isigny but were not pressing in that area (Utah-Omaha link up at Caretan now threatened).

Advance elements of the 77th Division were nearing Valognes, though the rest was strung out all the way to Avranches; 3d Paratroop Division had some units at Berigny and the main body had cleared the Avranches corner, coming out of Brittany; elements of the 17th SS Panzer Grenadier Division were between Balleroy and Coutances.

2 Pz and 353 Infantry also sent to the area at this time.

Army's appreciation of the situation (10 June) showed moderate confidence. The armored divisions, once ready, would be able to wipe out the Allied lodgement in the Caen-Bayeux area; the forces in the Cotentin, though not strong enough for counterattack, would suffice to hold Cherbourg.

The Allied progress on 10 June in the Cerisy Forest-Balleroy area was not known to Seventh Army until the morning of the 11th. Then 84 Corps reported that the situation on its right flank was serious. The fighting value of the 352d Division was now very slight, and the hole between it and its right-hand neighbor (I SS Panzer Corps) was larger. (I.e the Germans have next to nothing in front of the Americans pushing straight south from Omaha).

The reaction at Seventh Army was that reinforcements on the way would take care of this hole in time, although Allied armored reconnaissance activity indicated their intention to exploit the gap. At the end of 11 June, Army reported that Allied forces were regrouping and that they had made no significant gains during the day, though Carentan was threatened. Army's intention was to hold the Vire-Elle line and Carentan (i.e. prevent Utah-Omaha link-up).

84 Corps had the mission of blocking the road to Cherbourg and, with II Paratroop Corps under its command, of preventing any drive to sever the Cotentin peninsula. Its right wing was to push toward Balleroy and seek contact by reconnaissance elements with I SS Panzer Corps southeast of Bayeux. (I.e. Cherbourg has become its main effort, and its right flank south of Omaha is a "poor cousin" at the corps boundary).

By the close of the day, main elements of the 3d Paratroop Division were northeast of St-Lo; the 17th SS Panzer Grenadier Division was reaching assembly areas southwest of Carentan, ready to attack to east or north; and battle groups of the 265th and 275th Divisions were arriving westward of St-Lo. The 266th Division (battle group) was released for ultimate commitment in the St-Lo area. (I.e. corps strength reaches St. Lo arrive 11 June).

Seventh Army learned that Carentan had fallen on 11 June. During the morning of 12 June, Army received word that weak Allied reconnaissance elements had pushed close to Caumont. General Marcks, commanding 84 Corps, was killed in a strong attack. Army informed his successor that the 2d Panzer Division was on the way to the hole between the 352d and Panzer Lehr, with reconnaissance elements already near Caumont.

Army's views at the moment, the 17th SS Panzer Grenadier Division was not likely to be used in a counterattack to retake Carentan; instead, it must be held in readiness to keep open the corridor north of la Haye-du-Puits in the western Cotentin. Army was apprehensive of a new, Allied landing operation in the Cherbourg area, in which air landings might be combined with assault from sea west of the port. (I.e. 7th Army is fretting over Cherbourg, which has become its main effort. Utah-Omaha link-up is a done deal).

Higher headquarters, on the other hand, showed more concern over the Allied advance in the Caumont area, and Army Group sent orders that all possible measures be taken to plug the gap on the right of the 352d Division. Army informed von Rundstedt that reconnaissance elements of the Panzer Lehr and 2d Panzer Divisions had been put into that area, as well as some elements of the 3d Paratroop Division. Half-track elements of 2d Panzer were expected to arrive by 14 June, and first elements of the 2d SS Panzer on the 15th.

The principal fighting of 12 June took place between the Elle and Tillysur-Seulles. As Seventh Army viewed it, the Allies were making a main effort to exploit the gap. They had

managed to reach Caumont, and the flank of Panzer Lehr was exposed. In the Elle sector, local attacks were regarded as checked, although 84 Corps warned that the Allies evidently planned a drive to seize St-Lo.

Seventh Army's intentions for 13 June were: attack east of the Orne by the 21st Panzer Division; preparations for an attack by 2d Panzer Division in the Caumont area; and use of parts of the 17th Panzer Division for recapture of Carentan.

From Seventh Army's viewpoint, 13 June was characterized by a defensive success which ended its worries over the gap in the Caumont-VillersBocage area. Elements of the 2d Panzer Division had arrived to fill the hole; admittedly just in time.

With the 2d SS Panzer Division coming up to the same area and expected shortly, Army now envisaged an attack northward toward Balleroy to shorten the line. In the Elle sector, some penetrations had been made by Allied units in what is described as bitter fighting, but the 3d Paratroop Division was in position to defend that area. The German attempt to retake Carentan had failed. Allied gains had been made west and north of Ste-Mere-Eglise, and this area was now Seventh Army's main concern.

A curious report from 84 Corps informed Army that the U.S. 1st Division was "newly identified" in the fighting northeast of St-Lo (sic - that tells you how much intel came out of the Omaha sector in the first week; of course 1st Infantry landed on D-Day), and that the U.S. 29th Division, exhausted, was reported to have left the line (it did nothing of the kind).

On 13 June, the enemy forces in the sector between the Vire and the Taute comprised a battlegroup ("Heintz") made up of elements of both the 17th SS Panzer Grenadier Division and the 352d Division, attached to the 17th SS for operations but under the 352d for administration. The battle group included two infantry battalions (one newly arrived), elements of two engineer battalions, and some remnants of the 352d Divisional Artillery (4th Battalion). Their mission was to hold the ground from Montmartin-en-Graignes to the western end of the Vire-Taute Canal, against "continuous" Allied attacks "in battalion strength," supported by tanks.

On 14 June, Corps reported that the 352d Division was completely used up and should be taken out of line. On account of delays in reaching the battle area, the 2d Panzer Division was still lacking its heavier antitank guns, armored artillery, and heavy tanks. So far, it had been operating with its armored infantry units, which had taken heavy losses. In Army's opinion, the effectiveness of the other elements of the division was likely to be reduced by the fact that they were being forced to make a long overland march to reach the battle area.

That is the impressions of the German side in the first week, on the American sector.

On 13 June, US V Corps (facing south) stood on the defensive while VII corps opened the drive on Cherbourg to the northwest, and the newly activated XIX Corps took over on the front between them, facing west and southwest. Here is the US histories conclusion about the first week from the US point of view -

Starting from the smallest of footholds on D Day, V Corps had in one week driven inland 15 to 20 miles on a broad front. Junction had been firmly established with Allied forces on both flanks. The crisis of the whole operation had come at the very start, when unexpected enemy strength was met at the beach and the American troops had been called on for their utmost effort. Thereafter, the task of V Corps became progressively easier; the German 352d Division was pushed south at increasing speed and given no time to organize a defense. V Corps' advance had halted by decision of the higher command in view of overall tactical considerations. Its mission of capturing an adequate beachhead had been achieved.

In the course of a week's fighting casualties had mounted to 5,846 of which 1,225 were killed in action; more than half of these casualties came in the first day. Heaviest losses had fallen to the 29th Division, with 2,440 for the period; the 1st Division had 1,744 casualties, and the 2d Division 855. Enemy prisoners amounted to about 2,500, and casualties of the 352d Division had reduced that offensive unit to a shadow of its former strength.

The next US objective was to cut the penisula to the west, and then drive to Cherbourg.

German Seventh Army believed that, while it did not have adequate forces for a counterattack, it could hold its own in the Cotentin and defend Cherbourg. But on 9 and 10 June, when the 4th Division penetrated the defensive front south of Montebourg and forced the 709th Division to give way at Ecausseville, the enemy became alarmed.

Lt. Gen. Heinz Hellmich, commanding the 243d Division and elements of the 709th and 91st Divisions, was ordered to hold the Montebourg-Quineville line at all costs. General Erich Marcks of the 84 Corps urgently requested air power (sic) to combat the effective naval fire which assisted the 4th Division advance in the Emondeville and coastal sectors. He believed that the decisive phase of the battle for Cherbourg was fast approaching and that a breakthrough might be attempted within a day or two.

With the fall of Quineville and the Quineville Ridge on 14 June an Allied offensive toward Cherbourg appeared imminent. However, the northern front remained relatively quiet for nearly a week, while VII Corps concentrated on taking advantage of its Merderet bridgehead to cut the Cotentin Peninsula.

The problem actually facing the enemy was more than an effort to evacuate certain personnel from the peninsula. He was trying to delay to the maximum the American bid to cut the peninsula and, at the same time, to prevent having his best troops, the 77th Division, trapped north of the breakthrough if it should occur.

Most of the German units in the Cotentin had suffered severe losses in the fighting to date and the 91st Division was so badly decimated that it could scarcely be counted as a division at all. How long was it a good gamble to leave the 77th Division committed against the increasing American pressure?

By 13 June the enemy was sure that the intention of the U.S. forces was to cut the peninsula. At first Field Marshal Rommel thought that there was a possibility of preventing this by moving the 77th Division down from the Merderet to block the American advance west

of St. Sauveur-le Vicomte. He ordered this move on 14 June, but he still had no intention of risking the isolation of the 77th Division if the peninsula should be cut. He decided, on the contrary, that if the Americans broke through to the west coast, the 77th Division would be withdrawn south and the defense of Cherbourg would devolve on the 709th, 91st, and 243d Divisions.

In anticipation of an American breakthrough, 84 Corps on 15 June ordered the reorganization of German forces in the peninsula into two Kamfgruppen. The field order, copies of which were captured the next day by the US 9th Division, organized the 709th Division and 243d Division into one Kampfgruppe under Generalleutnant Karl Wilhelm von Schlieben, commanding the 709th Division. The 77th and 91st Divisions were combined in another Kampfgruppe under Generalleutnant Heinz Hellmich, commander of the 243d Division. If the peninsula were cut, Kampfgruppe von Schlieben was to defend Cherbourg and Kampfgruppe Hellmich was to pull out to the south to prevent any further American penetration south of St. Lo-d'Ourville.

No movement of troops was undertaken under this plan because the whole situation had become the personal concern of Hitler. He countermanded the Seventh Army's planned redisposition of forces in the Cotentin on 15 June, and ordered the line of that date held at all costs. But there was little the German command could do to carry out this order. The breaking of the Merderet line and the drive west had compromised the whole enemy position by extending his lines of defense.

(Note - a dwindling number of effective defenders were being driven back in a rapidly elongating line. They therefore rapidly became very thin on the ground, and could put up no effective defense where they were. Repositioning was mandatory; to sit still invited defeat in detail).

The problem was brought to a head on 16 June when the 82d Airborne Division surprised the enemy by advancing rapidly to St. Sauveur-le Vicomte and establishing a bridgehead across the Douve. Aware of the inevitable consequences of the continued American advance, 84 Corps immediately asked permission to withdraw the 77th Division southward in the hope that the westward surge of the 82d Airborne Division and 9th Division could still be stopped.

Seventh Army also considered this move imperative and, fearing landings on the northwest coast, also regarded it as urgent that "movement Cherbourg" (of von Schlieben's group) be executed immediately. Both Rommel and von Rundstedt appreciated this and were particularly concerned over the likelihood that troops would be needlessly locked in the peninsula and sacrificed. But they would authorize only the movement of small forces of the 77th Division, pending approval from Hitler's headquarters.

On 17 June permission was finally granted to implement the provisional clauses of the original plan o£ withdrawal as set forth in the Corps field order of 15 June. Hitler, however, again emphasized the importance of holding Cherbourg at all costs and enjoined the von Schlieben force to retard the progress of the Americans, reminding the general that "the possession of Cherbourg is decisive." Accordingly, von Schlieben was authorized to withdraw slowly from his "perilous position." (Note - 2 whole days had been lost. As a result, the forces meant to escape south would be decimated.)

The redisposition of the Kampfgruppe Hellmich proved more difficult. General Hellmich was killed on 17 June, while attempting to redispose elements of the 709th Division and his own 243d Division. Meanwhile, Generalleutnant Rudolf Stegmann of the 77th Division was ordered to disengage and withdraw to la Haye du Puits.

The division field order for this movement, captured the following day, gave the march routes for the various units. The 1049th Regiment (Col. Rudolf Bacherer) was assigned a route from Magneville across the Douve to St. Jacques-de-Nehou. This was the force which attacked and was then routed by the 1st Battalion, 39th Infantry, on the morning of 18 June. While directing the various elements of the 77th Division in their attempted escape from the peninsula, General Stegmann was killed in an attack by an American fighter-bomber.

The division field order of 17 June, which stated that "eventual enemy resistance on the march must be broken under all circumstances," had come too late. A battalion of the 1050th Regiment temporarily wrested control of a bridge over the Ollande River near St. Lo-d'Ourville on 19 June, took a considerable number of Americans prisoner, and opened the way for Colonel Bacherer to lead from 1,200 to 1,400 men through the American lines, but large numbers of the 77th Division were trapped in the peninsula and its artillery was completely destroyed.

The penisula was cut on the 17th, and holdout pockets wiped out by the 18th. US VIII Corps, activated on the 15th, was to hold the line south, while the drive north to Cherbourg by VII corps recommenced. VII corps had 3 infantry divisons for this task, and faced elements of 4 German divisions - 243 and 709, plus the forces that failed to escape - what was left of 77 and 91. Plus a motley assortment of "searchlight, panzer, labor front, marine, military police, antiaircraft, and coast artillery personnel". The attack jumped off on the 19th. On the 20th the Germans broke contact and retired to the fortified outer Cherbourg defenses, 4-6 miles from the city. On the 21st the US re-established contact all along the line.

The fight for the fortifications, after a refused ultimatum, opened on 22 June. 562 fighter bombers went first at low level, followed by 362 medium bombers at altitude. These thoroughly wrecked German rear area communications but did next to nothing to the outer fortifications themselves. That was left to infantry-armor teams with heavy artillery support. It took two days to breach the outer fortified ring.

In an intercepted message to higher headquarters General von Schlieben stated: "...communications to several battalions no longer available. Phosphorus shells have put eight batteries out of action. Tomorrow heavier enemy attacked expected. ... Completely crushed by artillery fires."

On the 25 the fighting was from strongpoints in the city itself, and naval gunfire was added, to the tune of 3 battleships, 4 cruisers, and numerous destroyers. Most of the city was cleared on the 26th. Von Schlieben was captured that day, with 800 others including his whole staff. Most of the rest surrendered on the morning of the 27th - 10000 in all. 6000 more lasted until the 30th on a nearby minor penisula, before also surrendering. Overall PWs taken by VII corps in the whole operation came to 39,000; its own casualties wree 22000 since D-Day.

In the meantime the front to the south was quite, while supplies went to the Cherbourg drive. Additional troops were also being built up in the bridgehead, and supplies stockpiled for the next stage of the offensive. That opened on 3 July with local attacks and became a general offensive on 7 July.

Back to how the Germans saw that drive.

On 2 July, Seventh Army's War Diary noted the Staff's conclusion that preparation for American attack was complete. Army's prediction was that the main effort would come from Carentan toward Periers.

When the attack started on 3 July toward la Haye-du-Puits, Seventh Army's first opinion was that this action represented only a major reconnaissance thrust. That view was abandoned at the end of the day, when three of the U. S. divisions were reported in line.

One defending battalion, Ost-Battalion "Huber," lost 80 percent in casualties and was overrun; the bad conduct of this (non-German) unit was blamed for the day's loss in ground, described as a "deep penetration."

Seventh Army at once began negotiations with higher echelons to obtain reinforcement, asking for permission to call up the 5th Parachute Division from Brittany and the larger part of the 275th Infantry Division, still south of the Loire.

Army had under discussion plans for relieving certain units which were particularly battleworn: the 17th SS Panzer Grenadier Division; the 352d Division, which had been roughly handled by V Corps in its drive from Omaha beachhead and was still in line northeast of St-Lo; and the 77th and 91st Divisions, which had lost heavily in the campaign that ended with the capture of Cherbourg (where at least half of each was cut off).

Whether relief of these units would be possible was now regarded as doubtful, in the face of the U. S. offensive getting under way. Seventh Army requested Army Group for two additional heavy artillery battalions, two artillery observation battalions, and a smoke brigade to help meet the coming offensive. Attention was also called to ammunition shortages, particularly west of the Vire.

The Commander and Chief of Staff of Seventh Army still believed at the end of 3 July that the attack toward la Haye-du-Puits was only a prelude to another and even greater U. S. effort south of Carentan. They informed Field Marshal Rommel, commanding Army Group, that they did not yet consider it necessary to ask for mobile forces from the eastern part of the Normandy front.

Hard fighting and further loss of ground on 4 July forced Seventh Army into plans for juggling units to strengthen the 84 Corps, west of the Vire. The 2d SS Panzer Division (Army Reserve) was ordered to send a battle group to the Periers area, to guard against a possible airlanding attack on that communications center. The 30th Mobile Brigade, reduced now to about battalion strength, was pulled from the sector north of St Lo and then started across the Vire to 84 Corps. (Not needing mobile forces is out the window on the second day, before the main attack even started).

The opening of the U. S. offensive on the Carentan-Periers highway put severe pressure on the 17th SS Panzer Grenadier Division. The situation near la Haye-du-Puits was now regarded as "tense." The next day brought little relief, with further penetrations made by the American attack toward Periers.

Army requested reinforcement for 84 Corps by a mobile unit and an infantry division, but was told it would have to manage with its present reserves (2d SS Panzer Division and the 15th Parachute Regiment).

Field Marshal Kluge, who had just relieved Field Marshal Rundstedt as commander of German forces in the west, visited the battle zone. Plans were discussed for committing the 2d SS Panzer in counterattack west of la Haye-du-Puits. But plans for relief of the 352d, 17th SS Panzer Grenadier, 77th, and 91st Divisions were now obviously impractical. The last three were all heavily involved.

In the western sector, 6 July saw the intended counterattack by the 2d SS Panzer units bog down as a result of air action. The Allied air force was also credited with hampering the German artillery in its work. The commanding general of 84 Corps reported that the American artillery, guided by air observers and supported by air attacks, was not only silencing German batteries but destroying the infantry even in their dugouts.

On 7 July, the Army command still hoped to restore the situation on the west front (la Haye-du-Puits) by counterattack of the task force sent by the 2d SS Panzer Division, and Army summarized the situation reached in the battle as follows:

Two infantry divisions (77th and 353d), one reinforced division (17th SS Panzer Grenadier), a combat group of the 243d Division, and the remnants of the 91st Division, had so far borne the brunt of the defense.

The American forces committed were estimated at five infantry and possibly one or two armored divisions. The Seventh Army singled out for special mention the power of U. S. artillery support, which had expended ammunition at a rate five to ten times that of the German.

In a brief analysis of the fighting, American commanders were credited with facility in tactical maneuver and with being quick to exploit favorable situations. East of the present battle area, on both sides of the Vire, six U. S. infantry divisions and two armored divisions were believed ready to widen the zone of attack.

German losses had been heavy; one battalion of the 353d, the only full-strength division in 84 Corps, had lost half its men in three days. Renewed pleas were made to Kluge for immediate reinforcement by the 5th Parachute Division and the 275th Division.

Then, on 7 July, US XIX Corps, previously quiet, added its weight to the attack.

Seventh Army had expected an attack on the Vire sector and received the first news without undue surprise. Its information on the penetrations achieved was reasonably accurate and Army noted that these penetrations had been sealed off for the time being with weak local reserves. The situation was described as "critical."

Nevertheless, more concern was felt over the situation west of the Taute River, where the main forces of the 17th SS Panzer Grenadier Division were being hard pressed by the attack of U. S. VII Corps and had to call on reserves from the 2d SS Armored Division.

For 8 July, Seventh Army's intention was to hold the enemy penetration in the area St-Jean-de-Daye (i.e. the old attack sector), using the 30th Mobile Brigade (on its way from St-Lo to the Lessay sector) and a last battalion from the reserve of the 2d Parachute Corps.

Concluding that the XIX Corps attack was just the prelude for even heavier American efforts along the Vire, the Germans felt that these forces would not be strong enough to withstand the U. S. attack for any length of time. Therefore, Seventh Army proposed to pull out the units of the 2d SS Armored Division from the la Haye-du-Puits sector (back into reserve, that is), even though this would mean weakening that whole wing.

Army Group decided finally to meet Seventh Army's requests for reinforcement. The 5th Parachute Division was to move up from Brittany, to the Lessay sector; more important, the Panzer Lehr Division was to assemble between Periers and St-Lo to bolster the front from the Vire westward (taken from the British sector).

Seventh Army's daily summary devoted more attention than before to the battle between the Vire and Taute Rivers, where the situation was now "unquestionably critical." The small reinforcements that came from 2d Parachute Corps had been committed, consisting of the 30th Mobile Brigade and the Reconnaissance Battalion of the 12th Parachute Regiment.

German plans were to assign the Panzer Lehr Division to the St-Jean-de-Daye sector (replacing 2SS, moved into reserve). Field Marshal Rommel (Army Group Commander) visited Seventh Army advanced CP and discussed plans for committing this division.

Seventh Army regarded 9 July as a day of attempted breakthrough on the whole front west of the Vire. In 84 Corps' zone a German counterattack was attempted west of the Pont-Hebert highway, to reduce a new penetration south of le Desert. But this effort, made by elements of the Engineer Battalion of the 2d SS Armored Division, "disintegrated under heavy artillery fire."

Battle Group "Heintz," which had taken 30 percent casualties, was still in line, assisted by weak elements of the 30th Mobile Brigade. The assembly of the Panzer Lehr Division was being delayed by continuous air attacks, and there was some discussion of using the division toward Sainteny, where the situation was still serious.

Seventh Army's hopes were now centered on the forthcoming attack of Panzer Lehr. Aided by the cover given by bad weather, that unit was able to reach its final assembly area. The commanding general of Seventh Army visited the battle zone on an inspection tour and discussed in detail the employment of Panzer Lehr. Its primary objective was to restore the situation along the Vire by annihilating the American forces in the "bridgehead" south of the Vire-Taute Canal.

After this, the division would be recalled, to remain as reserve for 84 Corps. The possibility was discussed that, in case of maximum success, the attack might be pressed toward Carentan. But no provision was made for following up the armor with infantry on the scale necessary to effect a major breakthrough. Gen. Fritz Bayerlein, commanding the division, apparently was unaware that a fresh American division had come into line north of le Desert.

Panzer Lehr was one of the best German units in action on the western front. It had been activated early in 1944, with completely new equipment, and, as Bayerlein afterwards stated, was the "best panzer division the Germans ever had." It was completely armored, and personnel included teachers and demonstrators of armored tactics.

But by 10 July the division had been through a month of hard fighting on the British front and had suffered 5,000 casualties. Strength was down to 10,000 men, and of these 2,200 (or more, according to Bayerlein's later report) were still back at Tilly-sur-Seulles. The movement west beyond St-Lo had been hard hit by Allied air attacks, and General Bayerlein regarded his men as not in condition for the mission imposed.

The division's available strength included troops of the 901st and 902d Panzer Grenadier Regiments, three battalions of 105-mm howitzers, and a battalion of the 36th Panzer Regiment. Bayerlein planned his attack in three formations: I and II Battalions of 902d Panzer Grenadier Regiment and a battalion of 20 tanks north from Pont-Hebert; the I Battalion of the 901st Panzer Grenadiers and two companies of SP guns (20 pieces) through le Desert; and the II Battalion of the 901st with 11 tanks from Bois du Hommet, driving east and northeast.

The 11th of July was a hard day for Seventh Army on its whole front, and its War Diary could get little comfort from the reports of Panzer Lehr's attack, on which so much hope had been placed. The complete failure of the attack must have been a bitter pill, but the Diary records it with grim objectivity.

The effort north of Pont-Hebert by the 902d Armored Infantry Regiment was reported as getting as far as Cavigny, but the German units had to withdraw because of powerful American counterblows against the "deep left flank." apparently this report refers to the U. S. advance, becoming pronounced by the evening of 10 July, toward le Rocher and Hill 91. This seems to have thrown Panzer Lehr's right wing column off balance.

The attack of the 901st Panzer Grenadiers beyond le Desert, in battalion strength, was reported to have got as far as the St-Jean-de-Daye highway, but was then hit by a flanking attack from the north. Elements of this combat group were cut off and surrounded.

American attacks between the two penetrations of Panzer Lehr got "as far as Eslandes," and a break in the German lines was only closed by use of the Engineer Battalion of Panzer Lehr in counterattack.

The details were "unclear" and the whole situation was regarded as critical. The Panzer Lehr units had definitely been forced to the defensive, and its effort "did not relieve the pressure on the main point of enemy effort."

General Bayerlein's memory of his attack, recorded a year later, was marked by an estimate of losses running to as high as 50 percent of the attacking force... Bayerlein attributed the result of the day to the exhausted condition of his men when they entered battle, and to the difficulty of operating Mark V tanks in the hedgerows. He declared that his armor had to fight at maximum ranges of 200 yards because hedges concealed everything farther away.

Panzer Lehr had been severely mauled by the combined onslaughts of the US 9th and 30th Divisions, and was now crippled to an extent that removed the possibility of further large-scale counterattack west of the Vire.

During this five-day period from 7 to 11 July, Seventh Army's War Diary reflects the unremitting, ever-increasing strain produced in 84 Corps by the continued pressure of American attack. All German efforts at counterattack failed to restore the situation and only used up their slim reserves.

When Panzer Lehr Division came in, that unit was hard hit on 11 July and thrown immediately on the defensive. Day after day, Seventh Army congratulates its units on defensive successes, but these consisted ordinarily in preventing breakthroughs or in stopping penetrations.

The period began with the attempt of a battle group of the 2d SS Panzer, aided by the 15th Parachute Regiment (of the 5th Parachute Division), to restore the MLR in the Mont-Castre area. At first, hopeful reports came in from this counterattack, but by 8 July Army had to recognize that the results were not decisive.

The left wing of 84 Corps tried to stand its ground during the next three days, only to be steadily pushed back and heavily punished. La Haye-du-Puits was lost on 8 July. By 10 July the Germans were at the southern edge of the Mont-Castre hills, and were also being forced back west of the Lessay-la Haye-du-Puits highway.

10 July unit strength estimates include - 77 division 1840 men, 353+91 1250 men, 243 700 men. 3800 men left out of those four divisions in front of US VIII corps.

On 11 July, alarmed by American success directly east of that sector (in the U. S. VII Corps zone), Army finally got approval from Rommel and Hitler for a withdrawal of the west wing. The line proposed was about two miles north of the Ay River, protecting Lessay, but certain US forces had already reached this new line at some points; Seventh Army was talking on 11 July of a further withdrawal, this time behind the Ay River.

From 7 to 9 July the 17th SS Panzer Grenadier Division, aided here by remnants of the 6th Parachute Regiment, was under extremely heavy pressure and lost Sainteny (to the U. S. 83d Division). On 10-11 July the German defense of this corridor was made harder by a flanking threat from east of the Taute.

On 11 July, Panzer Lehr's counterattack failed to ease this situation. A new American penetration south of Sainteny was checked only by committing a regiment of the 2d SS Panzer, which suffered heavily. With its commitment, there were no more reserves on hand at this main pressure point, and the threat here influenced the belated decision to withdraw the German lines toward Lessay.

By 11 July, the problem of building reserves for 84 Corps was as far from solution as ever. The pressure from American attacks was not letting up, and German efforts to counterattack had exhausted their small potential reserves.

The 2d SS Panzer units, as a result of battles in three different sectors, were worn down to what was described (12 July) as a very weak combat group, again in line on the front protecting Periers, with smaller units committed elsewhere.

Reinforcements from Brittany and the Loire, so long requested, had been started on the march 7 July. But these reinforcements were suffering the same disappointing delays, caused by Allied air activity and their own lack of transport, that had dogged German efforts since D Day.

The 5th Parachute Division (less the 15th Regiment, already in line and badly used up at Mont- Castre) was still short of Avranches by 11 July. The 275th Division (not including the elements in Battle Group "Heintz," now worn to remnants and facing U. S. XIX Corps) was even farther south in Brittany. The Engineer Battalion of the 5th Parachute Division was the only unit near the battle zone and likely to be available to reinforce 84 Corps during the next few days.

Seventh Army renewed its request for getting up the last two battalions of the 2d SS Panzer, still in southern France. But their arrival, with transport uncertain, would be a matter of weeks rather than days.

Both transport and ammunition presented serious difficulties in the battle zone of Seventh Army. There was no hope of getting further transport from the Brittany sector, where remaining units had been already so stripped of their resources that they were increasingly worried by the problem of holding the peninsula against possible Allied landings. The French Resistance movement, armed by Allied air drops, was in virtual control of large inland areas, and put an increasing strain on the weakened German garrison forces.

As for ammunition, the pressure of supply west o the Vire was such that Army refused on 7 July to reinforce 84 Corps by an additional battalion of heavy artillery because this would only further decrease the ammunition available to Corps.

American use of artillery in overwhelming quantity is stressed during these days, the barrage of 9 July along the whole corps front being described as something "never seen before." Such fire, along with Allied air attacks, caused losses in men and transport even on relatively quiet days and prevented the "superiority of German infantrymen" from coming into play.

From this summary of the battle, as Seventh army experienced it, the importance of the U. S. XIX Corps' attack is readily apparent. Coming into the fight when Seventh Army's reserves were already committed, the American effort along the Vire, though not unexpected, had created a new crisis.

To meet this, Seventh Army was given an armored division from the neighboring army on its east, had thrown in this precious reserve against the XIX Corps sector, and had failed to accomplish any worthwhile results.

Such was the situation on 11 July, when XIX Corps, aided by the 2d Division of V Corps, was widening its attack to include the zone east of the Vire by a powerful blow aimed directly at St-Lo (and II FJ Corps).

First reports from the Corps to Seventh Army on 11 July were couched in confident terms. At noon the II Parachute Corps "viewed the situation with calm," having "so disposed its reserves as to be ready to meet any eventuality." Success in repelling "attacks" east of Berigny is recorded with satisfaction.

But by night there is a very different tone in Corps' reports. "Thirteen" enemy attacks were recorded south of St-Georges-d'Elle; mention was made of "superior enemy equipment." Seventh Army finally received word of the loss of Hill 192 and St-Andre-de-l'Epine, with "very high losses in men and materiel." Some German units had been cut off and destroyed.

Reserves suddenly became a crucial problem: Corps had in previous days sent its last reserves across the Vire, and found little or nothing at hand to meet the situation. Scraping together what it could, the 3d Parachute Division was trying to form a new MLR from Berigny west, along the St-Lo highway.

It asked Seventh Army to give it the 14th Parachute Regiment (5th Parachute Division), from army reserve. But on 11 July, Seventh Army had too many problems elsewhere to commit its only reserves, which in any event had not yet arrived.

The 352d Division, including under its command the battle groups of the 266th and 353d

Divisions, had responsibility for the sector north of St-Lo. Here, defensive successes could be reported for 11 July.

Seventh Army recorded defensive success on 12 July against fierce American attacks east of the Vire, but at cost of heavy losses. Neither II Parachute Corps nor Army had any reserves. The "continuous artillery barrage" is mentioned as a factor in the serious reduction of effective combat-strength, particularly in the 3d Parachute Division.

As a result, Seventh Army was apprehensive over the danger of its front being torn open along the east boundary (Caumont sector). In case of further attacks east of St-Lo (said the daily summary) the lines at this boundary may "burst a seam."

On 13 July the claim was made that all U. S. attacks in the II Parachute Corps sector were "successfully repulsed," four tanks being claimed as destroyed in the battle. But even though U. S. losses were considered high, "our own were also high."

II Battalion of the 8th Parachute Regiment relieved I Battalion of the 9th, and was so low on ammunition that it had to borrow from the units relieved.

The slackening of the battle on 14 July was interpreted as weakness in the American effort, resulting from heavy losses in the earlier fighting. The losses of II Parachute Corps through 13 July were now in, and Seventh Army listed them as part of the evidence of growing strain on its resources. The 3d Parachute Division, in three days fighting, had lost 4,064 men; the combat groups making up the 352d Division had suffered 986 casualties in two days.

On 14 July the 352d lines finally gave, near the Vire, and the American penetration was only sealed by employing the "last available forces." That evening Field Marshal Rommel visited the CP of the II Parachute Corps. The commanding general of that unit informed Rommel that, combat strength having been so seriously diminished through the total lack of replacements, the demand of the higher command to hold the present MLR at all costs could "hardly be guaranteed."

In spite of the losses around St-Lo, both in ground and personnel, Seventh Army was still mainly concerned over the situation on the right wing of 84 Corps, where it believed the American forces were making their chief effort toward the Periers-St-Lo highway. But with Panzer Lehr's failure to restore the situation by counterattack, the German command now had no other recourse than a grim and dogged defense.

The withdrawal on the coastal wing, approved on 11 July and scheduled for execution on 13-l4 July, was being forced earlier than that by the continued American pressure. By 13 July, weakness on this wing was so apparent that 84 Corps asked permission to carry the withdrawal even farther back, behind the Ay-Seves river line.

Army Group grudgingly approved, ordering unconditional defense of this line, and refusing consideration of any further request for retrograde movement. The disengagement was effected that night without much trouble.

The 353d Infantry Division (less the Battle Group near St-Lo), at full combat strength on 3 July, was now worn down to 34 officers, 69 NCO's, and 583 enlisted men, including all personnel that could be brought in from rear echelons and staffs. The 15th Parachute Regiment, also at full strength when it began the battle in the Mont-Castre sector, had 447 officers and men.

In the area covering Periers (U. S. VII Corps zone), 84 Corps' best units were fighting hard to hold off a breakthrough, and were steadily losing ground. This sector was Seventh Army's chief worry, even after the battle spread east of the Vire. The battered 17th SS Panzer Grenadier and the larger part of 2d SS Panzer and Panzer Lehr were now involved here in defensive struggles.

By l2 July the German salient along the lower Taute had been wiped out, and the pressure from le Desert was threatening to reach the flank of units holding the Seves-Taute corridor. Further loss of ground was acknowledged in the next two days.

With regard to reserves the situation was as strained as ever. Two more regiments (13th and 14th) of the 5th Parachute Division arrived in the battle zone during this period, and Seventh army had to resist calls from both 84 and II Parachute Corps for their immediate use. Seventh Army decided to put them west of the Vire, in position to reinforce the Periers sector.

As soon as possible, the 5th Parachute Division was to replace Panzer Lehr; Seventh Army, now as before, was striving to build up a striking force of armored reserve. But within a day, one or two battalions of the 5th Parachute Division had already been committed to help the sorely pressed 2d SS Panzer.

The other reinforcing column, comprising parts of the 275th Division, finally reached Marigny on 14 July. Plans for its use aimed at relief of the 2d SS Panzer units.

But all these plans were subject to the pressure of battle needs, and also to the whims of higher command. As noted before, Hitler himself had been intervening since June to get certain units out of line for rest and refitting before they were destroyed. On 12 July, his formal orders came down to withdraw immediately the remnants of the 77th, 91st, and 352d Divisions.

As before, Seventh Army promised to carry out their relief as soon as possible, but found it necessary to keep them in line for the time being. There were no units available to replace them.

The US offensive had grown to 10 divisions abreast. On July 15 the western end of that attacking line slacked off, while the eastern end continued its push for St. Lo. The German command correctly sized up the American attack as putting its main weight east of St-Lo, and Seventh Army's Diary spoke of a "furious struggle," in which American artillery and air added to the troubles of defense.

The 9th Parachute Regiment's units distinguished themselves, warding of eight attacks and destroying seven tanks in close combat. An American penetration in the Martinville sector, noted that evening, was reported to be "isolated."

The right wing of the 352d Division was forced to withdraw its MLR west of the Isigny highway (Hill 122 sector). The II Parachute Corps was strained to the utmost, and again went on record that no reserves were available.

16 July caused no fresh alarm on the II Parachute Corps sector. Heavy fighting took place in the Martinville penetration area, but by evening Army's impression was that the "mopping up" had been accomplished "except for a pocket." And the 352d Division (now holding a sector corresponding to the zone of the U. S. 35th Division) reported defensive successes.

But the loss of Pont-Hebert, and loss of ground past le Mesnil-Durand on the ridge west of the Vire, caused grave concern to the defenders of St-Lo. As stated earlier (p. 101) Army reported to Army Group that the 352d Division's MLR might have to be taken back to la Luzerne-le Mesnil-Rouxelin-Rampan, in order to protect its flank along the Vire.

Seventh Army finally postponed this decision pending the attempt of Panzer Lehr to restore the situation between the Vire and the Terrette. That effort, by 17 July, had failed.

II Parachute Corps had already proposed that in case of such failure the 352d should withdraw even farther than originally planned, taking up a line from Rampan due east to Martinville, skirting the north edge of St-Lo.

The Seventh Army commander discussed this proposal with Army Group by telephone at 0950. Army Group protested that neither Rommel nor Kluge had approved such a withdrawal; but Army pointed out that the 352d was already under pressure that might force the withdrawal whether it approved or not.

The course of events during the day only confirmed Army’s point of view. The situation west of the Vire got worse, and with all bridges destroyed near St-Lo, the 352d was in danger of being trapped in the bend and losing its heavy weapons. At 1550 Army renewed its request for drastic withdrawal; at 1750 Army Group finally gave Seventh Army freedom to make any necessary decisions.

By that time the 2d was in forced retreat; indeed, in one sector the personnel of a regimental CP were battling a penetration. The movement planned and finally approved was already being produced by American advance. "Since no reserves are available, the left wing of the 3d Parachute Division, and the 352d Division are fighting their way back to the line Rampan-Montcocq-la Boulaye."

Army Group gave orders to hold and reinforce this line, which would still include St-Lo, but Army took a pessimistic view of the possibility of doing either.

The 3d Parachute Division had had no easy day. The penetration in the Martinville area had apparently been "eliminated," when a "new" American attack "reoccupied" the terrain, and advanced to la Madeleine. (It actuality, the penetration had been maintained throughout and was not "new"; the Germans just didn't know where the US battalion involved was). Counterattack at failed to close the gap at Martinville and suffered heavy casualties. Along the St-Lo-Isigny road, too, American thrusts broke through during the day.

Among the several misconceptions of Seventh Army, presumably based on division reports during this day, was the belief that American pressure along the Vire, southeast of Pont-Hebert, came from units that had crossed the river at that point.

Seventh Army put a good face on the withdrawal carried out during the night of 17/18 July, claiming that it went according to plan, and was followed only "hesitantly" by American forces. The German War Diary was still under the curious misapprehension that American units were crossing the Vire to get at St-Lo from the Rampan area.

While the new MLR reportedly held at all other points, II Parachute Corps was unable to stop a penetration on l8 July that reached into the city. At l825 Corps reported absolute lack of reserves to deal with this penetration (which was not according to plan), and spoke of inability to guarantee against a major breakthrough.

Under injunctions from higher command, Army was still clinging to the idea of maintaining an outpost line of resistance north of St-Lo, but had to face the fact that reinforcements could not be given to the II Parachute Corps.

The 275th Division was now, at last, available, but Seventh Army was unwilling to commit it east of the Vire. The army commander ordered the 352d Division not to give up the city, and to repulse with its own resources "the weak hostile units" penetrating the city. Army did loan one battalion of the 275th to help the 352d Division.

This order brought no results on the 18th, though German forces were still reported as being north and northwest of the city, holding on by virtue of outstanding artillery support. House-to-house fighting was still going on in St-Lo. The hopes of holding St-Lo were finally abandoned on 19 July.

Army trying to gain comfort from the fact that the town had been defended since 9 June against heavy attacks (in reality, there was no pressure anywhere near there from June 13 to July 3).

German units north of St-Lo got back to the west bank of the Vire, or to the hills south of the city. A new MLR was formed on the east-west ridges, and on the hills to the west commanding the Vire loop.

II Parachute Corps no longer had sufficient strength to maintain both an MLR and advance combat posts. The 352d Division, holding positions on both sides of the Vire, was reported to be badly shattered, a high proportion of its men suffering from battle fatigue as a result of their long fight. Corps warned that the unit could not be counted on to stem any major attack.

Army found it necessary to make another regiment of the 275th Division available to bolster the Vire sector; once again its plans for hoarding a reserve were being frustrated even before the reserve units had been organized in the battle zone. This left only three battalions of the 275th as army reserve.

That is what the American sector looked like to the actual commanders on the German side. A week after the fall of St. Lo, their reserves exhausted, the actual breakout took place. The infantry divisions and FJ had already been ground to powder, and the local counterattack attempts of 17SS, 2SS, and Panzer Lehr turned back. Panzer Lehr, badly depleted, was holding in the front line along an extended frontage because nothing else was available.

It was then carpet bombed and attacked by an entire infantry corps, and its positions overrun in 2 days. US armor then poured through the breech that resulted. The still fresh 116th Panzer division (behind Caen during all of the above, but not engaged) was then thrown into the gap, but defeated.

"Just like the early years of WW I", "straight ahead infantry attack", "sheer willpower". Uh huh, right.

[Tarquelne]

Originally posted by JasonC:

"Just like the early years of WW I", "straight ahead infantry attack", "sheer willpower". Uh huh, right.

Ah, thanks Jason.

But "Just like the early years of WW I" refered to the sacking of commanders. And I think the relevent quote was actually "It reminded me, more than anything of the first few years of WWI..."

The "frontal" infantry attack refered to Omaha beach and only Omaha beach. (Brian made that very explicit.)

"Sheer willpower" was a comment on movement through the hedgerows. That's pretty much it. Something a bit more specific than your German accounts gives info on. Allied accounts of lower level commanders useing subtle tactics (or even gadgetry) to handle the bocoge-based defenses would be best here.

I'm assuming Brian doesn't think that US forces _invariably_ used little finesse (tactical or technical) when working through the hedgerows. Just that they didn't use anything other than "willpower" (for which I think we can all read very-straight-forward-tactics, not psionic abilities, right?) often enough. What we really need to counter this is some evidence that the hedgerows were seldom tackled this way.

Is Brian's picture recognizable?

I think you're looking at the wrong picture. Brian's picture is over here.

[Brian]

Originally posted by Tarqulene:

Originally posted by JasonC:

"Just like the early years of WW I", "straight ahead infantry attack", "sheer willpower". Uh huh, right.Ah, thanks Jason.

I think Jason's .signature is rather appropriate here, Tarqulene.

But "Just like the early years of WW I" refered to the sacking of commanders. And I think the relevent quote was actually "It reminded me, more than anything of the first few years of WWI..."

The "frontal" infantry attack refered to Omaha beach and only Omaha beach. (Brian made that very explicit.)

Of course I did. Jason of course has chosen to overlook it in his diatribe. How surprising.

"Sheer willpower" was a comment on movement through the hedgerows. That's pretty much it. Something a bit more specific than your German accounts gives info on. Allied accounts of lower level commanders useing subtle tactics (or even gadgetry) to handle the bocoge-based defenses would be best here.

I think the "sheer willpower" refers more to the idea that if a commander was aggressive enough, his troops would follow suit and despite the impossibility of actually achieving their objective would do so. In otherwords, through the transference of the commander's will, via aggressive orders, the men would not be, borrowing a term usually associate with 21 Army Grp. be "sticky" or "canny" in following (or rather not following) their orders.

I'm assuming Brian doesn't think that US forces _invariably_ used little finesse (tactical or technical) when working through the hedgerows. Just that they didn't use anything other than "willpower" (for which I think we can all read very-straight-forward-tactics, not psionic abilities, right?) often enough. What we really need to counter this is some evidence that the hedgerows were seldom tackled this way.

Of course I don't. If they had, we'd have seen Western Front styles of slaugher (although it should be pointed out that the casualty rate for 21 Army Grp. in Normandy exceeded slightly that for the Somme, but I have no idea what the US rate was, compared to WWI).

Is Brian's picture recognizable?I think you're looking at the wrong picture. Brian's picture is over here.

Of course it is, Jason in applying his usual scattergun approach has missed it completely.

[ June 14, 2002, 08:27 PM: Message edited by: Brian ]

[Michael Dorosh]

T - there were plenty of Canadian "gadgets" invented that never saw use, but no major "innovations." Depends on your definition, but if there was no use for any of these "gadgets", then they didn't get used...if you see my point.

There is a good periodical up here called MILITARY ARTIFACT; the publisher gets stuff from the archives and puts photos and info into the newsletter - I've seen ring mounts for Jeeps (so they could have a "Bren turret" in rear seat, to flotation devices for carrying infantry across rivers, etc. The stuff that was truly silly never got issued, and I guess if it would have been issued, it was because it was needed - which makes it not so silly anymore.

????

[Priest]

Brian

On the Panther/T-34 issue, I have always got the impression from my readings that the Germans seriously considered just copying the T-34 but it was "national pride" that eventually caused the rejection of this idea. The "lowly" Russians had outdone them in a field in which they were supposed to be a world leader (tank design). To copy them would be admitting that, so they made a bigger and better T-34 (and more complicated) that was called the Panther. I agree that they could have never built on a 1 to 1 ratio but if you take the number of Panthers and Panzer IV's built in the last years of the war and turn them all into T-34s, what would you rather have?

[JasonC]

"Sheer willpower" was a comment on movement through the hedgerows.

Which includes all the fighting on the Cotentin and all the fighting in the July 3 to 20 offensive that took St. Lo. It usually is used to refer to the second of those in particular.

I gather I can't expect you to have read it before, or even to have read it now when I bring it to your attention. But if it helps I can pick out the particularly relevant passages.

"The commanding general of 84 Corps reported that the American artillery, guided by air observers and supported by air attacks, was not only silencing German batteries but destroying the infantry even in their dugouts...The Seventh Army singled out for special mention the power of U. S. artillery support, which had expended ammunition at a rate five to ten times that of the German. In a brief analysis of the fighting, American commanders were credited with facility in tactical maneuver and with being quick to exploit favorable situations...American use of artillery in overwhelming quantity is stressed during these days, the barrage of 9 July along the whole corps front being described as something "never seen before."...The "continuous artillery barrage" is mentioned as a factor in the serious reduction of effective combat-strength, particularly in the 3d Parachute Division...The 3d Parachute Division, in three days fighting, had lost 4,064 men; the combat groups making up the 352d Division had suffered 986 casualties in two days."

For comparison to the last figures, the tremendous losses of the US infantry divisions engaged in the push to St. Lo came to around 250-300 casualties per division per day. So the defenders were losing 2-5 times as much per division-day on the hardest pressed sectors - though hardly that ratio overall, since they had fewer divisions in the line, and not all suffered as heavily as 3 FJ. With an artillery volume 5-10 times that of the defenders, and upwards, the principle reason given by the Germans themselves.

Now, this is the precise period in which you maintained that the American commanders seemed to expect the advance to be made "by sheer will power". Call me dumb, but to me there is a distinction between "sheer willpower" and an artillery barrage "never seen before".

How did the whole subject come up here? What relevance does this have for what has been said before? I was the one who mentioned a US penchant for reliance on "technical means and machinery" (I never said "gadgets", that was Philippe's term). That was in my discussion of US WW II doctrine. I said, back on page 1 -

"at the tactical level, almost all attacks were delivered straight ahead on an enemy who could and did turn to face the attackers. The focus is on combined arms integration to deal with each portion of the enemy defense, and on the suppressive effects of heavy HE firepower.

"The infantry forces typically used at one time were actually rather small for the objectives and size of defending forces. The principle there was to minimze overall losses in failed attacks - economy of force. If one company - or at most two - can't get onto the objective, it is quite unlikely sending more will do the job. It would only produce a larger casualty list. Instead, send a lot more shells, then try again with a small infantry force.

"The overall doctrine relied on the logistical superiority of US forces, which they ordinarily could count on in most fights. It placed minimum strain on the tactical ingenuity of the lower level commanders, captain and below. They focused on the morale aspects of leading their men, and on coordinating fire support. It showed a typical American reliance on technical means and machinery, with combined arms understood as finding "the right tool" - most commonly "a bigger hammer".

Note that I explicitly linked the discussion of technical means with - logistic superiority, coordination with fire support, and the tendency to rely on "a bigger hammer". You said that rather than technical means, the Americans relied on "PBI" - for those in Palm Beach, that means "poor bloody infantry". "In the hard slog forward through the hedgerows, one reads continually of how the US commanders were attempting to force their *infantry* forwards, through the use of what appears to be almost *pure willpower*, rather than a proper understanding of the conditions facing them."

Here you were initially disagreeing with Philippe's comment, but with my thesis. In place of technical means, you put poor bloody infantry. My comments on technical means that led to Philippe's statement in the first place made quite clear that artillery was the leading one meant; that is what puts together "logistic superiority", "coordination with fire support", and "a bigger hammer". You were disagreeing with this assessment. Therefore, you were claiming that the American tried to push through the hedgerows with poor bloody infantry and willpower, not by reaching for "a bigger hammer".

And the Germans on the other side at the time just flat disagree with you. They were under the bigger hammer, and were quite aware it was being used on them. And that it was working, bleeding them white, and running them out of reserves.

[Tarquelne]

Originally posted by Berkut:

[QB]My understanding of the event was that at Omaha the first wave of tanks, 27 never made it ahsore,

27 out of how many?

[Tarquelne]

Originally posted by Pillar:

[QB]Regardless of Brians picture, the actual picture, corresponding with his or not, was just posted by JasonC.

<snip>

Snipped out the message, because Jason actually started comparing Brian's picture with his picture. (Yea, now we're getting somewhere!)

[ June 15, 2002, 12:46 AM: Message edited by: Tarqulene ]

[Brian]

Originally posted by Priest:

Brian

On the Panther/T-34 issue, I have always got the impression from my readings that the Germans seriously considered just copying the T-34 but it was "national pride" that eventually caused the rejection of this idea. The "lowly" Russians had outdone them in a field in which they were supposed to be a world leader (tank design). To copy them would be admitting that, so they made a bigger and better T-34 (and more complicated) that was called the Panther. I agree that they could have never built on a 1 to 1 ratio but if you take the number of Panthers and Panzer IV's built in the last years of the war and turn them all into T-34s, what would you rather have?

Its fairly clear from the various books on the Panther that there were several factors at play in the decision to adopt the VK.3002(MAN) prototype over the VK.3002(DB) version, which was the the supposed "direct copy" of the T34. One was a desire to get a vehicle quickly into the field, another was Hitler's personal intervention (in fact he favoured the VK.3002(DB) over the MAN vehicle) and the views of the Waffenprufamt 6 who favoured a more "traditional" German approach (ie the MAN prototype). Both vehicles were ordered into production, however it was later, as Ellis and Chamberlain suggest in their Profile, Panzerkamphwagen V panther, the DB contract was "discreetly rescinded". However as Jentz and Doyle suggest in their book on the Panther, even then, the DB version of the VK.3002 had by that time been somewhat changed to come more into line with stanard German engineering ideas. It was though, not that the Germans had "missed" the simplicity of the T34, they had instead considered it and rejected it, in preference to making a virtue of technical excellence.

As to which would have been of more value in the closing days of the war - the DB or the MAN version of the Panther, I'd agree that the DB version would have been easier to manufacture, which in the chaos of the end would have perhaps put more vehicles into the hands of the front-line troops but in the overall scheme of things, I suspect it wouldn't have made much difference. Germany would still have gone down. It might have taken a little bit longer and it might have allowed the use of nuclear weapons, but it would still have happened.

[Tarquelne]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

[QB]T - there were plenty of Canadian "gadgets"

Probably hard to judge, but in your opinion were most of the usefull gadgets issued? Or, maybe more to the point, did you ever happen to find yourself thinking. "Hmm, they really should have issued that gadget. There seems to be an anti-gadget bias operating in the Canadian military."? Or the opposite ("We're techno freaks!")